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SUMMARY
This work analyses the main lines of the attempts of the post-colonial state to ensure
the implementation of a project of social change to respond to the expectations Angolans had
of independence. Focusing on the functions and limits of the state and law, it aims to inquire
about the barriers to social change generated by state intervention and the role of law in the
shaping of social relations.
After references to the colonial society and the social groups and responses it
generated, the conditions in which Angola attained independence are summarised. Chapter 3
describes the project of change as in 1975 (the so-called socialist option) and the different
changes in the constitutional framework up to 1989 as a result of political struggles,
emphasising the progressive centralisation of decision-making within the state and related loss
of participation of grassroots organisation.
	 •
Part II deals with the central command economy. It describes the project of change in
the period 1976-1988, as well as the different national and international factors leading to the
failure of part of the avowed goals it aimed. Chapter 4 analyses the legal regimes of public
enterprise and the planning system, from the standpoint of resource allocation and shortage,
approaches of state bureaucracies to the system, problems of co-ordination and information,
and struggles for the control of allocative apparatuses. Chapter 5 approaches the central
command economy from the standpoint of control of wages and prices, statisation of trade and
welfare provisions. It demonstrates that in the area of distribution the central command
economy was not capable of satisfying the needs for consumer goods and lost the control of
this economic area for the informal economy. Chapter 6 refers to specific problems of change
in peasant societies and the policies of the post-colonial state to deal with them. Chapter 7
describes different aspects of post-colonial legislation dealing with international economic
relations, emphasising the progressive fragmentation of state property rights under
international contracting as one of the conditions for the failure of the attempts to implement a
central command economy.
The third part deals with the main lines of the 1988-1992 economic and political
reforms, analysing their background and outcomes, within the (analytical) boundaries of the
short time-span of these changes so far.
The conclusions focus on the economic and social, national and international,
boundaries of projects of radical change implemented from above in an underdeveloped
country, on the role of the peripheral 'soft state' and on the functions performed by post-
colonial economic law in promoting change and enabling social groups access to resources.
INTRODUCTION
Angola became independent in 1975 and during the period studied MPLA, the
party then leading the state, stressed the objective of radical change of society. At the level
of law, the constitution established the general goal of transformation of a colonised
society into a "prosperous and democratic country".' The constitution, and laws
developing its principles, later clarified the 1975 broad anti-imperialist orientations. In the
late 80s, after years of eroding war, MPLA, while maintaining the general objective of
building a "free and democratic society, with peace, justice and social progress", 2 changed
its strategy of development towards the construction of a "regulated economy", apparently
integrated into the world system according to the existing 'rules of the game'. The
restructuring, following the general trends of the restructuring of the state in the Third
World under the direction of international institutions, 3
 led to the official rejection of a
socialist path of development and to hopes of peace which were not fulfilled.
A. The problem
The overall goal of this work is to analyse the attempted process of change of the
colonial society from 1975 to 1988, with special emphasis to the content and role of
economic law. 4
 It is a reflection on a failed socialising project of change in an
underdeveloped country (UDC), 5
 which aims to lift the veil of the political rhetoric and
1. Constitutional Law, CL, art. 1; see Chapter 3 (constitutional programme).
2. New Constitutional Law. NCL, art. 1, as revised in 1992; see section 8.2.
3. See section 7.3. and Chapter 8, on the reforms; on the general restructuring see, e.g., Clarke, 1990.
4. Related to the functions of law as a mean of 'social control', that is, ruling the constitution and protection/legitimation of social relations,
a framework on which the allocation function of law is emphasised.
5. The concept is used here to contrast levels of economic and social development with these of other (more developed) countries; it does
not aim to enter into the disomion of the concept; still, the expression 'developing country is not used because there are strong doubts on
whether Angola is developing or. instead, reinforcing underdevelopment.
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legal solutions, and to understand some of the barriers to radical social transformation in
this country. Concerning law, this work inquires on the origin of legal regimes and their
effectiveness. It deals as well with the possibilities of alternative use of economic law by
some social groups, within a context of political and social parameters internationally
induced.
The title of this work, "Rupture and Continuity", summarizes the problems dealt
with: i. is it possible to achieve a project of radical change of society in an emergent state
arising from colonialism? ii. what are the limits imposed by society, including the relative
insertion of the concerned in the world system, to radical change? iii. what are the
constants of a process of historical development that post-colonial law cannot change
significantly, whatever the content of legal norms and the political intentions and
struggles? That is, what are the barriers determined by continuity opposed to rupture,
especially when rupture comes mainly from law and initiatives at the state level?, and,
finally, iv. are there, in the Angolan history, strengths pointing to original developments
and a future as a "prosperous and democratic country"?
The choice of problems may appear too broad. Its rationale is the absence of
studies on the post colonial society and law, which implies the need to approach themes
which in other (with more developed production of knowledge) societies would be the
subject of many studies even in other disciplines.
As referred to above this work analyses the Angolan economic legislation from
1975 to 1989 focusing on the issue of rupture and continuity within the frame of
attempted transformation of the colonial society.6
6 . Thus it approaches the allocation and promotional functions of the state, referring to Bobbio's meaning of the intervention of the state
aiming to favour behaviours socially desired, especially actions whidi bring about some advantages (according to aids of the legal order or
general policy measures) by using encouragement tedmiques vvhich make the actions either necessary, easy or advantageous (promotional
function, for example, by incentive laws), (1977: e.g., 24-8); the allocation function (distributional function) refers to the distribution of
available resources through an activity of the state (for example, employment, education), (Carcova, 1988: 48-50, referring to Bobbio).
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B. The scope
Within the limits of available information and the topography of the thesis, this
works attempts to refer to direct or indirect producers of normative solutions, and to the
responses of the recipients of legal commands. Thus, some struggles, goals and the
shaping of Angolan social groups along the colonial and the post-colonial periods are
briefly described. Moreover, as the subject-matter is the law of an emergent state it
implied references to the colonial state and law.
As Angola is an UDC integrated into the world system in a dependent position,'
there was a need to include to the regulation of international economic relations by
domestic law. However, the approach to international economic relations, although
determinant is incidental, strictly restrained to those aspects clearly conditioning internal
developments. 6 This is due to firstly, the shortage of reliable information on foreign
partners and contracting. Secondly, this work analyses a national (and thus restricted)
model, in the sense that, having as a premise a self-sustained development (the so-called
classic 'Soviet model') it does no comprehend international variables (or at least they have
not in the model a determinant role). It is not within the scope of this work to expand the
model by an exercise of integration of its international components but to analyse its
application. Still, there is an attempt to insert national developments within a very general
theoretical framework of development of the world system and the changing relationships
between core and periphery.' However, it should be stressed from now that some
international variables, especially the direct and indirect aggression of PRA by foreign
7. Dependence means here the structural position of a society in the world system as a producer of commodities to satisfy needs identified
in and arising from more developed societies, instead of the country's needs; the structure of international relations resulting from this
relative position (for example, purchasing technology and manufactured goods in exchange for raw materials or semi-manufactured goods
in the unequal exchange framework), leads the internal logic of development to distortions, the most significant of which are the
undersatisfaction of local needs and the creation of new needs not originated by an indigenous process of development.
8. See. e.g., chapters 1 and 7.
9. See. e.g.. Wallerstein and Hopkins, 1979, and Wallerstein. 1991.
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powers conditioned all the developments studied. The importance of this factor is evident
in aspects such as the allocation of resources, by law or other mechanisms, and even gives
rise to strong doubts on conclusions on the project of rupture and its application which
could be different if there was not the constant war. 10 Indeed, as stated below, Angola
tried a different form of integration in the world system, departing from African patterns,
which also meant, at the surface, a rupture with the colonial framework. Although this was
a failure in strict economic terms (and it is doubtful it could succeed) it has been harshly
punished by the regional power, the apartheid regime, with sustained support of the USA
administration. This aspect overshadows any conclusions on indigenous developments
which led to the present patterns of integration (that is, the 'standard' for African
countries). The only conclusion we may reach is that poor countries cannot dare
autonomous paths of development and if they dare, the winners are the same as in the past
(e.g., Chomsky, 1992).
This work deals as well with the rise and fall of a socialising project. The focus has
been the reading of a socialist strategy by those in charge of its statist variant, as well as
their practice. The merits or demerits of the model itself or experiences in other countries
are not assessed. Thus issues such as the vexata questio market versus planning are not
discussed at a theoretical level but approached from the standpoint of the concrete
problems raised by their implementation and working in this country. Nevertheless, some
conclusions may be reached, especially concerning transplants of models to societies
without concern for their social and economic backgrounds, something which is valid for
present transplants of capitalist models as well.
Since this work analyses public law, and the state, and as during the period studied
MPLA held power as a single party, the bulk of references to political groups goes to it.
10. Angola appears as a special case which cannot be compared to other African countries, except Mozambique-. for a 'surface' comparison.
see, e.g.. Young, 1988.
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The references to other political forces are thus incidental, focusing on their goals and role
when acting as power, for example in the Transitional Government, or counter-power, for
example UNITA. An analysis of their social composition, political internal practices, and
international connections, is not within the scope of this work."
The fact that this work deals with state and state law 12 also had consequences for
the content. The main emphasis is on urban societies, of which state law is a production.
Thus, the interference of customary law, and related peasants societies, is not approached
with the degree of depth its importance would justify. This may appear as a false problem
in developed countries, with the general scope of application of rule of law in a given
territory, but is an acute problem in many underdeveloped countries: the duality of
urban/rural legal spaces strongly conditions the effectiveness of state law, especially
economic law when ruling fundamental economic relations or containing directives of
economic policy. 13 This work does not deal as well with other normative systems,
especially the esoteric directives with a substantial social impact enacted by political
parties, which successfully compete with state law.
Concerning state law itself, the shortage of production of knowledge in this area
meant the need to describe legal regimes, given the shortage of references, and influenced
the choice of themes and the depth of strict legal analysis. On the other hand, the
widespread importance of regulations making concrete the content of formal law 14 and its
particular emphasis in a strongly administrative order, led to the inclusion of the level of
11. The main reference here remains Marcum 1969 and 1978, and concerning UNITA in the 80s, James, 1986, and Minter, 1988 (where
he makes the critique of Marcum ellmical approach to political groups, 19) and 1991.
12. Defmed as the law produced by the state in a context of legal pluralism.
13. See note 20.
14. Defined as the norms enacted by the parliament and usually establishing the general bases of the legal regimes.
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ministerial orders, something which proved rewarding in terms of assessment of the
application of formal law.
Interrelations within the legal order also influenced the scope of this work. For
example, the reference to the principles of the constitution on the economic system and its
mode of organisation, to the allocations of regulatory powers of the economy to state
organs, or even the decentralisation of these powers in non-state organisations, such as
trade unions, is essential to the understanding of economic legislation. But the constitution
means very little when strong mechanisms of guarantee are not implemented. So, besides
the description of the constitutional framework, there was a need to refer to the political
process and how it impacts on the realm of economic law.
In the area of interrelations within the legal order, there was also the concern to
present the norms of economic law sometimes with an organisation different from that
specific to this branch of law, using criteria external to the legal order aiming the
understanding of the relationships between these norms and other social spheres. Also, an
attempt to avoid the barriers of the division by branches led to the inclusion of labour law
and references to industrial relations, considered essential to the understanding of the legal
framework in the area of the economy.
Beyond the legal order, choices were conditioned by the parameters established by
the subject-matter. For example, economic law and its application demand the more or
less intensive intervention of bureaucracies, especially the state ones. It was thus necessary
to include references to their perceived goals and behaviour. Also, as these bureaucracies
are not an isolated social group and have an history, references to their roots and
achievements seemed necessary to allow the understanding of this form of administrative
state, the legal translation of this reality and the different legal solutions progressively
adopted.
6
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Finally, to insert economic law in its social context demanded the reconstruction of
a meaningful context, from the standpoint of genesis and application of the law. The
departing point for the reconstruction of this context was legislation under analysis,
avoiding the strict application of any model. Indeed, the 'thing', using Wiethälter's
expression in a broader sense, "a (concealed) basis of decisions ... a mean between
normative guide-lines and social relationships" (1986: 62-3) is too complex to be modeled
here. This risky option proved fruitful since it allowed the identification of some constants
of the Angolan history, including legal constants such as intensive state intervention in the
economy, which led to the answer of some of the questions this research project aimed to
enlighten.
C. Structure of the thesis
Chapter 1 deals with the colonial policies along a century, integrating the vaster
context of the world system, its impact in Portugal (as semi-periphery) and Angola, as
well as the transformation of Angolan formations in the dynamics of the restructurings of
the colonial power and the world system. The chapter emphasises the authoritarian and
interventionist character of the colonial state, the constant of war and repression, and the
successive failure of colonial policies due to inadequacy to the social reality and to the
responses of Angolan formations, which led to the dysfunctionality and ineffectiveness of
some legal regimes beyond the urban areas. The chapter is an introduction to the social
framework the post-colonial state would attempt at transforming, since it tries to identify
the formation and consolidation of some social groups as a result of the dynamics between
colonizer and colonized.
Chapter 2 describes briefly the Angolan responses to colonialism, the emergence
and development of nationalism, in an attempt to clarify the ideological background of
post-colonial policies. It also deals with the transition to independence, especially the
7
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experience of the transition government, the co-habitation of MPLA, FNLA and UNITA
in government and the social movements which emerged in towns and would radicalise the
MPLA project for the post-colonial society. The chapter ends with a synthesis of the
transformation of different social groups at independence.
Chapter 3 analyses the political developments from 1975 to 1989. It begins with a
reference to the expectations of Angolan on the post-colonial society and the state and to
the organisational experiences which acted as inputs for the emergent state: the pre-state
guerrilla structures, the 1974-75 social movements and the colonial state. After referring
to the project of change of society as reflected in the constitution, the chapter describes
the attempts of MPLA to respond to the expectations of all the social groups which had
supported it during the struggle for independence, as well as the conflicts generated within
and relating to the state, its new social composition and the struggles for power. The latter
meant changes in the project of social transformation, especially in strategies for
democracy, and in the very control of the state by different social groups, with alteration
in the structure of decision-making meaning progressive centralisation and
authoritarianism as the expectations of the people were not satisfied due to
underdevelopment, the war, the conflicts on models of organising society and the
struggles for power. This chapter deals with the general political and legal framework
which allows the understanding of the struggles and interest conflicts in the draft and
application of post-colonial economic law.
Chapters 4 to 7 analyse the central command economy, how legislation regulated it
and how it was implemented. Chapter 4 deals specifically with the process of
reorganisation of abandoned and nationalised firms, with special emphasis on industry, and
with the planning system. The successive restructurings of public enterprise (PE) and the
central command economy are related to the political struggles which took place within
the state for the control of sources of accumulation and to alternative use economic
8
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legislation. The chapter also refers to some of the problems of PEs and the planning
system as a result of the shortages economy, including the input information.
Chapter 5 approaches the central command economy from the standpoint of
distribution, analysing the providential post-colonial state as a supplier of goods and
services. It deals especially with the control of flows of commodities, prices and wages,
while referring as well to the welfare provisions of the providential state. It demonstrates
that the problems of producing firms multiplied in distribution and that in this area it has
been possible to some social groups linked to and/or rooted in the state to make an
accumulation which qualified them as substitutes of capitalist settlers. The chapter explains
that in a socialist programme constrained by resources and not by demand, it was precisely
in the area of demand that the system generated greater dysfunctionalities, as the informal
economy progressively controlled the distribution circuits, nominally state, with
consequent generalized ineffectiveness of legislation in force.
Chapter 6 refers to other area of the socialist project and the central command
economy, the agricultural policies. The latter were the most radical side of the post-
colonial attempt of change since they aimed at the reconstruction of the whole agricultural
production destroyed by successive wars and the very colonial policies. Furthermore, the
initial project lay in co-operativisation, which meant significant resources and the
mobilization of peasants to different organisational forms, and mechanization, which also
implied conditions not existing in Angola at the time. The chapter also refers that the
statisation of farming production promoted by patrimonialist groups within the state
conflicted with the expectations of peasants, and their agrarian representatives, who later
would voice their demands in the framework of the economic reform.
Chapter 7 deals with international economic relations with special emphasis in the
legislation on natural resources, that is the enclave economy, and on foreign investment. It
9
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demonstrates that independence meant a step backwards in the form of integration of the
country in the world system, as exploitation by capital penetration was replaced, except in
the oil industry and given the suspicions and lack of incentives of foreign investors, by
trade exploitation. It also shows that the range of goods and services traded with foreign
firms progressively expanded as a comprador state bourgeoisie stratified and benefited
foreign firms in allocation of state contracts, thus contributing to the reinforcement of
dependence. The analysis of the relationships between PEs and foreign firms in a
framework of fragmentation of property rights leads to the conclusion that the nominal
Angolan public sector had already a high degree of privatisation when the reforms
institutionalised it, something which was apparent as well in the area of marketing of
national production.
Chapter 8 deals with the late 80s-early 90s reforms. It is an epilogue of the bulk of
the thesis whose subject-matter was the socialist project. Indeed, the reforms were a
natural consequence of the process of social restructuring during the post-colonial period,
which had as a necessary passage, in the Angolan conditions, the socialist project. Thus
the chapter summarizes, by reference to previous chapters, the legal regimes altered by the
reforms while relating them with the economic, social and political developments dealt
with along this work.
The general thesis of this work is that the socialist project of change of the
Angolan society, if for many has appeared as the most adequate path to attain a fast
economic development and a more egalitarian society, for the majority of the Angolan
elites it has just been a form of social organisation which enabled access to and control of
sources of accumulation, allowing the redistribution of the abandoned settlers wealth
according to their interests. Thus the form of social organisation of central command
economy is, in some conditions, functional to the 'nationalisation' of capitalism, which in
colonial Angola was an exclusive of foreigners.
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Along the different chapters there was an attempt to analyse the weak points, the
lines of ineffectiveness, of all the legal armory of the central command economy. There
were some assumptions which constitute the theoretical background of the legal analysis
produced.
D. Premises on law
Economic law has as main subjects the state and large economic organisations.
This work tries to integrate producers (workers) and citizens, the forgotten categories of
textbooks of a branch of law which rationalises (and legitimates) the 'great dimension'15
and bureaucratic invasions, 16 appearing as a magic formula desperately attempting (among
other things) to rule the "too complex 'administration' of decidedly 'magical' relationships
(for example, monetary stability, full employment, growth, the balance of trade)."17
Law is approached as an instrument for maintenance, reproduction and
transformation of social relations, notwithstanding the risks of this choice. After describing
15. The problem of the 'great dimension' is related to the growth of organisations, especially within the state, and the location of decision-
making powers. It is a problems interesting constitutional and economic law. Indeed, because resources are scarce to satisfy increasing
needs, there are demands on access to goods and servicxs (from public goods to 'quasi-public goods'). When the degree of democracy is
relevant, satisfaction of these demands is channelled through the welfare or the socialist state. This means an increase in state functions and
growth of apparatuses to supply goods or services and to make decisions on the allocation of scarce resources. Conflicts of interests, and or
market failures, in the area of allocation of resources meant the empowering of the state, to a greater or smaller degree, to establish this
allocation. Within the state, the location of these powers related to its political tradition, usually of a centralised signal. Low-level units
were alienated from this allocation of economic powers duet° the top-down character of the promss: from revealing preferences at the level
of parliamentary elections to the concentration of decision-making in vanguards aiming to change society, the process of satisfaction of
needs went downwards. This led to a pattern of allocation of decision-making powers which nothing but history can justify, even when this
allocation is rationalised under the argument of 'complexity' of knowledge required to deal with scarce resources. Indeed, if many problems
of allocation are very complex, many are not so complex as bureaucracies or the political 'class' (or entrepreneurs) make them to rationalise
centralisation. And if scarcity justified the enlargement of state functions, it had as an outcome the emergaice of social groups sheltered in
the state who appropriate power at their own convenience. For example, if there is little discussion on the decision by the parliament of the
levels of aggregate public expenditure, it is quite difficult to explain why a central board of public administration should decide, say, how a
county council should use its budgetary funds. Problems become complex where macroeconomic or macrosocial issues are at stake. This is
the realm of centralised and specialised decision-making Still, if we assess, even in developed countries, the decisions on resources
allocated to central government and to experts, we find a substantial amount of irrationality leading to what Guiducci calls the 'great
mistakes' of the 'great dimension', which could be avoided in many cases through the transfer of powers to the 'small dimension' (1979: 72-
3).
16. State bureaucracies expand within the frame of the 'great dimension' with the enlargement of state functions to face demands from
society for enlarged public provision, and accountability, to face inarIcet failures or as a result of central planning. In many UDCs, state
bureaucracies flourish as substitutes of indigenous entrepreneurs, especially in the area of international relations. This special role may
make these bureaucracies appear as a comprador class, that is, middlemen dependent on foreign interests and acting on their behalf for
capital penetration in a given cotmtry. The control of some state apparatuses over nationalised enterprises and/or over national investment
led some authors to classify state bureaucracies as 'state bourgeoisies' (see, e.g„ Ileincani, 1986, for Algeria).
17. ViiethOiter, 1973: 209 (title of article), and 1973a: 96.
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how it attempted to regulate social relations (that is, how it faced and reflected the
relationships and problems of the time), the contradictory character of the functions
performed is emphasised. Law did not perform the functions law-makers foresaw 19 (and
from this stand-point legal regulation appears as strongly dysfunctional or even with a
substantial degree of negative functions) but, from the stand-point of some social groups,
it performed positive enabling functions of access to resources (material or immaterial).
The degree of effectiveness 20
 of legislation, necessary to the performance of its intended
functions, is considered very low and thus affecting and explaining problems in the area of
functions. Ineffectiveness of law is related in this work to the weakness of the soft state,2'
the inadequacy of transplanted contents, the competition of informal grassroots normative
systems, and the visible hand of opposing international and national interest groups. In
Angola, functions were affected, besides ineffectiveness, by the alternative use 22 by those
capable of achieving it: the strongest, those who have the control of knowledge and
information, including on legislation and law, that is, TNCs and national elites.
18. On the problem of functions of law, see, e.g., Bobbio, 1977, Giannini, 1977 (239-77), Carcova, 1988 and Correas, 1988 (91-108).
19. The expectations of law-makers relate to the concept of efficacy which "suggests a necessary reference to the ends of the legislative
authority ... (meaning) the effective attainment of the outcomes aimed by those who legislated (norms)", as well as to the concept of 'real
efficacy' or function' 'The historical' result of the fulfilment and non-fulfilment, of application and non-application of the whole of norms in
force, from the stand-point of the basic and of the legal order in a social formation divided in classes; that is, the protection, reinforcement
and reproduction of social relations" (Jearamaud, 1984: 6-7); on 'subjective efficacy', related to the attainment of the intentions of law-
makers and 'objective efficacy' related to the changes in existing social relations demanded by the organisation and working of the 'model'
it regulates, see, e.g., Correas, 1988: 98-102.
20. "Effectiveness of a norm is the relation of compliance (or at least of non-infringement) with that norm of the situations or behaviours
which are within its scope"; a certain degree of effectiveness is nersary to efficacy (Jeammaud, 1984: 6-7), but an high degree of
effectiveness does not mean necessarily efficacy, at least objective; the problems of ineffectiveness of legal norms suggested to Jeammaud a
distinction between 'legal effectiveness' and 'material effectiveness'; legal effectiveness is 'The conformation of a concrete legal situation -
the condition 'in law' of a subject - to the model constituted by the norm, for example, the effective recognition to such person of the right
heishe benefits under the law, since the previous requisites in that law are realised" .
 material effectiveness relates to 'The conformity of the
de facto situation to the legal situation thus allocated or imposed to the subject by the 'fulfilment' or the 'application' of the norm" (ibid., 11-
12).
21. On the concept see Kandeh, 1992 and also, Myrdal, quoted in Green, 1977: 56.
22. Approaching law from the stand-point of its functions of mediation of the domination of given social groups, the problem of 'alternative
use' as discussed by Marxists (e.g., Barcellona, ed., 1973 and 1973a) raises the question: can oppressed groups use existing legal
institutions (of a converse class sign) to protect their libertarian interests and to transform the actual relations of domination? This is a
much discussed problem with no clear conclusions. Still, 'alternative use' is possible under given (mainly balance of power) conditions and
for gives legal institutions but apparaitly the degree of actual transformation of relations of domination has not been significant: for
example, unions could buy shares in companies and promote workers participation in management achieving an 'alternative use' of
company law; this practice, even if widespread, would not by itself change the foundations of the system which generated company law,
although it could eventually increase the degree of industrial democracy. As far as Angolan legislation is concerned, there are many cases
of specific alternative use; for example, of institutions of statist socialism by agrarian strata sheltered in the single party.
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Internal conflicts of the norms of the legal order also condition efficacy. 23 Their
impact over real efficacy is emphasised in this work: for example, the rules on state
control of PEs, aiming at eventually to ensure them a 'social control' and a privileged
allocation of resources, relying in administrative regulation, as contrasted with the norms
ruling the activities of foreign firms, relying in contract regulation, allowed foreign firms to
have in fact a preferential status (since far more extended powers to regulate relations
have been allocated to them), which permitted them to compete successfully with
impoverished PEs and later, to buy them. That is, if the ends of economic law, in these
areas, were to promote the development of the state sector, the outcome was the
destruction of that sector (although many other factors contributed to the failure of PEs).
The overall conclusion is that it is extremely difficult, say impossible, for the post-
colonial state to attempt autonomous paths of development from above. Constraints arise
from its own weakness and contradictions, from the social structure it tries to change, and
from the international environment which makes the sovereign national state obsolete,24
while struggles for independence made it a social objective. While the process of
integration in the global system inexorably reinforces, the roles of post-colonial state
change, transforming it in a mediator of the shaping of the relationships demanded by the
centre's expansion. But the very weaknesses of the post-colonial state to perform its
functions enable peoples of the peripheries to assume themselves as a constant source of
'dysfunctions' to the dictates of centre's dominant elites. That is, they have strengths, they
have a future.
23 ..Jeammaud considers the "oppositions and conflicts between the norms of the same legal order themselves" as sources of ineffectiveness
(1984: 13).
24. For a critical assessment of this statement grounded on an approach to the role of TNCs in the international system, see, e.g., Burnham,
1991: 86.
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PART I
THE BACKGROUND
Blacks in Africa must be led and surrounded by Europeans, but they are indispensable as auxiliaries
Marcelo Caftan°, 1954
Create create
create in mind create in muscle create in nerve
create in man create in the masses
create
create with dry eyes
Create create
create freedom in the slave stars
(...) create love with dry eyes
Agostinho Neto, 1960
CHAPTER 1
COLONIAL POLICIES AND THE SHAPING OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT
For a long time the failures of the post-colonial state were subscribed to the 'legacy
of colonisation'. Criticized by some as a rationalization, the notion of 'colonial inheritance'
was not, however, systematically theorized in Angola: it did not go beyond references to,
for example, a 'distorted economy', illiteracy, etc. Still, the roots of the post-colonial
society and state may be found in the interaction of Angolan societies with the colonial
power in the framework of colonialism.' This chapter attempts to identify the areas more
relevant for the analysis of the outcomes of post-colonial state and the socialist project.
But a serious constraint arises when colonialism is under analysis. Given its own
specificity, the approach to colonialism usually has the colonizer (subject) as the starting
point and colonized societies (objects) are approached as victimized by a dynamics which
they could not face and overcome. In this part, an attempt is made, where possible, to
avoid this approach.
1.1. Markets and marketers - the international connection
Angola related to the emergent world system as a supplier of labour (slaves) who
were exchanged for manufactured goods. It has been the first stage of trade exploitation.
One of the consequences of the relations between Angolan kingdoms and the Atlantic
trade was the emergence of an urban nucleus specialized in international exchange. This
1 . For a definition of colonialism see Merry. 1991: 894-95.
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nucleus would become a first periphery, as contrasted with political units dependent on the
trade as suppliers of slaves and buyers of manufactured goods, the second peripheries.2
1.1.1. The slave trade
The relations between Portugal and the Angolan kingdoms involved in the Atlantic
slave trade conflicted. The conditions for the exchange, imposed by Portugal, included
obligations such as the adoption of the Roman Catholic religion. They also meant the
unregulated supply of slaves which had an impact in the population and led kingdoms such
as Kongo not only to a process of decay but also to question their relationships with
Portugal and try alternative partners such as Holland, France and England. Competition
with other European powers and the conflicts with Africans led, after the defeats of
Angolan kingdoms and their 'vassalage' to Portugal, to treaties and trade agreements
between colonial authorities and African chiefs (Birmingham, 1966 and 1972, Wheeler,
1971: 45-9, Miller, 1973: 17, 19). Whenever possible, Africans challenged these treaties
due to their harsh terms, whereby trade clauses imposed duties of payment of tributes in
kind, mainly slaves, to the colonial power. These tributes, population drain and successive
wars, caused the progressive underdevelopment of Angolan societies.
The slave trade meant the organization of a set of linkages between independent
kingdoms and chieftaincies, especially their elites, and the urban trading interests. Until
the 1840s most of middlemen, agents and dealers acting in the bush for the Portuguese
were Africans (Wheeler, 1971: 49-50, and Miller, 1973: 20). Commercial activities with
the Atlantic partners gave rise to a substantial interest in some Angolan peoples and even
led to their specialization, for example the Ovimbundu and Tshokwe during the rubber
boom. Their complete control of the hinterland trade until the 20th century, made them
2 . On the conceptualization of the world system, e.g., Wallerstein 1991. He makes the distinction between core, semiperiphery and
periphery (1991: 18).
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win the reputation of skilled traders, change their social organization and enjoy a period of
wealth in the 1850s-1912 (Possinger, 1973). Initially African trade was in the hands of
chiefs, sometimes was monopolized by kings, and later, in some cases, went to families
(Possinger, 1973 and Miller, 1973). Also, caravans crossing the territories of different
political units had to pay 'transit duties', in trade goods (Wheeler, 1971: 64-5). Wheeler
describes the 18th century as one of Africanisation and foreign control of coastal trade,
and the 19th century as one of Africanisation of plateau trade, emphasising the threat that
the control of trade by Africans represented to Portuguese imperialism (1971: 67).
Nevertheless, these trading nations were never able to go beyond a primitive accumulation
and expenditure in luxury consumption.
The abolition of the slave trade had as a consequence that the majority of settlers
became storekeepers in the bush where they were in competition with Angolans. To this
competition chiefs responded with harassment of traders, especially accusations of
witchcraft (Wheeler, 1971: 64-5). By 1914, after the occupation of the plateau by colonial
military forces (Principe, 1956), hinterland traders were progressively replaced by settlers
who got the monopoly of the supply of manufactured goods to these regions.
Progressively, they spread along Angola, far before the colonial army and authorities.
Coastal towns and hinterland focal points (the slaves fairs in the Luanda/Malanje
corridor, for example), corresponded to the 'colonial nucleus'. From the military
occupation and subordination of the resident population arose the incipient colonial
administration which later expanded hinterland. The consolidation of coastal towns and
the hinterland focal points as trading centres, especially the first peripheries of Luanda and
Benguela ports supplying trading and other services as links of the international trade
network, reinforced them as intermediaries between the second peripheries (peasants
societies supplying primary products) and the centre. The position of towns allowed the
extortion of marketing surpluses and the emergence of a commercial capital. The coastal
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towns appeared from the beginning of colonialism as a locus of disjuncture in the previous
organization of Angolan societies and gradually acquired the status of 'centre' in their
respective geographical area, working as a pole of control and attraction for 'tributary
societies' increasingly more dependent (Heimer, 1979).
Angolans gradually integrated the colonial nucleus and, during the period of initial
'creolage' in the 17th-19th centuries, filled (social) spaces where settlers were scarce at the
time (on creolage, e.g., Pepetela, 1989, Boxer, 1963, Pelissier, 1977, 1978, Martins, 1958,
Birmingham, 1966, 1988 and Wheeler, 1971, 1972). They were slaves, servants, traders
(e.g., Wheeler, 1971: 49-50, Carreira, 1977: 169, notes 11 and 15, Ribeiro, 1981: 28-83
and Dias, n/d), craftsmen, workers (Wheeler, 1971: 69, 94), soldiers and officers
(Wheeler, 1971: 37, 70, 94), civil servants and land-owners and/or aristocrats attracted by
the borough or simply ruined and searching for a new occupation, usually a job in the state
(e.g., Pelissier, 1978: 215-16, Wheeler, 1971: 45, 41-2). The creolage of coastal towns,
and the direct participation of many Africans in the international trade and/or control of
the hinterland trade, did not mean that racism and subordination did not exist in Creole
societies. On the contrary, the position of Angolans in the colonial nucleus was
conditioned by the colonial situation arising from previous defeats of independent political
units, such as was the case of the initial military strata. It was thus a position of
subordination where the ultimate decision-making power lay in settlers and their
representative boards, such as the municipal councils, or in the decision centres of Lisbon
or Bahia. This fact was important for the role played and the demands made later by urban
Angolan elites along the 19th and 20th centuries, as a response to colonial policies.
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1.1.2. The XIX century restructuring: from the slave trade to the trade of raw
materials
The ban on the Atlantic slave trade imposed by England forced the colonial power
to a restructuring which lasted for a century. 3
 The new international division of labour
which emerged from the abolition meant the change from the export of slaves to that of
raw-materials: agricultural and minerals. Both the colonial power and the Angolan
formations faced stringent difficulties to achieve their connected restructurings.
Many Angolan kingdoms involved in the slave trade which were already going
through a process of economic decay were not capable of reorganizing and change slaves
for the new products in demand in the colonial and thus the international market. The fact
that they had no products to exchange in the Atlantic market meant as well shortage of
manufactured goods and the inability to reorganize at least as middlemen in the hinterland
trade networks of Central Africa. The process of decay was reinforced with a gradual shift
towards self subsistence. This was the case of Kongo, for example. Other chieftaincies
changed quickly to other products, such as the Ovimbundu's turn to rubber trade and
managed to face the initial stage of the restructuring.
A part of the African elites tried to adapt to the new environment reorganizing the
production of commodities either as landlords of farms and plantations, where part of
trading capital was invested, 4
 or trading farming commodities supplied by peasants as
tributes to aristocrats of their regions. Some of the members of these elites were already
involved in other urban activities, such as the civil service and the army. Urban Africans
previously involved in the slave trade who could not follow this path, joined the colonial
nucleus as craftsmen or salaried/waged labour.
3. On the concepts of crisis, restructuring and rupture, see Holloway, 1992: 145
4. For example, the by Mbundu elites, since long involved in dose contacts with the colonial power and in trade. Rella (1992: 38) sees the
emergence of plantations as a result of investment of local trading capital, mainly held by Europeans.
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But the difficulties of Africans were faced by the colonial power as well. The
restructuring demanded of the latter a progressive territorial expansion and efforts to
achieve an effective occupation of conquered territories and the subordination of
indigenous peoples. This process was very violent since neither the urban elites nor
peasants accepted the three components of the system which was established: i. land
regimes leading to the loss of land by Africans, ii. forced labour to ensure cheap labour,
and iii. a legal framework of racial and cultural discrimination which had a special impact
in the access of Africans to jobs and economic activities, such as the civil service and
trade.
The attempts at a quick restructuring were jeopardised by the resistance of
Africans kingdoms (on these wars see, e.g., CEA, 1975, Principe, 1956, Sousa Dias,
1957, Clarence Smith, 1979, Wheeler, 1971, Wheeler and Christensen, 1973, Pelissier,
1977, Chilcote, 1972 and Ramos de Almeida, 1979) and of Africans to work in
plantations. 5
 The resistance of settlers to farming and of Portuguese to migration to
Angola (e.g., Bender, 1978 and Rella, 1992), the shortage of metropolitan capital, the
need to divert resources to finance the wars for the conquest of new territories (within the
boundaries later established at the Berlin Conference) and to ensure a process of continued
expansion, pre-determined by the needs of expansion of metropolitan industries, also
contributed for the difficulties of the metropolitan power to implement its colonial
policies.
As stated above, the restructuring meant the extraction and production of primary
commodities, either to the metropolitan industries or those of the proper centre. 6
 The
process of implementation of export production, incipient up to the abolition of slavery,
5. See section 1.2.
6. As Portugal was an Intermediate formation' (Rella, 1992: 39).
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meant thus for the colonial power: i. the need for investment, ii. the appropriation of
Africans land, and iii. an
 ideology and legal framework which grounded and reinforced
colonial domination.
Appropriation of land, dealt with below, was undertaken through violence and was
still expanding by the end of colonialism. 7
 Military and administrative occupation of the
territory, and related wars to break the resistance of Africans, aimed at: i. the guarantee of
the supply of raw materials at low prices and the maintenance of trade flows necessary to
an expanding trading capital, and, ii. primary forms of industrialization combined with a
primitive accumulation in the small trade mediating between the African
producer/consumer and the large foreign trade firms (Rella, 1992: 38). To achieve these
conditions of the restructuring there was a need of complete subordination of African
peasants.
The colonial state adopted measures to guarantee the supply of raw-materials to
metropolitan industries by the compulsory farming of agricultural raw-materials, such as
cotton (Carreira, 1977: 151-61, Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 45 and Pelissier, 1978: 403 ff)8
while providing for a system of price fixing for the purchase of raw materials at low
prices. 9
 Also, large companies could apply for the concession of the exclusive of purchase
of a given product to peasants ('natives'), which gave them an automatic control of
production and prices in the region. 1 ° Regulations on the direction of Angolan exports
also ensured the supply of metropolitan industries."
7. See subsection 1.1.2.
8. Decs no 11,994 (1926). 21,226 (1932) and 35.844 (1946). The 1st measures on compulsory farming were enacted in 1907, when the
native tax began to be paid in cotton; from 1912 the peasants of lcolo e Bengo had to farm cotton in a fixed area if they did not cultivate
tobacco, coffee and rice (Carreira, 1977: 151:58).
9. On prices, see, e.g., Galväo report (quoted at Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 271); for figures, op.cit., e.g., 378 (textiles in 1960).
10. E.g., Governor Regulation of 22.1.1946, establishing that the exclusive right of purchase (of crops) could be granted: i. for crops
needing substantial capital, technical assistance, machinery and selected seeds to which small farmers had no access, ii. there would a
priority of supply to the 'national market', and iii. prices were fixed according to the world markets and also 'the possibilities and needs of
national markets".
20
Colonial policies
As for the general framework of exchange of agricultural commodities, the
isolation in the bush, the lack of transport for agricultural products and the monopoly of
contacts with coastal traders, led to an unequal exchange between bush traders and
peasants. Traders sold manufactured goods at monopoly prices and bought crops at very
low prices, thereby extorting a rent. i2 Sales prices demanded by bush traders were usually
higher than those fixed by the state and in coffee regions prices were even higher for
Africans than for whites (Pelissier, 1978: 466). Plantation and mining companies, which
had their own shops, had the same monopolistic and unlawful behaviour.13
On the purchase of farming products, besides low price fixing, bush traders used
debt as a mean of inducing dependence and ensuring commercial supremacy. An illegal
system of credit over future crops was adopted: traders supplied manufactured goods to
peasants at prices fixed by them, or lend cash to pay taxes, at interest rates also fixed by
them. Loans were reimbursed by the crops, bought by traders at prices fixed by them as
well. With the system peasants became highly indebted and could not resort to other
traders to sell their production or try to discuss the exchange terms. There were families
that spent years in a state of indebtedness and some were forced to sell their land, when
possible, to pay debts. Peasants obligations arising from the system were guaranteed by
the complicity of station chiefs, often bribed by bush traders. The system was particularly
crucial in coffee zones and in the cotton areas where the concessionaires used this method.
(Carreira, 1977: 162-63; Pelissier, 1978: 466).
For 
example, in the mid 40s: i. German sisal and coffee producers had to sell their production to a government board 1.vhich decided on
its allocation, ii. the Exports Authority prioritized the supply of Portugal in tobacco and only surpluses could be oriented to non-Portuguese
markets, iii. 25% of the Angolan coffee production was channelled to Portugal according to quotas established to producers by the Coffee
Board, and iv. the Exports Authority fixed the prices of exported products (Governor's Orders of 14.8.1946, 2.7.1946, 10.7.1946 and
12.10.1946).
12 • These relations frequently were violent; Margarido refers the practices of white merchants in coffee areas (for example, burning
villages) to force African farmers to sell at prices lower than usually practiced (1972: 46).
13
. For example, an official report. of 1948 states that Diamang. in the Lunda Norte concession where it controlled trade, sold commodities
to natives' at prices higher than fixed, having a profit rate of about 20%, 73% and even 100% in some products, while the colonial
legislation only allowed a rate of 15% (Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 276).
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In plantations, employers of forced labour used the system in their shops, where
labourers were compelled to buy and became permanently indebted. This scheme made for
the perpetual renewal of the 'contract', saving the planters the costs of paying for new
labour recruitment. The state of indebtedness of forced labourers was completed with the
deductions for food or cloth supplied by the employer, at prices higher than those fixed
(e.g., Pelissier, 1978: 466, note 49).
The patterns of exchange in tributary societies allowed the appropriation of the
small surpluses of peasants, led to their progressive ruin (e.g., Bender, 1978: 244),
disrupted and retarded the development of peasant societies and reinforced the gap
between towns and countryside. These patterns were reproduced, although at a lower rate
of exploitation, in the relations between bush traders and their trading partners from the
cities, especially when bush traders were simultaneously farmers of export commodities
(Pelissier, 1978: 456-7). Commercial licensing and price fixing did not work and this
failure was one of the reasons for the measures taken under colonial reformism from the
1960s.
The dominance of metropolitan interests was reflected in reinforced protectionism
for metropolitan industries in the markets of the colonies. As it caused serious conflict
between local producers and the colonial authorities during liberalism it gave rise to
conflict with local capital and bureaucracies from the 1960s." During fascism, protection
not only of metropolitan industries but also of some strata of metropolitan capital was
implemented through the industrial licensing regimes, which prevented the creation of
industries either in Portugal or in the colonies (Sousa Ferreira, 1977: 53, 69). The attitudes
towards competition are also reflected in 1936 legislation providing that authorisations
14. The wine regimes preventing local production of spirits or banning the sale of Brazilian rum, are an example of protectionism of
metropolitan industries. They lasted for a century and the metropolitan state concerrtrated effotts in promoting exports to the colonies. On
the 'wine wars' and the responses of Angolan producers and consumers, see, e.g, Capela, 1973, Silva Rebelo, 1970: 273-83, Wheeler,
1971: 48, 73, Wheeler and Christensen, 1973, Carreira, 1977: 114, and Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 18, 89, 151; on the wine policies, see
Capela, 1973; see also Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 226 (figures exports of wine in 1947).
22
Colonial policies
were denied if in Portugal or other colony there already existed an industry producing the
same good in some conditions. 15
 These norms were complemented with regulations of
export commodities, especially with regard to prices and foreign exchange. The
centralized licensing schemes acted as a deterrent for the setting up of local industries
which therefore only began to expand from the 60s.
During the first restructuring the colony remained a buyer of metropolitan
products and a seller of cheap raw-materials for metropolitan industries. 16
 The
unfavourable terms of exchange in the relations of peasant societies when dealing with the
'first periphery' where also reproduced internationally. The exploitation of Angola as a
colony, when approached from the stand-point of exchange relations, was thus achieved
by a system of successive links from the bottom, peasant societies, to the international
relations of the first periphery with patterns of unequal exchange reproduced at the
different hierarchical levels. But while the extortion of colonial rent from foreign trade was
achieved by means of state intervention/regulation, in the exchange relations between the
first and the second peripheries, the monopoly position of bush traders and their
bargaining power reinforced by the 'natives' legal regimes (which acted at the economic
level restraining competition between settlers and Africans, who were banned from
trading), enabled traders to extort a monopoly rent without resort to state intervention. An
exception were the areas where African farmers competed, and/or conflicted, with colonial
15. Dec. no 26,509 (1936). The licensing regulations enacted from 1936 aimed 'to prevart unregulated competition among industrials of
the same brandi" (preamble Dec. no 26,509).
16. In 1910,90% of exports of Angola went to Portugal and 90% of imports came from Portugal but in 1913, the % of Angolan exports to
Portugal fell to 77%; in 1920, the main eworts of the country were coffee and diamonds (the latter quite near the coffee values), followed
by maize, coconut, wax and palm oil (Ramos de Almeida: 1979: 70, 98, 156). In 1956 22% of Angolan exports went to and 45°o of
imports came from Portugal. The balance of trade with Portugal has been negative for Angola, although the general balance of trade has
been positive until 1957 (op.cit.: 179, 336, 346); as to the year of IQ, which preceded the beginning of the independence war, the overall
balance of trade was negative for Angola. The exports structure was: i. coffee, 39.45%, ii. diamonds, 13.92%, iii. sisal, 10.55%, iv. iron
pie, 4.50%; buyers of exports were (% of exports): i. Portugal and colonies, 29.44, ii. USA, 19.06, iii. UK, 15.03, iv. Holland, 10 v.
Germany, 9.56, (source: Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 379-80); for late colonialism see note 34.
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interests, for example, the farming of cotton. Conversely, prices regulations, countering
the interests of traders, were ineffective.17
Progressively, as a result of this process, Angolans were pushed physically to the
hinterland and socially to the bottom of society, in a process of ruin and proletarization
from which not even the urban elites escaped (e.g., Vieira, 1989). The process meant a
higher hierarchy at a global level, since it meant more levels and more links: consolidation
of towns as first peripheries, linking to the colonial power, a semi-periphery, and to the
peasant societies, as second peripheries.
1.1.3. The second restructuring of colonialism: reformism and the slow shift from
trade exploitation to capital penetration
After the outbreak of the independence war in 1961, colonialism went a second
restructuring. The reforms of late colonialism will be dealt with in the different sections of
this chapter. Here, the improvement of the trade regulations and the framework of capital
penetration are briefly dealt with.
The former licensing schemes 18
 were expanded with the control of foreign
exchange and imports and exports through licensing of activity and operations. The
general framework for this control was the creation of the 'monetary system of the escudo
zone', a Portuguese 'economic space' with free movement of goods, where possible the
unification of customs regulations and the control of foreign payments. 19 The 'system'
17. See, e.g. Seidmamt, 1987.
18. Powers to license small industries were decentralised in the colony in 1962.
19. Dec. no 40,016 (1961), established: i. free movemait of goods within the Portuguese economic space, ii. when possible, the unification
of customs regulations on relations with foreign countries, iii. the non exchangeability of money circulating within the economic space and
'The creation of a system of interterritorial payments", aiming 'The maintenance of the external financial stability and solvency of our
money" (escudo), iv. the formation of a "genuinely national economy" and 'The promotion of a most efficient division of labour, that is, the
development of activities according to the best natural potential of each territory". The decree established a term of 10 years to and
restrictions to the free movement of goods and the liberalisation of operations of current invisibles. Still, quantitative restrictions of imports
were maintained with import licensing, even in the provisions for progressive liberalisation of transactions of goods, services and capital
within the economic space.
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legitimated Portugal appropriation of hard currency from the colonies exports and its
redistribution according to metropolitan interests, reinforcing the role of Angola as a
supplier of hard currency to ensure the equilibrium of the metropolitan balance of
payments. Indeed, all foreign currency obtained by the colonies was transferred to the
Bank of Portugal and the concerned colony got a credit in Portuguese money (Sousa
Ferreira: 1977, 47-9). As from the 60s Angola had to finance its war expenses, the
shortage of hard currency was controlled with the import and foreign exchange
licensing.20
Licensing policies were complemented by import-substitution incentives. The 1965
legislation on foreign (non-Portuguese) investment lifted barriers to its penetration, for
example by allowing a 100% share of foreign investors in companies. Incentives to
investment were mainly exemptions from taxes and customs duties, free repatriation of
profits,21 besides cheap labour, sometimes supplied by the administrative authorities. The
enlarged market created by the substantial number of Portuguese troops and the inflow of
settlers as well as the new prospects for the colony arising from the emergence of the oil
industry, also acted as incentives in the 60s boom (Sousa Ferreira, 1977: 75, 79, referring
to metropolitan capital).
Concerning foreign investment, non-Portuguese firms always played a role in
Angola due to the shortage of metropolitan capital for significant investments (e.g.,
Capela, 1977: 7 and 67). The patterns of direct investment from the 19th century show an
20. The Angolan war expenditure was financed by taxation, especially the consumption taxes; the so-called 'labour tax' (the former 'native
tax.), also contributed. On the import-export licensing scheme until 1971, Guide for Investment in Angola, 37-8 and later Dees no 421/71
and 422 71; see also Chapter 4, Table 2 (similar post-colonial licensing of activity and operations).
21. Dec. no 46,312 (1965, on foreign investment), defined as state reserves: goods of the public domain, public services and activities
interesting to defence (art. 21) but the CM could decide on exemptions (art. 21 par. 1); . the cleave allowed total or majority participation of
foreigi capital (alt 3) if the investment referred to goals approved by the CM (art. 4); foreign investors had to comply with the licensing
regulations (art. 4 par. 4); in case of refusal of authorisation of a foreign investment there was a right of appeal to the CM (art. 5);
incentives were tax and custom duties exemptions (art. 17), which could be larger than for national firms (art. 18); foreign investors had
also the guarantees of, e.g.: i. non-interference of the state in the investor's affairs (art. 8), ii. expropriation only on grounds of public
interest (art. 9) and, iii. export of profits and invested capital (art. 13) but the export of profits had to be licensed (Guide for Investment in
Angola, 33-7); on the post-colonial regimes, see section 7.1.
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interest of non-Portuguese firms in agricultural raw-materials and mineral resources by
investing associated or not to metropolitan capita1. 22
 The latter specialized for centuries in
trade, with some exceptions in the plantation economy and only from the 1950s
substituted 'exploitation by trade' for 'exploitation by capital penetration' (Sousa Ferreira,
1977: 67-76 and 384). After the emergence of the independence war, foreign capital
(Portuguese and non-Portuguese) invested significantly in the colony and this fact, added
to the emergence of the oil industry and oil exports, led to the 'golden era' of the Angolan
economy, the first years of the 70s.
Foreign firms penetrated the Angolan economy through direct investment23 or
acquisitions of shareholdings in metropolitan finns. 24
 Portuguese firms also depended on
their foreign partners through patents and marks licences, technical assistance and
procurement of spares and materials (e.g., CED, 1977: 47). The general patterns of
investment were: i. TNCs preferred to invest in mining and related activities, aiming the
export of non-manufactured commodities, 25
 some were present through trading companies
or franchised for the marketing of Western products 26
 and very few invested in heavy
industry, usually associated with Portuguese firms, ii. metropolitan capital invested in the
light and food industry, in some scarce projects in heavy industry, transports, banking and
22. On foreign investment and settlement during the 19th century until the 1920s, see, for example, Wheeler, 1971: 54-5, Ramos de
Almeida: 1979: 20, 115, 124-25, 152, 161, 167, Clarence-Smith, 1979: 17-18, 23, 29, Freitas, 1975: 62, Capela, 1977 and Guerreiro,
1958.
23. On TNCs investment in Angola see, e.g., Guerra, 1979: 128-29, 130-33, 136-7; Sousa Ferreira, 1977: 53-4, 87-9; Minter, 1977: 18,
28; on investment from WW2, see Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 276, 302, 310, 317, 328, 345, 354; Bender, 1978: 239-40; Guerra 1979
and 2, Actualidade Econernica e Cooperacito [1982], 29-30.
24. For the firms, see, e.g., Guerra, 1979: 136-37 and Ramos de Almeida, 1979:284.
25. The location of TNCs investment had some connections with territorial bases for activities or claims of their parent state in previous
centuries: USA and UK companies invested mainly in the north, Belgian companies mostly invested in the north as well; German and
South African capital invested in the southern areas, but German were also present in the central Highlands (sisal). On British in northern
Angola from the 17th century to the 19th century, see Wheeler, 1971; on North-Americans in Angola in the 19th century, Wheeler, 1971,
and in the 20th century, Marcum, 1978; on Germans in Southern Angola, Wheeler, 1971 and Clarence-Smith, 1979, and on South
Africans, Wheeler, 1971 and Clarence-Smith, 1979.
26. On some franchised of non-Portuguese marks, see Guerra: 1979: 137.
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plantations,27
 iii. local capital invested, and had its origin, in plantation and, later in the
food and light industries, here associated to Portuguese and non-Portuguese capita1.28
Local capital seemed to have no access to mining concessions, due to protectionism of
metropolitan firms, the comprador character of the Lisbon state apparatuses intervening in
international contracting, the shortage of technology and financial capacity, and fears of
autonomic demands if the local bourgeoisie could control these resources.29
The promotional role of the colonial state (reflected in the intervention through
concession regimes, licensing, price fixing, indicative planning and state contracting),3°
had as a consequence direct intervention through financial participations in many foreign-
owned firms, usually concessionaires of mining rights, or the creation of state-owned
banking institutions. 31
 The system, which processed the alliance of the colonial state with
27. In metropolitan capital, there was in the 70s a shift of ownership from trading capital to fmancial capital, involving a strong
concentration of ownership (see. e.g„ Sousa Ferreira, 1977). On main investment by Portuguese capital in 1973, see Guerra, 1979: 139-
142.
28. on
 the groups with origin in the late 1880s and early 1900s Angolan (settlers) capital by 1973. see Guerra, 1979: 145-53.
29. See subsection 2.1.3. (.1PLA Manifesto on discrimination against local capital) and Charter 7 (investment).
30. An example is the Cunene plan, due to its political goals, the amount of resources involved and the links between the Portuguese and
the South-African states and TNCs, within the frame of state contracting and building of infrastructures. After the 1926 accord,
negotiations between Portugal and RSA for a new agreement initiated in 1962, a pre-accord was signed in 1964 and the final agreement in
1969. From 1968 cooperation between Portugal and RSA also included joint military and intelligence activities in southern Angola; RSA
controlled the southeastern sector of operations, Kuando-Kubango, bordering with Zambia and the Caprivi strip (Marcum, 1978: 266-67);
the RSA controlled zone was 'occupied' after independence by RSA client UNITA. The Cunene plan aimed the construction of three dams
in the Cunene river, two for regulation of water flows and one for electric power. RSA would gd water from Calueque to Ovamboland and
energy for the Namibia mining centres and fishing facilities at Walvis Bay from Ruacana. In Angola about 150,000 has of land would be
irrigated and divided into 20 has plots to distribute to about 6,233 families, an average of about 37,000 new settlers; cattle ranchers would
benefit from water in an area of 173,000 has and it was expected that settlers could resort to local labour of about 73,000 'natives'. The
Cunene plan was connected to other projects, for example the supply of energy for the Krupp/Mineira do Lobito iron ore mining venture at
Cassinga. The metropolitan government created in Lisbon a special board following, so they said, the model of the Tennessee Valley
Authority. On RSA side the entities involved were the Department of Water Affairs (Windhoek), the Electricity Supply Commission
(Johannesburg) and IDC (Industrial Development Corporation, a mixed enterprise (Minter, 1977: 18). Contracts for the constructions were
allocated to Portuguese firms, some of them dependent on foreign partners, such as Knipp and IDC in related projects. The emergence of
independence prevented the plan, and related social and ecological damages (see Carvalho and V. Silva, 1973: 164-65) to go ahead, but
did not prevent RSA to occupy Calueque and Ruacana in August 1975 (Hodges: 1976, 55) preparing itself for the subsequent invasion of
Angola, under the alibi that its army was protecting the supply of energy and water to Namibia (actually by the 1969 accord Portugal
allowed RSA 'to station a small security force at the site", Calueque, Marcum, 1978: 4 .40, note 216). On the Cunene plan, see Sousa
Ferreira, 1977: 168-78 and Comic, 1988.
. Financial participations: in about 30 enterprises with mining concessions; in CFB and Tanganika Concessions, concessionaires of the
Benguela Railways, TAP (the Portuguese airlines); the banks Banco de Angola and Banco de Fomento; concessionaires of electric power
supply Sonefe, Hidroelectrica do Alto Catumbela, Companhia Electrica do Lobito-Catumbela; and Concar (meat processing). The colonial
state had as well indirect participations, for example, through JPP (Settlement Board) in ELA and Caixa de Credito in Satec. Financial
public institutions for specific loaning were Instituto de Credit() (housing and industrial projects), Fundo de Foment° Pecuario (cattle
ranching), Caixa de Credit() Agro-Pecu.irio (fanning and cattle ranching), (Guerra, 1979: 79-80).
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investors, also served to pay services of the regime's clients, who were appointed to the
different boards of mixed enterprises (e.g., Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 353, and Guerra,
1979: 120).
Imports licensing,32
 the creation of incipient import-substitution industries, 33 some
of them using obsolete equipment from the metropolitan industry, and the new revenues
from extracting industries, especially the oil and diamonds exports, led to surpluses of the
Angolan balance of trade from the early 70s. 34 The increase in local disposable consumer
goods improved the living standards of those with purchasing power. 35 Indeed, the rate of
growth of the manufacturing sector from 1960 to 1973 was, at 1963 constant prices, 11%
per year and the manufacturing output (only 6.5% of GDP in 1960) grew up to about 16%
in 1971 (Bhagavan, 1986: 149). The economic boom, which also meant conflict between
metropolitan industries and local capita1,36 motivated investments on education partially
satisfying demands of urban elites.37
32. The new imports policy from 1969, whim aimed to reduce the external debt and create incentives for the implementation of import-
substitution industries, prioritized imports of (data 1973): i. equipment (41%), ii. intermediate consumption (24%), iii. consumer non-
durables (21°o). iv. tedmical and energy consumption (9°o), and consumer durables (5%), athieving thus a change in the structure of
imports, with a decrease in imports of consumer goods and an increase in imports of "goods essential to economic development" (source:
Direccão dos Servicos de Comercio, DSC, 1974: 23).
33. Concentrated in 1973 in textiles. cement, fuels, beer, fishmeal, sugar, flour, soap, alcohol, asphalt, domestic gas and tobacco (DSC,
1974: 12).
34. After years of deficit, including 1971, the balance of payments was positive in 1972-73 (although the balance of trade positive from
1969 to 1974); i. the main exports were oil (27.6% in 1972 and 30.3% in 1973), coffee (30.0% in 1972 and 21.2°o in 1973), diamonds
(11.5°o in 1972 and 9.9°0 in 1973), iron ore (7.6% in 1972 and 6.2% in 1973), fisluneal, sisal, cotton, wood, maize, dried and fresh fish,
paper pulp, palm oil, tobacco, bananas, kassava, sugar and beans; in 1973 2 products (oil and coffee) accounted for 51.5% of exports, ii.
man imports were machinery, motor vehicles and parts, iron and steel, textiles, medicines, petroleum products, wines, wheat and fertilizers;
iii. main buyers were in 1970 1973: Portugal and colonies (29.3%), USA (19.9%), Japan (9.9%), Canada (7.5%) and Holland (6.0%); iv.
main sellers in 1972 were: Portugal (23.3%), USA (12.7%), West Germany (12.3%), UK. (9%), France (5.9%), Japan (5.7%) and RSA
(4.6°0), (source: DSC, 1974: 17-21). See also note 16.
35. As Bhagavan refers, the products available in the Angolan market in the early 70s were sufficient just for a minority of the population
and "19 out of 20 Angolans lived in bare essentials" (1986: 148); the present and past propaganda on the 'golden 70e arose from the access
to the goods by urban elites, European or African, and the fad that peasants living standards are usually forgotten when assessing colonial
policies.
36. On the 60s 'wine war', see Capela: 1973, 26-7, 29, 159, 161, and 30-35 (tor the documents); also, on conflicts within state
bureaucracies, Benner, 1979: 19.
37. E.g.. Heirner. 1979: 13, note 64. The Angolan university was created in the 60s but educated essentially white experts, since they were
the majority of students there during colonialism; anyway, traditional' Creole families got thus access to higher education, and related
access to the state bureaucracies, a demand originated in the 19th century.
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However, while ignoring the war going on in the countryside and ensuring the
profitability of firms by the practice of 'colonial wages' to African labour, the whole
industrial structure arising from colonial reformism could not resist the emergence of civil
liberties in 1974 and collapsed rapidly in the period 1974-75, when workers finally could
demand higher wages. The survivors were those with capacity to face the problem, the
TNCs. But the memory of past urban affluence endured: 'post-colonial reformism' would
adopt a package of policies with some resemblance to these of colonial reforms while to
reach the 1973 levels of production was from independence defined as a national target.38
1.2. Peasants and their land
The state of Angolan peasants, about 81% of total labour, at the time of
independence was the result of colonial policies towards them. They involved three
crucial aspects: i. the constant and ever expanding expropriation of land and related
European settlement, ii. the 'natives' and forced labour regimes, which, with the land
regimes, constituted the legal and ideological foundations of the destruction of pre-
capitalist formations and related subsumption of peasants, and iii. the impact of war on the
organizational forms in the countryside.
1.2.1. The natives regimes
The political constitution for the majority of Angolans during the last century of
colonialism may be found in the 'natives' laws formally regulating the relations of black and
mulatto Angolans with the colonial state up to 1961 and, in fact, regulating peasants until
independence.
The 'natives' legislation constituted the background of the discrimination against
Africans in all economic and social areas, legitimizing forced labour, land expropriation
38 •
 See sedion 1.2. and Chapter 8. respectively.
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and a tight regime of control of Angolans which, in different forms, lasted until
independence. This legislation would have its fate strongly connected to peasants
rebellions: the first laws were enacted during the Tulante Buta rebellion against forced
labour, reinforced by the 1917 rebellions and would be repealed after the 1961 uprising in
northern Angola. The 'separate development' and attempts of social engineering of African
institutions they meant had 'boomerang effects' on colonial policies. Indeed, from the
1920s and after the conquest of the remaining independent chieftaincies, 39 peasants
constructed their own movements under forms which by their very cultural 'strangeness'
were out of the control of colonial authorities, for example, secret societies and messianic
movement s.4°
The 'natives' legislation and related policy of 'assimilation' and cultural oppression
probably reinforced the 'great divide' among urban African elites. The 'official' end of the
'Creole era'4 ' with the new legislation contributed for the cleavages between those who
were for reform within the system and those who realised that Portuguese colonialism
could not be changed by reform or pleas for the rights of urban Angolans. This conflict
would lead to the emergence of 'new Creoles' from the late 40s.42
Another outcome of the 'natives' regimes, which actually aimed to divide Angolans
and isolate both urbans and peasants, was the emergence of a group of 'middlemen' in the
political relations between the two groups. They originated in peasants elites, for example
country aristocrats or small farmers, with some degree of urban education. With colonial
rule expanding and the defeat of previous forms of armed struggle, this group, the
39 . The last relevant war ended in 1920 with the defeat of Tsholcwe and the loss of Lunda independence (Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 145).
4°. On messianic movements, see section 2.1. and, for a general approach, Chiloote (ed.), 1972.
41. Pelissier considered that the 'Creole era' had fmished with Matos repressive legislation (1978: 230). In fad, what happened is that while
Creoles lost their importance in the colonial nucleus and under fascist repression, their culture became underground but, as later events
showed, flourished (see section 2.1.).
42. See section 2.1.
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'agrarians', radicalised by the land and labour policies, would play a crucial role in the
independence war and, later, in post-colonial politics.43
The natives status
From 1914 the colonial state imposed the racist distinction between 'civilized'
Africans and 'natives', which would constitute the legal background for the life of peasants
up to 1961. The 'natives' legislation divided Africans into two groups: 'natives' and 'other
persons' (later under the racist label of lassimilados')." 'Natives' lost citizenship rights
under a special status ruled by customary law and were only entitled to the political rights
granted by the customary law of their communities. The 'assimilados' were exempt from
customary law and would enjoy full use of the political rights guaranteed by colonial
legislation. The governor decided who could be included in the category 'other persons'.45
The attempts of the colonial state to institute an apartheid system to regulate the
relations between the colonial nucleus and peasant societies and to tame urban African
elites by putting their status under the discretion of the governor, were furthered by 1917
legislation providing for the criteria to consider an African as Portuguese citizen. 46 The
1926 Natives Statute,47
 developed the 1914 legislation." The 1954 Natives Statute had a
more restrictive definition of 'natives', combining racial and cultural criteria with
43. See Chapter 3.
44. As Sousa Ferreira puts it: "As the distinaion between 'civilised' and 'non-civilised' was made on a racial basis, it is very difficult to
consider that the attitude arising from it was not racist (as the colonial ideologists argued). An effort to disguise racism was made allocating
to this distinction a cultural aspect.: the African was accepted as civilised and incorporated to the Portuguese society if he attained a given
cultural level meaning the ability to read and write Portuguese. Given the high percentage of illiterate among Portuguese settlers at the
colonies, it is difficult to understand why they were not included among the 'non-civilised', sinless one admits that the distinction lays in fact
in race and not in culture." (1974: 119).
45. Law no 277; for a summary of the natives status as ruled by this law, see Wilensky, 1971: 49-54.
46. Dec. no 3,621, 28.11.1917, approvingthe Organic Charter of Angola, art. 258. •
47. Dec. no 12,533 (1926). revised in 1929 by Dec. no 16,473, "Political, Civil and Criminal Statute of the Natives of Angola and
Mozambique, here referred to as '1926 Statute'.
48. 1926 Statute, art. 3.
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educational requirements in a system where Africans had a very limited access to
education (e.g., Sousa Ferreira, 1974: 51-97). The 1954 Statute defined 'natives' as
"Those individuals of black race, or their descendants, who, having been
born (in the colonies) and usually being there, do not yet possess the
education and individual and social habits assumed for the complete
application of the public and private law of Portuguese citizens."49
To become an 'assimilado', Africans should integrate in the colonial nucleus and
behave as its members.5°
The 'assimilado' status was linked to the different documents both groups of
Africans should exhibit. The identity card (ID, for Portuguese citizens) was necessary for
all kinds of acts, from access to jobs, especially in the civil service, to driving licences.
Having an ID also meant formal freedom of movements, since 'natives' had to carry a
passbook, the so-called 'native card' (Wilensky, 1971: 72, note 8), aiming to control
labour, the movements of the population and the fulfilment of tax obligations.
The distinction between 'natives' and 'assimilado' also worked as a barrier in other
economic areas. For example, licenses for the marketing of cotton could only be delivered
to "Europeans and assimilados", damaging the interests of Mbundu traders. 51 Also, only
'civilized Africans' could be granted individual property of land, while the 'natives' were
subject to an obscure regime of 'communal land'.52
49. Dec. no 39.666, 1954 Statute, art. 2.
50. "(He should) ... behave properly and have acquired the education and habits associated with the full application of private and public
law of Portuguese citizen", to prove domain of Portuguese language, to have a profession, job or post or estate ensuring him and his family
a sufficient income, as well as having fulfilled his military obligations (cit. Statute, art 56); the certificates were delivered by the station
chiefs. Women could not apply autonomously for the 'assimilado status, but they could acquire it under some conditions (cit. Statute, art.
57; see, e.g., Wilensky, 1971: 167). The district governor had discretion powers to grant the 'assimilado' status, after application through
the administrative hierardiy. The grant of 'assimilado' sl aruc could be revoked by a judge. Some individuals could have these formalities
waived, e.g, either if they were civil servants, belonged to the administrative hierarchy, were registered traders or owners of commercial or
industrial undertakings; cit. Statute, arts 60, 61 and 64; see Wilensky, 1971: 166-7.
51. Dec. no 11,994 (1926) forbade the purdiase of cotton produced by 'natives' by people who had no licence. These regulations also
meant that only enterprises could apply for licences, and barred access to bush traders and Africans. An additional effect was the
destruction of the African commercial networks, in the concession areas (Carreira, 1977: 153-58); see section 1.1.
52. See subsection 1.2.2..
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The connection of the status to the labour regimes ('natives' were subject to forced
labour) to ensure the supply of cheap labour, made the grant of the 'assimilado' status very
difficult. By 1950, the status had been granted to 30,809 blacks and 23,335 mulattos out
of a population of four millions. (Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 290, 299, and Pelissier, 1978:
65-6, 59, 77). Although many authors relate the low number of 'assimilados' to the
educational policies barring the access of Africans to the prerequisites of Portuguese
citizenship, the action of the station chiefs, the bureaucracy involved, and racism aiming to
favour settlers also seem responsible for these low figures (e.g., Pelissier 1978: 67, 69,
468). Massive migration to neighbouring countries to escape forced labour also
contributed to the little interest shown in the acquisition of the lassimilado' status in
regions as northern Angola.
The humiliation and reinforced ruin this regime brought to Angolan elites, whose
status was at discretion in the hands of administrative authorities, motivated the
'qualitative leap' of protest in the 50s and petitions to the colonial government reformists
assembled at Liga (e.g., Wheeler, 1971: 135). Concerning peasants, the 1961 jacqueries
were motivated, among other reasons, by the curtailment of their movements under the
'native card'. As an example, during the most exemplary autonomous peasants rebellion of
modern Angola, that of Baixa de Cassanje against the compulsory farming of cotton,
peasants showed their hate for this legislation by the symbolic ripping of 'native cards'
(Pelissier, 1978: 416). The Natives Statute was hastily repealed in 1961, by a decree
ironically with a single article, under the argument that the 'process of assimilation of
natives' was completed. Indeed, it was a direct result of the emergence of the
independence war and related international pressure.
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Chiefs, peasants and the cosmetic 1961 reform
The repeal of the 'natives' system 53 was a formal progress waiving legal barriers to
access of Africans to jobs and some economic activities, but did not have in the life of
peasants the impact it eventually had in towns. Indeed, the colonial state continued its
efforts to control peasants by manipulating invented tradition54
 and resorting to coercion
with the resettlement policies.
To control peasants without effective occupation of the territory, the colonial state
needed an alliance with chiefs. In an early stage, fascist legislation on the organisation of
flower in the countryside compromised with chiefs, co-opting them for the control of
peasants, while retaining the supraordinating power of the colonial state. As occupation
spread and the colonial apparatus of local administration developed, legislation raised the
restrictions on selection and requisites for leadership to the point where the colonial
government allocated itself the power to appoint directly the rulers of peasants
communities. The advance of the colonial state into the political life of precapitalist
formations was suddenly stopped by the outbreak of the independence war. Among other
things, this led to the reinforcement of rnilitarisation of the social control of Africans. In
response to this arose, conversely, such phenomena as the rebirth of traditional allocations
of power, although interfered by factors such as the needs of anticolonialist struggle and
international pressure."
53. 11)t. no 43,893,6.9.1961; the preamble explains the measure as "the logical consequence of the evolutionary process (of the 'natives')
that has been tmdergone by our legislation in this field" (quoted in Wilensky, 1971: 178).
54. On invented tradition see, e.g., Ranger. 1983, Channock, 1985, Snyder, 1981 and 1981a, and generally, Hobsbawm (ed.), 1983.
55. See subsection 2.1.3.
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The 1961 reforms maintained basically the former organization in rural zones.56
Keeping the colonial constructed hierarchy of chiefs in administrative units defined by the
colonial state, the latter were directed by a 'native authority', who was under the orders of
the colonial authorities (Wilensky, 1971: 179). The 'elective system' of chiefs was
maintained while a chiefs advisory board, a committee chosen by chiefs among "good
men", was created. Some chiefs powers could be delegated in the committee. 57 However,
some groups of villages were directly subject to the colonial authorities, who could be
aided by 'liaison officers' they appointed. To enforce the new traditional system, a so-
called 'local militia' became a military corp (Wilensky, 1971: 179-81). Bender describes
how the system worked:
"the militia primary function was to compromise its members with the
nationalists. ... Population control was further extended in each
resettlement through the establishment of a network of spies and informers
who were coerced or recruited among the villagers by the secret police
(Pide/DGS)." (1978: 161-62)
The new legislation extended the control of movements to the 'ex-assimilados' who
previously did not need to report their movements. From the 60s this control covered the
entire African population: nobody could leave the region of residence without a pass from
the administrative authority (Sousa Ferreira, 1974: 119-20, quoting an UN document).
There were no state apparatuses to apply the natives legislation. Thus, the station
chiefs and their hierarchy got conflicting functions which lasted until the 70s. Indeed, from
1929 these authorities combined administrative functions (including the recruitment of
labour), these of judges of 'native courts' and of prosecutors. With no legal training, they
56. Established by the different natives statutes and by the Overseas Administrative Reform (RAU), which provided for a sd of norms on
the organization and succession of traditional powers, which in fad conflicted with the customary law of many Angolan chieflaincies.
57. Dec. no 43,896, arts 2 and 3.
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were supposed to apply unknown customary law58 to private relations of 'natives' and
judge some kinds of crimes in suits where simultaneously they acted as prosecutors
(Wilensky, 1971: 83, 85, 240, 242-43). The 'natives' adjudication, especially in the
criminal area, further undermined the standards of rights peasants enjoyed under the
screen of respect for tradition. In fact colonial authorities had discretion powers to rule all
the aspects of Africans life.59
Expansion of colonialism and changes in precapitalist formations
The attempts of social engineering described above conflicted with changes in
peasant societies, induced by the very expansion of colonialism. There are three main
aspects: i. the ruin of chiefs and aristocrats, and urban landowners, under the overall
scheme of land expropriation and consequential undermining of their authority, ii. the
progressive integration of some peasant societies in the capitalist economy leading to
changes in their organisational forms, and, iii. migration of peasants to other jurisdictions
reinforced shortage of labour and undermined the rule of chiefs.
Possinger stressed the impact of the development of capitalist relations in
Ovimbundu chiefs power. After the decline of the caravan trade by 1912, Ovimbundu
integrated in a market economy turning from the honey and rubber trade to cash crop
agriculture sold to bush traders. This restructuring led to a growing importance of owning
sufficient land and to the search of new land. The first stage was the dispersal of
population having the clan as the migrating unit. But the increasing scarcity of land in the
region, since the central Highlands were desired by settlers from the 1910s, led
58. From 1914 to the 1954 Statute and as late as 1961, successive legislation ordered the codification of tradition (Wilensky, 1971: 45 [on
the 1914 legislation], 80 [on the 1926 Statute], 129 [on the Imperial Organic Charter], 135 [on RAU], 181 [on the preamble of Dec. no
43,897]); however, the task was not achieved.
59. See Capela. 1977: 211. for the 19th cesitury, and Pelissier, 1978: 119-29, for the 20th century.
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Ovimbundu to further migration and to create new villages with new chiefs where later a
different social structure emerged:
"farmers (began) to consider land as private property ... Fallow land ...
soon became hereditary within the family. ... Subsequent, however, the
normal inheritance practice was to pass landed property from parents to
children. Thus the individual and clan-free family was born ... (and) the
political significance of clan leaders was destroyed as radically as the old
chiefs following the departure of their subordinates." (1973: 38-9)
Later, after the beginning of the independence war, many chiefs supported the
resettlement projects of colonial authorities, in spite of people's protest, since the projects
appeared as a return to a way of life Ovimbundu no longer accepted but were convenient
for the revival of chiefs' authority. When resettlement was abolished in central Highlands
in the early 70s, some chiefs protested (Possinger, 1973: 46).
Migration caused by changes in production, taxation, forced labour and land
expropriation also undermined colonial policies based on alliances with chiefs and the
implementation of colonial agricultural policies. For example, in the 50s an annual average
of 30,000 African workers migrated abroad and in 1960 there were about two million
Angolans living in neighbouring countries while in that year alone about 100,000 Africans
migrated abroad (Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 290, 377, 379). The shortage of labour in the
plantation and mining economy led employers to resort to labourers from other regions,
for example Ovimbundu for northern plantations, thus reinforcing internal displacement of
persons. Migrants were not directly subordinated to traditional authorities during their
absence and integrated in groups where, although ethnic links played a significant role,
former power relations were substituted and out of colonial contro1.6°
60• 'As the possibilities for political and economic self-regulation (for peasant societies) became more and more limited for larger social
units (residual) articulation on these levels was increasingly assumed by individual villages (or their equivalents in the herd societies).
Conversely, on the ideological level, the tendency was to expand the collective self-identities, referring them to the larger ethnic
(ethnolinguistic) groups which as a rule encompassed several (former) political units (especially among the Ovimbundu, Mbundu and
Bakongo)". (Heimer, 1979:9 and note 33).
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While traditional power structures on which colonialism relied disintegrated, many
chiefs involved themselves in hazardous activities against the colonial state and
collaborated with nationalist movements (e.g., Davidson, 1972: 244, 264).
The legislation on chiefs control and invented customary law demonstrates the
negative functions of metropolitan legal constructions: i. the economic needs of
colonialism, for example, resort to forced labour and to chiefs to supply it, undermined
eventual attempts of indirect rule and the very foundations of chiefs legitimacy, ii. the
expansion of capitalist relations outdated the alliances with chiefs attempted by the
colonial power, iii. the conflicts these policies caused were so deep that they even led to
the emergence of a nationalist movement, 61
 while reinforcing the most oppressive and
corrupt strata of the colonial bureaucracies, the station chiefs, and, iv. the factors above
referred to contributed increasing recruitment of peasants by nationalist movements.
61 . UPA. see subsection 2.1.3.
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1.2.2. The land regimes
As stated above, the first restructuring of colonialism, conditioned by the
restructuring of the world system, demanded the subordination of peasants and their
integration in the production of export commodities. One of the legal instruments used for
this purpose was land legislation. This legislation performed during the 20th century
different functions. The first has been to legitimate the acquisition by settlers of land
possessed by Africans, stabilizing the possession of land by the latter in a legal framework
of private ownership as conceived by metropolitan law and demanded by the working of
capitalist relations. Thus, after failed attempts to use taxation to integrate peasants in a
putative capitalist economy in the initial stage of the first colonial restructuring which
motivated many peasants rebellions (Capela, 1977, Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 36, Freitas,
1975: 62, and Wheeler, 1971: 56, 64), land legislation established from 1901 that all land
not privately owned under the Portuguese law, belonged to the state which could grant it
to settlers and later 'civilized natives'. This principle persisted in legislation until
independence (Pelissier, 1978: 153 and Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 188).
Another function of the land legislation was to respond to the opposition of
Africans to land expropriation. To achieve this function, there was a need to guarantee
reserve land for Africans and the complicity of chiefs and local administrative authorities in
the implementation of a scheme ensuring settlers access to African land with the least
opposition possible. The system adopted, which fits within the general framework of the
natives status, was nevertheless very ambiguous, due to colonial constructions on what
would be African customary law on the possession and use of reserve land. Indeed, the
colonial legislators always hesitated when facing the idea of making Africans 'owners', in
the Western sense. It seems that an additional function of land regimes was thus to prevent
the emergence of a class of African capitalist landowners competing with settlers, since
there were actual fears that different patterns of relations between settlers and Africans
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could arise from the simple working of economic forces. 62
 The access of Africans to full
ownership, as conceived by Portuguese law, was restricted under the land laws up to
independence. For example, in the 1954 Statute 'civilized' Africans could be granted
individual property rights on land if they fulfilled some requirements, which usually acted
as barriers to their possession or access to land ownership. Firstly, they had to prove
"continuous, peaceful and notorious occupation and improvement of land" (Ramos de
Almeida, 1979: 318). However, Angolans resorted in many areas to shifting cultivation
and land which might seem not occupied was in fact lying for further farming. The same
happened, mutatis mutandis, with grazing lands of pastoral peoples. Secondly, applicants
had to fight the encumbrances of the complicated bureaucracy either of land concession or
to guarantee occupation vested rights, which demanded the demarcation of the concerned
area and its registration. The majority of Africans were not aware of this proceedings,
even of their existence. Thus, the 'civilized' Africans with access to this regime were but a
few.
The 'natives' were allocated 'communal land', formally state owned, and which
could not, in principle, become private property. 63
 The ambiguity of the land regimes lies
in the differentiation of access to private ownership and in the very obscure concept of
'communal land', which eventually lost its former content as some peasant formations
integrated in the cash crop fanning. Peasants formations in Angola were diversified, kept
different stages of development and patterns of economic behaviour. The general design of
62. For example, Carrico and Morals proved in the 70s that African farming in some regions had a per ha productivity equal or superior to
that of settlers (1971, quoted in Bender, 1978: 130); Carvalho and Vieira da Silva demonstrated the same for cattle ranching (1973: 161-
62): in 1971 about 90-95°0 of Angolan exports of meat came from the African production, although this fact was hidden by the marketing
system (Bender, 1978: 189).
63. In 1919, reserves of land for 'natives' exclusive use were created. In 1927, the first regulations of the fascist government on land
arranged for a reserve of land for Africans four times the size they actually occupied at the time of the law enactment However, the law
had a safeguard clause for expropriation of reserve land, establishing compensation in. money or land in the case of Africans were evicted
(Pelissier, 1978: 153). The 1954 Statute provided also for common use of reserve land under customary law. Dec. no 43,894 (1961)
forbade the transfers of inhabitants from the land they 'occupied'. Land was divided into three classes: i. 1st class, the urban and suburban
land; ii. 2nd class, land for occupation by 'council areas and common use by 'ex-natives' and, iii. 3rd class, the residual land which could be
granted to individuals by concession. There were area limits for land concessions. However, the Overseas minister could grant concessions,
by contract, for areas superior to the legal limits (Guide for Investment in Angola, 1967: 32). On the 1973 regulations which maintained
the system, Guerra, 1979: 103.
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land ownership in the Angolan precapitalist formations was that the community was
entitled to them on grounds of common ancestors, and in this sense, the land was
'communal'. However, cultivated land belonged to the concerned family who provided
labour and, as the case may be, marketed surpluses. Thus there were elements of
individual possession. In addition, some peasant societies began to depart from the clan
ownership, for example the Ovambo, Ovimbundu, Kikongo and Mbundu.64
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the majority of Angolan peasants, this aspect
- use and fruition of land owned by the state or private ownership of land - apparently was
not relevant if it did not disturb the system of land allocation and of production in the
different communities. The latter was ruled by their customary law. Thus the crucial
problems, when assessing the entitlement to land occupied by Africans are, firstly, the
powers to determine which land constituted reserves (or 2nd class land in a more modern
version of the law) which was vested in local administrative authorities (Pelissier, 1978:
154) who usually did not take into account entitlements of peasants communities and
favoured the land claims of settlers (Bender, 1978: 122, 190). Thus, the main factor in
expropriation of land was more the application than the content of land legislation.65
However, as land expropriation in Angola gave rise to serious conflicts and many
peasants revolts especially from the 19th century, local authorities and settlers always used
a set of justifications for their contempt for land legislation, especially the reserves norms.
Settlers used as techniques of expropriation the recruitment forced of labour to get the
land compulsorily abandoned, 66
 as well as the argument that desired the land was not
64. see, e.g., Clarence-Smith, 1979: 74-81 (on Ovambos, referring to cattle), Pelissier, 1978: 457, Ribeiro, 1981: 352-53 (Kikongo and
Mbtmdu coffee producers), and Possinger, 1973, (Ovimbundu).
65. I am very
 grateful to Mr. Julio Morais and Mr Zenha Rella for their comments on this work concerning the issues of customary and
state land law, as well as on the gender division of labour in Angolan peasant societies.
66.
see, e.g.. Ross Report, quoted at Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 167-68, and Bender, 1978: 148.
41
Colonial policies
cultivated (Bender, 1978: 181-82). 67 Furthermore, peasants were not aware of the
requirements of registration of land rights and the bureaucracy of the process worked as a
bar to their protection against expropriation. The dependence of peasants on bush traders
may have been an argument for land expropriation, when land, even when under
customary 'common ownership', was used as a security for loans. 68 Tax obligations and all
kinds of fines imposed by the administrative authorities contributed to the abandonment of
land by people working under forced labour to pay debts to the state, and consequent
eventual occupation by settlers.
Nevertheless the land regimes by themselves did not, even with settlers agriculture,
respond to the needs of metropolitan industries. They were complemented up to 1961
with the compulsory farming of cotton instituted from 1926 in areas where companies
were granted monopsonies and Africans banned to trade. From 1932 the recruitment of
labourers in the concession areas was also banned. 69 Legislation of 1946 reinforced the
compulsory farming of cotton within the 'cotton areas' providing for the allocation of plots
to peasants where they should cultivate cotton under the supervision of the station chiefs
and/or officials of concessionaires, while being forced to sell the cotton to the companies
at fixed prices. 70
 This regime destroyed the peasants economy and reduced them to an
extreme poverty, caused migration and, later, the 1961 revolt. 71 Due to international
protest and the emergence of the liberation war, the 1961 reforms included the repeal of
67. Concerning the coffee regions. for example, in 1956 African farmers had to prove to have planted 3,000 coffee plants to be classified
by the authorities as farmers; although Kikongos have beal working hard planting coffee to prevent the loss of their land, in 1957 only 110
were classified as farmers in Huige (Pelissier, 1978: 459-61) See also Wilensky, 1971: 181-83 and Pelissier, 1978: 154.
68. See. e.g„ Wilensky, 1971: 165, on the ban of use of 'natives' land as a security for loans; on bush traders, see subsection 1.1.2.
69. Dec. no 21,226 (1932): this meant that in these areas Africans could not even become waged labour; see Carreira, 1977: 157-58 and
Davidson, 1972: 136.
70. Dec. no 35,844 (1946); see Pelissier, 1978: 403-05 and Carreira, 1977: 159-61 (on the corruption of state officials and the Cotonang
police); in the 40s Malanje, Lunda, Icolo e Bengo, Quissama, Dande, Benguela and Seles were under the regime of cotton areas (Carreira,
1977: 160) and there were 10 concessionaires in 1960, with Cotonang at the top (Pelissier, 1978: 404).
71 • For example. from 1950 to 1960 the population of the province of Malanje decreased (minus 2.41%) (Pelissier, 1978: 408); after the
repression of the 1961 rebellion (see subsection 2.1.4), the region became almost desert (Carreira, 1977: 163).
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the compulsory cotton fanning 72 and new land laws which maintained the basic legal
framework which lasted up to independence (Wilensky, 1971: 181-83, referring to Dec.
no 43,897, 1961).
The process of land expropriation, although initiated from the 16th century and
provoking significant forms of protest, is interconnected with white settlement. The latter
was not significant until the 1920s but from the 40s the white population began to double
every decade up to about 300,000 by 1970. Pelissier argues that the land rush by settlers
was 'moderate' until the end of WW2 given, among other reasons, the preferences of
settlers for coastal zones (1978: 153), except plantation and mining companies whose
significant land expropriation was a matter of the concession decrees enacted by Lisbon.73
Land expropriation varied according to the regions and the problems were
different in Benguela, Huambo, Cabinda, Uige and Kwanza-Norte, highly desired, than,
say, in Lunda-Sul or Kuando-Kubango. In 1960, the most acute land problem appeared in
Cabinda, where 91.67% of land was under formal concessions to plantation companies
committed to the destruction of the Mayombe tropical forest. In Kwanza-Norte, a
Mbundu traditional coffee producer and from where originated a substantial part of
Mbundu elites, 18.36% of land was under legal concession, as well as 13.51% in the
72. Dec. no 43,639. 29.7.1961; the decree established 'The complete freedom of cotton farming" (quoted in Wilensky, 1971: 175).
However, the decades of companies domination in the cotton zones had an impact whidi lasted: in the 70s, nevertheless the new legal
framework, Cotonang was still ruling the Malanje region, buying almost all the production of the province to 260 white and 1,000 black
farmers (Guerra, 1975: 27, Angolan ed.). African and European small farmers tried to respond to the company's monopoly by marketing
co-operatives; on the 1961 decree, see also Pelissier, 1978: 408, note 26.
73. For example, in 1973, Diamang occupied an area of 50,000 square km and "had the biggest concentration of workers in Africa:
28,000 field (African) workers in 1969, plus 650 employees and 1,000 skilled workers. Practically, the life of more than a half of the
Lunda Norte depended on the company (Guerra, 1979: 129); Diarnang occupied the 'closed zone' in Lunda, where it behaved as 'a state
within the state', having a monopoly of trade and its own agricultural and ranching activities (Ramos de Ahneida, 1979: 276, 302 and
Guerra, 1979: 129). In 1922, the Tshokwe and Lands began to migrate to Zambia to escape forced labour for the company's mines;
Diamang introduced then a practice which became widespread, the recruitment of labour in other ethnic regions. CADA, for example, in
the early 70s had the largest coffee plantation, 20,500 has, with 5,000 Angolan and 1,000 European workers in 1970 (Guerra, 1979: 140).
The iron ore company Corrpanhia Mineira do Lobito had in the 70s, besides the concession for mining, a 5,000 has farm in Cuima
(Guerra, 1979: 131). Cotonang, controlled under the system of compulsory farming of cotton the whole area of the Malanje province
(Guerra, 1979: 133). Coirpanhia de Mangan& de Angola (iron ore mining) occupied an area of 33,000 has in the province of Malanje,
with 1.000 field workers and 129 skilled personnel (ibid.: 132). Land occupation by big companies also acted as a barrier to occupation by
poor white settlers; for example, in Gabela, Sumbe, Arnboim and Seles, during the 'coffee land rush' these settlers were barred by CADA
and other plantation companies (Carreira, 1977: 132).
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Luanda district, 6.61% in Huambo, 6.39% in Benguela, 5.92% in Kwanza-Sul (Pelissier,
1978: 155).
The land rush in coffee areas was significant during the 40 and 50s, when exports
of coffee to USA and the high prices in international markets motivated settler migration:
from 1950 to 1960 the white population of Huige increased 569% and in Kwanza-Norte
230%, while doubling in the other provinces of the country. Coffee plantations increased
from 636 in 1956 to about 2,000 in 1962. Still, the related land expropriation could not
destroy African fanning of coffee. The boom also made possible the survival of a group of
Mbundu and Kikongo small farmers, who sold their coffee to bush traders or to export
companies. 74 Radicalised by expropriation and discrimination in trade, Mbundu and
Kikongo small farmers (the 'agrarian' socio-political group) would participate in nationalist
protest and became a target of (competitor) settlers during the repression to the 1961
peasants rebellion in northern Angola.75
Given the availability of free land, expropriation of Africans meant their removal to
other places, and the consequent rupture of their commercial ties, social structures, and
increased poverty due to diminished quality of soils. However, but it did not directly give
rise to a class of landless people forced to sell their labour power in the market. This is
one of the reasons why, concerning labour, economic coercion did not work and the
colonial state had to resort to direct coercion, expressed as the 'moral and legal obligation'
of Africans to work and related sanctions. Also, the shortage of settlers prevented reliance
on them by the colonial state and the civil society for the creation of the foundations of a
capitalist economy. The task of making a substantial number of landless workers was
74. From 1946 to 1960 Angola was the 1st African producer and in 1960 was the 4th world producer, on the coffee boom and related
aspects, including figures, see, e.g„ Carreira, 1977: 129-35, Pelissier, 1978: 451, 455, Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 377. For African small
production, Guerra, 1979: 103.
75. See subsection 2.1.4.
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assumed by the fascist state from the 50s through the settlement-resettlement
programmes.
The 'settlement-resettlement' policies worked in the following way: i. substantial
amounts of money and state effort were spent in promoting settlement programmes, ii.
Africans were forced to abandon their land, due to 'economic reasons' (the implementation
of programmes) and, from 1961, to security reasons, and, iii. were resettled in strategic
hamlets whose organization and disposable land did not permit their maintenance in
agriculture, iv. as peasants were ruined they had to contract their labour in exchange for a
survival wage which did not allow them any savings to come back to profitable agriculture
(Bender, 1978).
While promoting 'reforms', the colonial state transferred the 'ex-natives' from their
former areas into strategic hamlets, allegedly to prevent contacts with the guerrAla. But
the resettlement policies, heavily implemented from the late 60s, had an economic function
as well, to free land for concession to settlers. Bender estimates that by 1974 over one
million peasants (the actual rural population controlled by the colonial state in the late
1960s and 70s) had been displaced into resettlements. The resettlement policies had a
strong impact in African agricultural production, leading to a food crisis, since the
disposable land in the strategic hamlets did not permit the maintenance of peasants in
farming (1978: 195, 177). Resettled peasants were thus barred from subsistence or cash-
crop agriculture, a gap progressively filled by settlers. Also, planters took advantage of
resettled people, by "labour relations which are hardly honourable, low wages and
disproportionate profit for employers". In some regions peasants resisted resettlement and
the colonial state resorted to violence, while land was occupied by settlers. Resettlement in
peace zones was opposed by many civil servants, but the opinions of the military and
settlers prevailed. Conflict between military and agricultural apparatuses was later solved
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with the revocation of resettlement in the central Highlands and the adoption of ERA.
(Bender, 1978: 165-94).76
The de facto status of 'ex-natives' under resettlement, apart from their standards of
rights, had important consequences in the colonial and post-colonial societies. Indeed, a
substantial part of African farming and herding was destroyed in favour of settlers,
notwithstanding the late 1960s and early 1970s attempts of the colonial state to ally with
some strata of peasants. From the 60s, agricultural programs implemented by different
state agencies aimed to face the food crisis generated by the resettlement policies and win
the goodwill of peasants, that is, their integration in a capitalist economy and consequent
rejection of guerrilla activities. From these plans, only the ERA and coffee projects were
successful. 77 Nevertheless, resettlement created a labour reserve, forcing peasants to
migrate to towns or resort to 'contracted' labour when they did not migrate to
neighbouring countries or join the guerrilla. As settlers progressively substituted resettled
peasants in agricultural production, when they massively left the country in 1974-75, they
created a vacuum in food production which led to many difficulties of the post-colonial
state.
76. Quotation refers to a government official report on northern Angola. The central Highlands are an example of 'preventive resettlement
aiming to favour land expropriation. In the highly desired plateau land, there was no war, only infiltration of guerrilla groups in the eastern
zones. Nevertheless, the military authorities implemented a programme of preventive resettlement in new villages. As Ovimbundu were
already involved in cash-crop fanning, they were not willing to leave their farms and come back to a scheme which meant the return to clan
production (Bender, 1978: 179-87). See also, Carvalho and Vieira da Silva (1973: 164-65), on the impact of the Cunene plan and
resettlement on southern peoples.
77. ERA was a programme centred in state support to African farmers, adopted for the central Highlands in 1968. It restated from a change
of attitude of some apparatuses of the colonial state on how to deal with peasants participation in the guerrilla: whether by direct coercion
in the strategic hamlets or whether by 'economic and social development' (Possinger, 1973, Cruz, 1985: 5-7 and Guerra, 1979: 155-56).
ERA aimed to: i. stimulate informal peasants associations for the marketing of as (to avoid the extortion practiced by bush traders), ii.
provide access. to loans (since the existing system prevented it) and, iii. eventually, ensure the processing of crops and provide technical
assistance to farmers. Later the associations changed into pre-cooperatives and, when the project was stopped by war in 1974, it seems that
the goal was the formation of marketing co-operatives. (Cruz, 1985: 6-7). See Possinger, 1973, on the leadership conflicts the scheme
generated within peasant communities. In Urge, an area of guerrilla and coffee mouoproduction, the state implemaned a plan for the
creation of local markets, where small farmers could sell their coffee avoiding bush traders mediation. Programmes included the creation of
peasants associations. The state granted loans to associations for facilities for coffee processing and purchase of tools and machinery (Cruz,
1985: 7-8, who refers to 13 'associations' covering a population of about 57,000, and Guerra, 1979: 155, who refers to 4 cooperatives of
small farmers in Huige in 1972. There were also marketing co-operatives for export products, cattle ranching and associating the cotton
producers of Malanje trying to escape the Cotonang monopsony. Co-operatives were ruled by a restrictive legislation which, although
providing tax incentives, submitted them to a tight control by the state (Cruz, 1985: 8, referring to Leg.Dipl. no 3,784, 1967).
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1.2.3. Labour
Land and labour are examples of continuity in the Angolan history. Their specific
features in the country conditioned all the outcomes of the state, colonial and post-
colonial, and replicated in areas far beyond the agricultural framework. The first aspect is
that availability of free land, which notwithstanding different levels of productivity and
expropriation of fertile lands by settlers, conditioned the supply of labour either to
agriculture, industry or services. Indeed, given land availability, reinforced by the extended
family solidarity ties, Angolan labour did not become, except for small town enclaves, a
stable proletariat. Massively recruited in peasant societies, waged labour was essentially a
semiproletariat (Shivji, 1986: 24) with the possibility of ultimate resort to subsistence
agriculture. Labour was thus scarce and the colonial state had, for centuries, to resort to
non-economic coercion to ensure the supply to colonial undertakings.
Peasants and forced labour
The first restructuring of colonialism merely moved from slavery to forced labour,
the so-called 'contract system178 which would last until independence, although formally
abolished in 1962. 79 The practice of slavery also continued up to at least, the 1920s
(Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 11, 14, 83, 97). Thus nobody ever succeeded in organizing an
78. Basic labour legislation during the up to the Is Republic: 1836, decree abolishing international slave trade in Portuguese vessels in
Portuguese Africa; j, treaty considering piracy slave trade in Portuguese vessels and setting up a joint commission
and arbitration court to control the implementation of the treaty; 1853: decree on the transport of freed slaves to S.Tome where served as
forced labour for 7 years; 1856: taxation reform: chiefs taxes were no more paid in slaver 1858: decree on gradual (within the next 20
years) abolition of slavery in Africa; 1869 decree establishing that all the remaining slaves in Angola would become libertos' and forced to
sign a 5 years labour contract with their previous owner; 1875 law on the 'transition from slavery to free labour': 'non-productive Africans'
considered 'vagrants' were under 'public sponsorship' and so compelled to 'contract' (forced labour in Angola and S. Tome), as well as
forced porterage (which was formally abolished in 1853); 1878: legislation allowing private organizations to requisition workers (freed
slaves) to the colonial authorities, who should satisfy their demands 1899: decrees allowing recruiters to supply 'contracted labour' to
private organizations resorting either to direct propaganda in the villages or using chiefs to supply forced labourers 1908: failed attempts
of control of shipments of forced labourers to S.Tome; 1909: new regulations on S. Tonle forced labour reduced 'contract' to 3 years (which
might be renewed in S. Tome), restricted recruitment zones, provided for fixed wages, food rations and medical care for workers while
reasserting vagrants could be compelled to work in agriculture.
79. For a comprehensive study of the labour regimes from slavery to the early 1970s, see Carreira, 1977. Clarence-Smith refers to the
south, especially forced labour in fisheries during the last decades of liberalism (1979: 30-34, 42-3).
47
Colonial policies
economic system based on freedom to work, at least in entrepreneurial agriculture
(Capela, 1977: 6).80
Legislation aiming to change from slavery to free labour with an intermediate stage
of 'contracted' (forced) regulated labour, was ineffective. Indeed, the availability of land
and the maintenance of struggling competing jurisdictions as to where labourers could
move and avoid compulsion to work under the colonial rule, the over-exploitation these
forms of labour constituted and the resistance they generated, as well as the opposition of
settlers themselves to the new legislation, had as main consequences a relative failure,
during the 'liberal period' of the intended rationalisation of colonial exploitation (that is,
the shift from export of slave labour to that of raw-materials). It also led to the emergence
of Angolan protest under new forms, which went beyond the defence of their
independence by peasants formations. The 19th century labour legislation divided settlers
and civil servants and caused the so-called Brazilian revolts. Forced labour also motivated
the non-violent protest within the first periphery, the regional revolts of peasants societies
most affected by the system, and significant migrations from the last decades of the
century (Wheeler, 1971, 63, Clarence-Smith, 1979: 70-1 and Marcum, 1969: 52-4). There
are few studies on workers struggles during this period but Clarence-Smith argues that
"the labour history of the south was one of constant stniggle".81
80. See also Ramos de Ahneicia, referringto the Casement, Ross and colonial official reports in the early 20th century (1979: 19, 24, 167-
8).
81. When the legislation of 1869 was enacted there was a 'wave of insubordination' among former slaves (1979: 37-8). More serious
workers protest followed the enactment of the 1875 legislation, on the total abolition of slavery, and in Narnibe, from 1876 former slaves
refused to sign a five-years contract. This movement of disobedience, which prolonged during the 1870s, was reinforced by the fact that the
regulations on the minimum level of wages were lower than in other areas of the country. Later the colonial state tried to force the signing
of contracts and alleged a conspiracy of workers in one of the larger plantations of the region. The army invaded it and arrested workers
leaders. Soon the colonial authorities were in conflict with settlers as well, who intended to maintain slavery, with the cooperation of
corrupt civil servants. In 1880 there were dashes between forced labourers and the police and the brutality of repression deterred workers
to present their claims to the state, while many ran away to join social bandits and raid their former employers. In 1884 the colonial state
decided, against the labour legislation, the automatic prorogation of previous contracts. This de facto slavery led to new riots in the south
and 400 workers leaders were arrested and deported to Mozambique (1979: 38-40).
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The emergence of the 1st Portuguese Republic in 1910 did not mean significant
changes. Forced labour was maintained under the 1911 labour code, notwithstanding
demands of urban political groups, workers expectations 82 and peasants rebellions. This
legislation was anticipated by the introduction of the 1st 'native card' from 1910,
demanding 'natives' to exhibit to authorities a pass-book with their identity and labour
record. 83
Forced labour persisted during fascism since the scarcity of voluntary labour to
work in agriculture, mining and fisheries remained and settlers were not willing to pay
wages determined by the market or even the low wages fixed in legislation. In 1928 the
colonial government enacted a labour code which forbade forced labour for private ends.
The prohibition was merely formal even at the level of the text of the law.' 4
There has been a substantial gap between these laws and the practice of both
employers and colonial officials. Essentially, labour maintained the patterns dominant
during the first stage of the restructuring. The main difference is that during fascism we do
not find the conflicts between the state and settlers evident during the liberal period. Still,
82. Clarence-Smith refers that the emergence of the Republic led in Namibe to new workers demands and a general hope. While there was
a widespread claim of labourers to be released from their situation of slavery, in a fishery there was a strike, probably the first noticed in
Angola. The attempts of Norton de Matos, during his first mandate, to and forced labour led to some state supervision on the issue. In
Namibe, during the period of supervision, many workers decided to stay in urban zones and became "a stable proletariat", while forced
labour from peasants and the so-called 'vagrants' was ensured in a covert way (1979:41-3).
83. The basic aspects of the 1911 and the 1914 labour legislation were: i. the moral and legal obligation of natives to work, to which they
might be compelled by the authorities; ii. if the native resisted compulsion he would be punished with hard labour iii. public authorities
might requisition natives, resorting to chiefs; iv. employees offences, espec. running away, were punished with hard labour and employers
offences were punished with fmes. On the labour legislation during this period, see Carreira, 1977 (capon. 108-09), Ramos de Almeida,
1979: 15, 52, 57-8, 89, 106, 156, 161 and Vvilensky, 1971:31-5 and 32 note 5.
84. Dec. no 16,199, 'Native Labour Code'. While establishing the 'principle of free choice of employers by the natives', it prescribed that
natives had a `moral duty to work', authorized the state to "urge" natives to work and established criminal sanctions for breath of contract
by employees. The code established limits to the formal 'freedom of work': either compulsory work in public interest "for the benefit of
natives" or "as correctional punishment". The administrative authorities had powers to approve contracts and control the implementation of
labour regulations. Simultaneously, they were the representatives of contracted labourers at law and administratively and judges in offence
cases. They had thus conflicting functions. The 'natives protection' included regulations on wages, food, cloth, housing, rest, women and
children work and labour accidents (Wilensky, 1970: 92); settlers soon protested against the food and welfare regulations, declaring that
the calories rates were to high and would damage the diet balance of 'contracted' workers (Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 344); anyway, as
Carreira refers, the code was not applied at all. (Wilensky, 1971: 90-2, Ramos de Ahneida, 1979: 191 and 215-16, for the constitutional
issues involved).
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the fascist government was aware of the violations of labour legislation but resorted to
'state inertia'.85
As in previous times, forced labourers responded by significant migration during
the whole fascist period and later by their participation in the independence war. Also,
there were some spontaneous collective forms of protest, as the 1956 strikes of forced
labourers and, in 1957, the refusal of peasants, prospective forced labourers, to assemble
near administrative stations to 'choose' their employers, notwithstanding the threats by the
colonial authorities which were followed by massive arrests (Ramos de Almeida, 1978:
337, 347).
Within the 1961 'reforms', the colonial state enacted an new Rural Labour Code
(RLC), ,€ which stated in the preamble the prohibition of discrimination on ethnic, cultural
or sexual grounds in labour, especially in wages and forbade all kinds of compulsory work
and the recruitment of labour with the aid of, or facilities provided for, state officials,
including 'traditional authorities'. 'Tutelage' and criminal sanctions for breach of contract
by the employee were abolished. However, the code contained a safeguard clause to state
involvement in recruitment: state departments and local authorities might recruit labourers
for their purposes but appointed recruiters could not be administrative officials (Wilenslcy:
1971, 174-75, 193, 198-99).
This code was applicable to the labour relations of Africans working in services
and industry, with emphasis on the 'manual' and 'unskilled' character of the work
85. For example. Galvâo report to the parliament (1947). quoted in Ramos de Almeida, 1979: 272. In 1956, the governor of Moxico
reported that in the region, natives could not become traders, their food was worse than a century ago, women were prostituted in their
work places and chiefs were punished by administrative authorities with corporal penalties (op.cit., 337). Pelissier, for the late 50s refers
that some authors notice the use of children in the European coffee plantations. Nevertheless, the too frequent tendency of some planters to
consider Africans as cattle adequate to work free of charge in their plantations seemed sometimes to be approved by station chiefs" (1978:
465).
86. RLC, Dec. no 44.309 (1962).
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performed. 67
 There were also political goals, since 'unskilled' workers had no right to
associate in unions, even in the tightly controlled 'legal' unions (Callen, 1985: 5). Racism
underlies the provisions on the 'unskilled' nature of work, aiming at the 'ex-natives', as
Europeans were not under the label. 8 8 So, from 'non-civilized' black and mulatto Angolans
moved to 'unskilled' labour. 89 Also as men were conscripted in large numbers into the
colonial army or migrated abroad, women were brought under the regime of RLC, to
legitimate the resort to them as actual forced labourers.9°
The overall intention of the RLC was to 'privatise' forced labour, so the colonial
state could not be blamed, internally and externally, by its practice. However, state inertia
allowed the endurance of forced labour (Carreira, 1977: 118, 134). Colonial local
authorities persisted to act as suppliers of forced labour until the transitional period,
notwithstanding the rhetoric of the 1928 and the 1962 legislation (e.g., Davidson, 1972:
134-39). Increased poverty, due essentially to land expropriation and the marketing of
farming products by bush traders, led peasants to search for jobs which were mainly
occasional (Bender, 1978: 169 and V. Silva and Morais, 1973: 98). This had, anyway,
effects on wages, putting them at a level lower than the already very low rates fixed by
labour regulations (e.g., Bhagavan, 1986: 147, Carreira, 1977: 126, and Bender, 1978:
226). In short, even the form of free labour was unlawful.
87. RLC, art. 3; see lAllensky, 1971: 194-95.
88. For example. 900 0 of the members of the largest union. SNECIPA, were white (Cahen, 1985: 5) while, according to Bender, less than
6°o the Portuguese immigrants in Angola between 1950 and 1964, who were 7 years or older, attended schools beyond the 4th grade
(1978: 229-30).
89. For the figures see Guerra, 1979, 122-23; see also note 92 (structure of labour).
90. Preamble of RLC (quoted in WilensIcy, 1971:198): there are no figures on women wages in agricutture but in five work, for example,
71°0 of the working class women living the Luanda slums earned less than the minimal legal wage (Monteiro, 1973a: 231).
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Urban working class
The economic expansion of the late 60s colonial restructuring, and the fact that in
industry and some services the practice of forced labour was more restricted than in the
plantation economy, had some impact in towns. 91 The three focal points for the incipient
industries (the so-called industrial parks), Luanda, Benguela and Huambo, attracted from
the 60s an inflow of migrant workers, who, nevertheless, were not significant in terms of
total labour in the country, since the peasants subsistence economy prevailed. 92 Also, in
Luanda, for example, there were no large workers concentrations, except for the port, the
oil refinery and some few large factories, since the small and medium-sized industries
prevailed (Cahen, 1985: 2). Cadres were only about 3% of active population and "the
majority of the 100,000 cadres were Portuguese" (Dilolwa, 1980: 220).
Although earning higher wages than rural workers, industrial and services workers
were not skilled according to the colonial definitions and needs, 93 lived in slums and had
to compete for jobs with poor settlers (Bender, 1978: 258) and poor peasants searching
for a temporary job (Guerra, 1979: 101). 94 Also, as there was not a proper system of
social security, they had no work stability and often had to resort to extended family
solidarity or to return to the countryside to survive. Furthermore, the overwhelming
91 • In 1970 the urban population was 15% of total and included 76°0 blacks, 15.5% whites and 7.5% mulattos (Heimer, 1979, 8, note 29.
quoting data from the 1970 census); see section 8.2., for data of urban population in the late 80s.
92. According to Dilolwa, in the last years of colonialism labour had the following structure: i. rural labour was 81.7% in 1970 and 80.4°o
in 1973, with subsistence peasants still 73.6% in 1970 and 72.4% in 1973, and waged labour in araiculture (including fisheries, livestock
and forestry), was 8.1 in 1970 and 8.0% in 1973; ii. waged labour in industry (including mining and construction) was 5.3% in 1970 and
5.7% in 1973; iii. waged labour in services was 7.1% in 1970 and 7.7% in 1973; iv. salaried employees in all sectors were 3.4% in 1970
and 3.6% in 1973; v. private entrepreneurs were 2.5% in 1970 and 2.6% in 1973; vi. total labour in 1970 3 Mn and 3.236 in 1973
(quoted in Bhagavan, 1986, 194, data from 1973 are estimates). See subsection 6.1.3 for the figures available for the post-colonial society,
espec. note 80.
93. The manufacturing industry had the following personnel structure: 80% unskilled, 12% skilled, 6% non-managerial administrative
personnel and 2% managers (Bhagavan, 1986: 147); "Africans got the unskilled jobs. All jobs requiring some skill (whether technical,
clerical, managerial) were almost entirely taken by white settlers, with a very small share falling into the mestico population ... industrial
growth, although more rapid and diversified up to 1974 than in most Afiican countries, had done little in transforming African labour in
quality and quantity." (Baghavan, 1980: 17).
94. On patterns of migration and semiproletariat characteristics, see, e.g., Callen, 1985: 2.
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majority of urban workers had no access to union organization and any kind of workers
struggles, including strikes, were forbidden and ruthlessly repressed. Nationalist
movements did not seem very interested in organizing them and their struggles as such,
due probably to the vicious repression and control by the political police. 95 Still, there was
hidden workers protest and the most significant struggle in towns has probably been the
1973 strike of dockers in Luanda, when there were severe clashes between strikers and the
police, including P1DE/DGS (Cahen, 1985: 5).
Migrant workers hid in the slums of colonial towns where they cohabited with part
of the ruined African elites. For example, in Luanda, on which some studies are available,
in 1970 more than 50% of the 200,000 slums inhabitants and 80% of the heads of family
were born in rural Angola and within the minority born in Luanda many were the sons or
grandsons of rural migrants. Africans at the Luanda slums were divided into 74%
Mbundu, 18% Ovimbundu, 6% Kikongo and 2% from other regions (Monteiro: 1973a,
214-15). Monteiro's works on the Luanda slums shows that their population was in a
process of change, less evident among the Kikongo and Ovimbundu communities. 96 Men
living at the slums, Africans and Europeans (these only 3.7% of the slums population),
were: 71.28% waged workers in private companies, 19.10% waged in public institutions,
7.17% self-employed, including 1.65% Portuguese traders (Monteiro: 1973, 216-17).
Women were unskilled labour, mainly servants.97
95. For example, Monteiro (1973a: 231, note 9) refers that the police kept files of all families living in the Luanda slums; see also
Pelissier, 1971: 228; on nationalist movements unionism, see, e.g, Cahen, 1985: 15, 17.
96. Which meant, for example: i. the devaluation of some values of the extended family, suds as solidarity to relatives which was
substituted by participation in mutual aid associations, ii. the shift from matrilineal to patrilineal system of family authority and succession,
and iii. the rejection of tradition, say refusing to pay the bride's wealth or to divorce in case of woman's sterility. Still, polygamy lasted and
the heaviest burden of change was carried out by women who had lower wages but often had to bear the children's sustenance (Monteiro,
1973a: 216-18, 222, 227). Men did not pay their children maintenance in a situation of conflict between the matrilineal and matrilineal
system, meaning either the responsibility of the uncle (mother's brother) or the father, while the gender division of labour and
responsibilities at peasants societies, and polygamy, lasted (with the burden of many production tasks over women and children, see
Possinger, 1973: 48).
97. The professional patterns of women living at the Luanda slums were: I. washer of cloth 45%2°/0, ii. ambulant trader, 21.8°0, iii. sewer,
8.6%, iv. housekeeper 7.1, v. maid, 5.9°0, vi. worker at incbis try, 4.1%, vii. farmer, 2.9%, viii. cook, 1.1%, ix commercial employee,
1.1%, x. cleaner, 0.8°0, xi. twist, 0.5°0 (Monteiro, 1973: 231); see note 90 (discrimination against women in wages).
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Due to its achievements in the 1974 popular movements, urban working class
would become 'the leading class', under the socialist option. Still, given the lack of
experience and the very social composition of MPLA, this leadership would prove an
illusion.
1.3. Conclusion
The colonial state made serious efforts, during the period of so-called liberalism, to
improve the rationality of colonialism, finding alternative regimes to exploitation by
slavery, promoting the entry of foreign capital, building infrastructures for the expansion
of this capital and conquering lands for the setting up of a plantation economy. The
economic constitution of liberalism proved inoperative in colonial realities, as labour
regulations and the behaviour of companies reveal. The political constitution of liberalism
conflicted as well with the very colonial situation. When the demands of Angolans reached
a given level, the colonial state resorted to measures and legislation which did not
differentiate substantially from fascism. This is the reason why we may find the origins of
the most significant measures of the fascist period in those adopted in the last decades of
colonial 'liberalism'.
As the 1st Republic ended, the economic structure, including centre-periphery
relations, and the legal framework, arising from 'liberalism', was a mature fruit for further
developments by the fascist state which had the task, from the colonial stand-point, to
stabilize colonial domination in Angola, as conquest of the territory was finally achieved.
Agrarian and commercial colonialism prevented the expansion of the colonial
economy, by relying on the settlement of European farmers and traders while barring the
expansion of local agriculture and industries. The legal ideology of the metropolitan
government, added to its ethnocentrism and attempts at 'separate development', reinforced
the failures of the colonial power to control Angolans through economic and legal
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mechanisms and is an example of negative functions. The slow changes in the agrarian
character of fascism reflected in attempts from the 50s to induce some capital penetration
and ally with Angolan bureaucracies.
However, protest radicalised by fascist repression led to the armed struggle and
forced fascism to change colonial policies. To the diversified forms of protest against
colonialism, the state responded with 'reformism'. Whatever the rhetoric of the
metropolitan government, during reformism the colony continued to perform the functions
of protected market for metropolitan industries not competitive in the markets of
developed countries, of supplier of cheap raw-materials to these industries, and absorbent
of metropolitan unemployment. Later Angola also became a supplier of foreign currency.
The shortage of sufficient capital accumulation by the Portuguese bourgeoisie remained, a
factor which determined the belated decolonisation. 98 Still, for the first time the colonial
state was capable of ensuring a significant inflow of settlers while reinforcing metropolitan
and non-Portuguese investment. The discovery of oil in Cabinda made it possible to
finance war with oil and other mineral resources revenues. While maintaining a colonial
war and widespread repression, the colonial state tried to make it compatible with
reformist policies and alliances with some Angolan strata. Nevertheless, the struggle for
independence spread and, if eventually it was not reflected in guerrilla activities, the
progressive migration abroad and the adhesion of people to nationalist movements, or at
least ideas, made independence appear as a feasible project.
Reformism was neither capable of maintaining colonial rule under a changed
international environment nor to support the emergence of a 'Rhodesian' regime. Indeed,
'reformism under war' and the impossibility of a military victory over the guerrilla, played a
determinant role in state's outcomes and led, among other reasons, to the collapse of
98
. As Amilcar Cabral put it "Portugal cannot decolonise because it cannot neocolonise" (Cabral, 1972, quoted in Cohen, 1986: 49).
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fascism and the restoration of representative democracy in Portugal as well as to the
independence of the colonies. When 'everything' was going so well, with the economy of
Angola reaching its peak in 1973 and the guerrilla operations reduced, the 25th April coup
overthrew fascism, initiating the decolonisation.
Heimer argues that in the last years of colonialism, especially the early 70s, the
transition of Angola from a dependence of the metropolitan power to the integration in the
world system, was achieved (1980: 22). The restructuring of 'colonial reformism' implied
indeed a re-organisation in the hierarchy of economic processes which became more
complex: centre -> metropolitan power as a first periphery -> colony as a second
periphery (with urban areas as the centre) with its internal peripheries, the tributary
societies. Consequences of the restructuring were the emergence and/or consolidation of
the extracting and manufacturing industries, as well as free labour, the integration of some
tributary societies in the capitalist economy, and the expansion of some sectors which
were not directly dependent on the metropolitan economy.
However, the hierarchy of processes as established at independence existed already
before the 70s. As Sousa Ferreira points out, Portugal, in its relations with developed
countries, was a periphery in the sense that, among other aspects, it exported raw-
materials and imported manufactured goods and technology in an unequal exchange
scheme. The relations with the colonies were converse (1977: 43). Still, the relationship of
Portugal with the colonies was conditioned by its own position in the world system. Thus,
during the 'liberal' period the patterns of investment of non-Portuguese companies already
meant decision-making outside the metropolitan power. Dependence on the 'real centre'
was reinforced by non-Portuguese investment from the beginning of fascism and from the
progressive shift of Angolan exports from the metropolitan power to countries such as
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USA and the UK. 99 The mediating role of Portugal, as submetropolitan power in the
relations of the colony with the centre of the world system and its impact of the degree of
development of the colony at independence, led Bhagavan to argue that Angola "suffered
a double burden of underdevelopment" (1986: 144) which would condition the post-
colonial outcomes.
99.
	 See notes 16 (balance of trade in the 50s), and 34 (balance of trade in 1972-73): also Chapter 7 (foreign investment).
57
CHAPTER 2
NATIONALIST STRUGGLES AND THE TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE
The post-colonial society was not the passive result of the application of colonial policies
by the metropolitan state within the general framework of development of the world system.
Instead, it results from the dynamics between colonialism and Angolan formations, which always
responded, in diversified forms which changed and developed across the time, to colonial
oppression and changing policies, which were as well conditioned by Angolan resistance. In this
chapter, the Angolan responses to colonialism are outlined, as well as the developments during
the period of transition to independence. Lastly, the main social groups which would compete for
power in the post-colonial society are identified, in an attempt to explain the projects of rupture,
and the endurance of continuity.
2.1. Nationalism and struggles against colonialism
Notwithstanding the particular oppressive character of Portuguese colonialism,
throughout their history Angolans kept a permanent struggle against it, which assumed different
forms. This section discusses the different forms of peaceful protest and the 1961 revolts.
For centuries Angolan kingdoms fought to preserve independence. Progressively defeated,
in a process lasting from the 16th to the 20th centuries they were integrated within the borders of
the colony of Angola. Notwithstanding defeat, many former political units kept their traditional
power structures and demands, which from mid-19th century in many cases did not appear as
restricted to a given ethnic group.
Angolan nationalism' has its roots in the 19th century, when new forms of protest against
colonialism emerged, laying the basis for the future struggles for independence. The foundations
of nationalist demands which developed until independence may be found in the so-called
Brazilian revolts, motivated by the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade and the excessive
1 . On different concepts and forms of nationalism, see flobsbawn, 1990.
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centralization of decision-making in the metropolitan government. After the liberal revolution in
Portugal and the independence of Brazil in 1822, autonomist demands, some of settlers, some of
Creoles associated with precapitalist formations whose elites were not interested on the disruption
of slave trade, spread. 2 The 1823 Benguela secession, albeit motivated by slavery interests, both
of chiefs and settlers, and Brazi1 3 as well, was the first anticolonialist urban initiative. Indeed, part
of the region rebelled against colonial domination and seceded from Portugal, in an attempt to
unite to Brazil in a confederation (Confederacao Brasilica). The Benguela secession was defeated
and, after investigations and arrests, the colonial state responded by diverting trade from Bahia to
Lisbon and implementing controls over the communications between Benguela and Brazil (Silva
Rebelo, 1970: 235-38, 240-44, 249-52, 256-57, 259-61, 270-73, 283-84, 287-89). Furthermore,
in 1825 the metropolitan government signed a treaty with Brazil by which the latter undertook not
to interfere in Angolan affairs (Wheeler, 1971: 90-2). Notwithstanding this treaty, Brazilian
involvement in Angola's politics lasted until the 1870s, when this country turned to more
American-oriented politics, and from 1830 to 1845 the region of Benguela came under a new
rebellion which revealed the first structured alliance between chiefs and Benguela Creoles. The
persistence of 'Brazilian' revolts probably motivated the 1838 treaty between Portugal and
England, where the latter agreed to support Portugal in case of a general revolt in Angola
(Wheeler, 1971: 90-2, 104).
Brazilian-type attempts of autonomy continued in the second half of the 19th century ; but
it was during this period that new, more African centred developments of protest against
colonialism emerged in urban societies. They may be summarized as: i. expression of
independence demands of the Congo kingdom and involvement of Congo aristocrats and peasants
in struggles against colonialism, 5 ii. the emergence of the Angolan press, the diffusion of Angolans
2.Rebellions began with a troops revolt in Luanda, soon defeated. See CEA, 1975: 122; Silva Rebelo, 1970: 67-8, 76-81, 226-32, 247-51.
3. There were strong relations between Angola and Brazil to where a part of the slave trade was oriented. See, e.g., Silva Rebel°, 1970, on the period
1808-1830.
4.On settlers protest, centred, for example, on labour regulations, the convicted pattern of settlement, the lack of financial autonomy for the colony. the
centralisation of decision-making in metropolitan organs, see. e.g., Wheeler, 1971: 91-2, 104, 145, Ramos de Almeida: 1979, 25, 37, 227, and
Clarence-Smith. 1979: 57.
5.On the activities of two princes of Congo, Alexus and Nicholas, during this period, see Wheeler, 1972, Pelissier, 1977: 102-05, and Marcum. 1969:
21. 49-50.
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claims and a continuous development of autonomic and nationalist ideas, including the building of
the concept of Angolan nation, which constitute the ideological background of the 1910s protest
movements and the immediate ancestors of the 50s and 60s urban nationalist movement, and, iii.
the creation of the first African urban associations. These three elements of protest endured for
about one century and are constants in the country's history.
The 1st Republic was marked by a number of features. Firstly, the first African parties, and
autonomous social urban movements claiming the solution of specific problems, emerged.
Secondly, urban organisations allegedly cooperated with peasants societies in armed struggle.
Thirdly, at the level of political intervention, Africans and their former associates, Portuguese
republican exiles, dissociated and, as a consequence, a more African centred intervention
emerged. Fourthly, the first African representatives, elected by parties co-opted by the colonial
government, participated in the highest collective organ of the colony. Fifthly, workers adopted
(seldom) new forms of struggle, for example strikes. Sixth, there was the first 'great divide' among
Angolan reformers (now 'old Creoles') and their non-elitist, even socialising, partners, leading to
later radical developments. Seventh, the conquest, and resistance, of independent kingdoms
continued, paired with armed revolts of submitted precapitalist formations ruined and disrupted by
forced labour and taxes. 6 Finally, the consequent failure to implement the political constitution of
liberalism in this context meant responses of the colonial state which did not differ substantially
from the overall patterns of Portuguese colonialism. Peasants rebellions were crashed bloodly in
the 'conquest' style. Non-violent protest often met censorship, suspension of publishing of
newspapers, dismissal of civil servants, deportation and prison. Also, the 1st Republic prepared in
Angola the repressive background for fascist oppression. From the early 1920s, colonial
authorities committed themselves to preventive repression of nationalist demands by: i. the ban of
African press (1921-22), ii. the ban of local associations, iii. the revocation of African
participation at the Legislative Council and the ban of Liga and Gremio Angolano in 1922, as well
as Liga's newspaper, iv. imprisonment and deportation of journalists, whether European or
6
. On the wars between the colonial power and Angolan kingdoms during this period, see, e.g.. Principe, 1956, Sousa Dias, 1957, Clarerioc-Smith,
1979, Wheeler, 1971, Pelissier, 1977 and Chilcote, 1972: 286, 293.
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African, as well as Angolan urban intellectuals accused of supporting peasants rebellions, v.
repression of workers movements against forced labour and dismissal of top colonial officials
sympathising with workers demands, and, at the level of direct cultural repression, vi. the ban in
1921 of teaching and printing in national languages (Wheeler, 1971: 123-25 and 151).
Thus some characteristics of fascism already existed in Angola when the 1926 coup d'etat
took place. 7 Still, the New State' provided repression with a legitimating legal framework and
reinforced the colonial domination. Preventive repression led to new deportations and arrests after
the 1926 coup (Wheeler, 1971: 145). Since then, political protest was invisible, as political parties
and many associations were banned, the media controlled, demonstrations forbidden and any type
of protest, even petitions, could mean an individual's imprisonment or, in Angola, 'missing'. Until
the 60s urban protest followed the 'liberal tradition' of non-violence. During this period, the large
migration of Kikongo to Zaire originated a new axis for protest at Kinshasa, where Angolan
emigres organised. Peasants unrest was channelled through different religious movements whose
leaders were persecuted by the colonial authorities.
After two decades of apparent social peace, notwithstanding the arrest and deportation of
selected individuals, Angolan protest re-emerged with new, mainly clandestine, patterns
demonstrating that preventive repression could not eliminate previous demands. The violent
repression of different forms of protest radicalised Angolan elites who moved into armed struggle,
while steps to integrate this struggle at a national level were made. Later the particular control of
opponents in towns led the centre of protest to shift into peasant areas, while in towns residents,
without the possibility of organising significant political activities, reinforced the associations
movement which became a form of resistance to the reinforcement of cultural oppression and
racism.
From the outbreak of the war of independence, the 'soft' Portuguese fascism slid in the
colonies to massive killing grounded on race and religious aspects, only hampered by the need of
7
. On fascism see. e.g.. Capella, 1986: 44-6.
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different patterns of domination as Portugal had to resort to foreign capital to finance colonial
wars. 8
2.1.1. Urban protest and the movement of ideas
Three cultural movements played a crucial role in the development of Angolan nationalism
and the post-independence project of change: i. the 19th century protest writing, 9 Voice of
Angola lo and the Message movement.
Message protest
After two decades of silence imposed by censorship, a youth movement, 'Let's discover
Angola', emerged in Luanda in 1948. The movement resulted from the awareness of the gap
between intellectuals (the urban elites) and workers and peasants, so "it was necessary to
undertake the discovery of the people" (Jacinto, 1986: 4). Under the umbrella of Anangola,
research, writing and discussion groups led to the publication of the journal Mensagem
8. On the support to the colonial war by Western powers. see Minter, 1972.
9. During the period of 'free press' (1867-1922), settlers, the Angolan bourgeoisie, Portuguese exiles and Brazilians were involved in the local press.
The freedom of press was restricted: the governor had censorship powers and many journalists were arrested and deported. The most important feature
of the Angolan press of this period was the creation of the concept of 'SOILS of the country', that is the concept of Angolan nationality, as contrasted with
the Portuguese one or the fragmented ethnical nationalities. Also, from the 1880s there were suggestions for the creation of organisations of Angolans
to defend their interests as such. The Angolan press also contributed to the awareness of Angolans by its strong criticism of colonial policies, for
example against slavery and forced labour, discrimination of 'sons of the country in education and jobs, especially the civil service, corruption and
inefficiency of the colonial state (Wheeler, 1972: 70-3, and Castro Lopo, 1962: 15-20, 1963, 23-9, 1964: 11-29, 63, 65-8). However, the majority of
journalists of this generation just claimed for reforms of colonialism. They constitute the ideological ancestors of the African social group known as
'old Creoles', since protest had a defensive character, within the context of the slow furthering of colonial domination, by expansion of conquest and the
restructuring of the colonial economy. See, e.g., Wheeler, 1972, Castro Lopo 1963 and 1964 and Freitas, 1975: 369-78.
10. "Voz de Angola Clamando no Deserto" ("The Voice of Angola Crying in Wilderness - Offered to the Friends of Truth by the Natives"), first
edition, Lisbon 1901 (here the 1984 edition is used). The immediate cause of 'Voice of Angola' were the racist declarations, in 1893, at the parliament
and press in Portugal: i. black people should not have citizenship rights, and, ii. blacks and mulattos should be banned from leadership posts and the
civil service, the army and the police, where they should be substituted by settlers (Voice of Angola, 1984: 137). This proposal, and the racist
campaign that followed, was an aggression against Angolan elites, and also the ideological background of the 1914 and fascist legislation on the civil
service and the 'native status' (see section 1.2.1). After the ultimatum crisis of 1890 and the Fontes Pereira case (Wheeler, 1972: 76-8, 1971: 99-102.
and Castro Lopo. 1964: 76-9), colonial racism increased and a tie* censorship in was imposed. The first measures to bar the access of Angolans to the
civil service were adopted, land expropriation increased, jeopardising the positions of African elites, while slavery continued. As a part of local elites
were in the civil service, the strengthening of colonial oppression was fiercely resented. Angolan journalists responded with "Voice of Angola", a work
produced from 1890 to 1901. Voice of Angola dealt with many problems of colonisation as seen by urban Angolans in the turn of the century,
constituted the first anticolonialist document from the Portuguese colonies and was later a source of inspiration for nationalist movements. Claims for
independence are not the main subject of articles, which generally call for reforms within the colonial framework, but there is an explicit reference to,
when stating that the bars to the education of Angolans aimed to prevent thdependence (1984: 28). A natural right to rebellion is also argued for
(1984: 131-32), while there is an appeal to all Angolans, whatever their race and as opposed to metropolitan whites, to unite in the struggle against
white racism and discrimination (1984: 100-01, 97, 134, 154). The civilising mission is questicaed, mainly by contrasting the (bad) quality of
Europeans to the virtues of Angolans, especially blacks, who are approached as naturally good (1984: 53, 131, 162). Still, in an article race relations
are seen as a result of the relationship between oppressed and oppressors (1984: 159), while other refers to social differentiations among Angolans
(1984: 148). On law and rights, Voice of Angola argues for the maintenance of citizenship rights and the guarantee of equality under the law without
"selections of races or separations of colours" (1984:149). it claims for an effective right to education emphasising its impact in the labour market and
access to jobs, as well as ma project for independence (1984: 27-8, 53, 66, 131, 162). There is also protest against forced labour, corruption of civil
servants involved, and the attitudes of Europeans towards Angolan workers (e.g., 1984: 51, 69). On land, a sensitive point for the survival of urban
elites who were landowners. Voice of Angola claims against land expropriation and the fact that many concessions granted by the colonial state to
settlers were not farmed, while stressing the performance of Angolans in agriculture (e.g., 1984: 24, 96).
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(Message). Censorship was so strong that the Message generation had to resort to poetry to pass
nationalist claims. Themes of Message writers were the dignifying of everyday life of people, the
praising of Africa, and protest against colonialism, racism, forced labour and political repression.11
Message borrowed from the 'Voice of Angola' and republican heritage, while influenced by the
spreading of nationalist and pan-African ideas after WW2. An important influence in the content
of the movement was the oral tradition transmitted by the ruined Mbundu elites to young
intellectuals who composed the movement (Vieira, 1989: 69-71).
Message was essential to the emergence of present Angola because: i. it achieved the
rupture with the Portuguese (colonial) frame of references giving birth to the organised project of
independence based on an Angolan identity, 12 ii. enlarged the frame of references to Africa and
the world, inserting internationalism into the Angolan culture and building international links, iii.
developed a radical protest against oppression, economic and cultural, centred in a collective
hope, which created the 'great collective dream' of independence. 13 In short, it achieved a
'qualitative leap', as contrasted with 'old Creole' protest: with Message Angolan protest became
offensive and originated a radical socio-political group, the 'new Creoles', composed by the post
WW2 generation, who promoted armed struggle and later played an important role in the socialist
option.
The fascist state was keen in repressing the emergence of a national consciousness in the
colonies and, in general, any form of antifascist culture. All the organisations, their journals and/or
directions, involved, directly or indirectly, in the Message movement were banned in the 50s and
60s (Freitas, 1975, Margarido, 1980, Andrade, 1980, Vieira, 1989, and Jacinto, 1986). Still,
11.See. e.g, Jacinto, 1986, Margarido, 1980, Vieira, 1989, Andrade, 1980, and Davidson, 1972.
12. Viriato da Cruz, one of most brilliant leading members of this generation wrote about 'Let's Discover Angola': 'The movement should revive, but
mainly by other methods, the fighting spirit of the African writers of the and of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th. This movement fought the
exaggerated respect for Western cultural values (many of them outdated); it incitated youngsters to rediscover Angola in all its aspects through a
collective and organised work; exhorted to produce for the people; asked for the study of foreign modem cultural trends, but with the target to rethink
and nationalise their valid and positive creations; it demanded the expression of popular interests and a genuine African nature, but without
concessions to the thirst for colonial exoticism. Everything should be based in the African esthetic sense, intelligence, will and reason" (quoted in
Andrade, 1980: 6). See also Davidson, 1972: 157-58.
13.See e.g.: i. internationalism, Viriato poem "Black Mother" (Andrade, 1980: 155 and translated in Davidson, 1972: 159), ii. radical protest, Jacinto
poem Monangamba (translated by Wolfers, 1979), iii. on independence project and struggle, Neto poems "We shall return" (translated by Wolfers,
1979) and "Haste" (translated by Holness, 1975).
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repression reinforced the radicalism of urban elites and the Message movement would play a
crucial role in the shaping of the MPLA Manifesto of 1956.14
2.1.2. Urban associations
Freedom of association, although restricted to non-party organisations, allowed the
creation of the first local formal associations by settlers in mid-19th century. Opponents to the
colonial state joined social clubs which were centres for political discussions. The most significant
for future Angolan developments were the Republican clubs where Portuguese political exiles,
part of the Creole bourgeoisie and Angolan intellectuals associated (Wheeler, 1971: 72, 91-2,
103, 105, and Castro Lopo, 1963: 7-9). From 1874 informal Angolan urban associations
organising Carnival dances (Ribas, 1965: 43-4), 15 from 1880 professional African organisations,
and from 1900 cultural, recreation and mutual-aid formal associations spread (Ribas, 1965).16
These associations, were the organisational background for the Angolan parties founded after the
proclamation of the Portuguese 1st Republic.
Associations of all kinds spread during the republican period (Ribas, 1965). 'Education of
the People - Mutual Assistance' is a special case since it fought for a specific objective, the
development of education in Angola, and its experience allowed a deepening of nationalism, of
more radical tones. Also, the association used new techniques, for example promoting the first
peaceful African demonstration noticed in Luanda. 17 Except for the Association of Civil Servants,
it seems that no organised unionism emerged from the post-republican enlarged civil liberties.
14. See section 2.1.3. The first generation of Message (for Luandino Vieira Message had two generations, and he belongs to the second, 1989: 68)
after the attempts of fascism to destroy their cultural groups and the ban of their journal turned into direct political action and become the founders not
only of MPLA in 1956 but, some of them, of the Angolan Communist Party (PCA) in 1955 and PLUA in early 1956.
15. See Ribas, 1965: 43-55 for the organisation of Carnival up to the 1950s.
16.The majority of founders referred to by Ribas were civil servants and skilled workers (e.g. printers), (op.cit.: 27, 29-33).
17.The association was created by a civil servant and journalist, A.J. Miranda, who denounced abuses against African workers, fought elitism among
Creole parties and journalists, opposed the colonial state directly by refusing to collect taxes and founded the clandestine party referred to below.
Miranda brought innovations to the content of nationalism by his opposition to the instituted system, his emphasis in the 'people' component of diange,
and revived the timid reference of Voice of Angola linking the prospects for independence to knowledge and education. On 'Education of the People'
and Miranda, see Samuels, 1972.
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Under fascism associations became played an important role in the diffusion of nationalist
ideas, the defence of indigenous culture and the mobilisation of youth. Liga Nacional Africana"
and (Anangola), 19 which probably integrated the remaining members of former political parties,
were the most important. The associations aimed to supply welfare services to members and
support the recognition of their rights (Wheeler: 1971: 147).
From the late 40s emerged in towns other cultural associations which contributed to the
diffusion of nationalism and the education of Angolan elites and mobilisation for nationalist
struggles although they had not the direct political impact of Liga and Anangola (e.g., Marcum,
1969: 105-11, 113-14, Jacinto, 1986: 4, Pelissier, 1978: 238-39, and Ramos, 1991: 11).
Refugees abroad created many mutual-aid and cultural associations which originated,
especially in Zaire, 'secondary' political parties from the independence of that country. Marcum
refers to various Kikongo associations in Zaire. For example, Simao Toco, a Kikongo prophet
who in the 1940s launched the first Angolan (Protestant) church, 2 ° initiated his activities in the
early 40s in Kinshasa where he created a mutual-aid and educational association for Bazombo
resident in Zaire. In 1956 his followers founded an "ethnical mutual-aid association", Assornizo,
later the political party Alliazo (Marcum, 1969: 72-9, 82-3, 89, 92-3, 291-92).
18. Li. ga remained an important organisation where reformist 'old Creoles' committed themselves to the 'politics of collaboration', as Wheeler calls it,
that is, fighting for the rights of Angolans within the colonial system. In 1938 Liga petitioned the participation of African representatives at the colony
Council of Government, which was granted in 1946. Integrating many members of the Angolan bureaucracies, Liga argued for their rights and
obtained the ban of the racist division in the civil service. Liga also subsidised schools and provided scholarships and medical care, while remaining a
social club for the resistance of urban culture. Although Liga continued to display its loyalty to the colonial state and gave an image of neutrality in
forthcoming events, from the 40s colonial authorities often suspended Liga's elected organs substituting them by 'administrative committees' of 'loyal
Angolans' (Wheeler, 1971: 135, 148-9, and Vieira, 1989: 69).
19.Anangola. paralleled Liga in 'reformist politics' and welfare and cultural activities. The cultural movement "Mensagem" (Message) generated and
developed from 1948 in this association. Also, the first clashes of a second wave of conflicts between 'reformists' and 'radicals' are reported at
Anangola, when the younger members of the association began to contest the approaches of 'elders' on the future of the country. Still, as a result of its
alleged connections with nationalist movements, Anangola had to face the early 60s wave of repression but managed to survive (Jacinto: 1986: 4).
20. Tokoism is a 'country variation of urban reformism centred in protest against white racism and forced labour. The religion argued against white
rule and challenged tradition, looking at chiefs and elders as mediators of orders from whites and contesting their authority. Tokoism avoided all
unnecessary contacts with whites (Marcum, 1969: 80-1, and Margariclo, 1972: 38, 42-5, 50). Tokoism did not challenge white rule at the political
level. It urged Angolans to go to schools and learn Portuguese to be able to find free jobs and achieve legal protest (Margarido: 1972, 50). It also
encouraged members either to work voluntarily in agriculture and trade with any white, or to prevent forced labour by migrating to towns or abroad.
So many Tokoists left Angola, mainly to Zaire, where they were "good workers in colonial undertakings" (Margariclo, 1972: 45, 47, 50, and Marcum,
1969: 82). "Tokoism awakened a strong current of opposition to forced labour in the plantations of Angola" and its social base were migrant labourers
(Andrade, quoted in Braganca and Wallerstein, 1982: 11). The colonial authorities persecuted Tokoists, deporting Toco and some followers, but later,
during reformism tried to ally with them since apparently they refused to integrate 'violent' nationalist movements. On Tokoism, see, e.g., Margarido,
1972 and Marcum, 1969, espec. 82-3, 88-9, 95, 98, 161-62, 170-7, and 204-05 (political activities of Tocoists).
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These associations, where Angolan elites concentrated, were thus the background of
political groups created from the mid 50s. Cultural and social associations were thus for 1950s
nationalist movements what the 19th century republican clubs were for the 1910s political parties.
But the associations movement was larger. In the 50s university students connected to CEI,21
created many popular clubs (Vieira, 1989: 71, 69). 'Old Creoles' were also active in promoting all
kinds of associations, especially from the mid 30s.22
The slums associations were mainly sports clubs and dance groups (Ribas, 1965: 44-6,
100-05, and Bettencourt, 1965: 119-22). As colonial repression was reinforced with the outbreak
of the independence war and racism increased with the inflow of settlers, the slums associations
kept the tradition of solidarity and cultural resistance. From the 1960s, filed at the police,
surrounded by barbed wire, having to exhibit passbooks, with no unions rights, under permanent
repression from the police, the mobile slums population developed autonomous forms of
organisation which enabled it to solve its own problems in the absence of political organisations
and later to adopt more advanced forms of community participation when it was allowed. With no
access to the elites 'asphalt' associations, such as Liga and Anangola, the slums population direct
relations with nationalist movements did not appear widespread, as the shortage of urban
operations during the independence war shows. By its own initiative, the slums population
continued the associations movement, although the practice of withdrawing elected leaders when
they did not comply with colonial rule, persisted. The associations contributed to the social base
of the 1974-75 movements.23
2.1.3. Political parties
The underground political parties which emerged in the 1950s were preceded by the
experiences of Liga and Gremio during the Republican period. In the last decades of the 19th
century Angolan elites had been associated to Portuguese exiles, the majority of them republican.
21. On CEI, see. e.g.. Margarido, 1980, Andrade, 1980, Freitas, 1975, and Jacinto, 1986.
22. Luanda African associations listed by Ribas at "Izomba" have as founders representatives of the big Creole families (1965: 33-6).
23. See subsection 2.2.1.
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This fact conditioned the expectations that the emergence of the 1st Republic would mean
autonomy for the colony (Wheeler, 1971: 71). This proved to be a "failure of hope", using
Samuels' expression. 24 Local political parties were founded from 1910: Liga Angolana and
Gremio Africano. 25 Both became members, respectively, of the pan-Portuguese colonies Liga
Africana and Partido Nacional Africano, created in Lisbon with goals such as the revocation of all
discriminatory legislation and land reforms to protect the rights of Africans (Wheeler, 1971: 115-
18).
Liga Angolana
Liga is the main reference for nationalist groups during the first decades of the 20th
century. In Liga newspaper, Angolense, emerged more radical ideas, for example arguing for
independence. Also, in Liga circles the 'great divide' between 'reformists' and 'radicals' became
transparent with, for example, Paixdo Franco dissent. 26 Still, although Liga was keen to assert its
loyalty to the colonial power, the party soon acquired a reputation of being 'anti-European' among
settlers and colonial authorities. In 1914 and 1917 Liga was accused of "conspiring with
rebellious tribesmen" (Wheeler, 1971: 117). The accusations of Liga cooperation with peasants
rebellions were never proved but in the concerned period there were the rebellion of Tulante Buta
in Congo (1913-15), the Dembos (1916-17), Amboim and Seles (1917) revolts and the Cuanyama
resistance the Portuguese invasion from 1914 to 1917. Under this excuse the colonial state
arrested, with no evidence or trials, many Liga members in 1917, while settlers burned villages in
'retaliation'. In 1921, after the so-called Catete Revolt, concert between urban intellectuals and
peasants protesters was an excuse for the repression of Angolan intellectuals, their organisations
and press, which included the ban of Liga and Grernio and reduced this generation to silence
24. 1972, title of article.
25. A number of Creole clubs merged in 1912 to set up a new party, aimingto fight for the general interests of Angola and the rights of its members as
well as for the development of education. Although the majority of Liga's members were black and mulatto Angolans, the party was open to whites and
natives from the other Portuguese colonies. Gramio African° resulted from a division within Liga.
26. See Castro Lopo, 1964: 80-1, Freitas: 1975, 380-82 (Pabdio Franco), and Samuels, 1972: 57 (A.J. Miranda). Pabtlio Franco created in 1902 the
journal "Luz e Crenca" (Light and Belief) and wrote as well in Angolense; accordingto Mario Antonio "we see the tendency of the author to facts of
recent history, mainly those related to the struggle for liberties, and, especially, the promotion of oppressed classes. Events of workers struggles in
Europe are often referred to. Although stating that his aspiration was only freedom, with no regard to the system institutionalising it, it is certain that
his sympathy seems to go to socialist doctrines, given his emphatic elicitation of the people, often repeated" (quoted in Freitas, 1975: 381-82).
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(Wheeler, 1972: 81). 27 Still, sparse references remark on the creation of a clandestine party (a
secret society "aiming to kill whites", according to colonial sources) by about 1914 (Samuels,
1972: 58 and note 20) and the endurance of a (probably underground) Socialist Party in the 1930s
(Vieira, 1989: 69).
The MPLA Manifesto
During the 50s various clandestine political movements emerged in towns. Given the later
hegemony of the 'official nationalist movements' (MPLA, FNLA and UNITA) we know very little
about them. 28 In Luanda the most important trend seems the creation of the Angolan Communist
Party (PCA) in 1955, which committed 'suicide' in the next year as its members concluded that
"the situation of the working class did not allow the advance of the party and it
was necessary to conduct our work in such a way that we could group the largest
possible number of people. The only way of achieving it was an organisation of
national type." (Jacinto, 1986: 4)29
PCA was dispersed into PLUA, founded in the beginning of 1956, which merged with
other clandestine groups, especially MINA, to form MPLA in December 1956 (e.g., Jacinto,
1986). MPLA produced then a Manifesto innovating political protest and inserting goals not
reached until the 90s. The Manifesto: i. is anti-imperialist demanding an "Africa for the
Africans",30 ii. argues for a different form of protest, the armed struggle, iii. calls for a broad class
participation, "revolutionary struggle by an wide front which will not consider political options,
social situation, religious beliefs, philosophical tendencies", and, iv. connects the project of
independence to a more concrete form of state, adding the idea of democracy and formulating as
goals of the movement "to make Angola an independent state, to install an Angolan government,
democratic and popular ... of all forces which fought".
27.A powerful denouncement of the 1920s repression of intellectuals related to protest against land expropriation is made in Assis Junior, 1984.
28.See. e.g,. Marcum 1969, Pelissier, 1978, and Ramos, 1991.
29.On the working class, see subsection 1.2.3.; PCA, which was a multiracial organisation of Angolans, faced an additional problem, the existence in
the country of a communist group, affiliated to the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), (Mingas quoted in Freitas, 1975: 102).
30.Quotations of the MPLA Manifesto refer to the 10th December 1956 Manifesto as published in JA, 10.12.1976.
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The Manifesto also protested against the economic and social problems arising from
colonialism: i. concessions to foreign enterprises, especially in mining, and export of profits, ii.
privileges of metropolitan capital as contrasted with local capital, especially in licensing, iii. land
concessions to settlers and non-recognition of Africans rights on land, iv. barriers to 'native'
traders and privileges of bush traders, v. forced labour, low wages, discrimination against blacks
by restricting them to manual work, absence of social rights and security, as well as the working
conditions generally approached as overexploitation leading to "a policy of murder of the black
people of Angola", and, vi. the costs of access to education. It also refers to the low living
standards of the Angolan middle-class and the living conditions of the poor. It denounces cultural
oppression, especially the destruction of national languages, the historical bias, the undermining of
Negroes self-esteem and the destruction of traditional social structures, including the 'native'
(extended) family.
The technology of organisation is the other innovative aspect of the Manifesto, since it
emphasised initiative and creativity of loose organisations. 33- Throughout its history, MPLA often
worked as such. Indeed, due to extreme difficulties of communications in the framework of fascist
repression, many MPLA sympathisers in urban areas and guerrillas operating within the country,
lived and worked in self-management with no permanent contact with the leadership. Because
many Angolans took the Manifesto seriously, they organised in almost all the towns of the
country and took many initiatives not giving the leadership even time to produce a decision on the
subject. This allowed MPLA to ensure the participation of a wide range of social groups in the
struggle for independence and to become the only nationalist movement with a national adhesion
(that is, including people from all races, tribes and regions). Whenever they could, MPLA leaders
tried to achieve this control but during colonialism it proved impossible.
31
.
 ..MPLA will be the sum of the activities of thousands and thousands of organisations ... which will be created all over Angola ... organisations of
family, neighbourhood, work place or residence, study, culture, entertainment, sports ... Individuals should begin to organise themselves in terms of
their most felt, immediate and of everyday life interests. ... (and) "unification of organisations will be made through the effort of each organisation to
achieve the goals and principles of the Manifesto.... through ideas, principles and goals common to all organisations, to all organised Angolans."
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Congo revival, the Kinshasa axis and UPA/FNLA
The colonial authorities intervened frequently, and especially from the 1850s, in the
kingdom's politics either by promoting the appointment of kings of their choice or by repressing
protest against 'friendly' rulers. In 1913, the Tulante Buta rebellion challenged, among others, the
king of Congo due to his role in the supply of forced labour. The king was deposed but the
endurance of the forced labour supply motivated a significant migration of the Kikongo 32
 to Zaire
(Marcum, 1969: 52-4). The colonial authorities intervened in the king's succession in 1955 to
prevent a Protestant from becoming the new king. The incidents which followed the protest from
Kikongo aristocrats led the colonial army to Mbanza-Congo, the kingdom capital, and the arrest
and deportation of many Kikongo (Marcum, 1969: 56-61). But the most important outcome of
the 1955 succession conflict was the emergence of UPA/FNLA.
One of the groups involved in the king's election conflict, the 'Leopoldville group', from
1952 had contacts with USA officials. In 1955 they petitioned for a UN trusteeship of the
kingdom, which would be administered by the USA. After the events in Mbanza-Congo, the
Leopoldville and the Matadi groups (Necaca, Pinock and Holden Roberto) asked the USA to
intervene, arguing that the kingdom "is a territory separated of Angola, to which it had been
unjustly united in 1884", while emphasising that the Portuguese colony was the territory from
what they called Ngola (Marcum, 1969: 61-2). 33 During the 50s these royalists created UPNA at
Kinshasa and, when the king died in 1957, turned back to action at the international level to get
support for the restoration of the kingdom. USA officials promoted contacts between UPNA and
recently independent Ghana. African leaders criticised ICikongo royalists and advised Roberto to
change demands and fight for the independence of Angola. UPNA was thus transformed into
UPA and became, according to its statutes, an organisation of all Angolans aiming to install in the
country a democratic regime of peasants and workers (Marcum, 1969: 61-7, 91, and Ramos,
1991: 9).
32. In this work the expression Kikongo is used to refer to the Angolan Bakongo. I am grateful to Ambassador Toka (himself a Kikongo) for his
remark that Angolan Bakongo call themselves Kikmgo to differentiate from Congolese and Zairian Bakongo since they identify themselves primarily
as Angolans, and Bakongo is a secondary identification, as fleimer generally argued (see note 102).
33. Letter quoted in Marcum, 1969: 62; on Kilcongo nationalism in the 19th century, see, e.g., Wheeler, 1972.
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The royalists of the Kivuzi clan, other opponents of the "Leopoldville group' in the
election of the king, and Kikongo who did not accept the Accra 1958 arrangements to abandon
demands for the restoration of the kingdom, created in 1959 Ngwizako, a party for negotiations
with the colonial authorities. However, its expectations proved wrong when its members were
forbidden to cross the border. After the independence of Zaire Ngwizako became a political party
and would fight UPA hegemony among Kikongo migrants for the next decades (Marcum, 1969:
91-2).
Although Ngwizako kept the kingdom's flame for the next years, UPA 'Angolanity'
lectured by African leaders was only apparent, as events demonstrated. In 1961, UPA activities
restrained themselves mainly to the Kikongo zone, while rebels were committed to kill non-
Kikongo, the 'invaders' of the kingdom territory. In 1974, again, UPA/FNLA expelled from the
territory 'foreigners', for example Ovimbundu workers. In Zaire, during the independence war,
UPA/FNLA maintained military bases and exercised political power in areas of the kingdom,
while ruling, as a state within the Zairian state, the life of Angolan Kikongo. The policies of the
fascist state on the shaping of traditional power institutions have in the Congo kingdom its most
striking example of negative functions: instead of taming 'natives' into 'assimilation', they
generated a nationalist movement whose rebellion in the next years had high social costs, while
loosing Kikongo labour for colonial coffee plantations.
2.1.4. The 1961 revolts
Peasants often responded to oppression with messianic movements (e.g., Chilcote, ed.,
1972). Two peasants movements, actually led by 'provincial Creoles', were important for further
outcomes of nationalist movements, because many of their members later joined them and also
because they had a large social base. They are the Mbundu Maria movement in Malanje (Mbundu)
and Tokoism, of a Kikongo origin.34
34. See note 20.
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All the Mbundu region had a lasting contact with the Portuguese culture and colonial
oppression, and it was the most important cotton producing area. With the emergence of
cottoncracy in the region in 1926, protest was led by some Creoles who in 1927 sent a letter of
protest against colonialism to the League of Nations and were deported by the colonial
authorities. In 1930 a religious movement, known as Moise Noir, arose in the region. Its main
feature was the belief that "American Negroes would come to liberate Angola from Portuguese
oppression" (Marcum, 1969: 47). Although apparently a religious movement, it was banned
(Pelissier, 1978: 184, and Marcum, 1969: 47-8).35
In 1960 a new Malanjian messianic movement, led by a prophet, Ant6nio Mariano,
emerged. The Maria movement made the 1961 peasants rebellion against the compulsory farming
of cotton and appeared as the peasants response to Cotonang rule in the region, preceding the
Luanda revolt and the northern uprising. According to its code of conduct, the movement was
anti-authoritarian, challenging traditional power, anti-European and against forced labour,
egalitarian and anti-colonialist.36
At a time of fall in cotton prices, the peasants of Baixa de Cassanje adhered massively to
the movement, including some chiefs. From January 1961 they refused contacts or to comply with
the dictates of station chiefs and Cotonang officials, while the order to leave fields and refuse to
pay taxes spread. It has been a peaceful rebellion, with no killings or use of weapons and the
rebels, in the first stage were only avoiding to plant cotton (Pelissier, 1978: 409-18 and Ramos,
1991: 10).
Repression which followed demonstrates the behaviour of some foreign enterprises in
underdeveloped countries and their links with oppressive governments. Cotonang complained to
the colonial state arguing for strong repression, and it seems that pressure even came from
35. Pelissier argues that it was probably the movement known as Kazonkola, connected to Garveyism and led by Mbundu elites.
36. Rule 1: "not to work for the whites any more and to cut all contacts with them", rule 2: 'to break all relations with blacks working for whites or
refusing to join the movement", rule 4: 'to abolish hierarchies in the villages, the chief has the same value as his subjects", and rule 15: "to expend all
one's money since, after the arrival of Maria, money will be changed and equally distributed among us". Maria would announce herself by a tempest
whidi would forever separate Angola from Portugal. As the tempest ended, Maria would arrive, resurrecting the dead and killed livestock. Then
Lumumba would come to govern the country. While expecting the tetnpest to come, people should comply with the code of conduct_ (Frade report,
quoted in Pelissier, 1978: 412, note 40, and Ramos, 1991: 10).
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Brussels. As the station chiefs arrested protesters, rebels expelled bush traders and Cotonang
officials from some villages. After these events the colonial army bombed the Baixa with napalm,
burning villages, and, guided by the station chiefs, killed in "a repression with no nuances", even
burying peasants alive (Pelissier, 1978: 417-18, Freitas, 1975: 133). The Baixa de Cassanje
rebellion was last non-violent protest by peasants in the fascist period. Still, it was the only victory
of African peasants in the beginning of the independence war: the legislation on cotton
compulsory farming and sale was repealed, although it had cost 20,000 Angolan lives (Ramos,
1991: 10).
With peasants in armed struggle
In 1959 the political police reinforced repression of the urban secret organisations, which
led to the '50s trial', where different anti-colonialists were assembled. 37 In 1960 the arrest of
Agostinho Neto was followed by a demonstration of the people of his native village demanding
his release. Police forces intervened killing demonstrators, who had been mobilised by MPLA.38
Disbelief in non-violent protest led to the 4th February 1961 revolt in Luanda, a suicidal
simultaneous attack of the Luanda political prisons and a police station by MPLA groups." The
majority of rebels were inhabitants of the slums. Portuguese policemen were killed but rebels did
not succeed in releasing prisoners. The accounts of the organisation of the revolt are
contradictory, although unanimous that MPLA participated and it aimed to release the political
prisoners who were arrested without trial for about two years. The controversies on the 4th
37. The '50s' trial (actually 58) divided defendants among racial lines into 3 cases: 12 mulatto and 3 black Angolans, including two musicians of
Ngola Ritmos (leading a musical raiewal linked to Message) and 3 foreigners, a Ghanaian, a Cuban and an American negro; in this case 3 were
judged in absentia; ii. 5 whites, 1 mulatto and one black, including 4 Portuguese residents and a member of Message (Helder Nato); iii. 30 black, 2
mulatto and 1 white Angolan, plus an American journalist; in this case 12 were judged in absentia and, among others: Antonio Jacinto and Deolinda
Rodrigues (Brazil), Viriato da Cruz and Mario de Andrade (Paris), the American journalist and 3 FNLA leaders (Roberto, Pinock and Necaca, who
were at Kinshasa). (figures based on the list of defendants, Marcum, 1969: 33-4 and note 63). Pelissier argues that the majority of defendants belonged
to IqINA or to MPLA (1978: 250-51).
38. See, e.g., Braganca and V‘ Tallerstein, 1982: 66-73, 181-87, Pelissier, 1978: 310-11, Davidson, 1972: 185, Jacinto, 1986: 5 and Ramos, 1991: 9.
39. Rebels used cutting tools, with which they could not face the colonial army guns; the attack to the prisons was repeated on the 11th February (e.g..
Ramos, 1991: 10).
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February are about who ordered it and why. 4') The obscure points seem related to the 'free
initiative' of loose organisations. Still, a FRAIN declaration in May 1960 refers to the
organisation, by MPLA, of forthcoming action in Luanda. With the presence in the town of
foreign journalists who were, at least so they said, awaiting the hijacked Portuguese vessel S.
Maria, the Angolan revolution was finally in the headlines.4'
Settlers and the colonial state responded with white terrorism, massively murdering people
in Luanda slums and burning huts. 42
 Repression forced nationalist protesters, some of them
MPLA militants and sympathisers, to hide in the forests. There, apparently with no contacts with
the leadership, they participated in the 1961 peasants rebellion led by UPA/FNLA. 43
 Indeed,
mimicking MPLA, UPA ordered the beginning of an armed rebellion in Congo's areas, which
spread to the Dembos region. However, UPA did not even control many commanders, some of
them actually MPLA members acting under cover, which made the March 1961 events rather
confusing. 44
 The rebellion expanded in the coffee regions where Mbundu and Kikongo small
farmers, forced labourers, and other opponents to colonialism, rose against the authorities,
plantation owners and their employees. It appears more as a rebellion of small farmers and
contracted labourers than organised actions towards armed struggle for independence. Kikongo
insurgents killed people on a racial basis, such as whites and mulattos, on cultural and tribal
grounds, for example educated blacks and Ovimbundu forced labourers (Pelissier, 1978: 435,
524, 526, 558, Marcum, 1969: 145, 192, and Ramos, 1991: 9). Thus the UPA 1961 actions
40.On this discussion see, e.g.. Marcum, 1969: 126-30, Pelissier, 1978: 363-85 and Davidson, 1972: 190-92; also, among Angolans, Saydi Mingas
(quoted in Freitas. 1975: 67),  Mendes de Carvalho (writer Uanhenga Xitu, an ideologist of Mbundu agrarians and a former president of the 4th
February Committee at the time arrested for the '50s trial'), (quoted in Ramos, 1991: 11-12), an anonymous, ex-member of MPLA direction at the time
in prison (quoted in Agualusa, 1991: 20).
41.On FRAIN and Andrade declarations, Braganca and Wallerstein, 1982: 8-10; also, Neto, quoted in Freitas, 1975: 74-5.
42. On the repression of the 4111 February, Marcum, 1969: 128-29, Pelissier, 1978: 387-91 and 570 (where he refers the special hate of settlers to
'blacks with glasses' they saw as 'Llunumbists) and Davidson, 1972: 192-96; Portuguese witness (military) declared in 1991, about life in Luanda in
February and March 1961: "As the night falls, the doors are locked, life disappears and we cannot listen to the laughs of women drinking vermouth in
the colonial homes, h is the (time of) hunting of the 'turra' (colonial slang for 'terrorists). Civilian militias incite the troops to the massacre: eye for eye,
tooth for tooth. the (Portuguese) 'soft customs' fell down", and "women whose sons and husbands we took away did not even ay any more" (quoted in
Cabrita, 1991:7); according to Angolan sources, settlers and colonial soldiers made thousands of killings in the slums, and built digs where they even
buried people alive (Ramos, 1991: 12).
43.Davidson. 1972: 192-96 and Neto declarations quoted in Freitas, 1975, 74-5.
44. Marcum, 1969: 211-15, referring to Ferraz Bomboko, Tomas Ferreira and Benedito; these concealed or switched off loyalties to MPLA. and
MPLA competition, led to Roberto to lobby for the expulsion of MPLA from Zaire (which he got) and to order UPA troops to kill any MPLA groups
they found (Marcum, 1969: 214 and Ingo, 1983: 61).
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appear also as an attempt of reoccupation of the Angolan part of the Congo kingdom, which
FNLA tried again in 1974.
The rebellion was followed by a wave of white counter-terror. The colonial state
apparently convinced itself, and tried to convince the world, that the rebellion was a joint
conspiracy of communists and Protestants. So settlers and the army made a fanatic religious
persecution of Protestants in the Mbundu areas (Methodists) and in the Kikongo areas (Baptists).
Settlers jealousy and greed over land held by Africans also played a role with African successful
planters being killed in the counter-terror.45
For the subsequent dynamics of the independence war the colonial indiscriminate
repression had significant social consequences. As many 'old Creoles' were forced to flee to the
forests and abroad, they participated, mainly in 'exile politics', as the conservative wing of MPLA,
while the guerrilla apparatuses progressively integrated a new generation of 'radicals'. MPLA
internal conflicts became evident from the 1970s and played an important role on the post-colonial
developments, although overshadowed by the conflict between MPLA and UPA. The latter
reflected the cold war global conflict, but were motivated as well by the narrow ethnic approaches
of UPA and later UNITA.
The fourteen years of independence war had also other significant consequence: they
reinforced disjunctures in the Angolan society, divided in two opposed Angolas, with ways of life
and forms of organisation substantially different and conflicting: the colonial society and the
liberated zones. Both models, and individuals carrying them, would confront each other after
independence.
45
. See, e.g,. Davidson, 1972: 193-99, Marcum, 1969: 144-45, Pelissier, 1978: 463, note 36, 534-40, 547-49, 552, 555-57, 560-62, 570, note 15,
Rosas: 1991, 21 and Cabrita, 1991: espec. 8-9; a recent account by Portuguese participants and witnesses of the white counter-ten-or includes
declarations about the massive killing of villagers, the burning of villages, the cutting of ears and heads and their use as amulets by Portuguese
soldiers, torture, even by doctors, using electric shocks and burning prisoners alive, rape of women (villagers or prisoners), and the killing of any
prisoner arrested, usually denounced by settlers with no evidence or grounds for arrest, (Cabrita, 1991: e.g., 8-9).
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2.2. The transition to independence
As referred to above, when the 1974 coup in Portugal opened the door to decolonisation,
Angola was in period of economic boom due to the development of extractive industries,
especially oil, and as a result of a set of reformist policies adopted by the colonial state. With a
special impact among these policies were more incentives to foreign investment and the
substitution of imports, the control of imports and exports and foreign exchange, the restructuring
of state apparatuses and the lifting of barriers of access to the civil service with a decrease in the
ideological control in recruitment, the development of education, especially in urban zones, and
the contradictory change in agricultural policies to incentive Angolan small farmers combined with
the reinforcement of European settlement.
These reforms coexisted with the persisting war for independence waged by nationalist
movements in the countryside, the police control of the population, including their movements
and forced displacement and resettlement in strategic hamlets under military control to prevent
contacts with the guerrilla, the inexistance of basic fundamental rights and freedoms and the
repression of all opponents of fascism and colonialism. However, the violent colonial repression
did not prevent urban residents to associate in different kinds of associations nor peasants to
become the main source of recruitment for the guerrilla. Ideological control did not prevent either
the spread of nationalist and socialist ideas.
While colonialism restructured, nationalist movements made, in the controlled territories
or in exile, their experiments of social organisation which impacted their later outcomes and
projects in the post-colonial society.
As stated above, the MPLA46 emerged from the cultural movements in urban zones and
later tried to ally with peasants and extend its guerrilla to all the national territory. From these
46
. The MPLA Maximal Programme, as published in 1975, intended: to abolish "all privileges granted by the colonial regime to the Portuguese and
other foreigners" (point 1 'c), to implement "(a) balanced development and by stages and the planning of the Angolan economy" (point 4/a), "the
creation and progressive development of state commercial and industrial enterprises, and as production and marketing co-operatives" (point 4/d). 'The
mploration of the country's energy resources by the state" (point 4/f), 'The protection of private inductry and commerce" (point 4/j), The
encouragement of private industry and trade, useful to the state economy and to the people's life" (point 4/k), "the protection of economic undertakings
explored by foreigners useful to the life, progress and reinforcement of the total independence of the Angolan people" (point 4/m), 'The effective
implementation of a policy simultaneously taking into account the interests of employees and employers" (point 4/o), 'The control by the state of all
Angolan foreign trade" (point 4/q); on agrarian reform, 'The land to who works it" (point 5/a) and the "nationalisation of lands of the opponents to the
movement for immediate and complete independence of Angola, of the traitors and the declared enemies of the independent and democratic Angolan
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roots arose its 'relative autonomy' (or at least of fractions within MPLA) either from the centre's
powers (whatever their political signal), the former colonial power or the very African countries.
During the independence war MPLA suffered various international defeats within the framework
of cold war. They included the loss of OAU support during some years, military defeats and
serious internal crisis. However, it was the only nationalist movement which tried to create new
political and social structures in the zones under its control which are dealt with below. 47 Also it
was, at independence, the only political group with a project of its own and supported by cadres
capable of implementing this project. The MPLA membership included members of different
ethnic and social groups, notwithstanding criticisms of an eventual predominance of Mbundu
members in its leadership.
The FNLA48 remained a movement based on the ethnic group Kikongo, set up by
aristocrats ruined by the expansion of the plantation economy (in the coffee producing provinces
which were integrated part of the former territory of the Kongo kingdom) and by the intolerance
of Portuguese colonialism towards African traditional institutions. During the war for
independence FNLA was characterized by a fascist-type authoritarianism having Roberto as
'supreme chief (Marcum, 1978: 185-6, 34-6), by serious ethnic crime, arrests and killings of its
own members (e.g., Marcum, 1969: 135, 235, 1978: 43-4, 186-8, 198, 231, 390, note 12, 393,
note 51, 419, note 396, Ingo, 1983, [73], 61 and Ramos, 1991, 12), by its clientelism towards the
Mobutu regime and the support by the USA administration, including CIA. At independence
FNLA appeared as militarized fascist movement with the project to implement in the country a
state' (point 5/b), plus "definition of limits to the size of rural private property, taking into account the agrarian situation of each place' (point 5/c),
"after revision of land titles, purchase by the state, at fair prices, of lands over the established limits" (point 5/d) and "distribution of land to the
peasants without land or who do not possess it in a sufficient extension" (point 5/e), (quoted in Freitas, 1975: 118, 120-21).
47. See subsection 3.1.2.
48. The economic proro-amme of FNLA stated in 1975: "Apostles of the development of the industrial and agricukural production ... made within the
framework of social objectives defined as follows: a. rising the level and quality of life of working masses, whose conditions are still miserable due to
the over-exploitation by colonial monopolies of which they had been an object; b. liquidation of the strata of ewloiters whose wealth comes from the
exaggerated labour force of our peasants and workers (sic). To attain this target we will use not only enterprises of foreign capital (including
Portuguese) but also those of national capital, private or public. We are not against investments if they are useful to the development of the country."
But the FNLA Programme included in the 'agrarian reform' "elimination of capitalist concentration of land by nationalisation of the official
organisations of land distribution (sic)", (point 02.03) and "distribution of lands to the peasants who do not own or who do possess them in an
insufficient scale, with preference to the farming collectives who will be created under the sponsorship of the state" (point 02.04); in industry the
programme included: "nationalisation of all sources of energy" (point 04.01), "control by the state of all large industrial enterprises" (point 04.02),
"control or participation of the state in all mining enterprises" (point 04.03), and 'nationalisation of all transport means" (point 05.01); (quoted in
Freitas, 1975: 340, 115-16).
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regime similar to that of Zaire (Marcum, 1969, 1978, and Heimer, 1979). The social base of
FNLA were mainly coffee small farmers, traders who had migrated to Zaire and later a part of the
landowners of coffee plantations in Uige and Zaire who from 1974 had favoured a 'Rhodesian
solution', which did not prevail.
UNITA° was a movement composed by former dissidents from FNLA who claimed to
represent the ethnic groups which, according the founders, were not integrated either in MPLA or
in FNLA (Marcum, 1978: 160-69). 50 UNITA, playing in the sino-soviet conflict, adopted an 'anti-
colonialist' and 'anti-imperialist' image of the Maoist type, a populist discourse and, as principles
of organisation, "collective decision-making, democratic centralism and criticism and self-
criticism". It urged members "to relate to the peasantry through sociocultural values and
economic grievances", to share the way of life of peasants to prevent their suspicion, and try the
unity of "genuine Africans" for a "popular armed struggle" (Marcum, 1978: 165-69, 195, 377,
note 216, 379, note 250, 400, note 116). Today there is evidence that, apart from its obscure
origins, UNITA was a client of the colonial military structures operating a 'guerrilla' in Eastern
Angola coordinated with the colonial authorities to help to destroy MPLA guerrilla and prevent
the eventual access of FNLA to the zone (Pezarat Correia, 1991, Marcum, 1978: 211, 218, 406,
note 207, Afrique-Asie, 1982). At independence UNITA had a markedly ethnic base
(Ovimbundu), a strange radical programme (the most radical programme of the so-called
nationalist movements), and simultaneously a right wing and revanchiste discourse (here against
the non-Ovimbundu ethnic groups), while from 1974 appealing to extremist settlers which
adhered to UNITA after the failure of their hopes and activities for a 'Rhodesian coup' after the
overthrow of fascism in Portugal. The social base of UNITA was composed by peasants of the
subsistence economy mobilized in ethnic grounds, a part of Ovimbundu 'contracted' labour, a part
49. The 1975 UNITA goals, according to its Statutes, were "favouring the participation of people in the management of state's affairs, according to the
best revolutionary traditions of a popular democracy" (Statutes, art. 6/18), 'to promote an agrarian reform according to the principle the land to who
works it The land must be considered collective property and not private property" (art. 6/11), 'to promote a planned economy in order to the
systematic development of all human and material potential of our country, to guarantee the construction of socialism in Angola" (art. 6/12). On the
UNITA 1992 programmes, see Appendix to Chapter 8.
50. UNITA always had MPLA as the target for its discourse on atheists, not 'genuine Africans' (see Marcum, 1978: 169, 193-94, 380, note 258).
During the independence war, apart from attacks on the Benguela railway it repeated after independence (Marcum, 1978: 192-93), the movement's
guerrilla activities were not significant, although later exaggerated by Portuguese military. Indeed, by 1970, it accounted for only 4% of attacks to the
colonial forces, and its so-called liberated zones had about 300 guerrilla members and thus did not seem relevant for post-colonial projects of social
organisation (Marcum, 1978: 217-18,411, note 286).
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of Ovimbundu elites educated in missions and later by the low income and capitalist settlers who
had favoured a 'white independence'. Also, when it held power in the so-called "Republic of
Huambo' (DPRA) in 1975, some of its capabilities in government were tested under RSA
protection. 51
 In the 80s, again under RSA protection, UNITA held a part of the territory, where it
built a model of 'small-sized' society. Given its connections with the colonial power, UNITA was
the first movement to sign a cease-fire with the Portuguese authorities, followed by FNLA and
later the MPLA.52
2.2.1. Popular struggles and social movements in 1974-75
The emergence of civil and political liberties in 1974 favoured the emergence of a wide,
autonomous and decentralized popular movement in urban zones, which developed in the struggle
of workers for better working conditions, the struggles of students and teachers for participation
in the schools management, the struggles against the initiatives of right-wing whites for
'Rhodesian' solution, and the self-defence of inhabitants of the slums against attacks firstly from
white extremists and later from the FNLA and UNITA armies. This movement, composed by
multiple organizations, autonomous or linked indirectly through the 'loose organization' patterns
to the MPLA, associated to the latter when the framework for the sharing of power only
recognized as 'legitimate' Angolan political forces the three movements above referred to. The
1974-75 popular movements played a significant role in the project of change of society as
outlined in 1975 and their dynamics impacted developments up to now.
A specific feature of this period, is that from May 1974 urban residents reorganised and
defended themselves from white aggressions without resort to the direction of any nationalist
51 • The Democratic Republic (DPRA) was the joint post-colonial experience of FNLA and UNITA attempting the balkanization of the country.
Firstly, these movements were incapable of sharing power and managing conflict at the top level of the coalition government they formed at
independence. As Hodges states, in fad FNLA governed the northern provinces (the region of the Congo kingdom and its tributary region of Dembos)
and UNITA, backed by South-African troops, the central-southern Angola. The two partners were incapable of merging their armies into a so-called
'national army, had frequent military clashes and FNLA did not allow LNITA to move into northern Angola (1976, 55-7). In its area UNITA even
kept the previous colonial authorities in office and in fad little changed, except for the flight of settlers. As for human rights, both movements in their
zones killed all MPLA militants they found, and UNITA, killed as well peasants who did not comply with its rule. Expelled from the country UNITA
soon returned and, backed by the RSA army, waged the devastating late colonial war which jeopardised all the MPLA project. In its controlled
territory, the attempts of social organisation adopted show a military fascism which shows no prospeds for a democratic future of the country. See
section 6.3.
52
. On the cease-fire agreements, see, e.g., Marcum, 1978: 246-47, 252 and 429, note 59.
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movement. As for MPLA, it was in April 1974 in a crisis which took months to solve, if solved.53
So the movement as such did not take significant initiatives in towns until October 1974.
Nevertheless, although a substantial part of the towns population for many years had no direct
contact with MPLA (whose activities outside the guerrilla zones were quite invisible), urban
residents, especially in Luanda, Huambo, Benguela and Lubango, had
"an actual sympathy, albeit diffused, for MPLA. A whole generation was preparing
itself to support this movement without having been in organised contact with it"
(Cahen, 1985: 5).
The FNLA and UNITA did not thus find substantial support in the non-white urban
population, although faster in a cease-fire allowing their legalisation.
The first free demonstration of Africans since the Republican times was held in Luanda on
the 1st May 1974, demanding the release of political prisoners. On the same day whites made a
counter demonstration against claims for independence and for "the union of the Portuguese".
Some days later, Angolan associations promoted in Luanda a new demonstration of several
thousands carrying MPLA flags and demanding "immediate independence". The colonial army
forbade "all demonstrations with propaganda of movements still fighting" (Cahen, 1985: 6, 9).
These events opened a new phase in the life of urban Angolans who would fight,
practically without 'external' support, against white racism, led by local capital, which, until the
conflict was decided by the Alvor Agreement (AA), intended to promote a 'Rhodesian' solution
for Angola. 54 White terrorism began by July 1974. Liga, which had became a forum for MPLA
supporters and a centre for political mobilisation, called for a national mourning and the first
general strike in the country to protest against white racism. The strike was massively successful
53. During the war for independence MPLA had three significant crisis: Viriato da Cruz schism in 1962, the Chipenda (Eastern front) rebellion in
1973 and the Revoha Activa dissent in 1974. These internal splits of MPLA remain a mystery, since information on them is contradictory and the
sources available are often unreliable. 'Readings' of the crisis explaining them just as personal struggles for power are not convincing, although might
have played a role (e.g, Mingas, quoted in Freitas, 1975: 104). The main issues seem to have been conflicts on strategies for the stniggle against
colonialism, for example, the Viriato dissent (e.g., Ramos, 1991: 11 and Marcum, 1978: 90-1, referring to Viriato "What Kind of Independence for
Angola?", 9 [1], Revolution, 1964), the working of MPLA, and, generally, models of development in the post-colonial society, in a context of
dependence on external support, especially for weapons, and conditioned by the internal dynamics of the struggle. On the 70s MPLA crisis, see
Heimer, 1979: 29-30, Marcum, 1978: 248-51 and Ramos 1991.
54. On white attempts of Rhodesian solution, see Heimer, 1979: 41-3 and Juju interview (JA, 16.11.1975). Liberal and socialist whites formed the
Democratic movements in towns, which tried to counter white racism and the nuirginalisation of the nationalist movements which waged the war for
independence; in 1975 some of than integrated into MPLA. As racist whites moved to support UNITA and secondarily FNLA after the AA, Cahen
argues that this fad "accelerated the path to an antagonism colonised/colcxiiser to the struggle MPLA/FNLA-UNITA, where class struggles and ethnic
cleavages intrinsically crossed" (1985: 10).
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at Luanda. 55
 To respond to settlers attacks, slums inhabitants created groups of 'self-defence', the
organisational background for the later Neighbourhood Popular Committees (NPCs), and
expelled whites from the slums (Heimer, 1979: 43).
Later, the social movements which emerged in 1974 had to face UNITA and FNLA
opposition, since the latter argued that no social organisation should be permitted outside the
three 'official' nationalist movement and their client organisations. This position, which influenced
their attitudes towards the neighbourhood organisation and the workers struggles, made them
oppose students as wel1.56
The workers movement and the neighbourdhood organization, by its later impact in law
and the developments during the period of centralized planning deserve a special reference. The
students movement, 57
 as from April 1975 the prolonged strike made students move to political
activism in other social movements, had not the same impact. The students 1975 rebellion was: i.
autonomous, with no direct party involvement since MPLA, the movement to which some
students were connected, was neutral (Cahen, 1985: 14-15), ii. directed against a ministry headed
by an African and, later, against the TG itself, where nationalist movements sat, and, iii.
undermined UNITA's fabricated image of 'democratic movement for peace and elections' and
forced the TG to show its real political objectives and nature.
55. Terrorism was led by taxi drivers, policemen and others who "assaulted the slums, killing, robbing, raping indiscriminately, without any reaction
from the general governor" (Callen, 1985: 7, 10); see also Freitas, 1975: 224-25, on the reaction of Portuguese authorities to the general strike.
approached as "a manoeuvre of agitators and provocateurs" (communiqué Chief-Command 14.7.1974, quoted at Freitas,
56. See notes 57 and 70.
57. Students were in 1974 one of the first groups to organise. University students in the 1st May 1974 decided to create an anion, AEUL. Membership
of the union was not necessary for participation in decision-making at the students top organs: the university assembly and the school general meeting.
Soon AEUL demanded the liberation of political prisoners, participated in the general strike against white terrorism, and promoted an unlimited strike
until measures "unequivocally anticolonialist were taken by the (metropolitan) govenunart" (quoted in Cahen, 1985: 10). Later students occupied
some faculties and, associated to part of the academic staff initiated a movement for the reform of curricula. Innovations extended to the management
of sdiools, under a campaign for democratic management by elected boards. Students at high and secondary schools also demanded legalised unions,
and later involved themselves in a teenagers rebellion against the Ministry of Education, allocated to UNITA by the AA Indeed, students, who were
claiming the recognition of their unions and the democratic management of sdanols, fought the minister of Education from the beginning to the end of
the TG. The minister refused to recognise some elected management committees and the union of secondary school students. In this conflict the
minister allied with the rector and directors of some faculties who were trying to get back power taken by the management committees, while white
underground groups. FNLA youth and the minister intimidated students and teachers. The movement radicalised and widened with the participation
of the teachers For-Union Association, university students and some lecturers. The demands were: i. the recognition of democratic management and
unions, ii. the revocation of the transfer of a director of a secondary school, and iii. the dismissal of the rector of the university. Students decided a
strike and got the support of the teachers For-Union and some university lecturers. The strike and students demonstrations led the minister to call the
police, which invaded schools, while students meetings and leaflets were banned. By April 1975 the TO decided to suspend students demonstrations
and leaflets during negotiations between students and the minister of Education and recommend the withdrawal from occupied schools. Since then the
Luanda schools were striking until the TO collapsed in August 1975 (Cahen, 1985: 10, 14-15). A subtle impact of the students 1974-75 movement
was the silent teenies rebellion, with many slums teenies leaving home and/or school and following FAPLA.
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The neighbourhood organisation
In mid 1974 CACs, a loose organisation connected to MPLA, launched the demand for
'people's power' (PP). PP later generated substantial conflict, reflected in the 70s 'great divide'
about conceptions of democracy. 58 It was defined at the time as the coordinated power of
workers, through workers assemblies (WAs) and committees (CTs), neighbourhoods, through
neighbourhood assemblies and committees, and students, through the university or school
assemblies and management committees. The neighbourhood assembly was "the supreme organ of
decision by the people" (Cahen, 1985: 11), and there the inhabitants exercised a direct democracy
on the area's affairs. 59 The committees, elected at the assemblies, dealt with the self-defence of the
community and other local problems, such as the organisation of food supply after the expulsion
of white traders from the slums.6°
By September 1974, the Luanda slums were organised in assemblies, committees and self-
defence groups, to bar settlers attacks and, from the end of 1974, FNLA armed attacks. When the
MPLA official delegation arrived to Luanda in October 1974, it approved the idea and self-
defence groups became an important source of recruiters to FAPLA.
During the transitional period, NPCs campaigned for their legalisation from the very day
of entry in office of the Transitional Government (TG). Yet, they only became legal in 1976.
Indeed, labelled by FNLA as 'soviets', NPCs remained a target for whites as well as UNITA and
FNLA aggressions, the latter even resorting to military action against the inhabitants of the
slums. 61 The activities of neighbourhoods organisation during the transitional period contributed
58. See section 3.2. (conflicts on democracy). CACs, Committees Amilcar Cabral was a Maoist youth group which later associated with a Trotskyist
group GSR and founded the underground OCA (Communist Organisation of Angola), after the MPLA order to dissolve the committees and their
members integrate the formal organisation of the movement.
59. See subsection 3.2.2. (Law no 1176). PP even promoted 'city general meeting, called the Luanda people's assembly, which rallied tens of thousands
of people (Cahen, 1985: 11). A 'city general meeting as a form of democratic decision-making in a town with more than 500,000 inhabitants is a
technical impossibility and the participants were there merely to demonstrate their support for 'people's power'.
60. For example, while the gap of white traders was filled by African traders who had the same patterns of speculative behaviour, some NPCs tried to
create consumers co-operatives.
61. See, e.g.. Roberto message to the press quoted in Freitas, 1975: 299-300. UNITA and FNLA proposed and voted for, at the TG, the official ban of
NPCs (Callen, 1985: 11).
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to bring into open the sharp conflict between the three 'official political movements' on models of
decolonisation and, also, on conceptions of the post-colonial state.
The association of MPLA with the neighbourhoods organisation had two main
consequences: it alienated the support of many 'reformists' who identified more with MPLA than
with the two other movements but, on the other hand, was crucial to the popular mobilisation,
support and victory of MPLA during the town battles of 1975. However, although connected to
MPLA, NPCs had no direct political affiliation to the movement. When the legislation on NPCs
organisation was approved in 1976 within the single-party constitutional framework, they lost
their previous independence.62
The era of 'people's power' in 1974-77 in Luanda has been the most lively period in the
political life of the slums, to which the scheme represented something new, as contrasted with the
covert nationalism of local associations or the exclusive political action by elite groups during the
Portuguese 1st Republic.° Many mistakes were made, arising from the violent conjuncture of the
time and from the lack of experience. 64 Nevertheless, Still, with abolition of the neighbourhood
and village assemblies the poor lost the means of deciding their own affairs.
The workers movement
The majority of Angolans had no access to unions. 65 Although some of the existing unions
began a process of democratization, from May 1974 workers created autonomous commissions
(CTs) in the majority of industrial enterprises, a form of organization more adequate to their
experience. Usually CTs were not permanent, but elected during a process of demands to
represent workers in negotiations. Since the banks strike, in June 1974, 66 CTs were elected in
62. See subsection 3.2.1.
63. For an account of political participation see Gjerstad, 1977:28-9; see subsections 2.1.2. and 2.1.3.
64. N‘'hich may be included in the 'costs of change of ruling class', using Bettelheim's expression, integrating as well the costs of learning democracy.
65. See subsection 1.2.3. In this part I partially follow Cahen, 1985.
66. strikes with
 the agreement of unions had been allowed from May 1974 by a local government order (DL no 5, 25.5.74); on the banks strike and
CTs, see Cahen, 1985:8.
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informal workers assemblies and demanded their recognition. Their members were sometimes
mid-level or administrative cadres, as workers had no skills to negotiate with employers. CTs
were not directly linked to any nationalist movement and usually were elected in an unitary basis
(Callen, 1985: 7-9). UNTA, the MPLA linked union, 67 arrived at the industrial zones with the
project of creating 'enterprise union committees' (EUCs). As it found the CTs movement
expanding, it allied with them and was the only trade union to get itself inserted among the
working class, through the connections with CTs. Where there were no CTs in an enterprise
UNTA founded one. 68 The movement of CTs spread around the country, basically worried with
economic demands and resorting to strike to press employers. Workers demands in 1974 were:
higher wages, eight hours work, paid holidays, social rights, such as pensions and medical care,
and the dismissal of PEDE informers or ruthless managers and intermediate cadres (Cahen, 1985:
7-11, 13, 15).
Dockers staged in May 1974 the 1st significant strike of the African semiproletariat, after
demands of wage increases were not accepted by the employer, a public authority. Later they
associated with railway workers from October 1974 and were the only segment of urban
proletariat to create an union ex novo. Other strikes followed and employers began to realize that
they could not cope with CTs and workers demands. 69 They got the support of the newly created
'puppet parties', as well as the UNITA and FNLA 'unions' or even armies (Callen, 1985: 9-10, 12-
17)70 From February 1975 the TG approved the 'mobilisation decree', to respond to workers
protest through their 'militarisation'.
67. UNTA was created in Zaire in 1960 and had been based in Kinshasa during the independence war; it mobilised workers, organised 'production
bases (collective small farms) and 'peoples shops in liberated zones, promoted literacy campaigns and training of cadres (Report to the 1984 Trade
Unions Congress, 77, 8, Novernbro, 1985: 8). See also subsection 3.4.4.
68. Legislation of July 1975 (m.o Labour, UNITA) regulated the election of unions committees. To destroy the CTs movement, the TO tried to adopt
legislation only recognising unions as representatives of workers, but UNTA and the CTs protested (Cahen, 1985, 12).
69. In January 1975, before the entry into functions of the TG, a contradictory strikes law was adopted; Dec. no 3/75 repealed the colonial legislation
punishing strikes as a crime (Criminal Code and Dec. Law no 23,870, 1934), so avoiding eventual repression of workers on grounds of fascist
legislation. The decree established restrictions to decisions on strikes attempting their control by unions and the state (Secretary of State for Labour).
70. On UNITA and FNLA unions, see also Marcum, 1969 and 1978. Usually FNLA and UNITA tried to convince workers not to strike using tribal
arguments (Cahen, 1985: 15). UNITA promoted with FNLA the ban of the 1st May 1975 demonstration by the TO and defended the exclusive of
workers representation by the unions of the three movements (Callen, 1985, 12-17).When PP organized the 1st May 1975 demonstration in Luanda to
express its demands to the TG, the FNLA union CSA did not join, FNLA bombed (and destroyed) the headquarters of UNTA and prevented the
demonstration, by using its army to deter demonstrators. The 1st May demonstration was finally made on the 22 May, although surrounded and
provoked by FNLA troops (e.g., Callen, 1985: 12, 17; references of FNLA documents quoted in loc.cit.).
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As unemployment spread, many African workers left cities as the result of loss of jobs in
paralysed industries. The young union movement had thus to face during 1975 quite a unique
problem: employers and almost all skilled personnel vanished, enterprises were closed and massive
unemployment followed. The amazing situation generated the 70s nationalizations. The Angolan
workers movement did not, except for the bank employees, demand nationalization or workers
control and had no unionist strategy in 1975 with such objective. 71
 But as owners and/or
managers fled, the first experiences of self-management were implemented in many enterprises
which workers CTs succeeded in keeping functioning. 72
 The informal self-management schemes
established in 1974-75 were partially legalised in the new PEs created during the transitional
period and in the legislatioi1 on state intervention, and had considerable changes up to 1989.73
The workers movement would have to face serious opposition and repression of its
demands from the post-colonial state, combined with the progressive loss of bargaining power of
the working class. But in the period of one year, the Angolan working class, supported by
professional unionists and students, initiated a rapid process of learning. Although they did not
demanded nationalisation, urban workers nevertheless played an important role in maintaining
enterprises functioning when the owners fled.
2.2.2. The Alvor Agreement and the Transitional Government
After attempts to marginalise MPLA from the negotiations of the independence accords
(Admiral Rosa Coutinho, high-commissioner in Angola, quoted in Freitas, 1975: 161-62), the
Alvor Agreement (AA) 74
 was signed in January 1975 between the Portuguese government and
FNLA, MPLA and UNITA, which were co-opted by the colonial authorities on grounds of
revolutionary legitimacy as the movements representing the Angolan people since they had
71. See subsection 2.2.2.
72. An example is Cabinda Gulf Oil when the company paralysed due to pressure of the US government (see subsection 7.2.1.) (see declarations of
an Angolan engineer working there in 1975, Mangueira, JA, 9.4.76).
73. See subsections 3.2.2., 3.4.4. and 8.2.3.
74. On the transition to independence, see, e.g., Pezarat Correia, 1991, Heimer, 1979, and Freitas, 1975.
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pursued armed struggle against colonialism." The Agreement recognized the right to
independence76 and created a Transitional Government (TG), 77 the first experience of Angolans in
managing the state and composed by representatives of the three 'official movements' and the
Portuguese state, to rule Angola until the elections for a constituent assembly. The AA also
provided for the draft of a provisional constitution, an electoral law and the promotion of
elections for a constituent assembly, restricted to candidates from the three official movements.78
The date for independence was fixed at the 11th November 1975 and the Portuguese army was to
withdraw from the country from October 1975 to February 1976, after creating the national
army.79
The TG was directed by a Presidential College, a troika composed by three PMs, one of
each movement, while a High Commissioner represented the colonial power." The different
ministries were allocated by the AA to the four parties involved. 81 Concerning the Angolan
parties, ministries soon became fiefdoms with the patterns of authoritarian rule which underlined
all the agreement under the 'three-single party' scheme. The TG was a failure of joint management
of the state because the three movements could not agree on many issues since they carried quite
opposite interests. 82
 The previous experiences of a modus vivendi imposed by foreign powers, for
example OAU attempts to merge MPLA and FNLA in the 60s, had failed. 83
 The same happened
75. AA, art. 1.
76. AA. art. 2; see also arts 3.8 and 10.
77. Win. ch entered into furtctions on the 31 January 1975 and was ruled by AA, arts Sand 10.
78. AA. arts 44, 43/a-c and 41, respectively-, elections would be held in October 1975.
79. AA, arts 4 and 35, respectively; the new army would result from the merger of the armies of the three nationalist movements; on the 1991
agreements, see Chapter 8.
80. AA, arts 14-15, 11 and 13, respectively. The decisions of the TG were made by a 2/3rds majority (art. 13).
81. AA. art 21 and 22; ministerial posts were allocated: i. Portugal - Economy, Public Works and Transports (AA, alt. 21/a), ii. FNLA - Interior,
Agriculture, Health and Social Work (art. 21 1b), iii. MPLA - Planning and Finance, Justice and Information (att. 21/c), and iv. UNITA - Natural
Resources, Labour and Education and Culture (art 21/d); for some ministries there were secretaries of state allocated to the nationalist movements not
holding the ministerial post (att. 20).
82. Although authors such as Hodges state that the three official movements agreed in almost everything (1976: 48). the fad that the TG adopted a
policy measure does not necessarily mean that MPLA members had voted for it, since the 2 3rds could be obtained by the favourable vote of
Portuguese, UNITA and FNLA ministers.
83. See, e.g.. Mingas. quoted in Freitas, 1975: 152-53; for a more complete description of these attempts, see Marcum, 1969 and 1978.
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with the TG where the antagonism between the two blocs then constituted (FNLA-UNITA and
MPLA) was not resolved within the government and took the usual form of armed conflict.
Agreements between the blocs such as Mombassa and Nalcuru 84 were short-lived.
Unpopular decisions, demonstrating its authoritarian nature, a serious economic and social
crisis with little response from the government as such, plus corruption scandals 85 and clientelism
in allocation of resources (e.g., Heimer 1980: 127, note 256), brought discredit to the TG and not
even the 'revolutionary legitimacy', and related threats, of nationalist movements could save it
from strong opposition, especially in towns. The TG collapsed in August 1975, after the victory
of MPLA in the battle of Luanda and related flight of FNLA and UNITA members in the
government. 86 The High-Commissioner assumed then the legislative function of the TG and
absent members of the government were substituted by 'general-directors' appointed by the
Portuguese govenunent. 87 Within the 'single-party' underlying scheme of the whole independence
arrangement, soon the country was split into single party dominated territories, and the LTNITA
and FNLA zones on ethnic divisions, with the support of the RSA and Zairian armies.88
The collapse of the colonial economy and the TG
When the process of disintegration of colonialism began, there were two factors which
would have a significant impact in the post colonial developments. The first was the collapse of
the colonial economy based in non-economic coercion of labour and the low level of wages which
kept waged workers, either free or forced, in a situation of extreme poverty while ensuring the
84. Readied in January 1975 between the three movements (agreeing in common points for the negotiations at Alvor), and readied in June 1975
(repeating the movements intentions to respect the AA), respectively.
85. For example, the minister of Health (FNLA) allegedly embezzled public funds and the case raised substantial popular protest in towns, when
people realised he would not go under trial; from the very beginning of the TG some nationalist movements began to embezzle all kinds of public
assets; the situation is illustrated by, for example, the ministerial order (m.o.) of 7.5.75 (MPLA-PM and Planning and Finance) alluding to the theft of
public assets, especially cars, by the official movements and, while referring that each movement received 15 Mn escudos per month from the state,
forbade payments by the Budget (NB) of expenses made by the movements, unless they were discounted from the value of the subsidy they received.
86. The fonnal recognition of the collapse of the TG came under Dec. no 104/75.
87. Dec.Law no 458A 75 and Dec. no 107/75.
88. On the 1975 war, see, e.g.. Bergerol and Wolfers, 1983, Freitas, 1975, Heimer, 1979, Hodges. 1976, Marcum, 1978, and Ray and alia, 1982.
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profitability of the colonial economy. The second were the popular movements which spread in
towns.
As the TG entered into office, the country was already going through fast changes which
resulted from the collapse of fascism. Post-25th April metropolitan governments had granted
higher standards of liberties, which did not meet the metropolitan standards. 89 Nevertheless,
legislation such as the press law, the strikes law, or the PEs decrees of incorporation providing for
workers participation in control boards, were enacted before the TG, and represented a significant
change, taking into account the departing points, fascist secrecy and censorship, or the illegality of
workers' protest.
With the metropolitan power weakened and still going through its own restructuring, the
emergence of civil liberties led demands to blossom. As stated above, settler entrepreneurs could
not face wages demands and related strikes, since they were not prepared to work in a non
colonial labour environment, and many were even actively against the new pattern of relations
being shaped in the country. So they responded to the changing economic environment by
sabotage9° or flight, which reached its peaks during 1975. Indeed, 85% of the manufacturing firms
were "small establishments owned by white settlers" (Bhagavan, 1980: 16) and 90% of them left
the country. In April 1975, a report of an employers association provided the following picture:
60% of the surveyed enterprises had strong difficulties of procurement, 45% had a stock of raw-
materials inferior to the standards, 12% had their stocks completely exhausted, 11% had
registered refusals of transport, 60% had a decrease in sales (and in about 24% this decrease was
superior to 50%), in 25% the costs of labour had increased more than 100% and in the majority of
other firms there was an increase of about 67% (quoted in Cahen, 1985: 13). Prices increased
more than 100% while shortages began to disrupt the supply of enterprises and households. As
for labour, the colonial wages Angolans had under the former regime, and on whose grounds all
89. For example, the political police remained in office (Freitas, 1975: 210, quoting Portuguese official sources.
90. Behaviours defmed were defined as sabotage in Dec. no 125/75 (on state intervention in the management of private and mixed enterprises). see
subsection 4.1.1.
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the colonial economy worked, were soon contested. The increases of wages workers got during
1974 and 1975 could not reach the inflation level: 100% in eight months.91
The TG was incapable of understanding the collapse of the colonial economy and the
1974-75 crisis, the most significant problem it had to face, together with the war going on
between FNLA and MPLA. It allocated the burden and the blame of the crisis to the working
class and underestimated the impact of the urban social movements which were developing.92
The set of measures adopted by the TG to face the necessary restructuring began in
February 1975, with the approval of the 'mobilisation decree', allowing the government to order
the military mobilisation of "any institutions, services or enterprises of public or private nature"
for a period of three months, renewable until "the circumstances which motivated the mobilisation
cease". Enterprises under this regime were controlled by the army, "which may appoint military to
direct and ensure its functioning". The personnel was "under military authority, discipline and
justice and will be considered permanently under employment with the wages and salaries
established by law or contract". 93 Employers, who benefited from the regime's freezing of wages
and prevention of strikes, soon promoted strikes to get their firms under the 'military mobilisation'
scheme (e.g., Cahen, 1985: 12). Others, not pleased with the intervention of the 'formal' unified
army, resorted to their links with UNITA and FNLA whose troops went to firms to repress
workers protest, until the TG, under the pressure of the workers movement, had to enact
legislation banning the use of private armies in industrial conflicts."
91. From August 1974 to April 1975, Callen, 1985: 10; on wages during colonialism, see subsection 1.2.3.
92. For example, Chitunda, an UNITA minister saw, in April 1975, the crisis as the work of "dangerous elements, agitators and anarchists, almost
exclusively of a Portuguese origin, established themselves in almost all social, professional or occupational levels, inciting workers and the local
population to disobedience and contempt for the entrenched authority within the enterprise." (quoted in Freitas, 1975: 351) Chitunda probably
referring to university students who were also workers.
93. Dec. no 7'75, arts 1-3.
94. Dec. no 34 75.
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The fall of the TG and post-TG policy measures
As the perspectives of war grew with the attacks of FNLA to urban population and its
occupation of the northern part of the country, the massive flight of settlers dramatically
reinforced the problems of closure of firms and unemployment. 95
 As a result, by mid 1975 one
out of two workers in Luanda, the main industrial centre, had lost their jobs (Cahen, 1985: 12).
Notwithstanding the protest of unions, the TG did not take any measure and the towns migrant
workers had to go back to their societies of origin to survive. Migration had began from August
1974, as a result of white terrorism (Freitas, 1975: 230). The loss of jobs increased the exodus of
African workers from cities, approached as a sign of 'traditional' African tribalism, since, for
example, Ovimbundu moved back to the central Highlands. But nobody noticed, except Cahen
(1985: 20, 96 the wave of unemployment caused by the flight of settlers. The state absorbed
experts but unskilled workers only could come back to peasant societies. However, as Heimer
noticed, tributary societies were also affected by the economic crisis and had difficulties to absorb
the returning unemployed migrants (1979: 84). Abandoned plantations and farms were occupied
by peasants and in some cases former waged labourers tried, even under self-management and
notwithstanding the scarcity of inputs and food, to shape new relationships (1979: 84). 97 FNLA
and UNITA, which claimed the control of Kikongo and Ovimbundu, took advantage of the
situation, and, although they could not exercise a 'tribal' rule based on ethnic loyalties, 98 had their
territorial constituencies reinforced. Also, part of unemployed workers were integrated into the
95. See, e.g, Bergerol and Wolfers, 1983: 114. The preferences of settlers were Portugal, Namibia, RSA and Brazil (Freitas, 1975: 234).
96. In his study on workers struggles Calico makes the point that the migration of these workers was and simultaneously was not tribalism, arguing, as
Hamer did as well, that the ethnic question in Angola cannot be approached in a linear way: either Angolans are tribe-oriented and have 'tribal parties'
(for example Marcum) or tribes do not exist' or, at least, 'should not exist' (the position of many intellectuals, including MPLA members). For an
Angolan study on the ethnic question, see Nato, 1992.
97. See Chapter 6.
98. During 1974-75 UNITA made strong appeals to the Ovirnbundu on grounds of tribalism: i. against FNLA stating that it had killed Ovirnbundu
contracted workers in 1961 (see subsection 2.1.4.), had expelled them from the north in 1974 and Bakongo farmers exploited them along with the
Portuguese, and ii. against MPLA because, according to UNITA, it relied heavily on the despised Mbundu (e.g., Hamer, 1979: 63, note 259); still, it
had to execute villagers as witches to assure their compliance and kill co-operatives dynamisers and MPLA activists in the central Highlands. As for
FNLA, who reoccupied the Congo kingdom manu rnilitari, it had no control over refugees who came back to the country and rebuilt their former
villages with no contacts with FNLA (e.g., Hamer, 1980: 127, 258); Kikongo who tried to set up a local MPLA group near Uige were prevented to do
so by FNLA threats of physical violence (e.g., Henna, 1979: 62, note 255); nevertheless the massive exodus of Kikongo and Ovimbundu working in
towns reinforced tribalism and favoured the tribal claims of the two movements (as Heimer argues as well, op.cit, 73, note 295).
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armies of the so-called nationalist movements which during 1974 and 1975 expanded with the
support of foreign powers (e.g., Marcum, 1978, Hodges, 1976 and Wright, 1994).
As abandoned firms paralysed, the issue of nationalisation entered into the agenda.
Although nationalisation is dealt with below, it should be stressed that the TG rejected any state
action to deal with the firms behaviour and problems (e.g., Cahen, 1985: 13). FNLA and UNITA
declared against nationalisation and relied on flying private enterprise and foreign investment to
set up the post-colonial economy, and it seems, to solve the crisis. 99 Still, both had nationalisation
goals inserted into their programmes, an example of nationalist movements rhetoric. The so-called
left-winger MPLA had the less radical programme on the issue and, as for the 1975 concrete
problems, seemed to have no clear ideas. UNTA demanded "workers participation in the
economic and social management of the country" (Cahen, 1985: 16), but did not fight for
nationalisation.
The factors referred to above led to the fall of the TG which took no serious measures to
face the economic and social crisis. Moreover, given the FNLA/UNITA bloc within the
government, it took repressive measures against the social movements, thus becoming a barrier to
their demands and the solution of the crisis. After its collapse in August 1975, and when the state
was thus managed jointly by the colonial authorities and MPLA, a flow of legislation proved that
one of the main reasons for the TG inertia was the FNLA-UNITA bloc. Late measures to face the
crisis, such as the 'take-over of banks', 10° the intervention of the state in abandoned enterprises,m
99. Savimbi, for example, quoted in Freitas, 1975: 361, 127.
100. The first significant intervention was the takeover of banks, in August 1975, made possible by the support of banks employees, whose
organisation and demands initiated immediately after the 1974 coup. The new organisational framework designed for the management of banks would
be followed in other branches, with adaptations. The takeover of banks is a special case in the Angolan nationalisation because in 1975 workers
lobbied for the intervention by the ministry of Planning and Finance, arguing that some bank managers were committed to what could be called
economic sabotage, including the transfer to subsidiaries abroad of Angola's hard currency and non reimbursement of loans to the (local) central bank.
After meetings with the banks CTs, the minister of Planning and Finance (m.o. no 80/75), suspended the management boards of banks operating in the
country, including the local central bank, and appointed 'management committees', composed by many former managers and representatives of
workers, usually intermediate cadres. To manage the branch, a special board was created, the 'banking coordinating committee', composed by
representatives of the ministry and the management committees (later 'legalised' by Dec.Law no 129/75).
101. Informally, after the takeover of the banks, the ministry of Planning and Finance authorised some CTs, and informal management committees of
enterprises under self-management to use the firms accounts to pay inputs, usually after the appointment of a government representative to supervise
the enterprises. As these measures had no legal background, in October 1975 the High Commissioner approved the decree 'legalising the de facto
situation. Dec. no 128 75, which remained in force during the period studied, legitimated what would become the first step towards the formal
nationalisation. The decree allowed the state to intervene in private firms aiming to keep abandoned firms working to prevent unemployment, inflation
and the collapse of the economy. It provided for workers participation in decision-making in the part on management committees which substituted
suspended company organs. The powers of the committees were broad and the intervened companies had a large autonomy since state control was a
posteriori. Proposals of management committees on policy measures were encouraged (Dec. no 125 75, arts 11-15). See subsection 4.1.
91
Nationalist struggles
and the reorganization of spaces left empty by the flight of settlers, for example the creation of co-
operatives. State bureaucracies smoothly 'Angolanised' by the flight of civil servants, were also
fast in initiatives, either to support popular demands and/or to control the self-managed
institutions created by urban social movements.
On the transitional period we may conclude that the 70s restructuring of the metropolitan
power enabled, as it did in the past, the demands and initiatives of the peripheries to flourish,
providing a social base for change. But, as in other countries, attempts towards a socialist path
had always to face wars and/or ruinous boycotts, which reinforced state role, authority and
apparatuses, instead of empowering people to develop autonomous initiatives and choices. The
restructuring of Portugal, as its empire disintegrated, changed its role in Africa. The function of
regional police was allocated to apartheid South-Africa whose 'late colonial VJ al.' against Angola
had as a consequence, among others, the progressive exhaustion of people's conquests, as the
post-colonial state consolidated to face war.
2.3. Conclusion : social groups, formation and interests
To understand the different projects of change adopted in post-colonial Angola and their
dynamics, there is a need to describe briefly some of the most important aspects of Angolan social
structure at independence and the impact colonialism and the different forms of integration in the
world system had on the formation and consolidation of these groups. This description is a
conclusion of Part I, as it aims to enlighten the patterns of continuity and change in the dynamics
of the relationships between colonialism and Angolan societies.
Elites and bureaucracies
The former national bourgeoisie, inaccurately called 'petty bourgeoisie, originated in the
African aristocracy which was progressively integrated within the colonial society as colonialism
expanded. This group enjoyed a relevant status during the so-called 'Creole periods'. The main
patterns of the economic path of this social group have particular features. Firstly, it held political
power over African population and economic power grounded on the control of hinterland slave
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trade to the international network. Later, there was a loss of formal political power, with
maintenance of informal control over peasants, and progressive change of patterns of control of
trade with harsher competition from settlers and change of commodities, integration in farming
(for example, coffee plantations), and progressive integration of part of this bourgeoisie in
colonial state apparatuses. The third stage was that, as colonialism became more oppressive by
the end of the 19th century, with the constant 'Europeanization' of state apparatuses and other
social spaces and the progressive occupation of land by settlers, a process of decay set in among
the Angolan bourgeoisie and this was reinforced up to the 1970s. By the end of the 19th century,
and early 20th, this group produced the essential elements of the Angolan nationalist programme,
creating the very concept of Angolanity and led different forms of protest, urban and peasant,
against the expansion of colonial relations. This was especially the case where its interests were
directly affected, as in the case of expropriation of land, discrimination in jobs and access to
education, ban on trade, etc. In the fourth stage, after the emergence of fascism in Portugal, the
discriminatory policies and political repression reinforced the process of decay of this group, with
progressive loss of ownership of means of production and other property, leading simultaneously
to a radicalization of part of its components and to its rupture into to ideological groups:
'reformists' and 'radicals anticolonialists'. Although this divide initiated in the 19th century, it
would have a significant political impact from the late 1940s, when nationalist ideals began to be
structured in terms of struggle for independence. Finally, while sections of former aristocracy and
bourgeoisie participated in armed and underground struggle, making up the majority of MPLA
leadership and one of its revolutionary components, other segments were co-opted by colonialism
when it banned the 'natives system', retaking its reformist patterns and becoming enabled to lead a
neocolonial project in case the country reached independence.
This social group, which elaborated different projects of change along a century, has
shown, either the 'radical' or the 'reformist' components, a remarkable capacity of survival and
leadership and was able to keep power in the post-colonial state and to make the alliances
necessary to its survival. In the so-called process of class formation in Africa (Kandeh, 1992), this
group does not appear as a class in formation but a class in transition. Indeed, this class has,
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notwithstanding its social and ideological internal conflicts, homogeneity and endurance of status
as dominant class. The generalised perceptions of this group as 'petty-bourgeoisie' obscured this
status (and the very analysis on the Angolan society) and future perspectives of the group. The
latter is in transition in the sense that, having lost the ownership of production means as a result of
colonialism, it maintained the political foundations (including superiority of knowledge [a mean of
production], political projects and control of political movements), of access to this ownership in
the post-colonial society (either in its capitalist or socialist variants). After acquiring a substantial
experience of control of the means of production during the so-called 'socialist project' and
'centralized direction' of nationalized industries, this group is presently in transition to the formal
ownership of private of means of production. The projects of the different components of this
group changed during the post-colonial period studied. However, the elites whose origin was
outlined above are not the classes which the post-colonial state has the function to constitute as a
new social group (the process of class formation within the state). Due to this reason, the
attitudes and policies of this social group within the post-colonial state differ substantially from
other social groups which were formed (or will be formed) within the post-colonial state.
Concerning the latter, on which a part of 'UNITA social base may be included, urban elites are
already (historically) advanced.
Poor peasants, chiefs and agrarians
In the other bottom of the Angolan society, there are the subsistence peasants. The
autarky of this social group, and its social structures, were always shaken by the wars for
centuries affecting the different regions of the country. Peasants always were the major victims of
war: from the remote times when they were targets of slave raids, to the periods of capture of
forced labour, to the military operations during the independence war for their resettlement in
strategic hamlets, till the raids of the post-colonial wars to serve as conscripts in the UNITA
army. From the economic standpoint, this group formed a 'subsistence economy' in some cases in
successive regressions of the mercantile economy (or its embryonic forms) as a result of the
restructurings of colonialism, which arose in war or revolts contexts. In a first stage, the
structures of the subsistence economy were shaken by the increase in slave trade during the
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Atlantic phase. Later, by the expansion of colonialism with consequent sumsumption of Angolan
political and social units, settlement and expropriation of land. The consequences were: i. the
proletarization of part of this social group who, as forced labourers or non-skilled migrants,
would partially originate the working class, and, ii. their progressive underdevelopment and
economic and social marginalization, with growing isolation and poverty. Poor peasants always
have been a 'reserve army' for the most diversified economic and political interests. They
participated in revolts and wars, they were called to produce for the market when necessary and
were back to the subsistence economy when their integration in the market was not convenient for
other social groups (such as poor settlers). Given the social structure of the subsistence economy,
including its own labour division, this group in Angola demonstrated a certain 'availability' for
participation in revolts and wars, having created an 'warrior' tradition when its interests are
affected, for example by land expropriation, or generally, by attempts of enlarged control, political
and economic, either by the first periphery or the centre (e.g., Hyden, 1987). Peasants constituted
the social base of the struggle for independence, that is, the struggle for a restructuring of the first
periphery and its articulation with the second periphery (ies). Simultaneously, they created their
own movements which contributed to increase the tensions within the peripheral subsystem (that
is, the national space). Angola is thus a country of constant peasant rebellions, expressed by
different forms such as messianic movements, social banditry and armed struggle, local or
generalized. In the past and in the present, all political movements resorted to poor peasants to
forward their struggles. This means that every political movement is highly indebted to peasants.
The destruction of peasants economy, the starvation crisis and the massive inflow of peasants to
towns have a significant impact on the changes they have undertaken in the colonial and post-
colonial societies.
Between subsistence peasants and waged labour and the elites are the so-called' agrarians'
who could be characterized as a rural and trading 'petty-bourgeoisie' if we took paradigms not
necessarily coincidents with the organization and relationships of this social group in Angola. The
small farmers group selling to the market with a certain stability is organically linked to the small
traders group, sometimes in terms of gender division of labour within the extended family and
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specialization of members in the organization of the marketing networks linking towns and
countryside. Thus the two groups are not approached separately here. Agrarians, as they appear
differentiated from poor peasants, were the survivors of expropriation of land (for example, the
coffee farmers in Uige and Kwanza-Norte) or the victims of expropriation who managed to
become self-employed (including small traders), avoiding forced labour and even waged (free)
labour. Given their links with the marketing networks (and thus the urban component), agrarians
had some kind of leadership in peasant societies and historically acted as mediators in the relations
between the first and the second peripheries. This political and economic role of agrarians
generated serious conflicts with the colonial state which until the 1970s not only prevented their
access to state bureaucracies, except in the areas of 'natives control', but also caused their
progressive ruin in favour of poor settlers in the competition in fanning and the hinterland trade.
Conflicts motivated the integration of agrarians in nationalist movements, where often they played
their mediatory role.
Agrarians had as a goal the takeover of the post-colonial state, which many attained given
the 'upwards mobility' policies of recruitment and promotion which prevailed until the intervention
of international financial institutions in the late 1980s.
The working class
The availability of free land in Africa (Hyden, 1987, Shivji, 1986) and the instability arising
from restructurings of the colonial semiperiphery and the role of the Angolan first periphery,
meant that the Angolan working was essentially a semi-proletariat, with some minoritarian
segments of stable proletariat.
The scarcity of labour, resort more or less intensive to non-economic coercion, non-
permanent work, migration, labour mobility and low wages are constants throughout the history
of Angolan labour. Equally constants are the changes in the structure and skills of labour
according to the centre's needs: i. slavery in plantations, trade, porterage and domestic services, ii.
forced labour in agriculture, mining, building, fisheries and army with free labour in the
bureaucracies (state or not), services and industry (initial stage of the first restructuring of
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colonialism), iii. forced labour in the same sectors with de-sldlling in the areas where competition
with poor settlers emerged ('agrarian fascism'), iv. covert forced labour in agriculture and re-
slcilling in the import-substitution industries, services, small cash crop agriculture, bureaucracies
and army (colonial reformism), v. re-skilling in bureaucracies, trade, import-substitution and
extractive industries and services ('statist socialism), and vi. de-skilling meaning at the lower level
a return to subsistence agriculture after unemployment (post-colonial reformism).
Angolan workers responded to the violence of change they endured as a result of the
restructurings by different forms: i. changes of jurisdiction, for example migration to towns or to
neighbouring countries, ii. rebellions and social banditry during the stages of slavery and forced
labour, iii. legal demands at the workshop (periods of civil liberties), iv. passive resistance, refusal
to accept forced labour followed by migration, exile, rebellions, messianic movements and sports
and cultural associations (fascism), v. participation in the independence war and creation of unions
in exile, vi. economic demands supported by strikes and pre-unionisation (liberties periods after
1974). In Angola there were as well the forms of workers protest in Africa referred to by Cohen
(1980): disobedience, flight, syncretic movements, revolts, sabotage, drug use, theft and managers
misinformation. The struggles of the Angolan working class had usually the patterns of self-
organization, except for their participation in the armed struggle.
Summarising l 0 2 we may conclude that at independence aristocrats and landowners had
become bureaucrats divided in reformists and radicals. Low level chiefs (corresponding to
reduced territorial units) and free men had become small farmers and traders, 'agrarians' when the
ideological dimension is added. Slaves, subsistence peasants, ruined small traders and farmers had
become permanent and non-permanent working class, part of the traders in the informal economy,
'radicals' and 'agrarians' when the ideological components are added. All these social groups had
102 . The overall picture of the Angolan society in the 70s was summarized by Heimer: "(but hi the 70s) the boundaries between tributary societies and
the central society (became) much more permeable. Not only it became easier for individuals to pass from the former to the latter, but some tributary
societies had also become partially absorbed into the central society. ... One of the ideological consequences was that, for the first time, important
numbers of Africans in the central society (and not just small segments) had began to think themselves as Angolans instead of or, more frequently, as
well as, members of a given ethnic group (identified with one or more tributary societies). A similar process occurred with a significant minority of
whites, mostly among those born in Angola or who had lived there for decades. And even in an increasing number of tributary socidies, a kind of
'secondary identification with Angola as a whole began to take place ... (the process of abolition of intra-societal boundaries would mean) essentially a
long-term transformation of the contradictions within the Angolan society. According to the logic of this transformation, class cleavages would become
paramount (with racial and ethnic cleavages becoming of secondary importance and eventually disappearing) ... (and tributary societies would)
become just 'underdeveloped coral areas' ... following the example of Latin America." (1979:9, 14-15).
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diversified expectations on the post-colonial state and society. The movement which would take
power in 1975 would have to respond to their expectations within the 'great collective dream of
independence'.
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CHAPTER 3
MODELS OF SOCIETY AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES
The PRA was born in war and with a substantial part of the territory occupied in the north
by the Zairian army (supporting FNLA and assisted by North American and British mercenaries
and RSA military) and at the centre/south by the RSA army, supporting the coalition of UNITA
and FNLA. Both proclaimed the DPRA in the date of independence. This difficult emergence
conditioned all the Angolan political process, besides jeopardising any project of social and
economic development in the country. The fifteen years immediately following independence were
marked by foreign aggressions, often by proxy UNITA, and international interference in internal
politics, from the Reagan 'linkage' scheme to the agreements for the adoption of a given
constitutional framework which included the Western 'standard form' of organising society.
The effects of successive foreign aggressions, mainly of apartheid RSA or led by this
regime, on the resources of the country and expectations of the people, went beyond the loss of
thousands of human lives and material costs.' Destruction of any built or rebuilt facility,2
1.There are many references to the costs of RSA and UNITA war against PRA: i. 15% of the population was displaced (about 1.5 Mn individuals)
and there were in 1990 about 40,000 disabled by war (South, June 1990, 79); ii. the war material costs are about USD 15 bn (PUblico, 4.11.1990),
while in 1985 they were already estimated at USD 7.6 bn, not including the estimates for the costs of the 1981 RSA invasion (Mario Nelson, 1985:
48), iii. according to an UN report (ECA) the GDP loss from 1980 to 1988 was 600% of the 1988 actual GDP and in 1988 the loss for the year was
90% of actual GDP. The same report, on the SADC region, states that the region's output in 1988 would be 40% higher if there was no RSA hostility
and the key targets of RSA attacks had been the SADC transport links, both internal and with the outside world. UNITA had a role in the
implementation of this RSA policy: in 1985 the costs of attacks to the Barguela Railway (CFB), led the company to owe to the central bank USD 160
Mn, of which USD 90 Mn debts contracted from independence (Mario Nelson: 1985, 46); Zaire and Zambia also had to bear increased costs to use
more expensive RSA railways for their copper exports (see, e.g., Hodges, 1987: 27). The transport by air to supply, for example, the Angolan central
Highlands are not included. RSA goals are listed at the UN report as: i. external strategy in defence of apartheid, ii. to impose economic dependence of
Frontline states on RSA while iii. providing "economic sweeteners such as soft loans, to countries further afield in order to divide Africa in the question
of relations with apartheid" (quoted in AED, 23.10.1989).
2. RSA or proxy UNITA economic targets were, e.g.: the sabotage of the Luanda oil refinery in 1981 (52 [6], Novernbro, 1982, 12-13) whose repair
costs amounted to USD 20 Mn (Hodges, 1987: 34), the attempt of bombing of the Cabinda oil fields in 1985 (Hodges, 1987: 17) and the attack to
Ambriz oil producing zone in 1991 (targeting the facilities of Sonangol, Chevron, Conoco and Bouygues Offshore, Pliblico, 12.2.1991); the bombing
of the iron ore mines at Jamba (not the LTNITA one) in 1982 (AED, 21.5.1982); the destructicxt, from 1984, of high-tension pylons of power line from
Cambambe to Luanda and transformers, leading to the paralysation of the town's power and water supply and industries using these inputs (e.g., AED,
12.11.1984); attacks to the diamonds mines from 1983, area of the concession of Endiarna, a PE, formerly associated to De Beers/Anglo-American
and later to the RST (e.g., AED, 27.4.1984, 8.6.1985, 11.9.1989); destruction in 1983 of the cellulose factory and power plant LO/11311M, supplying
Huambo, Cubal and Benguela, with related shortage of power and water at Alto Catumbela (e.g., AED, 18.3.1983); estimates of costs of loss of
manufacturing production resulting from the Lomaum attacks were, for example, about USD 75 Mn (Hodges, 1987: 34); in 1990 UNITA destroyed
178 high-tension pylons of power line, three hydroelectric dams, two oil reservatoirs, four oil pumps and sabotaged three water conduits (Priblico,
27.11.1990); in 1991, from January to March and according to Angolan military sources, UNITA destroyed 14 railway bridges, 13 water pipes and
devices and 3 diamond laundries at Lunda Norte, and made as well 40 military actions against UN supply routes, 167 total operations causing 700
killed, 70 prisoners and had 200 deserters (Thiblico, 23.3.1991); many UNITA attacks were followed by the kidnapping of expatriate workers,
including foreign missionaries, to tenify them and increase the costs of foreign labour (Palle°, 18.4.1991).
Models of society
diversion of resources to defence, 3 failure of projects caused by factors such as shortage of
resources or insecurity, exhaustion of a starving population permanently under threat, all this led
to the disenchantment with the very project of independence as well as the loss of the people's
self-confidence to decide its own future. 4
 In short, these processes led to the necessary conditions
for the implementation of a neocolonial project, which, at least at the level of intentions, was
rejected by MPLA when it took power.
Still, while the war of conquest of the national territory and expulsion of foreign armies,
with the support of Cuba and the USSR, developed (the 'great humiliation' UNITA would try to
revenge in the 90s) the new Angolan government tried to implement its project of change of
society.
3.1. The project of change implemented from 1975 to 1977
The project of change adopted in 1975 indicated a nationalist and socialist path of
development. It resulted essentially from the following factors. Firstly, the MPLA Programme
during the struggle for independence, dealing with matters such as the grant of land to landless
peasants and the nationalization of energy resources, to respond to expectations generated during
the struggle. Secondly, the dynamics of armed struggle against colonialism and the experiences of
creation of pre-state structures. Here, the strength of military apparatuses, embrionic forms of
popular participation in decision-making, reinforced by a certain egalitarianism and a
providentialist ideology concerning health, education, should be emphasised. Thirdly, the very
internal dynamics of MPLA which had as a consequence that by 1975 its leadership was
composed mainly by non-orthodox Marxists from the 'Presidential' wing. Fourthly, the vacuum
created in the economy, in enterprises and the public administration, by the flight of settlers and
3. For example, the 80s declared defence and security expenditure raised from 29.6% of total govenunent revenue in 1982 to 43.7% in 1985 but "no
data are published by the government on the foreign exchange costs incurred for purchases of military equipment, though a rough idea of the scale of
military imports can be deduced. According to the Ministry of Planning, global imports in 1984 amounted to ... USD 1.42 bn while the non-military
imports recorded by the MFT amount to ... USD 827 Mn ... these figures suggest military purchases at about USD 600 Mn, accounted for 42% of
total imports in 1984. Similar calculations for 1985, based on provisional figures, imply a rise in military imports to about USD 720 Mn, equivalent to
53% of total imports (USD 1,384 Mn). most of military equipment has been bought to USSR, though some weaponry also came from France ..., Spain
... and Brazil. Soviet credits to finance defence equipment sales account for the lion's share of Angola's USD 2.06 bn (disbursed and undisbursed) debt
outstandingto the USSR at the end of September 1985. This debt to the USSR accounts for two thirds of Angola's total external debt, but, fortunately
for Angola, credit tenns have been generous." (Hodges: 1987: 35).
4. See. e.g., a reliable anticolonialist Portuguese source, Luis Moita ("Retum to Africa", Priblico, 28.6.1991).
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educated Angolans. Fifthly, the achievements of the social movements which emerged in 1974-
1975, which resulted in democratic structures, as the CTs, the NPCs, the school management
committees, etc, which these movements demanded to be institutionalised. Lastly, the war, the
internationalization of the Angolan conflict and the need of support from the socialist bloc.
At independence MPLA had become a movement with a strong popular base, a coalition
of diverse social groups ranging from the peasants of the subsistence economy to the nationalist
technocracy of the colonial administration and the anticolonialist intelligentsia of the country.
3.1.1. The expectations of the different social groups
All Angolans expected from independence better living conditions and social
improvement. In urban zones these expectations were better known since they resulted either
from within MPLA, which mediated the demands of the different groups composing it, or from
the 1974-75 social movements. Later some information of the poor peasants and agrarians was
acquired, grounded on their reactions to policies, sometimes quite different from the predictions
of policy-makers, and their own economic and political behaviour.
It may be assumed, as some information arose from the policies and their implementation,
that there were the following expectations on change. Firstly, the urban elites were, by the end of
the 1970s, split into a radical group, socialist-oriented with a diversified range of models of
economic and social development, and a reformist group, which stood for a capitalist and
eventually neocolonial project. Both groups aimed to control the state but for different reasons.
Many radicals advocated the 'statist' framework dominant in the 1970s, a "poisoned chalice", in
Clarke's words (1990: 29). Reformists looked at the state as a form of political domination, a
source of accumulation and privilege, aiming at a 'patrimonialism' (e.g., Kandeh, 1992, and Ghai,
1993), or, as later happened, a mean of accumulation for the formation of a national proto-
bourgeoisie. In a certain way, this meant return to their previous status before the colonialist
offensive of the second half of the 19th century.5
5 . See sections 2.1., 2.2. and 3.2.-5.
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The expectations of waged labour were essentially economic: better wages and working
conditions, access to education, upwards mobility, and generally better living standards. Although
having created their base democratic structures enterprises, workers did not demand workers
control, except for a small number of working class elites, as to some participation in management
committees meant upwards mobility. Thus, the demands made later of enlarged working class
participation at top level were more the result of the model adopted and the expectations of some
segments of the working class, especially the unions leadership, than properly arising from the
grassroots..
Peasants expectations also concentrated on better living standards and working conditions.
Around land there were many expectations, especially the solving of problems resulting from land
expropriation and in some cases, expectations related to the control of traditional territories. On
the organization of work, it seems that many preferred an organization according to their
traditional patterns to the entrepreneurial ones while aiming at a decrease of the painful character
of manual work. Poor peasants did not make significant demands of participation in decision-
making at the central and provincial levels, and when this kind of demands arose they resulted
from initiatives from agrarians (acting as mediators between central government and the MPLA
leadership in a framework of balancing of ethnic and social components) and not from significant
pressure from peasants.7
From the standpoint of the initiatives which they developed through the 80s, we may
conclude that better living standards attained through upwards mobility and the control of the
state were the main expectations of the small farmers and traders group, or at least of their leaders
(agrarians). The latter's conceptions about the state conflicted openly with those of the urban
elites, whether radicals or reformists. Agrarians approached the state as a resource in itself, with
its apparatuses and sources of accumulation and privilege; they did .ot distinguish between state
and private property and between state property and the assets of its leaders and workers. Also,
6. See subsedions 2.2.1.. 3.4.4. and Chapter 5.
7. See Chapter 6.
102
Models of society
when in senior posts they considered civil servants, or the employees of PEs, as their own
employees. Agrarians had access to the state apparatuses from independence grounded in
'revolutionary legitimacy' and became the social group who was capable of making the most
successful 'alternative use' of the central command economy.8
The so-called bureaucratic petty-bourgeoisie, found at the lower levels of the state
hierarchy during reformist colonialism and in a less significant way in firms, has always been a
stronghold of nationalism, most of them with MPLA membership. The main expectation of this
social group was to replace settlers within the state and finns. 9 From 1974 there were fierce
conflicts, grounded on ethnicity and nationality, within state apparatuses between the Angolan and
the Portuguese bureaucratic petty-bourgeoisies. A target of the MPLA campaigns against the
"ambitions of the petty-bourgeoisie", aiming at the urban elites and not the actual petty-
bourgoisie, this group appears as the 'big looser' of independence. Although its demands of
upwards mobility within the state, and for access for assets such as state housing, were met, 1 ° its
living standards deteriorated as the years passed. An exception are the segments of the
8. Many agrarians ground their social position either on connections with low-grade chiefs, to whom they may relate by family/clan ties, on
'revolutionary legitimacy', that is, their participation in the independence war, or, lastly, on their superiority of knowledge towards illiterate peasants (a
contempt for the poor they share with reformists). Agrarians have a populist speech, appealing to peasants identities and, simultaneously, a non-
egalitarian approach to individuals. Indeed, in the local agrarian ideology, children, youngsters, women, soldiers, 'servants/kin' or just people with no
access to some kinds of knowledge (for example, the illiterate) should submit to the unlimited power of the 'chief (either the traditional ones, the
military or the party-state local rulers, or even the 'elders'). Thus, in agrarian ideology the ruled are not entitled to rights but eventually to the chiefs
benevolence. Defending, openly or not, the maintenance and application of tradition, including a covet tribalism, agrarians have a conception of state
which make them one of the most corrupt components of bureaucracies since they approach the state as a property of chiefs, where they do not separate
functions. It has been essentially through agrarian connections within the state that African traders succeeded in smuggling goods to the informal
economy, jeopardising any (unrealistic) attempt at proper rationing, while simultaneously their activities in the countryside created serious problems
for the co-operatives movement Still agrarians approach any to control of their activities within the state as aggression. A recent and well-known
example of MPLA agrarians is the so-called Catete group, the most sophisticated segment of Mbtmdu agrarians, claiming additional legitimacy since
they come from the region of origin of President Nato. A section of the members of this group were purged from the party in the mid-80s because they
had set up private farms in many cases using the resources of PEs over 1.vhich they had, due to their positions within the state, some kind of control
powers while using badly paid (when paid) labour. Indeed, when using kin or village 'subjects' labour, quite often agrarians do not pay labour,
approadiing labour supplies as a result of 'serfdoms': thus agrarians are called, in new Creole jargon, the Teudals'. Agrarians are quite keen in keeping
the instituted secrecy (see subsections 3.4.5. and 4.3.2.) and use it a a mean to manipulate people; communication of relevant information is not a
right, but a gift from the chief to the subordinates, who become linked by sharing secrets; the latter, as they are not controlled, often are deliberately
false. See, e.g„ subsection 5.3.2. (requisition') and Chapter 4.
9. The vacuum created by the flight of settlers, including civil servants, was filled by 'upwards mobility' of non-whites, coming from 'The low and
intermediate levels of petty-bourgeoisie and a part of proletariat" (Heiner, 1980: 91). From the transitional period legislation c:hanged colonial rules
on recruitment, e.g.: Dec. no 65/75, allowed the filling of posts in public administration by civil servants of the lower levels, without the requisites
demanded by colonial legislation and Dec. no 142/75, reduced educational requirements for access to posts in the civil service.
10.MPLA reacted, with no success, against the trend: "in the urban centres petty-bourgeoisie, heir as channel of incorrect conceptions bequeathed by
colonialism, generally assumes ... opportunist practices reflected in an enormous ambition of prestige and rush to command posts. ... it is necessary to
fight the petty-bourgeois vices and ideas demonstrated within the Angolan working class, by developing an intensive political work and organising
campaigns of ideological struggle against all the capitalist trends." (Politburo Declaration, as quoted in JA, 9.11.1976).
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bureaucratic petty-bourgeoisie who allied to traders of the informal economy either in the
embezzlement or in the unlawful use of state assets, as well as those engaged in bribery.11
3.1.2. The organisational components of the post-colonial state
The structure of the post-colonial state, with the wide functions and objective base
described in this work, was formed in the framework of the expectations and struggles of the
different social groups. During the independence war and in the transitional period two types of
structures were created which would play a significant role in future developments: the pre-state
structures of the guerrilla and the different forms of organization of people's power in 1974-1975.
To these elements of the post-colonial state should be added the apparatuses of the colonial state
(approached as organizations and processes). Having dealt with people's power in the previous
chapter, the other two organisational elements are dealt with below.
The structures of liberated zones
The experiences of creation of pre-state structures during the war of independence
accentuated the supremacy of the military apparatuses in all the movements involved in the armed
struggle. Peasants were the social base of all these movements, and all resorted to traditional
forms of power for recruited members or even as organisational point of departure. MPLA has
been the only movement where the filling of leadership posts went beyond the traditional pattern
'aristocrats, small farmers and traders'. All the movements involved in armed struggle had
authoritarian patterns of leadership, especially FNLA and UNITA 'supreme chiefs'. Among these
three organisations MPLA was the only one to establish a more democratic organisation in
liberated zones and only in this movement was authoritarianism challenged, 1- 2 probably due to its
larger and more diversified social base, as well as the dispersion and variety of the forms of its
'loose organizations'.
11.See section 5.2.
12.For example. it appears that kfPLA developed authoritarian patterns of decision-making at the top, with the president as the paramount figure (e.g,
Ramos, 1991: 13), while keeping a relative degree of democracy in the base.
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The guerrilla tradition was, firstly, of self-organisation in the different bases of MPLA
military regions given the difficulties of communications. The organisational forms varied from
region to region, with a very wide autonomy in the 1st Region. The latter was surrounded by the
colonial army and FNLA and was led by political cadres, who were simultaneously military, sent
from the MPLA bases in neighbouring countries to reorganize peasants after the white counter
terror in the 1960s. Peasants who took refuge in the forests rebuilt their clandestine villages which
in some cases managed to keep in touch with each other. MLPA cadres organised defence, run
schools and ensured some health assistance. The essential pattern was self-organisation, the
integration of the guerrillas in this organisation and isolation for a long time (Ingo, 1983, [72] 60-
1, [73] 60-1, [74] 60-1 and Ramos, 1991: 13).
In the Eastern Front, opened in 1966, there were attempts to achieve a larger integration
of the military and peasants, of intellectuals and soldiers. In this Region were created CIRs, which
were bases where guerrillas were often recruited after negotiations with chiefs of the region's
villages and went under military training together with literacy and political education (Ramos,
1991: 11, Minter, 1988: 10-14, Freitas, 1975: 141-42 and, generally, Davidson, 1972). In the
villages near CIRS there were 'action committees', the base structure of MPLA, whose leaders
were elected by the people before military operations began. It was a democratic innovation in
peasants formations which contrasted with the authoritarian patterns of the colonial 'natives'
regime. MPLA would later to apply this process of selection of its members (approval by an open
base assembly) in towns (Davidson, 1972: 277, 267). 13 The organization of power structures in
the areas under the control of the guerrilla continued to have patterns of self-organization, led by
the guerrillas, given the isolation and difficulties of communications. The attempts to control this
process by the MPLA leadership, and conflicts between the military and the political wings, led to
changes in the criteria of selection of military leaders, who should have simultaneously political
and military merit and combined the military posts with the political leadership of the zones where
they operated (Davidson, 1972: 280-82, 333-39, Marcum, 1978: 198-205 and Ramos, 1991: 10).
13 . See. e.g., Bhagavan, 1986, and Bergerol and Wolters. 1983, for the 1977 Rectification Movement
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The organisation of the MPLA liberated zones was characterized by a certain
experimentalism, where there were attempts to "learn from mistake" (Davidson, 1972: 284 and
Neto, quoted in Marcum, 1978: 199-200), by the autonomy and by the small dimension of the
different organisational units. The image of life in the bases which reached us show small
communities where poverty and risks were shared, the intellectuals among the guerrillas educated
peasants, tried to reorganize production, supplied some health care, while fighting colonialism
together.
However, later developments showed that democracy at the base in the MPLA liberated
zones has been for many participants in the independence war more the result of need to mobilise
people than the result of a deliberate purpose towards a deepening of this democracy in the post-
colonial society.
When the MPLA guerrillas were integrated in towns, the model of 'units of small
dimension', experimentalism and some degree of egalitarianism worked for them as a standard.
But the model conflicted with the 'management of macro variables' by the state and the
superstructure of centralized direction which was implemented. The organizational patterns
carried by the guerrillas were thus diluted within the post-colonial state. The consequence of the
defeat of the guerrilla patterns, as well as people's power's, was the progressive centralization of
decision-making and related authoritarianism dealt with below. At the same time, it meant the
progressive marginalisation of all these who represented a more democratic, or less authoritarian,
project than the model implemented within the framework of central command of statist
socialism.
The colonial state
The colonial state of the period immediately preceding independence was characterized by
authoritarianism, serious restrictions of rights and freedoms, the resort to military means to solve
conflicts (the colonial war) and the economic interventionism to guarantee forms of trade
exploitation of and capital penetration in the colony (that is, the relations with the centre). A given
degree of state intervention was always used in response to the shortage of capital (metropolitan
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and local) and of other factors such as labour. During the period which preceded fascism, the
colonial state ensured the supply of labour, the conquest of land, the building of infrastructures,
while simultaneously encouraging settlement of Europeans, acting as a mediator between
metropolitan and foreign investment and protecting metropolitan industries.
The performance of these functions gave rise to mixed state bureaucracies. As the colonial
state fostered the emergence of an African bureaucracy, from the 1890s there was a trend to
discriminate against Angolan personnel, by gradually raising the educational requirements for
access to the civil service. It became impossible for many Angolans to get posts since there were
almost no schools in the country supplying formal education for the necessary degees.14
Discrimination against Angolans in the civil service was furthered during the 'agrarian-commercial'
period of fascism. Under racist discrimination, the Angolan bureaucracies began to differentiate
themselves from the metropolitan ones and became the promoters of new forms of protest.
During colonial reformism, the state continued to supply labour, notwithstanding the
formal abolition of forced labour, to build infrastructures and to encourage settlement and
occupation of land by Europeans. While promoting the war against nationalist movements, the
reformist state rationalized interventionism by controlling a wider set of economic flows (foreign
trade, foreign exchange, foreign investment, access to natural resources, etc), and controlling
(restricting) competition through the licensing schemes. As in the past the colonial state ensured
trade exploitation, while the function of guaranteeing significant capital penetration was
emphasised during reformism. The reformist colonial state also used direct intervention in the
economy mainly by shareholdings in mining companies and financial institutions (the relationship
with the centre of the world system). Under pressurre to grant self-determination to the country,
the colonial state promoted from the early 1970s an administrative reform decentralizing decision-
making in the colony, searched for alliances with some strata of the African population and made
some investments in education and health.
14 . On the colonial educational policies during the liberal period, see, e.g., Sousa Ferreira, 1974: 58-66 and Samuels, 1972: 53-65.
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The economic apparatuses (from the planning authority to the licensing boards and a set of
promotional bureaucracies such as ERA), to perform their functions in a situation of shortage of
expertise became more liberal than other state institutions, local or metropolitan, in the
recruitment of personnel. They thus resorted to antifascist and anticolonialist experts, as well as to
Angolan elites, especially the traditional Creole families. These patterns of recruitment seem to
have influenced economic policy, for example the agricultural policies, leading also to conflicts
when colonial domination reached certain levels (e.g., Heimer, 1979: 19).
Local economic bureaucracies, mainly 'developmentalists', experienced their own 'great
divide' when independence was foreseen in 1974, between those for a socialist and those for a
capitalist model of development. The former remained in the country after independence and
enlarged the 'radicals' group, while the latter fled with settlers. The collapse of the so-called
socialism in the late 80s, brought back to the country many former members of colonial
bureaucracies, some fronting for a wide range of foreign investors and associating with reformists
and/or the emergent comprador bourgeoisie.
Colonial reformism enabled the indigenous state bureaucracies, weakened and
discriminated against from the late 19th century, to return progressively to the colonial state and
be capable to exercise power after independence. The interventionist tradition of bureaucratic
power reached its highest level under 'statist socialism', which was, in a certain way, a continuity
of former state practice and organisation. The reorganisation of the state after independence
sharpened the conflict between the heirs of the colonial bureaucratic tradition, who, whatever
their ideologies, had in common the centralised and hierarchic form of organisation, and the
carriers of the 'guerrilla', which reflected as an approach to the structure of the state the 'small is
beautiful' of isolated villages in liberated zones.
3.1.3. The roots of statism
In 1975 not only MPLA was the single force dominating the state (what was left from the
disintegration of the colonial state), but also the state was one of the rare social spheres capable of
responding to the problems of society. The collapse of the productive apparatus and the colonial
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institutions left very few alternative spaces given the fragility of the structures, economic and
political, which emerged from the 1974-74 social movements and had no time to consolidate
themselves,' 5 and the conflict which quickly came to surface between guerrilla structures and the
post-colonial state, dealt with below.
The economic demands of all social groups centred in the state. In the latter many
apparatuses, notwitstanding the massive flight of civil servants, kept the same organization and
practices, while the overall dimension of the state was substantially enlarged by the extensive
nationalization of abandoned assets. It became thus the main source of accumulation and upwards
mobility. Indeed, statist conceptions, added to the goals of social promotion generated during
colonialism and barred by the restrictions on the access of Africans to the civil service, especially
during the natives regime, led to a set of demands of employment within the state and to the
progressive expansion of the areas of intervention of the state and its apparatuses.16
Statism had thus in Angola, given the overwhelming situation of non-ownership of means
of production by the elites and the people, as well as the weakness of the civil society, 17 an
objective base to its expansion. The control of the state (central and local) was for a large period
the main goal of the different social groups which composed the MPLA coalition. Struggles did
not appear as against the state, save in isolated cases. They even did not appear as a competition
among different social forces through diversified forms of political mediation. The state became
thus a space for social struggles (e.g., Clarke, 1990a) - from the late 70s social struggles took
l5 Firstly, the social movements were not capable, during their period of autonomy, to coordinate their activities (Cahen, 1985: 11), although
attempts were made, even at the level of post colonial legislation. So, when repression, legitimated by the single-party control of all social
organisations, together with direct repression of members of the movements, undermined their gains, none of these movements were capable of
defending themselves from the growing interference of the party and state. Secondly, because within the pre-established 'official' movements scheme,
workers, students and neighbours had necessarily to link themselves to an 'official' movement, here the MPLA they could not cut these links and
pursue an autonomous path and self-defence in the pod-colonial conditions. The presence of FNLA and UNITA, and foreign intervention, also
contributed to the low possibilities of self-development of the social movements referred to. Indeed, many political, economic and social conditions
prevented citizens from pursuing a proper struggle for their rights during the period studied. For example, as RSA invaded the country, or as citizens
had to queue to fight for food to survive, there were little opportunities to raise democratic demands.
. The utilisation in Angola of a Marxist rhetoric to ground an accelerated indigenisation of the administrative apparatuses and the generalised
nationalisation of economic activities originated and mainly served to legitimate the ambitions of rapid social promotion. With the same goal the status
of freedom fighter was invoked, so perverting the recruitment criteria to all decision-making posts (a procedure today gauchely retaken by Savimbi in
his comments criticising the shifts of Angolan cadres)", (Pena Pires, Paha), 24.9.90). As enterprises were paralysed and their workers facing
unemployment, the demand for posts in the state substantially increased; on the other hand, agrarian members of the bureaucracies, within the extended
family/clan loyalties, reinforced these trends by recruiting a substantial number of personnel even breaking the new legislation which lowered the
requirements (for example, m.o. no 33/76, Finance, repealed abuses in the filling of posts at customs without respecting the educational requirements
for the posts). See Chapters 4 and 5.
17.1n its different meanings. see Fine, 1992.
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place within the state, either for the control of its repressive apparatuses, of the the economic
administration or of top decision-making organs.
As this stage of development of the Angolan state is today substantially overcome, it is
interesting that UNITA wages the present war demanding the control of, or at least substantial
participation in, state aparatuses, especially the economic and repressive ones, given its
incapability, demonstrated by the defeat at elections and war which followed, in controlling the
state through forms of political mediation which in the meanwhile became institutionalized.
3.1.4. The constitutional framework for change
The Proclamation of Independence and the Constitutional Law (CL) 18 resulted from the
compromise between the MPLA Programme, 19 the new demands arising from the popular
struggles during 1974-1975, and the context of war and single-party power within which PRA
emerged. The 1975 CL was in force up to 1991, whith changes mainly in the area of organization
of the political power. Both CL and the Proclamation pointed to radical change by a socialist path
of development: 'complete independence', and not only political independence, as a strategic goal,
while asserting the principle of negation of exploitation20 and the setting up of a planned economy
18.The CL institutionalised the main principles and directives of the Proclamation; the CL was approved by the Central Committee (CC) of MPLA in
10th November 1975; resulting from a revolution, CL contained a norm safeguarding the existing legal order, by maintaining in force all colonial
legislation which "do not counter the spirit of the present law and the Angolan revolutionary process" (art. 58, 1975 version, later art 85). A
nationality law was also approved, granting Angolan nationality according to either jus soli or jus sanguini criteria (art. 1/1) and forbidding double
nationality (art. 1 2). The frequent changes of CL refer to the part on state organs; in Title I (Fundamental Principles), only art. 9 was changed by the
1978 revision; Title II (Fundamental Rights and Duties), and Title IV (Symbols of PRA), were not dianged until the 1991 revision of CL; in Title V
(Final and Transitional Norms), new norms were added as a result of the 1980 constitutional revision, and art 57 (power of the MPLA CC to change
the constitution) was withdrawn.
19. On the MPLA Prograrmne, see section 2.2., note 46; as for the political system, the Programme established in 1975: L "(to implement) A
republican, lay and democratic regime for Angola" (point 3/a), ii. "(to adopt) An electoral system based on universal, equal, direct and secret vote"
(point 3 d). iii. "The People's Assembly will bathe supreme organ of the state legislative power" (point 3/e), "(emerging) from free general elections;
(and) legal political parties will be able to present their candidates in a common or separate lists" (point 3/f), and MPs will have immunity (point 3 h),
iv. "The first constitution of the Republic of Angola will be made by the People's Assembly" (point 3/g), v. "The People's Assembly will appoint a
goverrunent of national union which reinforces the union between the different social strata and really expresses the will of the Nation and especially of
the most exploited strata, for freedom and progress of Angola and against the political, economic and cultural subordination of the country to foreign
interests" (point 3/i); the govemment "will be the supreme organ of the executive power of the state" (point 3/j), with powers granted by the People's
Assembly to which it is accountable for its policies (point 3/k). Also "guarantee of freedom of speech, consciousness, ark press, meeting association,
residence, communication, etc, for all the Angolan people" (point 3/a) and "guarantee of protection of the person of all foreigners who do respect the
laws in force in the country, according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (point 3/m).
20. Proclamation, 8-10, and CL., art. 1: "PRA is a sovereign, independent and democratic state whose first objective is the total liberation of the
Angolan people from the vestiges of colonialism and domination and aggression by imperialism and the construction of a prosperous and democratic
country, completely free of any form of exploitation of man by man, realising the aspirations of the popular masses."
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to achieve economic and social development. 21 While the Proclamation established as a strategic
goal the implementation of a popular democracy, 22 the CL avoided the definition of a precise form
of state, but the constitutional principles allow to be include in the broad group of 'socialist-
oriented systems of the Third-World'.
The CL provided for an unitary state aiming the "common development of all the Angolan
nation and the removal of the sequels of regionalism and tribalism". 23 The principle of popular
sovereignty was established in art. 2, while art. 3 incorporated in the law fundamental demands of
people's power. 24 Art. 2, in fine, provided for the single party regime and established the principle
of direction of the state by the party. 25 The constitutional provisions relating to the country's
position in international affairs were contained in art. 16, which established the non-alignment
principle and art. 14 the principle mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-
interference in other states affairs.
The fundamental principles were not changed until the 1991 revision of CL, except the
norms and principles on the economic constitution. 26 The latter were altered by constitutional
revision of 1978 which incorporated into the CL the directives of the MPLA CC 3rd Plenary
Meeting of October 1976, defining a socialist path of development, and the resolutions of the
1977 MPLA Congress, ratifying the 'socialist option'. 27 This choice led to a new content of art. 9,
on the statute of means of production. In 1975, art. 9 established
21. Proclamation, 10 and CL, art. 8: "PRA considers agriculture as the base and industry as the decisive factor of its development. The state directs
and plans the national economy, aiming the systematic and harmonious development of all the natural and human resources of the country and the use
of wealth in the benefit of the Angolan people.".
22. Proclamation. 9: "PRA, under the direction of N1PLA, moves progressively towards a state of popular democracy. Having as nucleus the alliance
of workers and peasants, all patriotic strata will be united against imperialism and its agents, in the struggle for the building of a society without
exploiters or exploited".
23. CL, arts 4 and 5; art. 4: "PRA is an unitary and indivisible state, whose territory, which carmot be violated and alienated, is defmed by the present
geographical limits of Angola, and any attempt of separatism or division of its territory will be energetically fought."; art. 5: "The social, economic and
cultural solidarity between all the regions of Angola will be promoted and intensified, in order to achieve the common development of all the Angolan
nation and the removal of the sequels of regionalism and tribalism".
24. a" art. 3: "To the popular masses is vested a wide and effective participation in the exercise of political power, through the consolidation,
enlargement and development of the organisational forms of people's power." See subsections 2.2.1., 3.1.2., 3.2.1. and 3.4.3.
25. CI, art. 2, 2nd part: "The political, economic and social leadership of the nation is held by MPLA, its legitimate representative, composed by a
large front of all patriotic forces engaged in anti-imperialist struggle.".
26. See Vital Moreira, 1975: 35 and Simbes Patricio, 1982: 158-59.
27. See sections 3.3. and 3.4.
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"PRA will promote the implementation of just relations in all the production
sectors, stimulating and developing the public sector as well as impelling the co-
operative forms. PRA will be especially concerned with solving the problem of
land in the interest of the peasantry".
The 1978 revision adopted the principle of dominance of socialist ownership. 28 Also, a
directive on the content of legislation and priorities of allocation of public resources was then
inserted into art. 9: "The state must adopt the measures which will enable the constant
enlargement and consolidation of the socialist relations of production." 29 But art. 10, on private
and foreign ownership, was not altered:
"PRA recognises, protects and guarantees the private activities and ownership, if
they are useful to the country's economy and to the interests of the Angolan
people".
The 1978 revision did not change art. 8. In part one it contained a directive for economic
strategy, "Agriculture is the base and industry its decisive factor". 3° In the second part art. 8
provided for the 'principle of planning' and also for a directive on the allocation of resources.31
Art. 26 established a principle of distribution: "each (citizen) must produce according to his/her
capacity and be paid according to the (quantity and quality of) labour (supplied)."32
The principles and norms of the economic constitution established a complex system of
transition to socialism, where at the departing point, apparently, there was no dominant mode of
production and different social sectors coexisted. 33 The directives on the organisation of the
economy and allocation of resources pointed to goals such as development and a socialist model.
28. "The base of economic and social development is socialist ownership, constituted by the state and co-operative property." (CL, art. 9/1).
29. CL, art. 91; on the norms developing arts 8 and 9, see Chapter 4.
3°. This directive (a guide-line to the legislator in order to attain some substantive goals, Bobbio, 1977: 54) meant, according to some economists, that
accumulation for enlarged reproduction would come from agrictature, while (national) inthletry should work as supplier of inputs to agriculture and an
user of its outputs; a Declaration of the Politburo in 1976 indeed stated that "it is from the countryside that we may expect the accumulation of capital
sufficient to develop industry. But this has to be done without demanding exaggerated sacrifices to the peasant masses." (JA, 9.11.1976). In the 1975
evectations, the directive had a meaning destroyed by the worsening of the war, but nevertheless strange in an almost monoproducer of oil whidi,
simultaneously, had a low degree of development of agriadture.
31.On the content of art. 8, see note 21.
32. See section 5.2.; art. 26 also established the right and duty to work.
33.The definition of 'social sectors' existing in Angola was made by the MPLA Congress of 1977: i. socialist, based on PEs and co-operatives, ii. state
capitalist, composed by mixed firms and private enterprises inserted into the planned economy, iii. capitalist, including all other forms of private
property of means of production with production to the market and using waged labour, iv. small mercantile production, private property of means of
production, production for the market and no waged labour, and v. self-subsistence economy private property, subsistence production only
occasionally marketed, collective non-paid labour of members of the family ("Teses e Resoluctes" of the MPLA 1st Congress, 1977). These selors
had been defined by Lenin for USSR in the early years of the Soviet. state.
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Although many constitutional principles have no immediate effectiveness in the legal
order, they nevertheless institute directions for the state action, that is, directives for the draft of
legislation, plans and programmes aiming progressive steps towards the strategic goals, within the
reserve of possibility.34
 The part of this work on the economy demonstrates that there was often a
contempt for the CL programme, while war made it almost impossible to make significant steps
towards a more developed and just society. But, generally speaking, during its period in force, the
CL had no proper structures of guarantee, 35
 and even the norms on the control of constitutionality
(which were not included in the CL but in the Regulations of the People's Assembly) did not
work. No single case of repeal of a law or decree on grounds of its conflict with the CL was
published until the end of the period studied, although unconstitutional norms were enacted and
applied. Also nobody seemed to control, from the stand-point of effectiveness of the constitution,
flagrant state omissions, for example, on the enactment of legislation on co-operatives, 36 a
'dominant sector' according to art. 9, or the publication of the national plan (NP), a law according
to legislation concretising art. 8.37
The provisions of CL on state organs (that is, allocating powers) were frequently changed,
and reflected in a clearer way the sharp power conflicts within the single party system. But the
constitutional framework also urges a reference to the standards of rights citizens effectively
enjoyed and which conditioned all the project MPLA was supposed to implement in the post-
colonial society. They are dealt with in specific sections.
To understand the ineffectiveness of the constitutional programme it is necessary to go
through the political struggles of the different components of the coalition of social forces MPLA
represented as well as the way the post-colonial state consolidated.
34. That is, the state is obliged to achieve the constitutional programme of change within the boundaries of possibility, given by the economic and
social structure of the country and the international contest which arises from the relative position of the concerned country in the world systent
35. On the concept and types of structures, see Canotilho, 1983: 695.
36. See, e.g., sections 3.5. (CM Secretariat) and 6.2. (co-operatives).
37. The content of the plan, a law (see Chapter 4). was secret
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3.2. Struggles and the shaping of institutions
People's power caused the 'great divide' among radicals: at stake were conflicting
conceptions of democracy," political39 and industrial democracy, and plain struggles for power.
The single party framework which arose from the metropolitan definition of 'official movements'
and related victory of one movement over the two others, conditioned all the discussions on the
subject at the time, and in the future. Representative democracy at the parliamentary and
governmental level was not, thus, under discussion after independence. Many radicals, including
MPLA leaders, believed that the implementation of democracy should come from below, within
the frame of the people's power movement initiated in 1974. 4° So while art. 3 of CL generally
incorporated people's power as a democratic component of the political system, art. 50 legalised
informal PP structures as the local government organization.4'
But there were other issues in the agenda. Firstly, the independence of people's power
organisations from party structures, with CACs defending that they should not be under party
direct contro1. 42 CACs positions got them substantial criticism from MPLA officials, who accused
38. The conception of democracy in this work relates to the possibility of choosing. by participation in collective or by individual decision-making.
among the wider range of possible alternatives at any level of an individuals' life. Democracy includes from the working of the markd for consumption
goods, or for, say, educational opportunities or professional choices, to the political sphere stricto sensu. In this conception the satisfaction of one level
(if ever achievable) does not reduce the need for the others. Within this broad definition, the degree of democracy in a society is assessed by elements
which go beyond the political system or standards of living. Access to relevant information on available ahematives is assumed as a necessary
condition for the working of democracy, and pairing with known institutional machinery. This broad conception of democracy implies that
underdevelopment is by itself; whatever the political system, a situation of restricted democracy for large numbers of citizens of the concerned
socidies. when their range of choices is contrasted with choices available in other (more developed) societies. Development, and consequent reduction
of scarcity with the increase in the provision of all kinds of goods, including information and culture, employment, education and health, etc, is thus a
condition for the enlargement of the possibility to choose among different alternatives. However, trade-offs between democracy at the political level
and development, are assumed to be attempts of ruling groups to prevent the enjoyment of democracy by, at least, large fractions of the population in
the concerned society.
39. Locating democracy at a political level, its is defined as "a set of rules, including procedure rules to obtain certain results of interest to the
community by decisions technically laws, the so-called 'rules of the game', allowing the wider and more effective participation of citizens. vvhether by
direct or indirect forms, in the political decisions, that is in the decisions interesting the whole community." (Bobbio, 1979b: 34 and 1979a: 23) A
democratic system has the much discussed (see, e.g., Cerrone, 1979: 64-5, Guichicci, 1979: 73-8, Settembrini, 1979: 89, Gerratana, 1979: 99-107 and
Vacca, 1979: 132-92, in the mid-70s Rinascita debates) rules stressed by Bobbio (1979b: 74).
4°. The Politburo defined in 1976 the goal to implement "a revolutionary democratic dictatorship exercised by all revolutionary and anti-imperialist
classes over the internal and external reactionaries. To achieve this (goal) the state must be based on workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals and
progressive strata of the petty-bourgeoisie. The state of popular democracy grounds on people's power organisations which have to be dominated by
these revolutionary classes, largely controlled by the masses and led by the scientific ideology of the proletariat"; and appealed to democratic
participation: "it is nereqsary that assemblies disrusss solutions for the concrete problems of neighbourhoods. Workers should always be called to
participate actively in these achievements" (Declaration, as published at JA, 9.11.1976).
41. CL. art. 50 (1975 version): "The local government organs in the county, commune, neighbourhood and village are, respectively, the Municipal
CounciL the Commune Committee and the Neighbourhood or Village Popular Committees"; the municipal councils were the colonial form of
organisation and were changed by Law on People's Power to County Committees (LPP, Law no 1/76).
42. See, e.g., 14. Angola Revista, 16/28, 28.2.75, quoted in Cahen, 1985: 18. On CACs see subsection 2.2.1.
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them of lack of loyalty to the movement (on the issue of independence of people's power and
associations). Reformists and agrarians, suspicious of people's power, saw them as dangerous left-
wingers. But their most enraged enemies were orthodox Marxist-Leninists: the Henda
Committees and the Nito Alves group, who actually feared competition, since CACs had
reasonable support in the students and workers unions, as well as in the neighbourhood
organisation. When CACs lost the 1976 elections for the students unions to an Henda list, the
students movement came under the control of MPLA, while UNTA was reinforcing its control of
workers committees (Callen, 1985: 18). 43 As Nito Alves got the supervision of the neighbourhood
organisation, the discussion on the independence of people's power towards the single-party was
silenced, while later legislation established monopoly of choice of candidates to MPLA and
related organisations. But CACs can be credited for their efforts in raising, and practicing, a non-
party approach to popular organisation.
To respond to the expectations of the social movements, in early 1976 MPLA enacted a
set of legislation: i. Law no 1/76 (LPP), on local government, ii. Law no 3/76 (Title II)," on the
management of PEs, and iii. Dec. no 76/76, on the Democratic Organisation of Secondary
Schools. As the responsibility for the draft legislation was allocated to radicals members of the
government, the legal solutions illustrate their different approaches to the problems of
democracy. 45 Thus, for example, on 'party control', only LPP provided for candidates linked to
MPLA46 and only the decree on secondary schools tried to institutionalise the 1974-75 goals of
coordination of the different components of people's power. 47 Also, the most powerful
43. See subsection 3.4.4.
44. Law no 3/76 ruled nationalisation (see section 4.1.) and, on Title II, the organisation of nationalised enterprises. See subsection 3.4.4.
45. The drafts of LPP was under the responsibility of Nito Alves, as minister of Internal Adrninistration, of Law no 3/76, under the responsibility of the
ministry of Planning and Economic Coordination, Dilolwa, and legislation on secondary schools (draft Dec. no 76/76) was led by minister of
Education, Jacinto. In passing this legislation is the work of Angolans with no foreign advisers and no copies of foreign legislation: if there are
similarities with other legal systems, they are coincidences; at the time radicals maximised Angolan production and country-oriented. This kind of
approach, however, had (and has) costs, which may counter the baiefrts; for example, Law no 3/76, as a law on nationalisation, has been justly
criticised (mainly by foreigners, some of them lobbying against the possibility of natiorialisation) by its low technical quality.
46. Law no 176, LPP, arts 7, 12, 15, 22 and 29 (election of connnittees up to the province level) and art. 44 (candidates to the people's power
organisation only could be presented by an electoral commission composed by the MPLA Action Committees, UNTA, JMPLA and OMA).
47. See note 42.
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autonomous movements with a large social base and a significant record of initiatives got the
essential of their demands recognised.
3.2.1. Local government
LLP institutionalised both representative and direct democracy," establishing the
assemblies, as the lowest level of a system of committees going, in local government, from the
neighbourhood/village to the province leve1. 49 The neighbourhood and village committees were
elected by directly, while upper level committees were elected in a successive indirect way as the
level went up. 5° Members of committees could be revoked at any time by voters." Working with
representatives of the government (the commissioners at the different levels),52 the committees
coordinated their activities according to the principle of 'democratic centralism', which had
nevertheless some limits. 53 In some kinds of decisions higher committees had the duty of
compulsory consultation of lower levels (for example, in planning, civil defence and agrarian
reform) and decisions made without the consultation were "null and void". The committees also
had rights of information, either from the lower or the higher levels.54
48.On the fetishisation of direct democracy see, e.g.. Bobbio, 1979b: 48-51. See subsection 2.2.1., espec. note 59.
49. The LPP scheme for local government was: i. assemblies of village or neighbourhood, "composed by all residents ... but only those more than 18
years old have voting rights" (and thus teenies and teenagers, who had such an important role in the 1974-75 struggles, could participate in
discussions), (arts 4 2 and 9 2), the assemblies elected the area committees (arts 7/2 and 12/2); ii. the neighbourhood or village committees should
"mobilise the popular masses for the discussion and solution of their most pressing and immediate problems and for resistance and the construction of
popular democracy" (arts 8/a and 13 a), "discuss and adopt forms of reorganisation of social life ...", (arts 8/h and 13/h), "dynamise and support co-
operatives ..." (art 13j) or, in the villages, "develop and support collective forms of production" and "decide on the forms of organisation of
production in the village, especially on the reserve of land for collective subsistence crops near the village and on the application of the principles
which will be defined for the agrarian reform" (arts 8/j and 8/i), decide on the forms of supply (of goods and services, in their area), organising the
struggle against speculation, hoarding, smuggling and economic sabotage, cooperating with the concerned (public) services" (arts 13/i and 8/k),
"decide on solutions for the problems of housing, public health, education, communications and transports, as well as on other affairs interesting the
betterment of the living conditions of the inhabitants", (arts 13/I and 8/1), "supervise the activity of public administration services in the area" (arts 13/o
and 8 o), and collaborate in civil defence and struggle against criminality (arts 8/m, 8/n and 8/g, and 13/m, 13/n and 13/g), (art. 8 refers to villages and
art 13 to neighbourhoods); iii. from that level the committees (commune, county and province) had functions such as "to supervise and control the
activities of (local) enterprises" or public services (arts 16 2/11, 231/c and 302/h), cooperate in civil defence and struggle against criminality and
participate in planning (arts 16 2/e, 23/2/a and 30/3/a), (art. 16 for commune, art. 23 for county and art 30 for province).
50.The committees of a lower level elected the committees of the upper level (LPP, arts 15/1, 22/1 and 29/1).
51.LPP, art. 47.
52.The commissioners were appointed by the government under proposal of the local organisation of MPLA (LPP, arts 17,24 and 33).
53.LPP. art. 37, on democratic centralism. The suspension of decisions of the lower level by the higher organ did not apply to "decisions or actions of
the exclusive interest of the area of jurisdiction of the concerned organ whidi do not collude with powers attributed to other organs of local
government" and from suspension decisions there was appeal to the organ immediately superior to that whidi had decided the suspension (LPP, art
38).
54.LPP, arts 39 and 40. All organs had the duty to supply within 15 days information demanded by other levels, except in defence and security.
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In June 1976, there were elections for NPCs in Luanda. 55 The elections were anticipated
by a campaign for the party membership of candidates, under the argument that "right-wingers
cannot win the elections", while the organisers of elections claimed against the "last minute
militancy". 56 These references point to conflicts within MPLA, 57
 and as a synthesis and warning,
the PR declared "power sometimes corrupts". 58 Nevertheless, the 1976 Luanda elections were the
only direct and universal elections that took place in the country up to 1992. Elected NPCs
remained in office for about one year, until some were suspended for alleged participation in the
27 May 1977 coup.
3.2.2. Industrial democracy
Law no 3/76 institutionalised the workers participatory organisation which emerged in
enterprise before independence 59 through three types of different organs: the workers assemblies,
sector6° and general, and the management committee. These organs, and the government
55. The elections were ruled by Dec. no 45/76. An elections commission was appointed by the minister of Internal Adniinistration; the commission,
organised the voting areas, polling stations, the presentation of candidates and the scrutiny of votes (e.g., JA, communiqués of electoral commissions,
23.4.1976, 3.6.1976, 8.6.1976, 2.6.1976). Surveys published at JA on how the campaign was going on neighbourhoods, showed: i. 5 people said
nothing had been done for mobilisation (16.4.1976), ii. 4 argued there had been no voters registry, while one knew about it (17.4.1976), iii. 8 did not
know about the campaign, while one knew and another stated knowing as well but being convinced that there were attempts to get relatives elected
(1.4.1976, 7.5.1976), and, iv. in another neighbourhood all 6 interviewed did not !mow about the campaign (8.5.1976). The date of elections was thus
postponed (communiqué of the minister. JA, 9.5.76). The surveys published at the time in the press raise the problem on whether 'people's power' had
already become 'bureaucratised' by mid-1976, given the lack of interest of many people in the elections.
56.JA. 2.6.1976 and title of a communiqué of the staff of the electoral campaign (JA, 8.6.1976). respectively; Nito Alves declared that the MPLA
action committees should propose the candidates according to the law (JA, 5.6.1976); actually the law also provided for presentation candidates by
UNTA, OMA and JMPLA (see note 60), while the Luanda provincial commissioner, Fortunato, later involved as well in the attempt of coup, argued
that "only militants shall be elected to the boroughs (committees)" (JA, 9.4.1976).
57.One conflict concerned the problem secret versus public votins, with lawyers arguing for secret ballot and Nitists for public voting. Secret ballot
fmally prevailed as Dec. no 45/76 and m.os 15/76 to 18/76 (Internal Administration) changed the LPP provision for public voting into secret ballot, an
improvement, although formally unconstitutional. But before changes were imposed (probably by the Politburo), Nito Alves attacked in the press the
legal profession: "Some backward mentalities, dronically linked to bourgeois law, incapable of overcoming the reactionary character of capitalist law,
are scandalised with the ... elections system. Some lawyers, still conservative, criticised us by the fact that the eledions system did not guarantee from
now direct and equal voting by secret ballot (at all levels of committees). ... Be patient, eminent lawyers. In this concrete historical stage of our
revolution voting cannot be equal. The ones who think this want to sell our people's power to the traitors of revolution, the internal reaction,
opportunists, criminals. We should be clear: during many next years voting in Angola will not be equal until the level of productive forces under
socialist relations of production soundly established and under the leadership of the working class party advise our People the application of equal
voting" (JA, 5.6.1976).
58. Agostuth. o Nato on people's power (JA, 27.6.1976); Nato used to fight rhetoric and propaganda: for example, when he saw in a demonstration
pictures portraying him as The guide and educator of the Angolan people', it seems that Henda's propaganda, he stated "I am not the guide and educator
of anyone. I am comrade Nato", while sincerely on the side of the oppressed: he declared, for example, in the 1st May 1979 to the workers
demonstration: "It is necessary to make a second revolution".
59.For PEs created during the transitional period, e.g., Dec. no 76/75, creating a gross PE (CVC). Other new PEs had some detail differences but the
same essential features: i. workers appointed a member of the audits council  (cit..dec., arts 10/1 and 10/2), and, ii. the workers committee of the PE had
two representatives in the firm's advisory council (art. 13/1) which analysed plans, proposed prices and profit margins and discussed the problems
arising from the activity of the PE (art. 14); the PE articles also institutionalised the workers committee, as composed by ten workers "democratically
elected" to represent the personnel in relations with management, especially in the area of human resources (art 15). See subsections 2.2.1.
60.The sector assemblies took place at divisions, departments, factories, unit or sections of an enterprises (Law no 3/76, art 24/b).
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delegate, were compulsory for any PE. 61 Powers allocated to the workers assembly were wide,
especially in planning and control of management while the sector assembly aimed to improve
labour relations within the different departments and units of the firm by providing more intensive
links between management, experts and lower-level personne1. 62 The sector workers assembly
included the workers on the concerned department and the members of the management
committee, and discussed technical and general problems of the related division.63
Law no 3/76 also promoted significant change in power relations within nationalised
enterprises with the new patterns of management: i. collective decision-making by the
management committee, and, ii. the paritarian composition of the committee, with equal number
of members appointed by the state and elected by workers. 64 Candidates to the committee were
proposed by the union and had to represent every department, division or factory of the PE. The
management committee had the powers of the general manager. 65 Decisions of the committee on
human resources needed the compulsory consultation of the union. Some other decisions of the
management committee needed the compulsory consultation of interested departments, for
example on training. The government delegate could suspend the decisions of the management
committee if they related to goals defined in the plan or by the government, to loans, other
obligations or to mortgages over means of production. From the suspension there was
compulsory appeal to the branch minister.66
Simultaneously, Law no 3/76 provided for working class participation at upper levels of
economic decision-making by innovating and including representatives of unions at the branch
coordinating committees' (BCCs) aiming collective decision-making at the economic public
61
. Law no 3 76, art. 102.
62. The general workers assembly met once per month and was a forum for discussions of: i. the PE plans and their implementation, ii. "general
aspects related to the NP", iii. the activity of the management committee and/or the government delegate, and iv. the organisation of work and the
situation of workers (citlaw, arts 25/1, 25/3 a, 25/3/6, 25/3/c, 25/3/d, and 25/3/e, respectively).
63. Citlaw, art 26/1, 26/2 and 26/3, respectively.
64.Cit. law, rut 14 and arts 13 1, 13 2 and 13/4, respectively.
65.Cit.law. arts 13/4 and 14. respectively.
66.Cit. law, arts 16 8, 13/9 and arts 13/6 and 13/7, respectively. On the goverrunent delegate, see subsection 4.2.1.
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administration in the coordination of activities of PEs and definition of policies for a given
branch.67
3.2.3. Other attempts at democratic management
At secondary schools, the assemblies were maintained and students succeeded in
institutionalising their participation in a 'council of direction', composed by the director and
representatives of students, teachers and other staff The links with other people's power
components were implemented through a 'school committee' which included the council of
direction of the school, a representative of the local NPC and two representatives of CTs of the
most important enterprises in the area.68
Although without legal framework, social relations in agriculture were undergoing a
conflicting process of change. As foreign armies and their client movements progressively moved
towards sanctuaries in neighbouring countries, part of the peasantry occupied abandoned
plantations and farms, implementing an essentially subsistence economy. As the central power
reached these points, co-operatives dynamisers tried to promote collective forms of production.
The state omission to regulate co-operatives and criticisms to the co-operatives legislation
enacted after the collapse of the TG, led the MPLA Politburo to adopt in early 1976 the 'models'
for the organisation of co-operatives, which, with changes, acted as the only guide-lines in this
matter during the period studied. The 'models' instituted democratic principles of decision-making
for co-operatives, while establishing rules for distribution and organisation of work. Given the
relative degree of development and social practices, the farming co-operatives and the villages
democracy projects were the most challenging of the various attempts, of state or MPLA origin,
of radical change.69
67.Cit. law. arts 11/3 and 12, respectively. See subsection 4.2.1. (BCCs and NRCs).
68. Dec. no 7676, "Regulations on the Democratic Organisation" (of secondary sdiools). Cii dec., chapter 3 (connections with people's power
organisations). point 1 and point 3.
69. See Chapter 6.
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3.3. Failures, resentment, the socialist option and the 1977 coup
During the struggle for independence nationalist movements made the most unrealistic
promises of future welfare to their constituencies, within the frame of the 'great collective dream
of independence'." On the other hand, MPLA, as a broad social coalition had to face significant
crisis during the guerrilla period. The merger of the exile and guerrilla apparatuses with the
underground dispersed cells, the urban social movements, autonomous committees, and even
peasant societies which adhered in bloc to the movement gave it a dimension which, unless a path
of self-management and decentralisation was adopted, would mean a more serious crisis than in
the past. And this actually happened from late 1975, with the MPLA leadership trying to satisfy
the demands of everybody.
As contrasted with the 'small units' former experiences of MPLA, the large dimensions of
the movement itself, of the problems involved, for example managing thousands of abandoned
undertakings, of the popular participation and expectations, and of the country's territory itself,
conflicted with MPLA approaches to a providential, benevolent, state ruling change and supplying
welfare to a 'well-behaved' and 'grateful' population. 71 The components of the social coalition
immediately after independence began to conflict on the most diverse issues and areas. This
conflict was the result of their expectations and images of relative positions in the post-colonial
society, and developed in a context of spread anomy.
Managing conflict, MPLA compromised with the peasant and urban components, while
'paying bills'. 72 For example, while in Luanda people's power implementation went on with the
preparation of the elections for the NPCs, the government of many provinces was allocated to
70. There were Angolans who were sincerely convinced that with independence welfare would come automatically, probably by the redistribution of
the settlers wealth, and some even thought that there would be no need to work any more.
71.These conditions raised the problem of the paradoxes of democracy; see Bobbio, 1979b: 41, and on importance of 'small units' and decentralisation
of decision-making, see, e.g. Guiducci, 1979: 72-3.
72. An example of the duty to 'pay bills' for participation in the struggle for independence are the declarations of Mendes de Carvalho, a former
member of the CC quoted in Ramos, 1991: 11.
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various blends of agrarians, who adopted their authoritarian schemes of control of the population
and use of the state as a private asset of the commissioner.73
The first strains in the workers movement began to emerge within abandoned firms (under
state intervention or nationationalized) as many as workers representatives who got actual
management powers, just embezzled the (few) remaining funds of the firm while others fought for
positions in the management committee to have access to goods, and status symbols, or to use
their positions to jump' to higher and more rewarding posts. The radical working class, as the
economy and the living conditions did not improve by magic, continued to promote strikes, which
were repressed and taken as activities of the enemy, since MPLA, the movement of the urban
working class, could not bear the idea that this class was turning partially against it. Also, the
industrial democracy scheme provided for by the law to PEs and intervened companies was not
implemented in many enterprises, with the top state bureaucracies 'turning around' the legislation
in force and promoting alliances with workers elites to prevent the costs of sharing management
with radical and demanding unskilled workers.74
In the slums, as local marketing co-operatives could not ensure a proper supply of goods,
partially motivated by the collapse of the farming production and trade networks, the scarcity of
food became a serious problem while the informal market was soon reorganised, with African
traders practicing prices worse than former colonialists. 75 Resentment on the failure of
expectations arising from the 'great collective dream', reinforced underlying racial and tribal
cleavages repressed during colonialism, and the MPLA leadership had to spend substantial energy
in campaigning against it.76
73. In some provinces the provincial commissioner installed himself (they were men) as the powerful local ruler, owner of the state, including its
repressive apparatuses, deciding on everything from his palace (the former colonial palaces of the governors); the palace functioned as the
(compulsory) court for local civil servants and party officials. The only deterrents for agrarians in provinces were the central government, the patty top
organs and the army (whose officers were often redicals who opposed feudal rule .). Nevertheless agrarians in provinces succeeded in getting rid of
members of these apparatuses who opposed or just denounced their arbitrary and unlawful rule, using the most diversified means, from political
intrigue and defamation to invented suits whith led to the an-eat of opponents, usually government officials.
74.See subsections 3.4.4. and 4.2.1.
75. In some cases goods were smuggled from the slums co-operatives and from the state trade PF,s; on the patterns of behaviour of these African
traders. See sections 5.2. and 5.3.
76.On early 1976 a campaign on 'racial prevention' was organised, and many leaders made speeches against racism and tribalism, e.g.. Mingas, JA.
25.2.1976. Boavida, JA, 27.2.1976, Lara, JA, 27.2.1976 (against racist propaganda at the radio broadcast Kudibanguela, later forbidden), while
MPLA published a declaration against racism (JA, 4.3.1976) and in some villages meetings against tribalism were held (e.g., JA, 15.4.1976); JA
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In the countryside, while there was conflict within the collective forms of production,
peasants expectations of becoming equal to plantation owners by magic failed as well. The
discontent of many former small farmers was reinforced by the fact that the state took abandoned
plantations peasants had no capacity to manage. Local agrarian elites, candidates to private
ownership of latifundia, who had occupied farms and were already using the labour of poor
peasants, also saw their expectations barred by the intervention of left-wing bureaucrats and co-
operatives dynamisers."
The frustration generated by the worsening of living conditions and the failure of
expectations created an easy field to the action of political entrepreneurs able to channel
discontent. So, from 1976 a group composed of orthodox Marxist-Leninists, guerrilla friends
from the 1st Region, a part of Mbundu agrarians, a part of the urban working class, lumpens and
loose youth, began to assert itself, under the leadership of Nito Alves, 78 as the main claimant for a
'clear socialist option'. Indeed, notwithstanding the Proclamation, the CL and legislation MPLA,
within its large social framework, had not claimed being Marxist-Leninist79
 or interested in
implementing a proletariat dictatorship. Nito Alves had made his ascent partially at the expense of
Revolta Activa, against whom he made aggressive campaigns which contrasted with the mildness
of attacks from the radical part of the Presidential Wing. Defining Revolta Activa (which actually
was not competing for power) and OCA (whose underground organisation could eventually be a
competitor in the people's power elections and was harassing with clandestine pamphlets) as its
main enemies, 8° Nitists argued for and got the arrest of their members.
published an editorial against racism (8.1.1977) as well as a model of 'wall newspaper' against racism (29.2.1976), (the models were followed in many
work places and schools where workers and students used to have a 'wall newspaper).
77. See sections 6.1. and 6.2.
78.Nilo Alves, a member of the Politburo and a former teacher in the 1st Region underground villages, became, it seems, related to Luandans through
the underground contacts of the Luanda cells with the 1st Region; he made his post-25th April career with the support of the propaganda apparatus of
the Henda Committees and became lcnown by his positions against Revolta Activa; later Nito Alves parted from Henda's, and became more close to
'pro-Soviets', something Hendas could not bear, Nito Alves and his followers apparently belonged to the formal organisation.
79. See, e.g.. Agostinho Nato declarations to Afriscope, August 1975, quoted in Hodges, 1976:49.
80.E.g..
 Nito Alves at the Luanda Municipal Council, among others things, a speech against OCA and Revolta Activa (at JA, 30.3.1976 to 3.4.1976);
Nito Alves claimed against the "reactionary Maoist philosophy" (e.g., JA, 5.6.1976).
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These arrests inaugurated the repression of the Angolan left, which with changing forms
persisted the following years. In a war context, with apparently higher interests to fight for,
reinforced by widespread sectarianism, fear of the active Nitists and compliance to
authoritarianism, non-orthodox radicals did very little to protest against a measure which some of
them did not subscribe. The two dissident groups became the scapegoats for all evils the country
was going through, jointly with the imperialist aggression and the colonial inheritance." Agrarians
and many old Creoles supported the repressive measures, which made disappear from the political
scene 'non-loyal citizens' and demanding left-wingers agitating innocent popular masses.
Later Nito Alves turned to the second stage of the struggle for 'his' statist socialism, by
beginning a hidden campaign against non-orthodox members of the MPLA leadership. 82 This
stage was more difficult and Nitists underestimated the army and guerrilla loyalties. FAPLA was
an army with a substantial participation of soldiers and officers coming from the 1974-75 social
movements, but led by guerrilla commanders and with representatives in the MPLA leadership.
So, when the Nito Alves moved his criticisms against former guerrilla commanders, the reaction
of the CC was not the same as when intellectuals, students and workers were at stake. The 3rd
Plenary of the MPLA CC in October 1976 decided to adopt a socialist path of development,"
thus silencing the demands in this area, while simultaneously ordering an investigation to eventual
, 'fractional' activities within MPLA, aiming Nitists.
Besides its decisions on central government and planning, dealt with below and thus
satisfying the demands of a part of state bureaucracies on the issue of the chaos installed within
the economic state apparatuses, the 3rd Plenary suspended Title II of Law no 3/76, eliminating
81. For example. under the title "CIA within the Angolan people", JA published a letter warning against Revolta Activa and Holden Roberto
(11.12.1975); in another issue, a FAPLA commander stated that the army asked for "leftists to be considered equivalent to UNFFA and FN1.,A" (JA,
28.3.1976) and an editorial attacked Revolta Activa and OCA (JA, 15.4.1976); as a general background the provincial commissioner of Malanje
argued that "Those who do not follow the words of Pres. Nato are traitors" (JA, 27.4.1976), while JA argued that "to denounce agitators is a
revolutionary duty" (15.5.1976).
82.Notwithstanding the campaigns (see note 76) in 1977 Nato had to make (again) a speech against racism (JA, 3.4.1977) given the Nitists veiled
attacks against the non-black leadership of MPLA; a summary of Nato's speeches against racism and tribalism was published at JA (19.5.1977).
83.The 3rd Plenary called for a Congress to decide on the transformation of MPLA into a Marxist-Leninist party (Resol. on the Realisation of the
MPLA Congress, as published in JA, 30.10.1976) while defining a socialist path of development by: i. establishment of a cartrally planned economy,
ii. enlargement and strengthening of the state sector, with nationalisation or purchase of "fundamental enterprises or sectors", iii. tight control over
private enterprises through the central planning and regulation of employment, wages and prices, iv. restructuring of the state in order to
'debureaucratise' it (General Resol. as published in ibid.). See Chapter 4.
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workers participation in management and stating that PEs would be under individual direction.
The BCCs and unions participation in the draft of policies for the branch were banned as well."
On local government the CC decided that in the future candidates were selected by assemblies at
the work place."
From early 1977 MPLA internally took measures against `Nitists'. 86 'Fractionism' became a
theme, reflected in speeches and the press. 87 Rejected by part of MPLA apparatus, 'Nitists' shifted
from internal struggle to coup d'etat in the 27th May 1977. 88 The violence used by the putschists,
especially the murder of MPLA left leaders, was followed by a wave of violence which
conditioned the behaviour of urban Angolans in the next years. After Neto stated that there would
be no pardon for putschists," and the press appealed to witch-hunting, 9° there was a national
feud. People were arrested or murdered by the most diversified entities and individuals (many
84. See subsection 4.2.2.
85 • Resol. on People's Power, 3rd Plenary CC, as published in JA, 30.10.1976; on the application of this directive in the 80s electoral system, see
subsection 3.4.2. The resolution also created the National C,onunission for the Implementation of People's Power, thus withdrawing it from the control
of a single ministry (no a.) while establishing that there would be elections only where MPLA had "strong, stable and mature organisational
structures".
86.For example, the Politburo declaration on 'fractionism' sacking Nito Alves, Jose Van Dimen and Fortunato from their posts in the state, while CC
members, Alves and Van Dunen, were suspended by the CC (JA, 24.5.1977) and the restructuring (with purge) of JMPLA (declaration of the
Politburo on the reorganisation of .IMPLA, JA, 2.4.1977).
87. E.g., JA, 30.11.1976 (Neto defming Tractionism' as underground work within the movement), and 6.4.1977 (Neto against Tractionism).
a.
88.Putschists assembled at the presidential palace in the dawn of the 27th May, supported by a demonstration of slums people mobilised by the NPCs
they controlled; simuhaneously they attacked, hying to repeat the 4th February, the S.Paulo jail, where some of their supporters were imprisoned, and
took as well some military garrisons with the support of officers, and the national broadcast station. One of the first measures taken by putschists was
to arrest MPLA leaders and middle cadres, mainly unorthodox radicals, such as hfulgas, Bute and Dangereux, while blockading strategic points in
Luanda. The first disappointment of putschists was that the slums population on whidi they relied did not follow them massively, although some
hundreds gathered into the palace: indeed, the 'popular masses' preferred to stay at home and did not respond to appeals made through the broadcast
station; from this day became clear that the loyalties of the slums population of the time went to MPLA and Agostinho Neto and that the slums would
not involve themselves massively in MPLA internal struggles. During their period in action, the putschists showed what would follow if they took
power: i. in the S.Paulo prison they decided to kill immediately, according to an OCA witness, OCA and Revoka Active members arrested there, but
fortunately they dianged their mind and decided to deliver them to epopular trial' which would judge 'traitors' and 'corrupts', as it was promised in the
broadcasts. Concerning the leaders of MPLA they arrested, they killed them coldly (except two who managed to escape), after showing them to the
'masses' at the Sambizanga slum.,
89.Neto to TPA (television station, quoted in JA, 28.5.1977).
90. For example, "fractionism is an agent of imperialism" (JA, 29.5.1977), 'There can be no tolerance to fractionists" (JA, 31.5.1977), 4ply the
dictatorship against fractionists" (JA, 1.6.1977), "ruthless revolutionary vigilance in the dine to the murderers" (JA, 1.6.1977).
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never identified) and for the most obscure reasons. 91 The apathy of the population Bhagavan
noticed in the early 80s (1986: 176) was the consequence of witch-hunting of 'leftists' and related
smashing of popular autonomous organisation. Indeed, some NPCs were suspended, nevermore
re-elected, and since then direct democracy in neighbourhoods was over. 92 The other components
of the 1974-75 people's power, the workers and students participatory organisation, were
changed to forms under control from above, while UNTA was purged and accused of lack of
loyalty (Cahen, 1985: 19-21).
3.4. The late 70s restructuring and the 80s developments
During the period 1977-1988 the post-colonial state organised and reinforced under the
banner of an attempt of 'statist socialism'. 93 The fate of people's power and the 1974-75 social
movements, led to a change in the conceptions of democracy. After years in which democracy
was a taboo, the early 80s saw attempts to restructure political participation from above with
constitutional revision. During this period political struggles shifted from base organisations to the
interior of the state and the party. This fact, and the control of information, made these struggles
even less transparent than in the past, while the state became an objective by itself, and not a set
of relations structured under different forms to attain given social objectives.
The restructuring of the state had some consequences. Firstly, the progressive
reinforcement of the PR powers, with weakening of the related organs of collective decision-
making, especially the CM. Secondly, a progressive degradation of the citizens rights, transparent
at the level of legislation. Thirdly, the enlargement of the economic and repressive apparatuses,
legitimated by defence against apartheid and the ideology of central planning. Fourthly, the spread
91. For example, innocent military in mission at Moxico, were killed by local agrarian authorities in 'preventive repression' only because they came
from Luanda; also, one of Luanda most well-known 'leftists', an university student not connected to putschists, who was working in the countryside,
was killed because, it seems, he was a 'leftist', and so looked with suspicion by the local authorities. On the effects of these events on the central state
economic apparatuses, see subsection 4.2.2.; according to a report of Amnesty International, "in July 1977 special military courts were set up.
Sessions, verdicts and decisions were kept secret. In August 1977 the PR declared that the leaders of the coup had been executed but did not advance
names ... There are reports of hundreds of people executed without trial, either by orders of military courts or simply by orders of officers of the
security police." (quoted in 0 Jomal, 21.6.1991). In 1980 the government declared that persons arrested in 1977 had been released (under the 1979
amnesty), (ibid.).
92.Mo. no 2677 (PM). suspended some NPCs of the Luanda neighbourhoods "considering that the situation of emergency in the country is not
compatible with the normal functioning of people's power institutions, especially the implementation of meetings to depose the members of elected
organs who, by their very criminal practice, showed not qualify to be representatives of people's power" (preamble cit m.o.). See subsection 3.4.3.
93.On the concept, see. e.g., Poulantzas, 1980.
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of corruption and the emergence of powerful bureaucracies, linked either to foreign capital or to
the informal economy where, at the expense of the state, a substantial accumulation was made.
Lastly, related changes in forms of protest, which lost their former massive characteristics.
3.4.1. Internalising political conflict
After the attempted coup the LPP was suspended and the MPLA tried develop a new
framework for participation in political decision-making. It concentrated firstly in reorganising the
party.
In 1977 MPLA was transformed into a Marxist-Leninist party and purged under the
'rectification movement'. The decision to transform MPLA in a Leninist party meant changes in,
and the loss of a significant part of, MPLA social base. 94 Nevertheless, as in the 80s the party was
reinforcing its leadership of the state, becoming a source of privileges and a means of access to
high posts and good jobs, 95
 there was a rush for party membership. So by the end of 1990 the
number of members was about 65,000.96
In the 1977 Congress MPLA party defined itself as a 'workers party'. This had political
and legal consequences, since the membership of workers was prioritized. The Angolan working
class was partially composed by a semi-proletariat. Also, although some segments of the working
class had been capable of pursuing goals such as participation in the management of abandoned
firms, the majority of the working class could not find solutions, if they exist, to the dilemma
'getting better working and living conditions' (by resorting maxime to strikes) or 'to create the
94.By the end of 1976 MPLA had 110,000 registered members and from 1977 to 1980, the number fell to 31,098 members (49.1% working class),
(PUblico, 26.4.1991). The party integrated the remaining former guerrilla apparatuses, historic and 1974 militants who had not beat involved in
'leftist activities or, if they had, made self-criticism (e.g., Hamer, 1980: 95, on some former Revoha Activa members).
95.The system of priorities in the access to scarce goods and services, in the country and abroad, made party and state posts, with top priority, a goal
for anyone aiming a better life. Nomenclature lists established the entities with access to special shops and other facilities. However, the privileges of
the Angolan Nomenclature actually made their living conditions rate by the standards of the British working class and foreigners usually had higher
living standards, whatever their jobs and skills. Nevertheless, the Nomenclature lists established a status of individuals according to their
party government connections which created a sharp division between 'rulers and ruled'. Under the reforms Nomenclature members lost some of these
privileges (PUbli co, 16.8.1990, 26.9.1990).
96.PUblico, 26.4.1991; from the rejection of Marxism-Leninism in 1990 (see section 8.2.) MPLA claimed that in the first four months of 1991, about
10,000 members adhered giving the membership a picture of about 75,522, of whom intellectuals/employees' were the majority (27,069) while
working class were about 21.51% (ibid.).
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technical and material base of socialism', mainly by supplying cheap labour while increasing
productivity and generating surpluses for the enlarged reproduction.
So as the working class participation was actually restrained, and the workers integrated
into the informal economy, simultaneously its elites were co-opted to the exercise of power.
Given the absence of a proper social base, grounded in working class autonomy and initiatives,
MPLA attempts to 'internalise' the working class appear as the result of needs of legitimacy.
Indeed, although the nationalisation process opened prospects for change, the dependent structure
of the country did not change significantly and the working class was progressively marginalised
from decision-making processes, either by the legal allocations of power reflecting the weight of
agrarians and reformists, or by the progressive shift of decision-making to centres abroad. Also, it
had no information and knowledge to achieve a genuine participation.97
To ensure the participation of workers, in the 1977 'rectification' movement and later
campaigns for party membership, candidates had to be approved by workers assemblies, a process
which followed MPLA tradition in liberated zones. 98
 Nevertheless this mechanism appears to have
additional functions: i. to legitimate the reinforced single party rule, on grounds of democracy in
the selection of members, and ii. to attract popular support. In a certain way, it attempted indirect
representation: workers selected the members of the party who would rule the country.
Discussion in the workers assemblies was not the exclusive criterion for party recruitment.
Thus, what was really implemented was the filling of some posts by working class elites.
For example, it was seen during the late 70s and early 80s as the height of democracy having a
worker as a branch minister, say. However, his/her function there, with some exceptions, was
more to subscribe decisions made elsewhere than to make decisions, and, in some cases, to
provide for autocratic rule.99
97.See subsections 3.4.4, 3.4.5. (freedoms) and 4.3.2.
98.See section 3.1.2.
99.There were exceptions to the rule that some posts had to be filled by people with specific operbse, a rule legitimating bureaucratic power indeed,
some people with no specific expertise were capable of creating competent teams to supply proper information, while being also capable of making
decisions which were the more adequate to attain some goals.
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3.4.2. Attempts of democracy from above: the People's Assembly
At independence, PRA inherited the TG apparatus and the framework of colonial
administration. There was a vacuum for a legislative organ and a need to restructure the state.
The 1975 version of CL created the Council of Revolution (CR), composed by leaders of MPLA,
the army, and high-level government authorities. 100 The CR was a consequence of the war
prevailing in the country at the time, as art. 34 of CL already established that the highest state
organ would be an assembly and that the CR was a provisional organ, working only "until the
complete liberation of the national territory and while there are no conditions to set up the
People's Assembly". 101 The CR enacted laws, 102 defined the country's internal and external
policies, granted amnesties, decided on etat de siege or emergency, authorised the President of the
Republic (PR) to make war and to declare peace, approved the Plan and the Budget, and elected
the Prime-Minister (PM), the members of government and the provincial commissioners
according to MPLA proposals. 103 The government was, thus, elected by a collective organ arising
from MPLA structures and grounded on revolutionary legitimacy.
From 1980, MPLA restructured the constitutional framework for state organs in a process
from above concentrated in the national and provincial levels. The People's Assembly (PA)
substituted the CR. 104 In the provinces, where the provincial commissioners ruled without any
control from non-party collective organs, the popular provincial assembly (PPA) was created as
the highest local organ. 105
100. Members of the MPLA Politburo (CL art. 36 1a),rnembers of the FAPLA Chief Staf, the heads of the fronts chief commands and the fronts
political cxxmnissioners, (CL, arts 36/b and 36/e), some mernbers of the govawnent appointed by MPLA and the provincial commissioners, CL arts
36/c and 36 d.
101.CL. art. 35; on the People' Assembly at the MPLA Programme, see note 19.
102.CL art. 38 a; legislative powers could be delegated in the government (ibid.).
103.CL, arts 38 b, 38/11, 38/g. 38 f, 38 c and arts 38 d and 38'e, respectively.
104.CL, art. 37 1: "The People's Assembly is the supreme organ of state power in PRA and expresses the sovereign will of the Angolan People".
105.Law no 781, on Local Government (LW), developing CL, arts 64-71.
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The single-party framework continued to condition the selection of candidates, who were
appointed by MPLA and related organisations. 106 The new attempt to organise people's power
established a system of indirect election by two levels. The first level were the assemblies in
enterprises, co-operatives, public administration, army, police and villages and neighbourhoods.1°7
While the workers assemblies were loosing power in the economic area and the local government
assemblies became meaningless, they were co-opted as a part of the political system: they elected,
by secret ballot, delegates to a conference, by province, which elected the members of PPAs and
the PA. 108 War prevented universal voting and the law provided for the appointment of an
'electoral conference' in the provinces under war. Nevertheless, even outside the war zones in
many potential places (say, enterprises) there was no meeting for elections.
Under the machinery of the 1980 and 1986 elections legislation only a small number of
Angolans exercised the right to elect and being elected provided for by art. 20 of CL.
Nevertheless, it seems that for those involved the process was lively, making possible debates
between the members of concerned organisations (from 1986 enlarged to selected
associations)- c 9 and socio-political groups. Some candidates were rejected by the base assemblies
as well as provincial conferences. The resulting composition of the PA was heterogeneous, with a
careful balance of ethnic groups and including pastors, chiefs, etc, but with dominance of
106
. Law no 8 80; the law referred at art. 5 to the constitutional principle of non-discrimination (CL, art. 18); but could not be elected those, e.g. with
criminal record and who had participated "actively in fractional groups. puppet organisations or ... who voluntarily participated in criminal actions
against the People and have not beet) rehabilitated" (art 8). Candidates were appointed by MPLA-PT, JMPLA, LTNTA and OMA (art. 10), in a single
list (art. 11). Law no 11/86, maintained the system of single lists and the absolute majority for being elected but enlarged the appointment of
candidates to "social and masses organisations ... according to what will be defined for each elections process" (arts 10,21 and 29).
107.Law no 8'80, art_ 18/1.
108.Cit. law, arts 21,28 1, 34/1, 34 2, and 39.
109.In the 1986 elections OMA had the right to propose about 20-21% women candidates to the PA, the majority of whom peasants, UNTA had the
right to propose about 17.2°o candidates to the PA and 18.9 4Yoto the PPAs (96 [11] Novembro, 1986, 13). See note 106.
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bureaucracies. 110 Members of the PA and PPAs were elected for five years,iii and were not
professional. 112
The PA had powers to: change the constitution, 113
 enact laws ,n 4 control the
constitutionality of legislation and decisions of the CM and PPAs, 115 monitor the performance of
the government, 116 approve the Plan and the Budget, ratify international agreements, declare &at
de siege and emergency, and authorise the PR to make peace and declare war. 117 Headed by the
PR, the PA met twice per year and when it was not meeting its functions were performed by a
restricted organ, the Permanent Commission (PC). 118 The PC had the powers of PA but could
not change the constitution and the laws it enacted needed ratification by the Assembly. 119 In fact
the PC produced the majority of formal laws, usually prepared by the parliamentary
commissions.12")
The PA worked as a forum for discussions between a part of the country's elites with a
representation larger than in the CR period, which eventually reflected a crisis of revolutionary
legitimacy arising, among other reasons, from the conflicts which were taking place within the
110.After the 1981 elections, the PA had 31 0 0 political and administrative leaders, 29°o workers. 24% peasants, 10% combatants, 3% intellectuals
and 3% civil servants. The provincial assemblies had 40% workers, 30% peasants and about 10% for combatants, intellectuals and civil servants
(Bhagavan, 1986: 168). Given the weight of the capital and the weight of Mbundu agrarians there was eventually a dominance of Mbundu, but there
are no data on the subject.
111.Law no 11 86, arts 2 and 3; the PA had from 250 to 290 members and PPAs from 55 to 100 members.
112.CL art. 35: , 'The quality of members of people's power assemblies does not imply either specific privileges or economic benefits. All members of
assemblies maintain their job with all the inherent rights and duties."
113.CL, art 38 a and RPA, arts 43-5 and 49.
114.CL, art. 38/b. The power to present bills to the PA (initiative of law) was allocated to the MPLA CC, the PC, MPs, the PA commissions, the CM
and the Central Council of UNTA (CL, art 45) while proposals on changes of the constitution could only come from the MPLA CC or the PC (ibid.);
"popular consultation" did not mean resort to referendum, but the opening of public discussion and presentation of proposals by anyone interested in
the draft legislation; examples of resort to "popular consultation" are the 1980s law on nationality and the family code.
115.CL, arts 38 c, 38 i and 38/j and RPA, arts 46-9 and 51.
116.CL, arts 38 g (control of activities of state organs), 381 (analysis of reports) and 60 (CM annual report of activities and reports on the NP and
NB) and RPA, art 66; Resol. no 11/87 (PC) provided that date organs were accountable to the PA and should deliver reports of their activities when
asked (art 1) for analysis firstly by the PC and later the PA (arts 6 and 7).
117.CL arts 38 d (and RPA, art 50); 38/o, 38/1 (the PA defined the range of guarantees suspended under both situations) and 38/m, respectively.
118, CL, arts 41 and 49.The PC was composed by the PR, the members of Politburo seating at the PA and other members elected by the Assembly.
under proposal of the CC (CL, art 50, as revised by Law no 287).
119. CL, arts 49, in fine, and 38 h, respectively.
120.The commissions were composed by MPs elected by the PA (RAP, art. 10) and by experts without voting rights (art. 5).
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state. We may conclude that from the 1975 constitutional framework there has been at the level of
the legislature a broadening of representation in central government. The movement from colonial
fascism to representative democracy was thus relatively rapid.
3.4.3. Local government
The 1980 constitutional amendment compelled the provincial commissioners to work with
the PPAs, 121 whose powers included: i. the approval of the provincial budget, ii. advice on
projects of regional development and supervision of their implementation, and, iii. the control of
commissariats and commissioners, especially by revoking their decisions if unlawfi.d. 122 LLG was
a first step towards a restructuring of the state at the local level and did not provide for any acts
of the PPAs. Sparse legislation from the late 80s allocated them normative powers in specific local
issues. 123 LLG also established a new collective organ, tending towards a local CM, the
comtnissariat. 124 Both the PPM and commissariats were an innovation at the provincial level,
attempting some control of commissioners. 125 New legislation on commissioners (Law no 21/88)
reinforced later the powers of local government executive organs, under a trend for
decentralisation.
With the repeal of LPP, neighbourhood and village organisations had no legal framework.
In 1980 the agrarians tried to institutionalise chiefs rule in villages by legislation demonstrating
their weight on decision-making on local government, appears as their programme for local
121 . CL, art. 64: "The local organs of gime power are the Popular Assemblies at the level of province, county, commune, neighbourhood and village
and their respective exeadive organs."; from the province level LW only provided for, in counties and communes, commissioners and commissariats
(LW, arts 70-85). See section 8.2, on the 1991 regime.
122 , LW, arts 10/g. 10t 1011, 10/j, 10/k, and 10/1, respectively.
123.E.g.. Law no 10 87 (see subsection 3.4.5) granted to the PPM powers to mad regulations on, say i. "the forms of use of leisure places, beadles,
fairs, places for shows and other of public interest" (art. 25/h), ii. "ceremonies, parties and lines of marriages and others (events)" as well as "funerals
or memorial services ceremonies" (arts 25/1 and 25/n); the PPM could also "elaborate directives for a healthy social relations in towns, counties,
neighbourhoods and villages" (art. 25/d).
124.The commissariat was "the executive organ of the PPA and the superior organ ... in the province" (LLG, art 50); it was headed by the
commissioner (art 59 a) who was appointed by the PR (CL, art 53/d); the composition of the commissariat (from 9 to 15 members) was decided by
the assembly. under proposal of the commissioner (arts 10 g,, 52 and 53). See section 8.2., on the 1992 changes.
125.Commissioners were in principle watched by the provincial MPLA organisation. However, relations between state and MPLA organs were not
peaceful. The CC 3rd Plenary of 1976 enacted directives on the subject: "In the province the provincial commissioner is the highest representative of
government. The highest political representation belongs to the coordinator of the MPLA directive commission" (Resol, on the Relations between
MPLA and the State, as published in JA, 30.10.1976).
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government and has some similarities with the colonial scheme for peasant societies.' 26 Law no 3-
A/80, provided for a village commissioner, appointed by the provincial commissioner after
favourable opinion of the MPLA organisation in the area and who could be the local chief "if he
supports MPLA and the govenunent". 127 The commissioner was assisted by the village
consultation commission, 128 composed by: i. the commissioner, ii. the chiefs of the area, and
elderly "of recognised reputation and prestige from every settlement", iii. the leaders of MPLA,
JMPLA and OMA in the village, iv. the leaders of peasants associations and farming co-
operatives, and, v. civil servants working at the village. 129 Although Law no 3-A/80 was repealed
by LLG, 130 the new legislation on villages and neighbourhoods LLG ordered to be enacted was
not approved during the period studied and sparse legislation points to the endurance of the
scheme provided for by Law no 3-A/80. 131 From the late 80s there was an attempt at
decentralisation and the control of county commissioners with the move towards the election of
the county assemblies established under the 1980 constitutional review.132
The framework of Law no 3-A180 represented an 'historical compromise' of MPLA with
the traditional power it tried to internalise and a 'reciprocal legitimation'. Indeed, in a certain way
it was an attempt to integrate the precapitalist formations while hindering their violent responses
to the economic crisis the country was undergoing. Another goal was probably to prevent the
manipulation of the resentment of the second peripheries by UNITA.133
126.See section 1.2.
127.Law no 3-A./80, on State Apparatus in Provinces, arts 37/1 and 37/2, and 37/4, respectively.
128.The commission had, among other powers, 'to study and analyse the worries, desires, claims and critiques of the population, sending the
suggestions to the village commissioner" (cit law, art. 40/c).
129.cit. law, art. 39.
130.LLG, art 99.
131.For example, the official journal (DR), in the summary of a CM decision (Resol. no 2/86), identifies commissioners with 'traditional authorities".
132.Resol. no 3/89 (PC), ordered the PA Commission for People's Power to set up, as a test and by an informal process, elected assemblies in some
urban and rural counties in some provinces. Up to the late 80s, the counties had a commissariat and a commissioner. On the 1992 scheme, see section
8.2.
133.UNITA took advantage of the economic crisis it caused, and related non-fulfilment of promises, and was capable of exploiting the resentment of
the second peripheries while associating to agrarians of non-Ovimbtmdu tribes, who ad as 'mediators' (e.g., declarations of UNITA military quoted in
Ramos. 1991: 15).
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Still, given the isolation, and related de facto autonomy of these authorities, the scheme
conflicted with the so-called socialist option. It even countered the trend for the weakening of
chiefs power in many regions by reinforcing it through the association with the state.134
Nevertheless, the initial attempts of 'leftists', mainly students who went to the countryside to teach
or to organise co-operatives, as well as those of some military, who reportedly got involved in
struggles with chiefs, commissioners and/or other local powers were not successful. 135 Also,
some of them were killed by FNLA and/or UNITA, some were sacked from jobs by agrarian
commissioners, some even had to flee the province to escape eventual arrest. So this legislation
may also reflect a step backwards of many peasant societies due to war and related isolation, with
MPLA allowing agrarians to exploit the conflict between the first and the second peripheries, as
did UNITA. It also reveals the difficulties of transformation of social relations in peasant societies,
if there are no significant economic changes.136
As for neighbourhoods, during the 80s they did not participate in decision-making since
the NPCs and assemblies were not established. But people reorganised informally under a more
restricted scheme: the 'residents committees' and the 'building, street, or square assembly', which
managed to maintain their self-organisation, with the consent of MPLA. There the residents
gathered together to face problems of the place which the state, notwithstanding powers,
promises and legitimation, did not solve.137
3.4.4. Industrial democracy
The wave of strikes during the transitional period grounded on economic demands did not
stop with the collapse of the TG 138 and the victory of MPLA. In the period immediately before
134,In the late 80s state officials had regular meetings with chiefs "to hear the problems of the peasants", meaning the progressive recognition of their
role as representatives of peasants (e.g., JA, 10.9.1988); on weakening of chiefs power, see, e.g, Possinger comments quoted at subsection 1.2.1.
135,See. e.g., the case of fanning co-operatives, section 6.2..
136.In 1974-75 peasant societies had to absorb people flying from towns and, given the collapse of the market, turned to subsistence economy (see
smion 2.2. and Chapter 6) which eventually reinforced chiefs powers; protests against the revival of tradition appeared often in the journal Novembro,
mainly letters by military and civil servants who travelled around the country and had to face the problems related to duefs and elders per (for
example, concerning the marriage with girls from different tribes or the payment of bride's wealth for which they had no money).
137.E.g. Dos Santos quoted at 95 [11] Novembro, 1986,38 and A. Cardoso, JA, 19.3.1988, respectively.
138.See section 2.2.
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and after independence, industrial workers continued, on a more reduced scale, to express their
demands to employers, including the state. In some cases, they tried to strike (or did strike). The
demands were not welcomed by the government, simultaneously fighting RSA aggression, trying
to reconstruct the destroyed economy and, from 1976, to implement a socialist strategy. With the
worsening of war, and related collapse of the economy, the functioning of ports and factories was
essential to the survival of the country. This fact conditioned the outcomes in the area of industrial
relations. Indeed, from 1975 to 1989 the state attempted to tame urban workers and ensure the
supply of scarce labour.
The labour legislation during this period is contradictory, reflecting the conflicts on the
issue and the bargaining power of the working class and UNTA itself. Some degree of industrial
democracy was maintained, but simultaneously workers protest was punished as a crime and the
regulation of labour relations meant a tight control over the supply and flows of labour. 139
UNTA and the working class
UNTA, left alone in the union field, tried to convince workers not to strike, and so did
members of MPLA leadership. 14° But simultaneously the first repressive legislation was enacted,
the law on 'crimes against production', aiming again to resort to direct coercion to deal with some
labour matters. 141
 From 1975 UNTA got the monopoly of workers representation and in 1978
created unions by branch, into which the CTs were integrated. In 1981 the restructuring of the
unions was completed with the creation of provincial councils and secretariats. 142 According to
UNTA figures, by 1978 it "mobilised more than 8,000 workers collectives, corresponding to more
139.See section 5.1.
140.On the strikes, the process of progressive control of CTs by UNTA and conflicts between UNTA and MPLA, see Callen, 1985: 19-21.
141.Law no 11/75 (see section 5.1.); although the situation of workers later improved significantly with GLL, nevertheless Law no 11/75 was still in
force in 1989.
142.This part is based on LTNTA report to the 1984 Congress of Trade Unions, as published in 77 (8) Novembro, 1985, 8 if, according to the report,
in 1974-75 UNTA concentrated its efforts in fighting "economic sabotage, hoarding and black marketing and for the organisation of workers in the
national reconstruction"; the 1975 1st National Conference of Angolan Workers "recognises that workers unity is the essential factor to lead an
winning struggle against capitalist emaloitation and defines UNTA as the only Trade Unions Congress in the Angolan unionist movement"; the 3rd
Conference in 1978 decided to create unions to substitute the former organisation only based in EUCs; from 1979 to 1983 more than 600 unions
cadres went under training; the thesis for the 1984 Congress were discussed by about 200,000 workers in about 2,000 enterprises and workshops, and
about 25,000 women participated in the discussions (ciLreport., loc.cii, 8-11, 30).
134
Models of society
than 400,000 workers (about 70,000 women), grouped in about 9,000 base unions
organisations.143
Although co-opted for the control of labour, UNTA tried, within the possibilities of its
subordination to the single party, to channel workers demands. 1 9 9 It may even be said that if
workers assemblies continued to meet and survived the reinforcement of authoritarianism during
agrarian period it has been, in a certain way, the result of UNTA pressure, and needs of legitimacy
of the 'socialist state', as workers autonomous initiatives were no more accepted. 145 The most
important of UNTA activities during the 80s is the adoption of GLL and the Law on Industrial
Justice. 14 6
GLL institutionalised: i. the unity of the legal regimes of labour relations, 147 ii. the right of
unionisation and protection of rights of unionists, 148 iii. the right "to participate in the direction of
the national economy", exercised "directly through the workers assemblies (and) indirectly
through the union organisation in each enterprise", which meant the enlargement to private and
mixed firms of the participation machinery established for PEs, 14 9 iv. freedom in employment
143.Cit.. report, loc.cit., 10.
144.For example, the 1984 Conference decided, among other things: i. wages: should be actually linked to production and incentives, allowances and
other benefits; workers in more productive or profitable enterprises should be rewarded; ii. prices: producers prices of farming products should be
annually revised to ensure they covered production costs; iii. rationing: quotas should take into account the size of families, large enterprises should
have their own shops and private traders should integrate the marketing network; iv. self-consumption: the state must guarantee an adequate supply of
consumer goods to the working class in order to end self-consumption; v. housing: the state must ensure the provision of materials for self-construction
and prioritize the allocation of houses to workers; vi. transport: access of workers to public transport in rush hours should be prioritized; vii. health:
enterprise health centres must be reactivated; and, viii. legislation: the area of social welfare should be developed (loc.cit., 31). See sections 5.2., 5.3.
and 5.4.
145.Shivji comments on Tanzania illustrate, mutatis mutandis, the development of workers struggles in post-colonial Angola (1986:242).
146.Law no 6/81, General Labour Law and Law no 9/81. The report of the Commission for the Draft GLL (composed by UNTA and the ministries
of Labour and Justice) refers that several bills were drafted and successively changed by disrossions with involved entities. The final draft law was
publicised in the media and about 200 enterprises were selected in all provinces for the public clisrmssion of the bill in workers assemblies. The bill was
also discussed on a territorial base where participated representatives of enterprises not included in the 200 sample. The public discussion of GLL
covered "large tens of thousands of workers, the majority of whom participated directly and actively in the debate.... The total amount of suggestions
and proposals of change (was) 123 at the date of making of the report" The Commission rejected 34 proposals, introduced some in the text of the bill,
clarified some norms according to suggestions and also changed some articles grounded on questions which arose in the public discussion (Report
CDL, 3/81, Trabalho, 1981, 31-3). See sections 5.1. and 5.2.
147.GLL, art I; the law rules waged/salaried labour and excludes cooperatives members, self-employed and the subsistence economy (cit. Report,
3/81, Tmbalho, 1981, 35-6 and 54-5).
148. GLL, arts 4-8; "to workers is guaranteed the right to organise in unions" (art. 4/1), "the free exercise of unions actitivities, according to the law
and the articles of unions" (art. 4/2) and "UNTA, the Angolan TUC, organises, directs and represents the unions, dynamising the performance of their
tasks in each stage of the Revolution, under the guidance of MPLA" (art 4/3); unions should "defend their (workers) interests and rights, especially in
the organisation of production, work and living conditions, in order to attain a constant improvement of their material and cultural existence" (art. 5/1).
149.GLL, arts 9/2 and 9 3; cit. Report, 3/81, Trabalho, 1981, 37.
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contracts, economic and social rights of workers, 1 50 and v. the creation of industrial relations
courts.
Workers participation
After the suspension of the 1976 scheme, in 1977 the new law on PEs (LPE/77) provided
for a more restricted participation of workers. The management committees were substituted by
the director, while the new collective board at each PE, the council of direction, had no elected
workers. Also, the council of direction was an advisory board, composed by managers of the
different divisions and departments of the PE, a representative of the party and a representative of
the union committee. 151 Under LPE/77 the union and the party organisation at the PE had, as
such, rights of consultation, actually wider than those of the assembly, for example in planning
and personnel polices, and managed the social fund with the director. 152 LPE/77 maintained the
workers assemblies but as an advisory organ and waived the rules on compulsory meetings.153
Also, it allocated the assembly the power to discuss only: i. the draft plan of the PE and the
degree of its implementation, ii. the "level of productivity and discipline of workers", and, iii. the
projects of collective agreements.154
But from 1981 GLL extended workers control of management to private and mixed
enterprises. It instituted the workers assemblies in these firms, which previously were legal only at
PEs. The assembly discussed issues related to industrial relations and verified "the fulfilment of
the production tasks and the condition and level of work organisation". 155 Managers had duties of
150.gee section 5.1.
151.LPE 77, arts 411 and 40. The council of direction had the right to compulsory consultation in the draft plans, annual reports, reports on the use
of the social fund, investment proposals, and personnel policies (LPE/77, art 41/2). See subsection 3.2.2.
152.LPE 77, arts. 49 a. 49/b, 49/c and 49/d (planning). 49/g. 49/h, 49/i and 49/j (personnel policies) and 49/t respectively. The 'social funds' of PEs
and mixed ventures, for example, aimed to finance workers welfare (such as housing) or cultural and sports activities. Social funds were adopted by
Law no 3/76 (art. 271/13) and maintained by LPE/77 (art 25/2) and LPE/88 (art. 24/1/c) for PEs. The social fund is financed by annual profits, but
under Law no 11/88 instead of being calculated on the base of gross profits as under previous legislation, is now calculated on the base of net profits
(art. 25,3). See also Chapter 4, Table 2 and section 7.1.
153.The workers assemblies were no more compulsory organs of the PE; indeed, LPE/77 only stated as compulsory organs the director and the
council of direction (arts 35 and 40, on the chapter on organisation of the PE); art_ 50 maintained the assemblies, but on the chapter on workers; Law
no 11/88 maintained this scheme (see subsection 8.1.4.); on workers assemblies, see subsections 2.2.1. and 3.2.2.
154.LPE77, arts 50/1,a and 511/b, art 50/1/c, and art. 50/1/e, respectively.
155.GLL. art. 12, in general and art. 12'1/b.
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information towards the workers assembly. GLL also empowered the unions, through the union
committee, to monitor management. The unions committees also had rights of information
supplied by managers.156
These norms were inserted in the broader framework of the right to participation of
workers in the management of the national economy. This right, not included in the formal
constitution, was stated in GLL which enlarged thus the compulsory consultation of workers in
some areas of decision-making (such as planning and collective agreements), directly either
through the assemblies or the unions, to all enterprises. 157 However, although the assemblies met
often and its powers worked at least as a 'negative limit' for management discretion (at the
different levels of the decision-making hierarchy), their functioning and effective participation
suffered the impact of the rights and freedoms environment, with restricted freedom of expression
and instituted secrecy. For example, an workers assembly could not assess the social need for the
labour supply in the future when the national plan was a secret, as well as the branch plan, when
workers only had access, if they had, to the enterprise's plan, and bureaucracies kept relevant
information for their 'private' use.158
GLL also restored the 'labour collective agreements' (LCAs), 159 as a form to regulate
industrial relations. LCAs were weed to between the unions and employers. A general accord
previously agreed to between the concerned union and the branch ministry, worked as the
framework for lower level agreements. After the approval of the general bases, the union drafted
guide-lines for the projects of enterprise accords which were discussed by workers. 160
 Some
156 .
 Cit.law, arts 12 , 3, 10 2, 10/21o, 10/2/c, and 10/2/d, respectively.
157,
 GU.. arts 9-12. On NCL, see section 8.2.
158 .
 see, e.g., subsections 3.4.5. and 4.3.2.
159 ,
 Cit.law, art. 76; formerly ruled by Dec.Law no 5075 and defined as an agreement between employers and unions to rule industrial relations.
160 . Exec.Dec. no 93'82 (Labour), "Regulations on LCAs in GLL"; arts. 1-2, 8-9, 11-12, and 16, respectively.
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ministries adopted 'general bases' for LCAs in the branch, such as Industry, 161 but they did not
seem widespread.
The association of UNTA to the state in the control of labour from independence made it
lose substantial support. In the 1984 Congress it initiated a new strategy, reflected in the
assessment of its functioning:
"the weakness (of UNTA) still noticed relates to the non-use of all the capacity of
participation and organisation (of the working class) and (non-use) of the technical
and cultural initiatives of the working masses, to the insufficient integration of
salaried personnel in the activities of the unions, the sprinlde of efforts and trend to
bureaucratisation, the low level of knowledge of unions cadres on the management
of the economy and to the insufficient capacity of intensive training and recycling
of cadres.11162
After a progressive restructuring UNTA began to distance itself from state power. As a
new workers movement emerged in the 90s, UNTA turned against the reformist 'vision' of the
economic reform which made the working class pay for the restructuring and supported workers
protest against many government measures.163
3.4.5. Rights and freedoms
Although an analysis of the standards of rights enjoyed by Angolans during the period
1977-1988 (the'agrarian era') is outside the scope of this work, some references to the aspects
which conditioned the success of the constitutional project seem necessary.
Generally, the overall framework for the exercise of rights and liberties prevented an
effective participation grounded on availability of alternatives, access to information and freedom
of choice. Indeed, the bill of rights included in CL 164 became meaningless by the regulations
concretising this area of the constitution. The provisions aiming to ensure democratic
161 • The only LCAs found were from Industry; as an example, the "General Bases for Collective Agreements in Heavy Industry" (approved by the
branch and published in DR no 47/85) which contained an interesting norm against bureaucratic discretion: 'no ministerial order of the branch central
apparatus may revoke or nullify clauses in the collective agreements (which were) included by the application of laws or regulations, except if there is
agreement of the union, the management and the collective of the enterprise and if law is respected" (art. 19).
162,UNTA report to the 1984 Congress of Trade Unions, as published in 77(8) Novembro, 1985, 11.
163,See subsections 8.1.6. and 8.2.3.
164,CL, arts 18-29.
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participation suffered the weak environment of rights and freedoms, as agrarian patterns of
behaviour were progressively adopted. Indeed, in the name of socialism and the Angolan people,
legitimated by concepts of the right of a vanguard to exercise a so-called 'democratic
revolutionary dictatorship' over the citizenry, and reinforced by the war and UNITA terrorism,
agrarians invaded almost all areas of everyday life, exercising preventive and ex-post repression
within the limits of their technical and political capabilities. As a consequence, citizens were
progressively alienated from decision-making processes and from the very participation in the
tasks, and hope, of reconstruction and development. Protest, except for shy initiatives in workers
assemblies and elite discussions at the PA and within the party, became progressively
privatised, 165 reflected either in integration into the informal economy, flight to foreign enterprise,
or resort to former forms of underground organisation, including the families network and links.
From the stand-point of the ruling groups, this state of affairs led to: i. the feeling of 'they'
(the leadership) and 'us' (the people), (Bhagavan, 1986: 176), which made MPLA loose a
significant part of its social base, ii. the strongly incomplete information of the rulers on the
preferences of the population, since all the machinery to reveal these preferences became
ineffective, and many preferences revealed were approached either as 'petty-bourgeois demands'
or 'activities of the enemy', iii. reinforcement of underdevelopment due to the constraints imposed
either to the production and dissemination of knowledge or to initiatives of the population aiming
the solution of problems, paired with a constant devaluation of national human potential (now
turned back to 'unskilled') and related loss of self-confidence of a population to which
independence had brought a renewed hope.
The general outcome was the 'control paranoia': incapable of facing the tasks of social
control they had allocated to themselves, facing an elusive reality they did not understand while
trying to maintain and reinforce power, agrarians committed themselves to a degree of repression
which by the late 80s called not only for economic reforms (demanded by the economic crisis
165
. As freedom of religion was guaranteed and actually exercised under the protection of powerful lobbies, a privileged space to attack goverrunent
policies was the church and the funeral, religious or lay On the tradition related to these practices, see, e.g., Akuna, 1985: 428-30, 436-40 and 446-53.
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caused by war) but also for political reforms, as the legitimacy of the ruling party entered into a
crisis.
As citizens participation and protest moved backwards, agrarian perceptions of rights and
freedoms led them to resort from the mid-80s to legislation to legitimate the 'control' of any
initiative. This legislation is described here to illustrate the standards of rights and, where possible,
references to the underground responses are also made.
Urban associations
Article 22 of CL guaranteed the freedoms of expression, association and meeting.
Associations, which had such an important role in Angolan politics up to independence, were
'informally' subject to previous authorization by some organ of central state, as during colonialism.
The students associations were purged in the late 70s and restored under the control of the party
Youth, JMPLA, in the 80s. 166 Liga merged with Anangola and AASA and changed into an
association dealing with international relations, loosing their identity and nationaJ impact. 167 some
associations connected to colonialism were extinguished in 1976. 168 The new associations
approved after independence either had strong connections with MPLA, or stated, directly or
indirectly, their loyalty to the party in the articles of association, while some resulted from party
initiative. 169
166. As for the democratic institutions students had created, the course assemblies were informally maintained and worked as forums for academic
discocsions within some limits. The schools general meetings were divided into staffs general meetings and students general meetings. They were
progressively emptied of content, given the standard of rights. The management of faculties was restructured and students and workers participated in
advisory boards, while the power to appoint the heads of schools and departments was transferred to state bureaucracies. The students leaders and
participants, including teachers, in the 1974-75 movement may be called the Angolan lost generation. A part died in the war, another part died in
prison or stayed there for some years, many had to flee the country to avoid imprisonment or political harassment. Many of those remaining in the
country were later discriminated in jobs or even in access to scholarships and schools. These who made 'self-criticism' and joined the instituted status
quo became well-behaved apparatchiks and some even re-ached high posts. See subsections 2.2.1. and 3.2.3.
167.Dec. no 23/79, approving the statutes of the new association, LASP (Angolan League of Friendship and Solidarity with Peoples). M.o. 77-C/76
ordered AASAto merge with Liga and Anangola in LASP (art. 4). See subsection 2.1.2.
168.The majority of associations extinguished by m.os. no 77-C/76 and 17/77 (1st vice PM) were settlers abandoned associations; some few however
had Angolan or Cape Verdian members.
169.Troth tn
. dependence about 10 associations were created, to guarantee the participation of workers of different areas in the study, discussion and
application of the party and government policy" (e.g., the Teachers Association, the Writers Union, the Artists Union, the Journalists Union and the
Musicians and Composers Union), (86 [10] Novembro, 1985, 44).
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The previous traditions of self-organisation of Angolans, especially in the slums, were thus
undermined. Nevertheless, the slum population went on organising dance groups, but the shortage
of necessary means implied some degree of control by the state. 17° Also, from 1987 regulations
on parties attempted to reinforce the control of the slums inhabitants in their dancing activities.171
Thus, although any law prevented, or regulated, the freedom of association, state omission in
enacting such law (except for sports clubs) meant that the future of any attempt of association in
fact lay in the hands of bureaucrats.172
In 1988 legislation on working class (enterprise) associations aimed at the complete
control of self-organisation by UNTA. Indeed, it was established that associations within
enterprises similar to 'cultural centres' 173 should submit their articles of association, plans and
reports to UNTA approval. 174 The union had powers to close the centres which did not corn&
with directives.175
While many associations were actually repressed, as the years passed underground
criminal organizations 176 began to emerge in the slums voicing their worries through all kinds of
170.BY the Secretary of State of Culture which distributed the materials carnival groups needed to present their dances; according to Novembro, by
1985 there were in the country 618 adult carnival groups, assembling about 50,000 members, and 232 children groups, associating about 30,000
children (86 [10], Novembro, 1985, 45).
171.In 1987 legislation on the control of parties was adopted submitting them to previous authorisation, as well as shows, and empowering the police
and local authorities to invade houses on grounds of alleged transgressions of the regulations (Law no 10/87, "On Administrative Transgressions, arts
2, 5, 11/1, 13). Offenders should pay fines and got imprisonment if the fine was not paid, arts. 7/1 and 23). This legislation shows the attempts of the
state to invade all areas of everyday life, making it difficult, and eventually unlawful, almost all the actions of common citizens. Although repressive
apparatuses could not control all the parties and all the pets, the regulations enabled them to dioose targets for 'control and eventual repression.
172.For example, when ACA was created in 1990, the ministry of Justice denied authorisation for about one year (see subsection 8.2.1.). Sports clubs
have their special law (the Law on Sports Associations, Law no 7/87), with statutes needing the approval of the Minister of Sports and Youth (art
14 1).
173.Dec. no 6/88, "Regulations on Cultural and Recreation Activities Within Enterprises"; cultural centres are "social organisations composed by
workers of a given enterprise or working centre, aiming the promotion of cultural, sporting or recreation activities, for leisure and the psychic and
moral welfare of workers and their families" ( arts. 1 and 2). An example of an autonomous cultural centre is that of INA (government press) whose
statutes were approved in 1976 as those of a workers consumers co-operative (m.o. 78/76, PM).
174.Cit.dec., art. 8/2; associations could not "associate in federations or other organisations, official or private without express authorization of
UNTA" (citdec., art 4).
175.Cit. dec., arts 9, 152 and 10.
176.For example, 'Black Hand, Full Coffin-Empty Coffin' (Mao Preta-CaixAo Cheio-Cairdo Vazio) known by school robberies, using a coffin where
they put the stolen goods (0 JomaL 12.1.90).
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criminal activities. 177 They were the result not only of the worsening of living conditions and the
action of anti-governmental groups, but also of the repression of slums associativism, for whom
independence did not bring the expected freedom.
Freedoms
Freedom of expression took a curious path. No Angolan went on trial for his/her writings
or speeches. Some, however, were arrested. 178 Those arrested for the expression of dissent
opinions were mainly in the left. 179 UNITA members went on trial on grounds of involvement in
terrorism and Nitists' were arrested under alleged connections to the 1977 coup d'etat.
The restrictions of freedom of expression also arose from the indirect institutional
framework on control of means of dissemination, for exam pJe mass media, by the party, which
made an ex ante censorship. /8° Freedom of expression, in the area of means, was also repressed
by the restrictions on access to nationalised publishers and by the 'control of ideology' at, say,
schools.'"
The control of media also made possible libel of protesters or just selected targets,
especially apparatchiks, insulted in the media by party and state organs with no defence. 182 Yet,
the rights of top officials 'in power' were guaranteed by special legislation, and defamation of a
leader was a political crime, a provision with a function beyond protecting the good name and
177. Murder, rape. robbery, assault.. etc, Resol. no 5/85 (PA), finally admitted the problem of criminality, the Assembly decided to study the adequate
legislative measures, including if necessary changes in legislation in force, to allocate powers to the CM to adopt and execute the "pertinent repressive
measures and the political, socio-economic and administrative measures necessary to a fast improvement of the situation" (art 1/a).
178.See Amnesty International report quoted at 0 kmal, 21.6.1991.
179.E.g.. Revoha Activa. CACs-OCA and Costa Andrade (see section 3.3. and note 184).
180.After the 70s restructuring of the press, the only institution having an independent publication (Apostolado) and press was the Roman Catholic
church. Control of media went to details such as the m.o. 2/75 (Ministry of Information, later extinguished) which 'enacted' the words to be said before
any radio broadcasting by the national station, RNA, and added that "fantasies' of any kind are not allowed" (art. 1/2, sic).
181.See, e.g., for an account of the state of production of knowledge and academic censorship in Angola in the late 80s, Birmingham, 1988: 11.
182.For example, members of the government or top officials made the scapegoats of the economic a-isis (see subsection 4.4.3.); although the right to
a good name and reputation was granted by CL, art. 17. There has been a single exception to the rule of sineearing in the press when the State Security
took the initiative in 1978 to publish in the press a statement that the managers of a PE, formerly accused of corruption in the press, were not guilty.
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aimed to prevent criticisms by 'criminalising' some areas of the freedom of expression.183
Furthermore, as individuals had no statutory right of access to any files related to them, there is a
flow of hidden defamation nobody controlled but which might have serious impact in the victim's
welfare.
In this legal and political framework, an important aspect of the exercise of freedom of
expression was related to the attitudes of different members of the leadership to the issue. If some
were liberal-minded, some were highly touchy and even resorted to unlawful intervention of party
organs to persecute critics. 184 Thus, the PA itself had to rule in the early 80s that non-voting
members of the parliament commissions should not be prosecuted for opinions given during
parliamentary meetings. 185 In fact, aggression by unknown individuals, might take place, if
dissident opinions were frequently expressed.186
The constitution did not include any norm on the freedom of information. Information was
highly centralized, protected by the 80s 'state secrets' legislation, a part of which was secret as
183.Under the law on crimes against the state (not available), implying imprisonment of individual offenders from one year up to eight years,
according to the rank of the offended person.
184.For example, the arrest of Costa Andrade in 1982 (about one year of imprisonment without trial) as a consequence of political conflict within the
party, the so-called 'painting and play case (on which patty militants, in a play offered to members of the government and CC in the PR birthday party,
made references to need of changes in the leadership) was ordered by the head of the MPLA Control Commission, a body which dealt with internal
party discipline; the Control Commission forced the arrest by the police under the principle of leadership of the state by the patty, and even published
in the local newspaper a communique accusing Costa Andrade, who had no right to reply; neither was Costa Andrade entitled to compensation, nor the
head of the Control Commission sued,
185.Regulations on Collaborators of the People's Assembly Commissions (Resol. no 3/82), art 6/2.
186.Understood by the common Angolan as witchcraft or fate; for example, in the mid-80s a gang of criminals terrified the white and mestizo
population of Luanda by making selected attacks to Angolan women, mainly white, they raped; the gangsters were usually expecting the victims inside
their houses or within the building when they arrived from some social activity; it seems that the gang was caught and went under trial but no political
motive or connection was proved in court; still, 4 female victims (one was murdered when she resisted the entry of uniformed criminals in her house),
had by themselves or their close relatives, connections either with the 1974-75 students movement, CACs, the co-operatives programmes and some had
been living, or their relatives, in Huambo.
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wel1 . 187 The common citizen, even journalists188 and government staff, had no access to it and
their participation at all levels of social life was conditioned by this fact (e.g., Bhagavan, 1986:
176).
The control of media, publishers, bookshops, imports of books and journals, research and
teaching meant also deliberate bars on access to all kinds of relevant information which prevented,
besides effective participation in decision-making, the local production of knowledge and
increased uncertainty in all kinds of decision-making impacting the very working of the
economy.189
The control paranoia of the 80s led to restrictions in the freedom of movement. From
1982, any Angolan living in the country had to carry a new 'passbook', the residence card granted
by the Ministry of Interior. 190 According to the 1982 decree, any citizen must register his/her
residence, and changes of it, with the police. To travel within the country an individual must get a
'travel permit'. When an Angolan travelled abroad he/she must also communicate the fact to the
Ministry. 191 An extensive set of sanctions enforced the compulsory use of residence cards and
persons not using or exhibiting it when asked, paid a fine and
187.For example, Dec. no 34/85, approving the "General Regulations on State Secrecy" (regulating Law no 1/83, On State Secrecy) established in
art. 1: "The General Regulations of State Secrecy are approved by the present deem., of which they are an appendix and a constituent part.", and art.
2: "The General Regulations of State Secrecy are a 'reserved' document and will be transmitted to the ministries and organs of central and local public
administration whose leaders and managers will ensure their adequate use and diffusion."; the regulations so were law without publication; see also
Chapter 7, note 4 (plan law).
188.The press law of 1975 (Dec. no 4/75) provided for a right of journalists to information stating that the media had "free access to the sources of
information, by the public administration and as well the public and private enterprises exploring goods of the public domain or concessionaires of
public services, except on those (sources) related to justice secrets, to the facts and doaunents considered state sea-ets or professional confidential
information or related to the privacy of citizens, unless the contrary is imposed by the superior interests of public order" (art 14/1) and "the journalists
are not obliged to disclose their sources of information and their silence cannot be punished With any direct or indirect sanction. Also the directors and
the enterprises (on media) cannot reveal such sources, when they know than" (art. 14/3) but "in case of diffusion in any media of elements integrated
into suit in justice secret, facts or documents considered state secrets or professional confidential information or related, without need for public
knowledge, to the privacy of citizens, the journalist may be forced, by court decision, to disclose the information source, and contempt of court is
(crime of) qualified disobedience" (art. 14/4). On the 1991 press law, see section 8.2.
189.See subsection 4.3.2.
190.Dec. no 90 82. arts 1/1 (compulsory use) and 2/1 (powers of the Ministry of Interior). See section 1.2.
191.Cit.dec., art 3, 8 and 9. respectively.
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"may be arrested during the legal terms for inquiries about his/her identity and the
true identification of his/her residence and the reasons or motives of its missing,
and it will be presumed that, in principle, this person is committed to unlawful
activities."192
As the measure was unpopular and its services inefficient, to achieve the control of
citizens and movements, the Ministry of Interior got in 1989 the control of the IDs services,
which, even during colonialism, were supervised by the Ministry ofJustice.193
The control of citizens through economic mechanisms (for example, the linkage of
rationing cards to employment, of this to access to higher education) 194
 also prevented individuals
to fight for their rights since it might affect their employment and thereby access to essential
goods. Also, the worsening of living conditions, which put the majority of Angolans in a situation
in which they had primarily to fight for survival, led people to attempt to satisfy primary needs and
have no time or energy to fight for the satisfaction of others. Thus the economic factors
reinforced the control of citizens by the post-colonial state.
However, different forms of hidden protest 195 enabled Angolans, when civil liberties
emerged in 1990, to produce the most diversified projects and forms of protest. Indeed, suddenly
and apparently by magic, political parties and associations poured in towns, and even the
(politically) well-behaved working class initiated a new movement of demands.196
3.5. The executive and concentration of power
While radicals were concerned with strategies to implement democracy from above or
restructure the economy in radical modes, agrarians and reformists did not take seriously PA or
192.Cii dec., art. 11; the terms for preventive arrest went up to seven months. The curious legal principle stated, the 'presumption of guilt' meant a
serious sd-back of the attempts of some Angolan lawyers for the adoption of legal machinery on the convase 'presumption of innocence', but
nevertheless demonstrates the attitudes of some members of the government on the criminal pion-cc and, in general terms, citizens rights.
193.Joint Exec.Dec. no 16/89 (Interior and Justice).
194.see chapter 5.
195 • The responses to the restrictions on freedoms were diversified and the forms of protest changed from previous patterns to avoid the widespread
repression. Besides the resort to parties, fimerals, leaks, publishing, organising and campaigning abroad, apparent or underground activities maintained
Creole culture and protest alive even in the conditions referred to above. For example, Independent Democrats argue that they began to exist from the
early 80s fighting for human rights, plural democracy, peace and the "integrated and balanced development of the courrtry", using means such as the
"copies movement" and "radio mujitnbu" to denounce "the economic, social and cultural degradation, the violation of human rights by both parties
involved in armed struggle (and) in both the movement (Independent Democrats) would find supporters." (Ramos, Expresso, 9.6.1990).
196 . See section 8.2.
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the PPAs, the remaining machinery of industrial democracy existing in PEs, or citizens rights.
They concentrated their efforts on government, on implementing forms of control of the
population, and on repressing any attempts at protest.
The PR as supreme ruler and the CM as a looser
The striking aspect of the changing patterns of organisation of the executive during the
80s is the progressive concentration of decision-making powers in the PR,197 to whom 'arbitration
powers' were allocated by the different conflicting socio-political groups, and the related
successive devaluation of collective decision-making reflected, for example, in the marginalisation
of the CM. This process coincided with the general reinforcement of informal decision-making
with evident contempt for the constitution.
The approach to the CM as a collective decision-making body supervising the
implementation of the internal and external policies defined by the legislative was not accepted by
those who in fact defended and practised where possible autocratic rule and did not want to co-
habit with other political groups. Thus the organisation and powers of the CM changed
significantly during the period studied. In the 1975 version of CL the CM was the executive,
headed by a PM, and had also the power to enact legislation (decrees) in matters outside the
exclusive powers of the CR. It was elected by the CR and later appointed by the PR. 198 In the
1976 constitutional revision, the PR became the head of government although the PM was
197.In the 1975 version of the constitution, the PR, the President of MPLA according to CL, was essentially the head of the CR and the chief-
commander of FAPLA (CL, 1975, tuts 31 and 32; 1980, art. 52). From 1976 the PR became the head of government and appointed the provincial
commissioners (CL, att. 32 c and 39, as revised by Law no 71/76, and art_ 32/d, respectively-,). From 1977 he appointed the members of government
(CL, art. 32b, as revised by Law no 13/77). From the extinction of the PM and vice-PM posts in 1979, the PR directly oriented the activity of the
central administration. Sparse legislation began to allocate the PR powers to appoint other senior officials and the 1980 revision received into CL these
powers (e.g.. CL, arts 53/d and 53/e). From 1980, the PR became the Chairperson of PA and PC and could revoke the decisions of the members of the
government or the provincial commissioners against the constitution and the law (CL, arts 41 and 50 and art. 53/j, respectively). The 1980 revision
created the presidential decree, by which the PR would "exercise his/her powers" (CL, art. 54). Also, sparse powers were allocated to him as head of
the CC Cadres Department or as thief-commander of FAPLA. In 1990, the PR was the president of MPLA-PT, headed the Politburo, the Secretariat
of the CC, the CC and the Congress, plus the Department of Cadres, within his fimdions as a member of the CC; as PR, he supervised the army, the
security of state, the other polices and his own security and General Prosecution; he headed the PA, the CP, the CM, CDS and the Economic
Commission, and his own two Cabinets (the as PR and another as head of government, which include committees of experts for legislation, economic
affairs, etc). The coordination of members of the government by the ministers of state did not work properly and later the PR got the control of the
areas allocated to the minister of state for the Economic and Social Spheres. Since the PR accumulated such a quantity of ftmctions, it is obvious that
he could not perform all of them and the actual power lied elsewhere (Law no 2/86, art. 2).
198.CL, arts 40. 41, 39, 42 and 53,d, as revised.
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maintained. 199 From 1979 the posts of PM and vice-PMs were extinguished and until 1986
ministers were under the direct coordination by the PR.200
The 1980 constitutional revision defined the CM as the highest organ of public
administration acting simultaneously as an executive of the PA and an autonomous organ.201
However, in the 80s the CM Secretariat, headed by a secretary appointed by the PR who was not
a member of the government, got the power to act as the staff of the PR for the CM decisions.202
These reallocations were not welcome by some sectors of the government who saw the
Secretariat as a competitor of the CM and a barrier in their direct contacts with the PR. But in
1983, under the emergency but unconstitutional powers, 203 the PR allocated the Secretariat
powers to control the CM itself 2" Later, a presidential decree invading an area of exclusive
competence of the PA made the secretary a member of the CM.205
In 1984, the trend for concentration, partially reinforced by the worsening of war,
originated a new organ, the Council of Defence and Security (CDS),206 which exercised the
functions of the CM when it was not meeting and the meetings of the latter were spated. 207 After
the II MPLA Congress of 1985 there were some changes in the centralised decision-making
instituted, especially in the area of the economy, dealt with below. 208 From 1988 the powers of
199.CL alt. 39, as revised by Law no 71'76 (art. 6).
200.Law no 1 79, art. 1.
201.CL, arts 56 and 58.
202.Dec. no 25-B'83, arts 5, 3/k, 10, and 3 1, respectively.
203.In 1983 the MPLA CC granted the President "special powers" (using the expression of the preamble of Pres. Dec. no 27/83). whose content, from
a legal stand-point, is unknown; since that in a focused way, the PR invaded the powers of the CM in legislation, as it is the case of the presidential
decree referred to; see also next note.
204.Pres. Dec. no 27/83, arts 3/c and 3/d. The powers of the CM Secretariat included, for example, 'to verify whether all the important issues which
will be analysed by the CM and its commissions, have beat previously analysed and approved by the NTYLA-PT Politburo" and 'to contact the
ministries. secretaries of state and other bodies subordinated to the CM whose documents (projects and bills) do not follow al. c) and send them back".
205.Pres. Dec. no 27/83. tut. 4; CL, art 56, as revised in 1980: "The composition of the CM is established by (formal) law.".
206.Headed by the PR and composed by the ministers of Defence, State Security, Interior, Provincial Coordination and Planning and the Head of
FAPLA Chief Staff (Law no 3/84, art 2/1). The law gave the PR powers to decide on the membership of CDS by other entities (cit. law, art 2/2).
207.Law no 3 84, art. I; the meetings of the CM spaced from one to three months (Regiment of CM, Resol no 1 84, CM, art 62).
208.See sections 4.4.1. and 8.1.
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the CM Secretariat increased, with the control of the activities of central administration in the
provinces and local government,209 and the control of the CM and CDS.210
The devaluation of the CM and the concentration of real power in CDS and the CM
Secretariat, and also the restructuring of the work of state organs was the result of the internal
dynamics of power struggles within MPLA. They meant the consolidation of autocratic rule by
the PR, who reinforced his control over the state though a network of organs directly linked to
him through the appointments mechanisms. In the 80s there was thus the marginalisation of the
CM, an organ where previously the different components of the MPLA-led coalition sat. Also,
under the 'special powers' allocated by the CC in 1983, the PR has been progressively ruling on
matters within the competence of the CM or CDS, or even the PA. This trend meant a
devaluation of the collective decision-making organs provided for by the constitution, and related
devaluation of normative acts in the Angolan legal order. 21 ' The devaluation reflected the shift of
power from the CM as a collective, not to speak about the PA, to individual members such as the
Secretary of the CM and staffs. This was the outcome of the 'agrarian era' of which old Creoles
took advantage and which appear as a 'peaceful' coup d'etat legitimated by the PR.
The alliance against Nitists' which led to the appointment of agrarians and radicals as
ministers and provincial commissioners became strained from the late 70s as agrarians jeopardised
any attempt to implement the planning system or coordination and supervision within the state.
Indeed, agrarians exhibited the following patterns of behaviour: i. they refused coordination, by
whatever means (say planning, budget, credit, etc) except through PR directives (and hence the
progressive extension of PR powers), ii. when disliking a collective decision, say of the CM, they
did not implement it or prevent the application by 'kitchen door politics' (informal repeal of the
209
. it became the "link between the central state ... and local government" (Dec. no 26/86, art 1, in fine) with the provincial commissioners reporting
to the CM Secretariat (Law no 12/86, art. 1 changing LW ari 59/b). The Pres.Dec. no 79/89 provided that ministries (except for Defence, Interior
and Security) must report monthly to the CM on their activities in the provinces (art 3). The role of ministers in this scheme was: they "may
participate in the meetings" of the CM Secretary with the offices fro local government (art 4/2).
210.The Secretariat prepared "ffie annual project of work of the CM", promoted "die integration of the activities of the CM and CDS", analysed "the
reports and proposals of the PA commissions for the activities of the CM and its organs" (citdec., arts 3/a, 3/c and 3/e). Also, ciLdec., art. 3/g). In
1989, the Secretary got new powers, for example to decide which matters were discussed by the CM, the CDS or the CDS Economic Commission, and
to control execution of decisions by state organs (Dec. no 59/89).
211.E.g.. Pres.Dec. no 6489, allocated the management of waters to the CM Secretariat (instead of the Secretary of State for Estate Planning.
Housing and Waters, to whom these powers had been allocated by Law no 13/86.
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measure by higher level agrarians or associates), iii. management posts were changed and filled
with agrarians relatives or political clients, iv. resources allocated by existing processes are
diverted either to their own personal advantage, the kin, the village, or other political clients, etc,
v. centralised decision-making was reinforced, with the member of the government deciding on
everything, from the selection of low-level personnel to the everyday management of PEs, or even
ordering private and foreign firms to make all kind of deliveries, vi. protest was approached as a
conspiracy of 'counter-revolutionaries', the 'corrupt' or 'elitist experts', leading to reports to the
concerned polices, and, vii. 'historic revenge' may be taken on some categories of personnel
(usually the so-called petty-bourgeoisie).212
The patterns of behaviour of agrarians in power were so different from those of radicals
and even reformists, that sometimes changes in ministers or provincial commissioners seemed a
change in the political party ruling the related administration. 213 No planned system can be
implemented under this style of management, especially when extensive powers of management of
the economy are allocated to the state and under the constraints imposed by war. 214
 The agrarian
era is thus characterised by sharp conflict led by agrarians, especially the Mbundu ones, to get rid
of remaining radicals. Besides witch-hunting activities, agrarians concentrated in devaluing the
CM and fighting the planning bureaucracies, as the possibility of coup d'etat proved to be the
Pandora box of the latent conflict between the first and the second periphery and the preferences
of the population were not known.
Having got some political victories, such as the appointment of their representatives to
repressive apparatuses, in the early 80s agrarians made direct attempts to eliminate the opposition
of radicals. The legal system, with its loopholes served to achieve these goals. Individual targets
were selected, accused of criminal acts which were never proved but which legitimated later
212.It quite common that protesters or people who resigned from posts did not get a 'release letter' (see section 5.1.) to be able to get a new job;
also, using the tedmique of aggression of needs related to self-ebteen to force individuals to resign from their posts, it was current the 'informal
punishment' through non allocation of any work or tasks at work place.
213.This was one of the causes of the mobility of experts, who fled the agrarians ministries and made many provinces to loose cadres who fled to
Luanda to avoid agrarian commissioners; on job mobility, see section 5.1.
21
	 •	 •	 •	 •4 On.	 this conflict within the state on the creation of political conditions for the implementation of the planning system, see e.g., subsection 4.2.1.
(upwards mobility), and sections 4.4. and 5.3.
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action against them within the party and/or the state. The first targets were in the army. 215 From
the mid-80s the 'discovery of the economy' by the Ministry of State for Inspection and Control
(SIC), had as targets managers of PEs or experts working in central and local government and, by
extension, members of the government, accused of corruption and made the scape-goats of the
failures of the economy. 216 While the process was developing, in 1982 radicals within the MPLA
central structures made demands against alleged agrarian corruption and for changes. They were
severely purged and the agrarian wing reinforced its powers within the party and state
structures.217
In their struggles against radicals, agrarians allied with reformists who, due to the
connections of their kin with 'leftist' groups, including Nitists', for some years had their weight in
politics undennined. 218 Furthermore, many reformists had no direct 'revolutionary legitimacy' and
the 'socialist option' and related party rhetoric made their situation ambiguous since at any time
they could be attacked on grounds of 'privilegists' or 'aristocrats'. Their battlefield is essentially the
state, given their bureaucratic tradition and superiority of knowledge. But having to face
collective organs some of them filled with carriers of 'revolutionary legitimacy' or prestigious
experts, reformists had to 'jump over' established allocations of power, for example the CM issue,
by sheltering in, say, the PR.
215 . Agrarians eve, 'invented' the very crimes, something made possible by the 'open criminal norms'; defence lawyers in these suits showed the
fabrication of evidence by the police, e.g.. releasing prisoners sentenced by courts when they produced declarations against their targets, or arranging
employment contracts to prosecution foreign 'witness'; an example is the so-called 'photographer case' in 1981, which aimed to involve the then
Minister of Defame, and on which a number of military spent several months in prison for the crime of having arrested the prosecution witness,
convicted by a court for a common crime and released immediately after the decision (some years of imprisonment) by the Security of State (which
had no powers to counter the court decision).
216.On SIC, see subsection 4.4.3.; the 'scapegoats system' implemented by agrarians actually grounds on tradition (e.g., A/tuna, 1985: 471).
217.It was the so-called 'painting and play' case (see note 184); since in the later appraisal of the case, they got some 'historic' Kikongo radicals out of
the CC (e.g., Lukold, a previous minister of education and member of the Politburo) or from the Politburo (such as Kimba, former minister of
Agriculture).
218.The big Creole families allegedly had members involved in 'Nitist' activities: the Van Dunens, Vieira Dias, Neto and Ingles, for example. The
campaigns against the potty-bourgeoisie, for example, reached reformists, and agrarians benefited from this reformist weakening.
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Although forced into an uneasy alliance with agrarians or to resort to family connections
to secure positions within the state or the party, reformists were (and are) more qualified to cope
with the control of the state. One of the outcomes of the agrarian era was thus the reformist rule
in the late 80s. 219 In their rush for power the reformists benefited as well from the constraints
imposed by war, as radicals restrained themselves from fighting them (Bhagavan, 1986: 176).
Realising the 'side-effects' of 'statist socialism', of which they became victims, many
radicals moved from the early 80s to demand reforms, 220 while reformists reinforced their
positions within the state, by resort, among others, to the PR/staff rule. The repressive legislation
of the late 80s, contradicting government declarations and other legislation, reflects the conflict
between agrarians and reformists within the state. After consolidating their positions, reformists
took the radicals reforms programme and created their own project, impkmented from the )ate
80s. International conditions also contributed in the 90s to split the organisation of government
set up in the 80s.
The evolution of organs such as the CM Secretariat or the commissions of CDS, which
were not headed by the ministers of state shows that the attempts to reallocate the PR powers
were not successful.
3.6. Conclusion
After a short period where the seeds of democracy from below were integrated in the
post-independence restructuring of the state and notwithstanding efforts to promote progressive
democracy from above, and as a result of the changes in the allocations of power at the level of
central government, the PR had, by the end of the 80s, become the 'supreme ruler'. These
developments, as contrasted with the 1975 project, make transparent many changes undertaken by
the Angolan society since independence towards reinforced underdevelopment. That is, the
reinforcement of underdevelopment at the level of the economy, caused by the conditions of
219.Birmingham. 1988. 9: "by 1987, the govenunent was controlled by a network of a dozen families of the old Creole military caste that had
dominated the black elite in the 19th century".
220.See Chapter 8.
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emergence of the country into independence and war, went together with steps backwards at the
institutional level. In a certain way, the institutional framework reflected as well the
'agrarianisation' of politics, meaning the rule of chiefs, with the PR at the top. As for the winners
of the scheme, reformists, this organisation was tolerated as a necessary step towards their goals
of control of central government. While traditional rule was instituted at the expense of collective
decision-making, 'staff/experts' rule was also accepted. Indeed, the need to 'rationalise' the work
of government, maximised by the needs of the planning system itself, the growth and increased
power of state bureaucracies and, finally, a door for the access of old Creoles, called for the
articulation of both traditional and staff rule.
For the citizens, their standards of rights were bargained against promises of future
welfare. In fact, these conceptions mean a trade-off between citizens rights and state supplies and
have a negative impact on development. Indeed, to break the vicious circle of underdevelopment
it is necessary to mobilize the initiative and energies of the population, aiming to create additional
resources for the take-off. Restrictions in citizens rights, meaning barriers to their self-
organisation and creativity, or even making any initiative difficult, waste a substantial amount of
human wealth and wisdom and prevent long-term successes in social transformation. Putting it
differently, standards of rights enjoyed by citizens in a given society are not just a matter of
democracy or justice, they have a material impact on the enlarged reproduction of a society. For
example, had Angolan citizens wider access to information, the expenses of the state in buying
information abroad would be smaller and the range of alternatives produced larger. Or had
Angolan citizens the possibility of self-organising to solve their problems, as they have done in the
past and are doing now in the economy, the state would not need the overloaded apparatuses for
which it paid. Also, the final outcome would probably be more adequate to the country's realities,
with consequential 'adjustment' savings. 221 This means that the 'developmentalise speech of the
221 . See subsection 7.3.1. Economic and social solutions without 'social adequacy mean high cogs of non-implementation, of which Angola is a good
example.
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Third World ruling classes preventing the enlargement or enjoyment of citizens rights for the sake
of development,222 is just an excuse to perpetuate their rule.
The setting up of new power structures was complemented by developments related to the
management of abandoned assets, aimed at the implementation of a central command economy.
The system of administrative planning, the allocation of extensive powers to the central
administration, especially to individual officials, favoured, in fact, the emergence of a reasonable
(economic) power base to agrarian rule (and corruption) at the expense of PEs and promised
welfare. They are dealt with in the next chapters.
222
. See. e.g., Turok. 1986: 66 and Shhji. 1985: 2.
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PART II
THE CENTRAL COMMAND ECONOMY
PRA is a sovereign, independent and democratic state, whose first objective is the total liberation of
the Angolan people from the vestiges of colonialism and domination and aggression by hnperialism as
well as the construction of a prosperous and democratic country, completely free of any form of
exploitation of man by man, achieving the aspirations of the popular masses.
Constitutional Law of PRA, art. 1
1975 version
We are capable of doing it. We are not worse than others in Africa and hi the world. We are not less
intelligent than them. Thus we have to use our capacity, our intelligence, mostly, our patriotism, our
commitment to the cause of our people to solve, in the best way, this problem.
Josè E. dos Santos, 1986
CHAPTER 4
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE AND THE PLANNING SYSTEM
The massive flight of settlers during 1974-75 motivated state intervention in the
management of abandoned undertakings. Workers and remaining managers maintained
some factories working, but a substantial part was paralysed, creating serious problems of
unemployment and shortages of goods and services.' This situation created, as stated
above, the objective base for the development of statism, together with the expectations
and demands of people on the state.2
The management of abandoned assets by the state, a new problem, asked for an
ordering framework. For many radicals, planning was the solution. It aimed to: i. promote
economies of scale by joint allocation of inputs (including labour and technology) and
distribution of output, ii. achieve a more egalitarian distribution guaranteeing the access to
ever scarce goods of those who during colonialism could not afford to buy them, iii.
provide criteria for distribution of consumer goods to the population after the
1. "Destruction and robbery plus the sudden flight of the Portuguese ... led to a situation of almost total paralysis, with the majority of
companies in all fields ... abandoned (in most cases after having been thoroughly sabotaged) and most essential services deserted and
disiointe4 including Education, Health, Finance, Banking. Customs and Excise, and all local government (water and electricity supplies,
sanitation, etc) except for a few major centres. 130 road and railway bridges had been destroyed and over 20,000 heavy road transport
vehicles stolen or sabotaged (80% of the total number ... in 1973), which virtually brought circulation of people and goods to a halt.
Distribution of products and supplies were thus made extremely difficuk. In the countryside all kinds of equipment had been stolen, or
destroyed and the foundations of agriculture undermined. There was also a shortage of workers. Most foreign farmers fled leaving their
agricultural enterprises in a state of paralysis and this plus the dislocation of the rural population due to war left agricultural production at
a very low level. In industry the situation was similar. In Mardi 1976, a survey of major industrial enterprises revealed that of 692
enterprises involved in the survey, only 284 (a little over 40%) were still functioning with their former administration, the rernaining 408
being totally paralysed or under state recovery. Oil earnings were paralysed until mid-1976, iron ore mining stopped and diamond mining
fell to 18% of 1973 production. Construction was completely hatted and fishing severely affected with the catch down to 10% of 1973
levels because the best boats were sailed off by their owners and most fishing companies had been abandoned. The commercial distribution 
network, made up of around 25,000 retailers across the country was virtually paralysed ... While it is relatively easy to calculate material
losses in sabotage and destruction through the war, and robbing of equipment, transport, cattle, etc, assessed at a total value of around USD
6,700 Mn, it is impossible to know the full picture of negative consequences of these actions ... As an example, how can one quantify the
loss to a recently liberated country, with 85°o illiteracy, of almost all skilled workers, all of them settlers, because colonial rule barred the
way to training of Angolan nationals as skilled workers? How can one quantify losses accruing from the almost complete breakdown of
links between the city and countryside, guaranteed under colonial rule by the network of 'bush traders' and truckers, virtually 100% of
whom were settlers who suddenly went back to Portugal, causing hundreds of thousands of rural families to return .... to subsistence
farming because there was no longer any market for their products?" (Mario Nelson, 1985: 44-5). See subsection 2.2.
2. See	 section 3.1.
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breakthrough of the trade network, iv. save in transaction costs by shifting of transactions
from a market which had to be recreated (in a context which made transactions difficult
and costly) to the hierarchy, v. gather and process information in order to draft and
implement economic policy measures adequate to the country's actual conditions, and, vi.
use planning as a mean to implement a socialist strategy of development.
In a certain way, planning appeared as a mode of exercise of owners powers over
abandoned means of production by making decisions on allocations and distribution of
resources. However, the planning process was jeopardised, from its very beginning, by
many factors dealt with in this chapter. Among them, the approaches of agrarians to the
state, their alternative use of PEs and branches, the traditions of the colonial bureaucracy
(which added to the 'socialist' bureaucracy created a mixture favouring corruption) played
an important role. Nevertheless, the efforts in the restructuring of the economy translate,
along with attempts to implement forms of grassroot democracy, into the ruptural element
of the post-colonial society.
The initial managers of abandoned assets, the branch ministries, soon had to share
power with the planning authorities3 which from 1977 and within the general framework
of administrative planning, got substantial powers in policy-making and implementation of
economic policy. The first attempts to set up the planning system were not ambitious 4 but
3. 'Planning authorities' mean here all the state artities with powers to intervene in the activities of arterprises or brandies according to
allocations of functional powers in the planning system; it includes essentially the Ministry of Planning, with wide competence in this area,
but as well the ministries of Finance, Foreign Trade and Labour, and the central bank (BNA), which shared with Ministry of Planning the
set of powers related to planning, includingto enact instructions.
4. From 1976 a National Programme (of ventures) implemarted indicative plamiing the Programme restrained itself to the supervision of
allocations of funding to projects proposed by the public administration, and related mainly to state contracting and building (and
reconstruction) of infrastructures; the Direction of Planning authorised estimates and movements of funds (mo. no 80/76, Planning and
Economic Coordination, approving the regulations for the National Programme for 1976, nos I/a, I/b, and II/a); the regulations established
that the Treasury executed the payments for the project (no III). Alter the CC 3rd Plenary in 1976 (see section 3.3. and note 84), Dec. no
89/76, implementing the planning system adopted at the Plenary ruled the content of the National Plan (NP), (art. 4/3), the branch draft
plans (arts. 2/2 and 3), the enterprises draft plans (arts 2/3 and 2/4), and the process (arts 1, 2/1, 2/3, 4/1, 4/2, 5, 6/1 and 6/2); the system
was later refined by Law no 2/82 (see next note).
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progressively the branch and planning authorities allocated to themselve all kinds of
powers at the enterprise level.
The 'standard pyramid' of organs of the planning system had the PA at the top and
the enterprise at the bottom. 5 The hierarchical organisation of the planning system raised
different issues, for example: i. the flows of information and costs of communications,
the role of participants in the process (either from below or from above), iii. the content of
decisions allocating and distributing resources, and, iv. the actual application of these
decisions.
The institutional framework at the level of law also raised problems. In a central
command economy the plan is a law, thus with coercibility and whose effectiveness is
guaranteed by a set of norms providing for complex machinery to change the plan
directives and/or indicators. Also, the plan law may be approached as a negative limit for
each of the decision-making systems involved. A law containing policy directives and
quantitative targets related to macro indicators, the plan law jumped, in administrative
planning, from the level of formal law to the m.o. and instruction level as the macro
5 . Law no 2 82, on Planning. PI182; the law provided for centralized planning. with the Plan being approved by the PA and "having the
force of law" (arts. 1 2 and 25/3); in principle the planning obligations emerging from this law aimed only PEs and state organs, but there
was a possibility of integration of mixed and private enterprise (art. 22/2; see subsection 7.1, note 54). The draft of plans was complicated:
i. grounded in the 'Prospective Guide-lines for Development', approved at the party congresses, the Ministry of Planning established
cyphers of control, that is pre-indicators (qualitative and quantitative targets to be readied by brandies and enterprises through the plan),
(arts. 15 1 and 15/3); ii. the cyphers were sent to the CM for approval (art. 15/1), and the Politburo for approval (art 15/2) and, after this
step, to the Plan Cabinets of the branch ministries for disaggregation by depended enterprises (art. 16); iii. based in these cyphers, the
enterprises made their draft plan and if they changed the cyphers they had to provide reasons (arts. 17/1 and 17/2); iv. the PE draft plan
should include the components investment, finance, credit, iniport export and hard currency (see Table 2); v. the draft plan should be
discussed in the PE council of direction and workers assembly (12E/77, arts 41/2/a and 50/1/a, and GLL, art 11/1/a); vi. after this the PE
should send it to the branch or to the provincial Plan Cabinet (P1182, arts 21/1 and 21/2); vii. the PE should initiate contacts with suppliers
and clients to negotiate 'economic contracts' (P1182, art. 19, see subsection 5.3.2.); viii. the brandi ministry analysed the PEs plans and
made corrections in the draft plans (PL, art 22/1); as some ministries went to far in the use of their discretionary powers, Dec. no 6/82
(Statute of Prioritizing Enterprises, SPE, see subsection 4.3.2.), established that prioritizing enterprises, as defmed by the list at the decree,
were entitled to a right "of compulsory insertion of their activities in the National Plan and to the individualising of their plans in the branch
plan" (SPE, art 4/1/a), that is to the allocation of resources made by the National Plan; ix. the branth minictry made the draft plan of the
branch, including the components investment, fmance, credit, import/export and hard currency (P1182, art 23/1); x. the branch draft plan
was sent to the ministries of Planning and Finance (fmancial plan, PI182, art 24/a), Foreign Trade (plan of imports and services supplied
abroad, P1182, art 24/1)), and Labour (plan of work force and wages, P1182 art. 24/c); State Secretary of Cooperation (SSC), (plan for
international technical cooperation, P1182, art 24/d), BNA (loans plan, P1182, art 24/e); xi. afterwards the ministries had negotiations to
prepare the final draft of the plan, and eventually celebrated interbranch agreements (P1182, art. 20); xii. the Ministry of Planning, having
the draft plans consolidated by these discussions, negotiated with ministers and provincial commissioners and made corrections in the draft
plans (PI, art. 25/1), xiii. the Ministry of Planning sent the draft national plan for approval by the party CC and after this to the PA (P1182,
art. 25'3); although the plan was a law the secrecy patterns of the Ministry of Planning led to the amazing situation that the plan was a non-
published law (in contrast with the Budget, which was published).
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indicators were disaggregated by branch and enterprise. 6
 This proved an example that the
economic power of the PA was not significant when contrasted with the actual capacity of
decision-making of those empowered to make the concrete decisions on allocation of
resources. State bureaucracies even could, by these decisions, jeopardise the
implementation of the policy directives of the plan law.7
This chapter describes the process of nationalisation of abandoned assets, the
different forms of organisation of the public sector and the progressive appropriation of
decision-making powers by different competing state bureaucracies. It aims to
demonstrate the importance of the socialist option, and related central command economy,
in enabling state bureaucracies to exercise owners powers over abandoned assets. The
pitfalls of the planning system in the Angolan conditions and the working, and impact, of
the general institutional framework are also referred to.
4.1. The nationalisation process
The two basic statutes enabling the state to takeover abandoned enterprises were
Dec.no 128/75, enacted during the transitional period, and Law no 3/76. The process
6. The plan appeared as a mean to make decisions on the management of enterprises through the plan compulsory indicators a set of orders
on production, purchases, sales, financing, etc, adopted by the planning organs through 'administrative ads of Dimming': "The draft plans of
industrial enterprises will include the following indicators: a. quantitative production- b. volume of mercantile production; C. increase in
productivity; d. number of workers-. e. wages and salaries fund (amount of wages and salaries to be paid during the plan period)- f. global
value of profits; g. payments to the Budget and subsidies from the Budget; h. investment and entry into functioning of new capacities of
production; i. volume of supply of technical-material resources." (PL/82, art 18 I). After the approval of the aggregate National Plan by
the PA, the 'descending phase' of planning began: disamegation by brandies and enterprises; the Ministry of Planning sent the branch plan
to the ministries (Pb 82, art 28/1) and these divided the targeLs by enterprises (PL82, art 28/2); as sometimes they took a substantial time
to perform the task leaving the PEs in a situation of uncertainty, Law no 4/86 (approving the NP for 1986, established a term of 30 days
for the approval by brandies of PEs plans,art. 5); the plans so elaborated were compulsory for the PEs (PI182, arts. 1/2 and 33/2) and the
enterprise should negotiate 'economic contracts' to fulfil the plan tasks (PI182, art 33/1 and Dec. no 7/82, art 6/I/a). The number of
indicators centrally fixed impacts the autonomy of the PE; legislation in force during the functionalist phase provided for 9 indicators for
industrial PEs  (P1182, art. 18/1) and empowered the Ministry of Planning to fix more indicators (P1182, art. 18/3), and to order the
division of indicators by 3 months terms (ibid.); the periodicity of indicators was also important for the autonomy of PEs; up to 1988 the
plan was annual and the powers of ministries in establishing the indicators, with the possibility of going into the three months tam
contrasted with other countries, where plans were pluriamival, and the PE was free to disaggregate the indicators by years or months. On
the 1988 changes, see section 8.1.
7. For example: the plan law asserted that a given level of employment should be maintained, or that a branch should produce given
quantities of output; but simultaneously the planning authorities decided to cut the supply of inputs to a branch, for example, by reducing
its import quotas (as they actually,
 did. see, e.g., subsection 4.3.1.); these decisions had as a consequence that the indicators related to
output were not attained and in some cases, firms paralysed and/or became bankrupt, with impact on employment targets; that is, decisions
of the PA were not implemented, or even minimally respected.
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initiated during the transitional period and its outcomes were conditioned by the state of
the economy at independence. 8
 Both laws are examples of dysfunctions due to non-
application of their organisational rules: those in charge of the application of the laws only
partially followed their provisions and created a parallel framework, more adequate either
to the existing conditions or their interests.
4.1.1. State intervention
The 1975 decree provided for four types of temporary state intervention in the
management of companies, when situations of abandonment or disruption of production
arose, or in case of mixed enterprises: 9 i. investigation, m
 ii. appointment of delegates of
the state,° iii. suspension of corporate organs and appointment of a MC, for six months,
renewable, with the powers of the suspended organs, including those of the general
meeting, 12
 and iv. administrative declaration of bankruptcy.°
8. See section 2.2. and Introducion to Chapter 3.
9. Dec. no 125 75 also provided for financial intervention: grant of loans or guarantees for loans (arts. 3 and 24-25) and transformation of
debts of companies into equity owned by the state (art 26). The situations allowing state intervention were described at art 2, while mixed
enterprises, through direct and indirect participations referred to at art. 3, coul as well be under intervention.
10. Arts 6_7; the ministers of Planning and Finance and Economy (in the TG, later the branch minister) could order an "urgent
investigation to evaluate the real condition of the enterprise", (art. 6/1); the company's officials (directors, managers, members of the audits
council and employees) had a legal duty to supply the necessary information, including by providing access to the company's records (art
63): this legal obligation was enforced by penalties sudi as imprisonment up to one year, fines and ternporary inhibition of the exercise of
managing posts in any company (art 6/3); the investigator should make a report to the concerned minister who could order the "measures
of economic and financial adjustment considered convenient" (art. 7/1).
I I . Arts 8-10; the minister could appoint 'state representatives' or members of the board representing state participations in mixed
companies, after hearing the CT of the enterprise (arts 8/1 and 8/2); the members of the board were under the regime of company's
directors (Dec. no 40,833, 1956) and the state was liable to third parties on the management decisions implemented by its appointees (arts.
9 1 and 10); the government representative had a veto right on decisions not related to current management, especially those "implying
disposition or emus of the company's ass fts, resort to loans or sale of goods meaning the change of the enterprise's productive capacity or,
also, withdrawal of provisions by the shareholders" (art 9/1); every month the state representative should report to the minister (art 9/3); if
the members of the board or managers did not comply with the decisions of the government representative, he/she could propose to the
minister the suspension of the corporate organs and the appointment of a management committee (art 9/4).
12. Arts 11-17; here the boards of the company were 'frOZ03 .
 for the period of intervention, and a management committee substituted than
(art 11/1 and 11/2); the committee had the powers allocated by company law to suspended organs, including those of the general meeting
(art 14/1); the members of the committee were under the regime of company's directors as established in Dec. no 40,833 (art 142); the
state was liable for third parties for the decisions of the management committee (art 17); as the latter, besides managing the company and
promoting "programmes of professional training for national cadres" (art. 15/1/d), should report on the economic and financial situation of
the enterprise (art. 15 1/a), and also "inquiry on the liabilities arising from past management" (art 15/1/b), suspended directors and
managers should provide the necessary information (art 15'3); the state supported the MCs with tedmical assistance or funding, at the
request of the MC (art. 15 4).
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Investigation was rarely used, 14 since the urgent problem was to keep the firms
functioning. According to available information, the administrative declaration of
bankruptcy was never used, probably because it meant unemployment and also implied
legal knowledge and commercial practice people involved, CTs and young cadres of the
state, did not master." The most applied instruments were the suspension of corporate
organs with appointment of an MC and the appointment of state delegates in corporate
boards when the latter remained in office.
Intervened companies were formally ruled by company law and fell outside the
public sector. The regime was equivocal, since in practice the companies were under total
control by the state." Ambiguity led to situations of illegality, such as the stay in office of
MCs for years with neither renewal, nationalisation nor return of the company to
owners. 17 Decisions on intervention without the compulsory consultation of workers'
representatives or, even, their participation in management, were frequently made.
Conflict between private shareholders and state delegates on the boards of mixed
13.Arts 18-23; if the enterprises were in a situation of technical bankruptcy, the state could declare them bankrupt without resort to courts
and appoint an administrator for the equity (arts. 18 and 20); the owners could appeal to the Administrative Court, vvhich could not grant
an injunction suspending the execution of the proceedings (art. 19); the appointed administrator communicated the administrative
declaration of bankruptcy to the court, which continued the bankruptcy proceedings (art 21/1); the government representative informed the
court on the goods and rights the state would acquire for a new enterprise or an existing enterprise (art. 22/1); after the assPts had been
evaluated by the prosecutor, the state should pay the price, which was included in the 'bankrupt estate' to pay creditors (art. 21/2 and 22 2);
the court appointed an administrator to manage the assets, rights and liabilities (art. 23).
14. stil there were some cases of investigation, e.g., m.o. no 29/77 (InriThrry), on an investigation under Dec. no 128/75 in an electric
materials and equipment firm.
15. In 1989 the institution was restored under a less administrative scheme; Dec. no 31/89 stated that intervened companies might be
declared bankrupt if the government so required to the General Pros orution (ruts 7/2 and 7/3), which might propose it to the court, on
grounds provided for at civil law (art. 7/4); the state might order a reserve of assets for itself; as under Dec. no 128 75 (see note 13).
16. Mo. no 35/83 (Inclwrry): "are considered 'state enterprises . ...: a. enterprises already created under Law no 17/77 (LPE/77), b.
enterprises under restructuring in order to create PEs under Law no 17/77, c. nationalised and/or confiscated enterprises, d. intervened
enterprises under the form established at art_ 4/c of Dec.Law no 128/75" (suspension of corporate organs and appointment of a MC).
17. For example, m.o. no 58/89 (Trade) 'suppressed' the 'intervention committee' in a private company (no 1), whidi was in office since
1985 (m.o. no 46/85) and appointed a new one (no 2); Dec. no 32/89 (see subsection 8.1.2., on privatisation) reassured bankruracv,
nationalisation or return to the owners as the solutions for intervened companies (as it was established in Dec. no 128/75 and Law no
376); the need to repeat legislation in force in new laws means that it is not applied, that is, that intervened companies were kept in their
temporary status for periods superior to those established by law.
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enterprises led to intervention by suspension of corporate organs in mixed companies
where the state had majority participation.18
After the suspension of workers participation in management, the provisions of
Dec. no 128/75 on MCs were no more implemented. Since then the management of
intervened companies was transferred mainly either to newly-created PEs with similar
activity, to government departments or to committees promoting the restructuring of a
branch.19
As Table 1 shows,2 ° state intervention in the management of private companies
was at its peak in 1976-78. Nationalisation was at peak in 1979, although lasting from
1976 to 1983. The reason is that usually state intervention served as a experience to step
towards nationalisation. 21 Only 7 enterprises were reallocated to owners, 22 mainly because
the majority of owners was absent. Still, under the 90s restructuring many remaining
intervened and nationalised companies were transferred back to former owners, after more
than ten years of absence from the country and management. The late 80s economic
reform also provided for the revision of legislation on state intervention, while compelling
/8. For example, the mos of 12.8.1982 (Culture) intervened two mixed film exhibition firms where the state had a majority financial
participation; the intervention was justified in grounds that state representatives, who had no experience and knowledge of company law,
had been manipulated by private shareholders (who had superior information on 'technical details) in general meetings; the management of
the intervened mixed companies was allocated to the film distribution PE, Edecine.
19. E.g., m.o. 11.3.82 (Agriculture, allocating the management of a coffee plantation to the national coffee PE, nto. no 209/77
(Transports, allocating the management of an intervened company to the local department of the ministry), m.o. no 55/77 (Industry,
allocating the management of SACMA to the Department of Heavy Industry), and m.o. no 8/78 (Internal Trade, allocating the
management of a company to the Benguela Materials Intervention Committee). There were different kinds of committees to manage
abandoned companies and the most important were the National Restructuring Commissions (NRCs). See subsection 3.2.2. and 4.2.1.
(NRCs).
20. The figures refer to a sample of official gazettes available. The present sample roughly coincides with the estimates of the "Guidelines
for the Development of PRA in the period 1980-1985", which states a figure of 250 private enterprises transferred to the state between
1978-80 (OFDES2, 9), 225 in the sample; except for plantations, the legislation surveyed does not include agricultural small undertakings,
informally allocated to state farms; as any economic data referred to in this work, the figures are rough estimates (see e.g., Hodges, 1987,
124, on the problems of some economic data on Angola).
21. For 503 state interventions there have been 457 confiscations and 7 end of intervention.
22. E.g., m.o. no 89/83 (Provincial Coordination) ended state intervention in a foreign company after 6 years (enterprise intervened by m.o.
no 62/77).
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state organs to make decisions on 'intervened' companies in order to end their transitory
statu S.23
4.1.2. Nationalisation
Law no 3/76 ruled nationalisation and the management of nationalised
enterprises. 24 The law divided the broad concept of nationalisation 25 into nationalisation
stricto sensu and confiscation. Nationalisation stricto sensu caused a right to
compensation26 and was grounded on reasons of economic and social strategy. 27 It also
resulted from unilateral transformation of debts to the state or state-owned banks in
financial participations in companies. 28 Confiscation was, in the Angolan legal order, a
punitive administrative measure with no right to compensation. 29 Both nationalisation and
confiscation could be total or partial. The latter involved the transfer to the state of shares
23. See section 8.1
24. on Title II, see subsection 3.2.2. and 3.4.4.
25. Defined as the transfer to the state, by an unilateral act of the latter, of privately owned means of production or enterprises.
26. Law no 3'76, art. 9: "1. The conditions for compensation will ... be established by negotiation between the state and interested parties.
2. Ifthe parties do not readi an agreement on the conditions of the compensation ... the CR, under proposal of the CM, will determine these
conditions." (by reference to arts 1 and 2). In 1989, after a report of a committee of experts, there were the firs formal decisions on
compensation for nationalisation (Dec. no 29/89); informally, in 1982 the Portuguese owners of Sonefe got compensation in hard currency,
under an agreement between the Angolan and the Portuguese governments (AED, 26.11.1982).
27. Cit. law, art. 1: "1. The CR may. in cases of special interest to the national economy and under proposal of the CM, decide the
nationalisation of the totality or part of the ass of national or foreign enterprises, considered important to the resistance economy. 2. The
choice of enterprises to nationalise will be based in any of the following factors: a. Type of activity; b. Volume of employment; c.
Monopoly situation; d. Impact in the balance of payments; e. Location. 3. The CR may also, under proposal of the CM, decide the
nationalisation of the totality or part of the assets of enterprises intervened by the state under Dec. no 128/75, when it considers that their
maintenance in the private sector is contrary to the national interest."; Law no 1/82, decentralized the process of nationalisation, allocating
the CM the CR powers and the branch minister the initiative previously of the CM.
28. Art. 2: "1. The CR may, under proposal of the CM, decide the nationalisation of the totality or part of the assets of enterprises whidi
had been granted financial support by state financial institutions and have not applied this funding in operations on the interest of the
enterprise or the national economy. 2. The CM may, on the other hand, decide the compulsory transformation of the debts above referred to
into equity of the debtor enterprise.'.
29. The grounds for confiscation provided for in art. 3 Law no 3/76, followed those allowing state intervention according to alt. 2 of Dec.
no 128/75. Art. 4 provided for confiscation when owners of enterprises either abandoned the country for a period superior to 45 days
without justification (al. a), had collaborated with white terrorist organisations (including the Portuguese secrot police, al. b), with UNITA
and FNLA, FLEC and the white separatist army (ELP), (al. c), or were convicted by the practice of tax, customs, foreign currency, against
public health or the national economy offences (al. d).
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(or other forms of participation in capital) owned by some individuals or firms and
originated a mixed corporation."
All the rights of nationalised estates were transferred to the state, which
guaranteed the right to compensation of third parties entitled to it." The CM could
allocate nationalised enterprises or assets to co-operatives. 32 The nationalisation
enactments meant the immediate cessation of functions of corporate boards and their
substitution by government appointees if the enterprise maintained corporate personality
and form (usually company). If the enterprise was liquidated and transformed into a PE,
the CM appointed an 'emergency committee' to manage it until reorganisation."
As Table 1 demonstrates, the overwhelming majority of enterprises transferred to
the state were confiscated (457 out of 499 transfers). About 99% of cases of confiscation
were due either to abandonment or to interruption of activity, and referred almost
exclusively to Portuguese owners. Nationalisation stricto sensu had no substantial weight
in the transfers (just 42 in the sample). 34 When the enterprise subject to nationalisation had
30. E.g... Law no 8/76, art. 1/2, on the partial nationalisation of 17 companies on which the nationalised holding Cuca had shareholdings,
among them the soft drinks companies, Sofanco and Refrigerantes Vitoria (later totally nationalised by Dees. no 177/80 and 178/80,
respectively). The meaning of Law 3/76 was not clear for many entities. For example, Dec. no 8/88, confiscated 21.67% of the shares of a
coffee company and although one of the owners was in the country and remained with a participation of 78•33%, the decree ordered the
liquidation of the company; later m.o. no 1/89 (Coffee) allocated to the private shareholder the buildings belonging to the company (with
the lien of repayment in kz of rents paid in hard currency unlawfully perceived by the Housing State Secretary) and to the state two
plantations, the bulk of the company's property and the credits of the company over the PE exporting coffee, ENCAFE.
31. Law no 3'76, art, 6.
32. Cit.law. art. 8; m.o. no 56 76 (Agriculture) provided for a priority in allocation of abandoned farms in the 'Luanda Green Belt' to the
neiAbourhoods and enterprises consumer co-operatives the m.o. was not implemented and the majority of the farms became private
property of 'upper' officials, many of them of state or party bureaucracy, or their kin, and some of them employing Ovimbundu labour,
Hodges states that the majority of abandoned farms were allocated to agriculture PEs (1987: 85) but Sarapu and Cruz refer the allocation
to co-operatives. See Charter 6.
33. Law no 3/76, art. 7.
34. Nationalised (stricto scrim), e.g.: i. mining companies: Angol (Sociedade Portuguesa de Exploracao de Petroleo, distribution of fuels.
Dec. no 3/77), later dissolved and its assets allocated to the NOC Sonangol (Exec Dec. no 1/79, Oil); Empresa de Cobres de Angola (Dec.
61/81), Icorniangol (Dec. no 91/79), ii. energy: CELB (electric power, Lobito/Benguela, subsidiary of Sonefe and where the state had a
participation), and Electro Industrial, electric materials (Dees. no 39/82 and 40/82, respectively, partial nationalisation and partial
confiscation); iii. construction and building materials: Cimento Secil (see Chapter 7), partial nationalisation of shares except the Danish
shareholdings (Dec. no 107/78); Sondadora (drills and foundations, Dec. no 108/82); iv. gE41:s: Grafica da Huila (Dec. no 44/83),
Unigran (Dec. no 62/83); v. food industry: partial nationalisation of share not confiscated in Sofanco and Vitoria (soft drinks, Decs no
177 80 and 178/80, respectively), the wine bottling Sovan, Savinex, Sovinca, Covip, Vinisul, Vinul and Gecol (Dees no 5/83, 6 83, 7/83,
8 83, 9/83, 10/83, and 11/83, respectively), Huilapao (Dec. no 13/83), Panificadora Benguela (Dec. no 23/87, partial nationalisation),
Combal (biscuits, Dec. 69/81); vi. light industry: Holdains, Angola (Dec. no 13/87); vii. plantations: Sapu (cattle ranching, Dec. no
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1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Total
207 139 63 49 6 3 5 12 5 8 2 4 503
27 32 28 56 25 4 1 14 4 2 2 195
39 16 5 67 36 8 22 57 J. 10 1 262
66 48 33 123 61 12 23 71 1 14 3 2 457
4 13 3 1 4 3 2 10 1 1 42
70 61 36 124 65 15 25 81 1 15 4 2 499
1 2 1 3 7
277 200 99 173 71 19 32 94 5 8 3 19 4 5 1009
Decis
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transit
d
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foreign non-Portuguese owners usually they were maintained and the firm became mixed"
or the state participation increased. 36 The figures demonstrate the defensive character of
the nationalisation process, where, as stated above, the only offensive nationalization has
been the takeover of banks.37
TABLE 1
State decisions on private enterprise in the period 1976-89
Source: DRs 1976-89; interv: intervention in management of private enterprises under Dec.no 128/75; confl: confiscation by abandon;
conf2: confiscation by paralyzation; milt: total confiscation; nation: nationalisation with compensation- transft: total transfers to the state
(total confiscation plus nationalisation); end: and of state intervention under Decino 128/75, without nalionalisalion; Iota): Iola) dethions
state organs conoeming private enterprise in the period; figures tinderfined-. nationalicankou or a:mascot:ten of just a pat. of ertpkoi, or of
both.
9378): viii. transport: CTA and Transportes Aereos de Angola (airlines, Does no 46/77 and 47/77, respectively), Navang (ships, Dec.
51 . 77). Secil Maritima (sea transport, Dec. no 1/87)- ix. media: RPA. television (Dec. 50/76). See Chapter 7.
35. See previous note on Cimento Sethi; also, e.g., the breweries Noes! (confiscation of all equity except the shareholding of Heineken,
Law no 9 76. art 1), Eka, where the shareholding of Societe d'Assistance Industrielle at Commerciale. SAIC, and Widbread Company
were not nationalised (Law no 1076, art 1), the heavy industry firm Diogo d'Avila, where the participation of Societe de Transformation
de Metaux was excluded (Dec. no 9477) or IFA (matches) excepting the participation of the French fhin Societe Industrielle at Forestiere
des Allumettes (Law no 6/77).
36. Such as the nationalization of some Portuguese shares in Diamang (Dec. no 61'77) which led state shareholding to jump from about
20°0 to 70.85% (art. 1); shares from Societe Generale de Belgique, Sibeka, Solomon, Guggenheim Foundations, Pacific Consolidated.
Morgan Trust Company and the banks Swiss Bank Corporation, Societe des Banques Suisses, Cornpagnie de G. at de Banque, Bancos
Pinto Magathees, Intercontinental Portugues, Portugués do Atlintico, Fonsecas e Burnay (nationalised in Portugal) and two insurance
companies, were not nationalised (art. 2). See section 1.1.
37. See section 2.2. Two banks were nationalised in 1976: Banco de Angola, which became the Angolan central bank, BNA. and Banco
Comercial de Angola, which became BPA, a merchant bank (Laws no 69176 and 70/76). The other banks ceased their activities by
cancellation of licences to loan money (for example, mos no 12/76 and 18/76, Finance, for Totta Standard and Pinto e Sotto-Mayor,
respectively). Some organisational confusion followed the takeover of banks. For example, it seems that in the few days mediating from the
takeover to the change of names who could manage accounts abroad (now the members MCs), some former manages succeeded in
withdrawing substantial amounts of forex from these accounts. Nevertheless, banks are a case of intervened companies whith managed at
least to provide minimal services to the population (only for deposits, since credits for consumption were suspended for an unlimited period
and the area of transfers of hard currency acquired a bad reputation) and to the economy. As banks had a record of firms owing them
money, in the euphoria of the first years of independence a 'providential' fire destroyed the files which had evidence of settlers indebtedness
to the nationalised Angolan banks.
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Law no 43/76 established simplified proceedings for the confiscation of houses and
buildings38 and sparse legislation covered confiscation of other abandoned assets, such as
bank deposits. 39 Transfers of private property to the state were also done through: i.
requisition4° and expropriation (compulsory sale to the state of unmovable assets) 4 ' of
assets, when there were no grounds for state intervention or nationalisation of enterprises,
and, ii. purchase of shares of strategic enterprises, such as in the case of two oil
companies,42
 and, iii. cancellation of concessions and transfer of assets to the state.43
Insurance companies, subject to licensing, were a special case: licences were not renewed
and the government negotiated the transfer of part of their assets to the state as reserves
for the assignment of risks by the latter. 44 The state also took over financial participations
38. Confiscation by joint m.o. of the Secretary of State of Housing (previously the minister for Construction) and the Minister of Justice,
instead of decree of the CM (art. 2).
39. M.o. no 24 76 (Finance) confiscated money and other deposits abandoned at the banks.
40. E.g., m.os no 13/76, 15-A'76 and 68'76 (Trade, Planning and Economic Coordination), on requisition of commodities and warehouses
for a PE. EMPA. Requisition referred to the compulsory sale, on grounds of public interest, of movables as contrasted with expropriation,
related to urunovables; in some cases requisition meant a temporary use, e.g., m.o. no 66/77 (Transports) ordering all the private sector
trucks, (except those supplying services for the industrial and trade sectors in Huige, Kwanza-Norte and Kwanza-Sul) to work only in the
transport of coffee. An interesting case is m.o. no 2/77 (Transports), which requisitioned the workshops of Casa Americana and allocated
them to Volvo. On requisition, see also section 5.3.
41. For example, Exec.Dec. no 35/81 (Finance) expropriated a building of a local-owned insurance company (Angolana).
42. Joint
  Exec.Dec. no 63'84 (Energy and Oil, Finance and Justice) on the liquidation of Firta; the preamble referred that Sonangol, the
Angolan NOC, bought Fina's shares in 1980; art. 1 dissolved the company and art. 2 allocated its assets to Sonangol; Exec.Dec. no 99 82
(Oil, Planning and Finance) authorized Sonangol to buy shares of Mobil Oil Angola to Mobil Oil Corp. (New York).
43. For example. Dec. no 32/77 revoked the concession of the Amboim Railways; Dec. no 91/79, nationalised a mining company.
Icomiangol (art 1) and revoked a mining licence (art 2), on grounds that 'the company ... classified as fusing quartz all its (exported)
production and did not refer to the existence of natural 'pieso-electric quartz' (preamble cit dec.).
44. Dec. no 17/78 created a new PE, ENSA, with the monopoly for insurance activity (tut 3); after this decree, m.o. no 72-A/78 (Finance)
cancelled the licenses of the three larger private insurance companies (one was the local capital insurance company, Angolana, whose
owners had fled, and two others were affiliated of Portuguese companies nationalised in Portugal); some parts of the risks portfolio of these
companies, and related assets for reserves, were transferred to ENSA; a case of non-negotiated cancellation of license was the UK company
Alliance, whose directors declared in 1976 to abandon business and that Angola should assume their liabilities (preamble m.o. no 78/76,
Finance); m.os no 78 76 and no 114/76 (Finance) cancelled the license. Before the cancellation of licences, m.o. no 114/75 (Finance)
suspended the management of 10 insurance companies (art 1), appointed a common 'direction committee' to manage them, subordinated to
the Insurance Restructuring Committee (CCISA created by m.o. no 68/75, Finance, arts 2-3) and provided for the appointment of CCISA
representatives in the managing boards of another 12 companies (art. 4); m.o. no 126/76 (Finance) declared null the insurance contracts
where premiums were not paid in time and m.o. no 147/76 (Finance) declared null the insurance contracts of 16 companies; m.o. no
148 76 cancelled licences of insurance companies.
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of the colonial state, mainly on mining (concessionaire) companies, financial institutions
created during fascism, and some PEs formed from 1974.45
Nationalisation of activity (that is, absolute reserves of public activity), for
example, health and education, banking, 46
 insurance, the legal profession, and the reserves
related to state ownership of natural resources also contributed to a given shaping of the
public sector. The state reserved areas (of ownership and activity) was regulated in sparse
legislation providing for absolute or control reserves and targeted essentially foreign
firms.47
The trend in the Angolan nationalisation process has been to nationalise the whole
company, mainly due to abandonment by owners. When they remained in the country, the
relations of state representatives with private partners have been strained in some cases,
which led to further statisation of some mixed companies. The process of nationalisation
was followed by a trend of concentration (horizontal integration) and to the statutory
grant of monopolies of activity to some PEs, for example in banking, insurance or airlines.
In many cases monopolies resulted from the reserves of activity and horizontal integration.
This pattern of nationalisation, and the planning system later implemented, led to a
misconception identifying the Angolan process with, say, the Soviet one. The distinction
between offensive and defensive nationalisation provides a way of separating two
processes which, at the level of law, may look similar. To distinguish the two kinds of
nationalisation we have to look at the workers' (and consumers') role in the process and
45. See subsection 1.1.3.
46. Law no 4/78 declared public the 'banking functions', which included the functions of the central bank, merchant banks and other credit
institutions perforating any kind of banking activities (art. 1).
47. Absolute reserves (of ownership or activity) ban completely private ownership or activities; the control reserves establish that the state
will hold a position (usually, a more than 50% shareaholding in joint-ventures) which will allow it to make decisions on the reserved area.
For an example of absolute and control reserves see section 7.1, on foreign investment (absolute reserve on areas banned to foreign
investment) and control reserve on mixed enterprises.
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their future in the power reallocations which the process signifies. As seen above, the role
of urban workers has been important but not determinant in nationalisation, whose driving
factor was the flight of settlers. Another factor determinant for later outcomes was the
bankrupt state of the economy (and enterprises). Indeed, the percentage of the 1976
volume of production of main products, as contrasted with that 1973 was: oil, 61%, iron
ore, 0%, diamonds, 18%, electricity, 59%, coffee, 33%, cotton, 9%, fish, 10%, and sugar,
44% (mario Nelso, 1985). Also, the degree of socialisation of many nationalised firms was
very low, and the majority had to face 'colonial induced' dependence problems." These
factors influenced all the social outputs of the process and the progressive takeover of
decision-making powers by state bureaucracies.
4.2. The relations between nationalised enterprises and state apparatuses
After taking over thousands of abandoned firms, the post-colonial state organised
to manage them, in a context of shortage of managerial skills and serious economic crisis.
As the scheme of participatory management of PEs and intervened companies was short-
lived, the branch ministries began to manage the firms directly, in what has been the
Angolan version of glavki. Later intervened and nationalised firms were merged into
national PEs, horizontally integrated, with 'jurisdiction' over all the territory. A new
reorganisation divided national enterprises into provincial enterprises while some
continued horizontally integrated. In the 80s there were the first attempts of vertical
integration, combining with a trend to accept the holding character of some PEs. 4 9
48. Bakeries are an example: "(it) is a dispersed and crafts sector ... Bakeries were, in their majority, managed by a head of family, having
as workers his wife, children and so on. (and) Our country had never been self-sufficient in wheat flour and the majority of wheat we use is
imported." (Kabulu, 1982: 35).
49. Although some PEs were holdings de facto, managing financial participations in mixed companies or joint-ventures (sudi as the NOC)
and also ensuring the management of intervened companies allocated to them (such as the film distribution PE), this was not accepted by
some government and party officials, who argued holdings were 'bourgeois' while fearing that PEs became too powerful; see section
7.1.
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4.2.1. The 1976-77 'glavki' period
The post-colonial regulation of PEs and their relations with the state began in 1975
during the transition for independence. The TG had approved proposals of state
bureaucracies for the creation of PEs as a mean to face problems such as the eventual
boycott of consumer supplies by white right-wingers." 'Transitional' PEs had an
organisation different from the post-colonial ones, in some aspects more advanced, for
example, while ensuring workers participation51
 they provided as well for consumers (or
clients) participation in the enterprise's boards. 52 Also their relations with the state were
not as intensive as they became later."
Title II of Law no 3/76 dealt with the economic organisation of the state and PEs,
introducing a 'system of hierarchical committees', relying on collective decision-making. At
the bottom of the system was the enterprise with its management committee and the
workers assembly. 54 As a liaison officer between the state and the PE there was the
50. In late 1974 there were rumours that white truck drivers were preparing a strike, following a Chilean model against the (reformist)
colonial government and to promote the 'Rhodesian' solution; state bureaucracies created than a reserve of food to face the eventual strike;
from these emergency basic structures were later created two PEs: i. CVC (import/export and wholesale), aiming "to ensure the regularity
of public supply of essential products (and) at the same time to control prices, in order to prevent the increase in living costs" (preamble
Dec. no 7675, creating the PE); CVC also had to 'promote the creation of import co-operatives, supplying them technical and financial
assistance, in order to foster the association of small firms into well dimensioned and economic (profitable) undertakings" (cit.dec., art.
2 g), and to create "strategic reserves to guarantee the regular fimctioning of economic activities, and to supervise, at the national scale, the
rationalisation of stocks of imported commodities" (cildec., art. 2/h); and, ii. EMPA (wholesale and retail), supplied by CVC, aimed to
ensure the supply to consumers, given the disruption of trade caused by the expulsion of traders from the slums and the flight of settlers
(created by Dec. no 49/74). Another PE, ETP (public transport), was created due to the abandon of the private concessionaire for the
service in Luanda (preamble Dec. no 83/75, creating the PE).
51. E.g.. Dec. no 7675, creating a gross PE (CVC). Other new PEs had some detail differences but the same essential features: i. workers
appointed a member of the audits council (citdec., arts 10/1 and 10/2), and, ii. the workers committee of the PE had two representatives in
the firm's advisory council (art 13/1) which analysed plans, proposed prices and profit margins and discussed the problems arising from the
activity of the PE (art 14); the PE articles also institutionalised the workers committee (see subsection 2.2.1.), as composed by ten workers
"democratically elected" to represent the personnel in relations with management, especially in the area of human resources (art. 15).
52. The participation of consumers and/or direct clients of a PE (for example EMPA in the case of CVC) in the advisory council (see
previous note) was established in CVC articles of association: the council included representatives of the workers committee, a
representative of EMPA, four representatives of consumers (to be selected according to further regulations since there was no consumers
association in Angola at the time), two representatives of importers, two representatives of retailers and a representative of the Secretary of
State for Trade, on which the PE depended (Dec. no 76/75, art. 13/1).
53. In the CVC case, the PE was ruled by company law except when law established differently (Dec. no 76/75, art 1/3); the control by the
state meant the appointment of the board of directors, two appointed by the minister of Economy and one by the minister of Planning and
Finance (cit.dec., arts. 4/a and 5/1) for a mandate of three years, renewable (art 5/3), as well as two of the three members of the audits
council, one by the minister of Economy and another by the minister of Planning and Finance (ibid., arts 10/1 and 10(2).
54. See subsection 3.2.2
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government delegate, whose main duty was to participate in the meetings of the
management committee and the workers assemblies. The government delegate was also
under duty to meet every fortnight the union comrnittee. 55
 These obligations probably did
not please the intermediate state bureaucracies, since their practice was quite different.
The other element of the system, the BCC, probably did not please some members of
government themselves, since it concentrated powers they later assumed. % The BCCs
were composed by the government delegates in PEs and a representative of the branch
union.57
The 1976 framework for the economic organisation of the state was not
implemented. Each branch ministry designed its own scheme of management, contained in
ministerial orders ignoring the existing legislation. The most important have been the
industrial and agricultural schemes. 58 The phase has similarities with the glavki times in the
USSR, and is characterized by the dominance of the branch ministries, which later lost
power during what Nove (1989) referred to for different realities as the functiangst
stage."
55. Cit. law, arts 23 1 and 23/2, raTectively; the govenunent delegate was appointed by the CM (art. 20/1) and could held the post in
various 'enterprises' of the branch (art. 20'2).
56. See subsection 3.2.2.; art, 12: "The BCC supervises the programming, organisation, direction and control of the economic activity of
the related branch, according to the Plan directives, and especially has powers to: a. control, rationalize and normalize the supply of
economic units: b. coordinate the management of stocks of economic units; c. analyse and make the fmal proposal on prices, according to
proposals drafted by the management cornmittess, and analyse the possible differentials in production costs, aiming their optimization; d.
coordinate the fmancial management of the committees; e. establish the types and quality of goods to be produced acconding to ... the
recommendations of the management committees; f. coordinate proposals of investment made by the management committees, rationalize
and insert them in the plan directives; g. submit to the decision of the Ministry of Labour and competent union organisations the proposals
of the committees on fixing and normalisation of wages and salaries, professional classification and other personnel benefits; h. recoinmend
... professional training and recycling courses; i. draft systems of information and normalisation of accounts allowing a control of economic
units.
57.Arts 11/3 and 11/2. respectively; the BCCs were created by the CM and subordinated to the branch minister (art 11/1).
58.On agriculture see Chapter 6.
59. In a central command economy the functional organ ads through various instruments, from plans to direct instructions; in principle
instructions should be limited to 'methodological directives', actually, functional bureaucracies gave PEs direct instructions on almost
everything. For the glavky system in agriculture see section 6.1.
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The National Restructuring Commissions (NRCs) were the form used from 1976
to 1977 by the Ministry of Industry to manage abandoned firms. 03 They were created ad
hoc outside the formal structure of the ministry and m.os allocated them the management
of intervened enterprises, just stating that they had the powers and functions of the
management committee under Dec. no 128/75. 61 Intervened enterprises were thus
amalgamated under a common management. For example, m.o. no 75/76 (Industry),
allocated 50 intervened companies the light industry NRC, m.o. no 72/76 (Industry)
allocated 31 intervened companies to the heavy industry NRC. Both orders stated that an
intervention committee should be appointed to the companies. However, in some cases
there were emergency committees, managing the nationalised industries.62
NRCs ensured the joint management, including provision of inputs, made the
connection between enterprises and the ministry, and generally aimed to guarantee the
functioning and reorganisation of abandoned enterprises, making a "rational management
of existing cadres", "normalizing action and methods, on execution and control, in services
common to the whole sector" and promote economies of scale in a context of shortage of
inputs. 63 Below the NRCs there were the provincial committees, and, from early 1977, the
60. NRCs were created by m.o. no 19/76 (Industry), for food industry, light industry, heavy industry, textiles, sugar, mining and electricity
(m.o. no 22 77) and oil (m.o. no 3/77); in the provinces there were provincial restructuring committees (PRCs, m.o. no 55/76, Industry);
NRCs functions were, to: i. "create immediately the organisational and functioning conditions making possible the efficient and opportune
management of the branch enterprises, contributing to the fulfilment of the general Guide-lines defined by the government",; ii. "support the
Secretary of State in the proposals and selection of workers responsible for the functions which will be defmed for the new structures", iii.
"draft and propose measures contributing to training and professional improvement" iv. "adopt emergency measures necessary to the
regularisation of supply and production of the Ws", v. "implement the bases of an accounts plan for the respective industrial branches", vi.
"adopt the measures necessary for the restructuring of productive sectors, mainly the specialisation of EUs in some types of products", vii.
"make inventories of the means existing at the national level", viii. "draft, with the organs representing the enterprises and unions, a
proposal of emergency production plan for this year ..." (m.o. no 19/76, no 2); in the NRCs responsibility was individual and direction
collective (no 3).
61. E.g., m.o. no 73/76 (Industry) no 2: "the NRC (Textiles) ... will have the functions referred to in articles 13 to 17 of Dec. no 128/75
(see note ...), especially those related to the draft of inventories and balance accounts"; also m.o. no 69/76 (Industry), allocating a paper
intervened company (Celulose do Alto Catumbela) to the heavy industry NRC;
62. Such as SATEC (textiles, m.o. no 25/76, Inrhistry); in this case two representatiVes of the ministry and one of workers (appointed by
them) composed the emergency committee.
63. M.o. no 22/77 (Indildry) nos 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, on the Electricity NRC; this NRC had geographic divisions with functional
organisation: departments of planning and finance, supplies, procurement, human resources and training, supervision and tariffs,
equipment, and operations (zones north, centre and south).
169
Planning system
intervention committees, composed by a representative of the ministry and three workers
appointed by the minister."
The industry scheme was followed under other names by, say, the Ministry of
Construction, with the 'support nucleus' (NA) managing abandoned enterprises. For
example, a set of ministerial orders allocated 15, 27 and 14 companies to the NA4, the
nucleus for building materials. A ministerial order established that all firms needing
intervention were under the control of a 'support nucleus' and that, case by case, the latter
together with a member of the enterprise appointed by workers proposed the measures
adequate to the technical-financial cleansing of the unit. After the approval of measures
proposed by the 'support nucleus', the enterprises were transferred to a state department.65
In some cases pre-enterprises were created, grouping intervened and nationalised
firms to set up a new organisation. This was the method followed, for example, in
Fisheries. M.o. no 40/76 (Fisheries) divided enterprises in 'nucleus of production,
distribution or services', by provinces, led by a director appointed by the minister with
powers to "manage the activity of the nucleus in order to its financial cleaning,
organisation of production and consequential furtherance of the creation of future state
enterprises". In some cases NRCs were preceded by the 'dynamising commissions', which
promoted the take-off of related paralysed industry.66
The amalgamation of enterprises under the control of NRCs led to the creation of
national PEs, horizontally integrated. Until the step was made, some NRCs were allegedly
64. Alter the informal repeal of Title II of Law no 3/76, and related collapse ofthe MCs scheme established in Dec. no 128/75 and the law,
the Ministry of Industry established the intervention committees, appointed just for 30 days, where the date representative was 'The
maximal authority within the economic tmit and may belong to various committees ... on which case he/she will have a permanent
substitute in each oonmaittee" (m.o. no 5/77, Indndry).
65.M.os no 46/76, no 48/76, no 49/76 and no 44/76 (Construction), respectively.
66.E.g.. m.o. no 17/76, Construction, creating the 'dynamising commission' for the industry of building materials.
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involved in 'fractional activities' 67 and dissolved by the PM in June 1977, 68
 who created
'regular' (non-collective) public administration organs for the Ministry of Industry. 69 After
these events the glavIci approach was abandoned. With the adoption of the 1977 law on
PEs, intervened companies, progressively nationalised, entered into the 'functionalist
stage'."
As the process of concentration and direct management of abandoned enterprises
was developing, the ministries organised to perform their new functions. A review of their
organic laws shows that in the period 1975-78 they had no homogeneous or clear ideas on
the subject. Some were 'modest' when approaching functions related to the control of
enterprises, while others were very ambitious. 71 The reorganisation meant, as said above,
the substitution of the commissions by a system of hierarchical individual organs. There
67. N'RCs had many Leninists and this may be one of the reasons for their adoption of the glavki model; some of them were eventually
sympathizers of 'Nitists'. After the putsch there was a purge at the Ministry of Inductry of members of the NRCs (professionals and
students): some dismissed, some arrested and remained in prison without trial for more than one year and an engineer. Ademar Vales, was
even executed in prison, nobody knows by whom or why (0 Jornal, 21.6.1991); some were re-hired later.
68. Preamble of m.o. no 32/77 (PM): "Taking into consideration(:) the moment our country is going through, due to fractional activities
translated in the refusal of development and strengthening of state structures, attempting to break our revolutionary process; ... that the
fractional activities were tharacterized by passivity and negligence when approaching the directives ddermined from above, promoting
indiscipline at all levels; ... the fact that the industrial sector is determinant to the goal fixed by MPLA, Scientific Socialism, and so has
been a particular target for these activities; ... the practical need to implement the decisions of the 3rd Plenary of the MPLA CC in order to
attain higher levels of production ...: 1. The following organs of the Ministry of Industry are extinguished: i. sub-NRC for Beverages; ii.
NRC for Food Industry; iii. NRC for Light Industry; iv. NRC for Heavy Industry; v. sub-NRC for Textiles; vi. sub-NRC for Sugar, vii.
General Commission for Planning and Management; vii. General Commission for Administrative Organisation". An argument for the
extinction of NRCs, undermining the strengthening of the state, was used as well by Vichinsky to purge (the later 'missing) Pashukanis
(Canoe, 1975, 77-8); the commissions actually represented a serious effort to change the organisation of the colonial state to perform new
functions under new patterns of decision-making, which always included, for example, participation of unions (see note 60).
69. The national directions (NDs); NDs should deal with the enactment of regulations for the branch, or licensing, investment projects and
so far, but actually became 'middlemen' between PEs and ministers for the management of intervened and nationalised enterprises; for
example, mo no 42/77 (Construction) allocating the management of enterprises under previous support nucleons to the ND. of Building
Materials; or m.o. no 37/77 (Agriculture), allocating the management of coffee plantations to the coffee ND.
70. LPE/77, see subsection 4.2.2.
71. As an example: Dec. no 48/77 (Organic Law of the Ministry of Foreign Trade), established that the Direction for Foreign Trade
Operations, e.g.: i. "supervises and controls the foreign trade enterprises subordinated to it" (art 18/b), ii. "authorizes or refuses the
applications for imports and exports and grants the licenses" (art 18/f), iii. "supervises the contracting of insurance and transport, and
solves in coordination with the competent boards all the problems related to the transport of commodities, their expedition reception,
delivery and commercial supervision" (art. 18/e). Dec. no 42/77 (Organic Law of the Ministry of Internal Trade), established that the ND
for Food, which controlled the distribution PEs (art 14/2), would, e.g.: i. "direct ... contracting between the public or mixed enterprises for
distribution of food and their suppliers" (art 14/1/i), and ii. "control the execution of the supply plan in the part related to food and other
goods of prioritizing marketing and define the policy of marketing of the respective gross trading PEs" (art 14/1/1); the provincial
delegations of the ministry would, e.g.: i. "coordinate and control the correct execution of the plan of mercantile circulation of consumer
goods, and products manufactured by other ministries" (sic), (art 21/1/m) and, ii. "direct, coordinate and control the transport necessary to
the execution of the plan of mercantile circulation, which will be implemented by the transport means of the delegation and or other
transport organisations" (alt. 21/1/n). On the 'modest' ministries, e.g., the 1976 Organic Law of the Ministry of Construction.
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was also a collective board of top officials of each ministry to advise the minister in policy
matters. 72 Informally, a new body arose as time passed, to provide a forum for the branch
national enterprises, mainly PEs, mixed firms, in some cases private firms as well, and for
the ministries mid-level experts and provincial delegates: the enlarged consultation council,
meeting usually once per year to discuss the execution of the branch plan and policies.
Upwards mobility and financial chaos
While the restructuring was taking place, the MPLA campaign against the so-
called petty-bourgeoisie provided the legitimation for upward mobility of the low-level
state bureaucracies, 73 and the recruitment of kin and village clients to posts in public
administration, with the consequential implementation of agrarian patterns of management
in some ministries. 74 While appointing to the posts of national director, say, people with
no adequate schooling or training, some ministers were, simultaneously, creating, so they
said, a sophisticated 'socialist system' (that is, centrally planned) to manage huge
monopolies.75
The management 'mistakes' in the early years of independence were widespread.
Vertical an horizontal integration of enterprises demands management skills not available
72. The consultation council was an advisory board to the minister, usually composed by the minister, the deputy ministers, the national
directors, the directors of special organs, such as the PLCs, the provincial delegates and other top officials of the ministry (e.g., Exec.Dec.
no 42 77, Internal Trade, att. 23).
73. With this move IxfPLA seriously damaged its traditional support in the nationalist 'genuine' state bureaucracies (see subsection 3.1.1.);
the caznpaign also aimed to clear the state of the resnaining 'leftists' (graduates and students of the 1974-75 generation) but due to the
ambiguity of the Petty-bourgeoisie' discourse, reached and irritated reformists.
74. The pressure of kin to the posts was such that the ministries became inflated with excess of personnel and developed a trend to growth
with no improvements; Law no 7/79 fixed limits to the number of directions and departments each ministry could create trying to stop the
trend for expansion of apparatuses and the unlimited recruitment of non-skilled personnel for top jobs in the state (nit 5). The press also
protested against the filling of posts by incompetent people: "ever more we have witnessed a total inversion of values, where the good
medianic becomes a bad director of 'Manautos' (car maintenance/repair PEs), a good cook a bad hotel manager and the good shop assistant
a bad general manager ... The resort to the hand of the cousin, father-in-law, uncle or from the tribe to 'jump' affronts the most elementary
regulations ... it happens that in our production and our social consciousness is still distant the main factor of progress, work. As simple
people say: "Why to work so hard if work does not end?" (93 [10] Novembro, 1986, 50). See subsection 3.1.1.
75. Such as the imports PE (Importang); the latter, backed by the branch ministry, concentrated almost all (except weapons) the
management and actual operations of the imports component on the balance of trade. As a result, in 1978 the PE had substantial dells and,
simultaneously, a significant number of debtors, mainly trade PEs; see, e.g., subsection 4.4.1.
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at the time and implement the 'great dimension' as does the setting up of a planned
economy. So, these economic policy choices were in contradiction with the resources
available in public administration and actually in the country, especially skills and
information technologies.
Also, during this period it was understood that the restructuring of (bankrupt
and/or paralysed) nationalised firms called for 'super soft budget constraints', reflected in
state efforts to finance from the Budget the take-off of bankrupt firms. 76 This situation
was reinforced in the late 70s by a trend, both from ministries and managers of PEs and
intervened companies, to ignore the working of money relations within the state sector.
That is, partners in transactions were not willing to pay for the goods and/or services
supplied, a behaviour which led to financial chaos and widespread breach of contract.77
Also, many PEs and intervened companies had no proper accounts, making attempts at
their control quite difficult, while preventing appropriate management decisions and
reinforcing their actual bankruptcy.78
This state of affairs was not the work of 'leftists' aiming at the (eventual)
weakening of monetary relations within the public sector. It was a result of i. the
76.The budgetary constraints of the firm may be divided in: i. hard, if the enterprise "can only spend the money it has", covering expenses
either from incomes from sales or by resort to credit under "'orthodox' conditions", and, ii. soft, if the previous conditions are not applied,
for example. when the state a) either prevents the firm to go bankrupt (through instruments such as "subsidies, individual exemption from
payment of taxes or other charges ... allowance on the centrally fixed price of an input, open increase of the centrally fixed selling price or
toleration of a hidden price increase, credit granted in soft conditions, prolongation of due credit repayment, etc)" or b) facilitates the
growth of the firm by providing it access to soft loans or subsidies from the budget, and the future of the firm will not be "tied to its present
and future fmancial situation" (Kornai, 1986: 12-13; see also op.cit., 32-51, on hard and soft budget systems).
77. For example, mo no 18/79 (Transports) urged debtors of a transport PE to pay debts referring to a circular of the PLC forbidding PEs
to grant credit to clients (who did not reimburse it). Exec.Dec. no 4/79 (Internal Trade) stated that "all the public administration bodies,
enterprises and entities owing debts to the internal trade PEs, will not be supplied in goods or services if they do not pay their debts within
60 days" (art. 1); the situation of generalized indebtedness led to the choice of scapegoats: m.o. no 57/83 (Fisheries) established that
managers of PEs would be punished with discounts in their salaries (50% in the 1st month and all the salary in the 2nd month and until
complete payment of debts) if the PEs they managed were debtors (alt 1); the m.o. also ordered the unions to watch the directors and to
inform the minister's cabinet on the debts issue (art 2).
78. For example. Importang accumulated debts and debtors and in 1978 was granted by the central bank a loan without interest to pay
debts "since various conditions allied to the serious difficulties of the port of Luanda during this period (up to August 1977) prevented the
control of these imports" (preamble Joint m.o. no 81/78, Finance and Foreign Trade, and art 1); a scheme to control the deliveries of the
PE to clients (public, mixed or private) and their payment, was implemented (cii m.o., arts 5-10); Joint m.o. no 82/78 (Finance and
Foreign Trade), ordered Importang to invoice deliveries and provided for invoicing methods.
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difficulties to manage huge national enterprises, combined with shortage of managerial and
financial personnel, ii. the upwards mobility which followed independence, iii. agrarian
views on 'people's property, 79
 and, iv. 'alternative use' of the 'soft budget' scheme, in a
context of disorganisation, by plain embezzlers.8°
The financial behaviour of enterprises and public administration, together with the
compulsion to print money to pay for inputs of unprofitable PEs, motivated the entry of
functional boards, especially the ministries of Finance, Planning and Foreign Trade as well
as the central bank, into the sphere of a priori controls over PEs. 81 The needs related to
the implementation of the planning system legitimated the controls.
4.2.2. The planning system and the allocations of power over PEs
The functionalist period is characterised by: i. the invasion of all areas of
management of PEs by different and competing state bureaucracies, ii. paternalism
towards PEs, 2 iii. soft budget constraints, iv. the unsuccessful attempts to ensure a
distribution of progressively more scarce resources to PEs, other firms, and consumers, v.
reinforcement of the informal economy fed by its connections with the state, vi. strict
79. See sections 3.1. and 3.5.; for agrarians, budget constraints did not exist since the 'country was rich'; when pressed by fmancial
authorities to provide accounts, or when urged to pay supplies by creditors, agrarian managers (of PEs or local and central administration)
used to argue that it was not necessary since the 'owner was the same', that is, the state.
80. see , e.g. Birmingham, 1988: 5.
81. For example, Joint m.o. no 19/77 (2nd and 3rd Vice PMs) created a national and provincial commissions to certify the debts of
nationalised and intervened enterprises to the Budget (which had been providing urgent finding to pay inputs) and (some were debts
contracted by previous owners and not reimbursed); on the mid-80s 'financial cleansing', see subsection 4.4.1.
82. Kornai compared the relationship between the socialist state and the enterprise to the relationship between parent and child, and
considered this relationship as one of paternalism, while stating that "the degree of paternalism in the relation between state and micro-
organisation is an important characteristic of the nature of a system" (1986: 52-3); he distinguished 5 degrees of paternalism: i. 4th
(highest), grants in kind/ passive acceptance., ii. 3rd, grants in kind/wishes actively expressed (the usual status of firms in socialist
economies), iii. 2nd, financial allowance (for investment, after the reforms), iv. 1, self-supporting/assisted, and v. self-supporting/left to
itself the Friedman-Hayek ideal (op.cit. 54-6). Paternalism conditions the behaviour of managers who have contradictory attitudes towards
the authorities (see also Kornai, 1986: 57-8, on the behaviour of lower-level managers).
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control of labour and progressive loss of power of workers, and, vii. the progressive
involvement of foreign enterprise in PEs, through different forms of contracting. 83
As a consequence of the informal repeal of Title II of Law no 3/76, 84 nationalised
firms lost their organisational framework. In early 1977 the minister of Internal Trade
reorganised trading PEs designing a scheme which was the first attempt of specific PEs
organisation. 85 The measures anticipated different future practices: i. the framework
adopted in the 1977 PEs law, ii. the use of PEs managers as scapegoats of the economic
crisis or targets for purges of 'non-followers', and, iii. the reorganisation or dissolution of
PEs and the central administration when there was the intention to purge top officials.86
After some isolated attempts to create a framework for PEs, LPE/77 restored their
corporate personality, emphasising financial and administrative autonomy, while providing
for a standard organisation which put an end to the branches initiatives and differences.
The general framework for PEs was: i. the PE was not the owner but the 'operational
administrator' of state assets, ii. had the most diversified functions, sometimes conflicting,
83. See Chapters 5 and 7.
84. Decided by the 3rd Plenary of the MPLA CC: "To continue in the path of confiscations and nationalisations. However, Law no 3/76
should be reformulated, not only in the part on confiscations and nationalisations, to make it possible the regulation of all the situations
capable of application of the law, but also in the part related to the management of state enterprises, in order to substitute the present forms
of collective direction by the individual direction." (point 3, as published in JA, 1.11.1976). See section 3.3.
85. Dec. no 7 77, creating 34 national and provincial wholesale and retail PEs, apparently to substitute the whole previous (colonial) trade
network (see section 5.3.), (cildec., art. 1).
86. EmpA, wholesales, was created in 1975 (see note 50); later state retail firms were created to substitute abandoned shops and also the
majority of consumers co-operatives in neighbourhoods, enterprises and public administration (extinguished in 1976-77 as a result of cuts
in supply of imported goods). In 1977 the Nitist minister of Internal Trade decided that the managers of EMPA were corrupt and ordered
their arrest Managers were accused in the press since: "our people has often denounced and complained on the shortage of goods in
Luanda and in the provinces"; an inquiry was ordered and "showed that many quantities of food had not been marketed and some were
rotten ... (and) the directors did not care about embezzlement and smuggling of goods by low level personnel... (as) who is silent, is
agreeing to (sic)", they were also dishonest. Managers were also blamed because they seemed to dislike control and in a committee they
voted against a bill on control of food (origin, quantity, quality, destination and price) by the bran& minictry So, as "in trade what is
hidden from the public has bad intentions. Aims speculation, sabotage, corruption. it is thus fair to conclude that the directors of EMPA,
hating control and supervision, ocxxitted goods which became rotten in huge quantities, as well as embezzled products and money taken
from the people in need of food. ... The directors of EMPA have made queues bigger, since they opened few shops. Why? Because the
queues are mainly a revelation that the stores were not sufficient And, so, they have favoured counter-revolution bringing discredit to the
first PE, since it is sure that firms like this are the guarantee of a Motherland which has chosen socialism." After comparing EMPA
directors to Chile anti-Alleride forces, the branch minister accused the directors and some low-level personnel of economic sabotage (under
Law no 57/76, al. a, imprisonment from 2 up to 8 years) and complicity with embezzlers (tinder Law no 11/75, art. 18, see subsection
5.1.), (communique of the Ministry of Internal Trade, as published in JA, 10.3.1977). M.o. no 10t77 (Trade) dissolved EMPA and
appointed a liquidation committee.
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defined by the founders, iii. was created, organised, restructured and dissolved by an act of
the founder, iv. depended strictly on a state organ, according to the principle of direction
by branches, v. had an unitary form, that is was a single legal person, eventually having
'production units' with no personality, and the law prevented the forms trusts, state
holdings or PEs associations, vii. workers participation was restricted to two advisory
organs.87
The provisions of law in this area were undermined content by the regulation of
relations between PEs and branch and functional ministries, as well as by the practice of
state organs. Indeed, the glavki precedent of direct management of intervened companies
acted as a standard of behaviour and was present in the regulations on the wide a priori
control powers of the state.
A. Founders powers, mergers, monopolies and divisions
LPE/77 divided the powers to make decisions on PEs among: i. the CM, only for
national enterprises, ii. the ministers of the branch, Planning and Finance for regional, and,
iii. the branch minister for local (provincial or county) PEs. They had powers for the
creation, dissolution, reorganisation (merger and division) and liquidation of PEs. They
also adopted the articles of association, or made changes to them, and defined the capital.
The allocation of these powers was made according to the 'area of operations' of the
enterprise, but in fact the actual power on the matter lay with the branch minister, who had
the initiative in the process, that is, who decided ex-ante whether a PE would be national,
regional or local and whether resort to other powers was necessary.88
87.Law no 17/77, on Public Enterprise (LPE/77). The law followed the Soviet "Regulations on the Productive Socialist Enterprise" (Dec.
no 731, CM, 1965); atthougb the Soviet law only ruled industrial PEs, LPE/77 ruled all kinds of PE,s, except those depending on the
Ministry of Defense and those "having as operator one or various foreign companies" (art 651d). On PEs under LPE/77, see Coelho, 1984.
88.LPE/77, arts 7 and 6, respectively. The powers related to the extinction or reorganisation of the PE were dependent on the allocation of
powers for creation, established by levels at art 6; arts 57-59 (extinction); arts 53-56 (reorganisation); arts 57-59 (liquidation). The
defmition of the 'area of operations' for a PE meant that it could not exercise its activities outside the area(s) defined in the articles of
association; however, the law established criteria for the defmitica of the area (alt 5/2).
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The economic public administration had thus 'freedom of enterprise' (that is, to 'put
in motion and run productive processes'), guaranteed by CL to individuals and private
firms. PEs were just 'operational administrators' of assets, having no possibility to make
decisions related to their expansion and/or association to other enterprises, independent of
the state bureaucracies. The exercise of owner's powers by public administration boards,
led to an almost complete instability of PEs themselves, and their workers, who, without
having been asked, followed the assets in their shifts on the frequent restructurings. The
latter were organisational responses to the shortages and the extreme difficulties to
achieve the take-off of the economy in the independence and prolonged war conditions.
Under the restructuring of LPE/77, nationalised industries were divided in sets of
new PEs and in some cases previous public boards were extinguished. 89 The new PEs
resulted from mergers of nationalised companies but the degree of concentration was not
as intense as during the NRCs or GPUs schemes. The PEs created under LPE/77 were
producers of a given good or service, with no diversification, but there were as well
marketing PEs aiming at supply inputs or services for the related branch. 9° The statutes of
many PEs show a general trend to horizontal integration, 91
 with some cases of vertical
integration. 92
89. E.g.. m.o. no 69-A'78 (Finance) extinguished the Insurance Coordinating Committee (which had restructured the brands) and
integrated its personnel in the new insurance PE, ENSA.
90. E.g.. Enatip. for the "supply of economic units of the brands (Fisheries) on materials, equipment, spares, and products necessary for
their efficient functioning" (preamble Dec. no 99/77, creating the PE). In some cases a conunittee or 'logistics departments' preceded the
creation of PEs for procurement of a branch (e.g., m.o. no 79/76), espec. the purdsase (usually abroad) of inputs and distribution among
enterprises, sometimes after clashes with foreign trade PEs. On inputs see also subsection 4.3.1.
91. For example: Dec. no 53/77, created a national sugar PE (ENA) merging 4 nationalised companies (art. 2); Dec. no 92/83, merged 5
plastic companies into a new PE, Enepa; Dec. no 280/80, merged 6 textile manufactures into a new PE, Entex, divided in 5 production
units; TAAG (airlines), nationalised company, was merged with another nationalised airlines company (CTA), (m.o. 1/79, Transports and
Communications), in 1980 the PE was formally created, incorporating as well a nationalised catering company (Dec. no 15/80). In
agriculture concentration was more intensive; for example, the Joint m.o. no 30/81 (Planning. Finance and Agriculture) created 26 new
PEs, resulting from the merger of fanns and plantations, on which the highest number is 52 firms merged (Kilenda I, art. 3/zz). Alter the
creation of the most important PEs in the late 70s, in the early 80s, nationalised firms were integrated into them; e.g.: m.o. 18.3.82
(Energy) incorporated an hydroelectric company (Hidroefectrica do Alto Catannbela) into the national electric power PE, ENE. The trend
for horizontal concentration lasted during all the period studied.
92. For example Sonangol, created ex novo aimed at In exercise all activities connected to the branch of oil and other hydrocarbons 
especially, exploration, production, transport, refining. storage, distribution and transformation of these substances, their derivatives and
residuals and also their connected equipment, the petrochemical industries and those connected and the marketing of all the substances
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As monopolies were seen as an expression of socialism and also legitimated the
exercise of economic power by state bureaucracies, some PEs were granted a monopoly
de jure. 93 The low development of the country and/or the movement of concentration of
nationalised firms led to the emergence of monopolies de facto as well. Although not
being capable of setting monopoly prices due to the prices control some PES, usually
backed by the branch ministry, in many cases showed patterns of monopolistic behaviour,
such as contempt for consumers and/or commercial partners. 94
 This behaviour as been
described by Kornai for Hungary in the mid-80s and worked as such in the Angolan
shortages economy:
(in a central command economy, given the chronic shortage), "the buyer
and the seller are not equally strong. We say that a sellers' market is
created. The sellers rule and the buyers are forced to submit. ... the
inequality of their positions strongly marks the attitude of both ... In a
shortages economy the buyer feels himself defenceless and subordinated,
while the seller develops a consciousness of power and dominance. ... The
buyer, ... (any economic agent, including household) tries to be friendly to
the seller, he makes an effort to win the latter's favours, so that he may be
served instead of a competing buyer. This can take many different forms,
for example by reciprocating services, or even through bribery. The buyer
tries to please the seller not only by what he gives him, but also by what is
not demanded. He is humble and submissive, so as not to annoy the seller
by expressing dissatisfaction, let alone by expressing any complaint. ... (for
example) in the relationship between a firm ordering the construction of a
factory and the firm that contracts the work. If the investor is too
demanding, the building contractor can retaliate in various way: next time
he will not accept the assignment or will put it further down in the list, etc.
... (Consumers in a shortages economy feel) a kind of permanent stress ... a
loss." (1986: 62-4).
The monopolies of some PEs had serious consequences for the supply of inputs to
the economy. 95 Foreign trade is an example. 96 The branch PEs when attempting to carry
referred to above." (Dec. no 52/76, art. 211/a); as the xtatP concessionaire for hydrocarbons (in association with TNCs, sae section 7.2.), the
NOC got the assets of previous fuels distribution companies (m.o. no 51/77, Irtdustry, stated that only Sonemgol might ad as "metier or
distributor of fuels", no 1/b) and evolved to a completely vertically integrated PE, involved from oil mploration to distribution of fuels and,
also, supply of services for the oil industry.
93. See note 44 (on ENSA, insurance) and 92 (on Sonangol distribution of fuels); the formal grant of monopolies to PEs was in some
cases, related to the absolute reserves.
94. See sections 5.2. and 5.3.
95. Industry, for example, had serious bottle-necks due to the inefficiency of the scheme implemented, especially in the supply of imported
inputs, givat the organisational framework implemented which aimed to protect monopolies granted to foreign trade PF,s: e.g, m.o. no
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out all the import operations of the country, from food to machinery, intermediates, raw-
materials and technology, were often incapable of achieving the purchases or the resale to
domestic customers. PEs dealing with external operations, and related ministries, may
appear as the nest of present comprador strata within the state bureaucracies. Sheltered in
monopolies, their behaviour contributed to reinforce the country's dependence. 97 Also,
some PEs, instead of satisfying needs, were actually watching potential competitors,
including PEs, which they even prevented from supplying goods or services covered by
their monopolies.98
A few years after the mergers, there was a trend to divide up the huge national
PEs, which had serious problems of management and accounting. The process started with
78 76 (Planning) created a Permanent Commission of Coordination of Supply to Indus try, on grounds that imports had neither been done
in time, nor on the desirable quantities and frequency. See subsection 4.3.1.
96. The monopoly was granted to the ministry which intended to execute all the operations of foreign trade for the public sector in a
country where actually some private firms where importers or exporters, maxime the oil TNCs, officials of the Ministry of Foreign Trade
argued that the PEs of other brandies could not make operations, a monopoly of foreign trade PEs; later, after their lacic of success in
implementing the operations some PEs were allowed to import and export (e.g., in transport, Sonangol, etc); the foreign trade PEs
specialised then in some areas, e.g., imports of consumer goods, some machinery and licenses of marks. The Ministry of Foreign Trade also
tried a monopoly of exports, an area in which it had conflicts with the branch ministries, solved by share of powers (e.g., Joint m.o.
12.5.1980, Foreign Trade and Agriculture, on exports of coffee, Joint m.o. 17.10.1980, Foreign Trade and Fisheries, on contractual
relations between producers of fish meal and the exports PE, Joint Exec.Dec. no 74/83. Foreign Trade and Construction, on exports of
cement). These conflicts for monopoly had a strong economic base: in 1982 Importang, the imports PE, handled USD 255 Mn of imports,
83°0 food (declarations of the diredor of the PE quoted in AED 25.2.1983). See Table 2.
97. E.g.. m.o. no 35/76 (Planning and Transports) stated that commodities imported and not withdrawn from the ports or reclaimed by
importers (public and private) would revert to the state if owners or their agents did not withdraw them from the parts (art. 2); this situation
was partially due to difficulties of transport and to the fad that many importers (including private and foreign) were only interested in the
grant of the licence to buy abroad and be paid the sellers commission, or having an opportunity for over-invoicing hard aurency payments,
and not in the sale of imported goods in the country. Novembro frequently protested against mismanagement and 'fast purchase; for
example: i. buying planes (USD 18 Mn aid° without caring for proper repair and maintenance of airports (USD about 15 Mn), meaning
that the rate of utilisation of these planes (in internal lines) was 50% what it could be with repaired airports (74 [8], Novembro, 1984, 66),
ii. buying computers with no possibility of buying a vacuum cleaner against dust or buying electronic equipment of communications for the
news agency, Angop, whith had no typewriters (70 [7], Novembro, 1983, 66); iii. "in the 70s we had the easy imports of new machinery,
increasing daily the stodc of means demanding, soon or later, maintenance means. In the last years, with the decrease in the import
capacity, we became a little more aware of the needs in spares and other (materials) since only in the stock of moving machines and
vehicles the % of those broken was higher than those usable. However, we are already in 1984 and it is still more difficult to import a spare
than a complete madiine. ... Spending one's time buying 'new' because one does not repair the 'used' is an example of mismanagement also
consuming resources which could be allocated to increase the capacities of production. ... we are sinking a little bit more into one of the
vicious circles of underdevelopment ... to spend more than the necessary to produce less than the reasonable" (73 [8], Novernbro, 1984,
66).
98. For example, in the early Ws, Diamang. the diamonds mixed enterprise, bought a plane to transport materials and personnel to the
mining region of Lunda Norte; on grounds of its monopoly, TAAG, the airlines PE, got an order from the Ministry of Planning to force
Diamang to sell its plane, which was made against a contract on which TAAG assumed the obligation of ensuring regular transport to
binds Norte; as TAAG could not fulfil its obligations, the transport was later made by a foreign company (see subsedion 7.2.2.).
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the division of some PEs in provincial enterprises." Later there was also division by
product, 100
 and in some cases the reorganisation meant a division by geographical area
with product concentration.m
The principle of 'direction by branches' led to competition and struggles in
interbranch relations. 102
 Within the 'reorganisation powers of the founder', some ?Es
changed from one ministry to another, as a result of political bargaining reflecting the
balance of power between the different socio-political groups holding ministries, and in a
situation similar to the contingencies of takeovers through the stock exchange: workers
and some managers had no say in the matter.103
B. Branch and functional controls
Art. 44 of LPE/77 allocated a priori and a posteriori control powers over PEs to
three ministries: i. the branch, ii. Planning and, iii. Finance. 104 These powers were wide,
but conflicts within the state between the different components of the ruling coalition, led
to a 'control paranoia' which reached its peak in the late 80s. Progressively, and under the
rationale of the implementation of a central command economy, a significant number of
99 . E.g. the national PE for forestries was divided into 5 provincial PEs (m.o. 100/85, Agriculture). From 1981 LLG (see subsection
3.4.3.) provided for the control of small-sized PEs by the provincial authorities.
10
°. For example, the huge PE initially aiming control the marketing of different food products (Dinaprope. Dec. no 100/78) later
specialized in meat and by-products (Dec. no 19 84) and the part on vegetables was allocated to a new PE (Frescangol, Joint Exec.Dec. no
69 86, Planning Finance and Agriculture).
101. For example, provincial PEs for services to agriculture (Agriser) resulted from territorial division of the inputs PEs Dinama
(Enterprise of Material Supply), Emma (Enterprise of Agricultural Mechanization), and the supplier of seeds (Ango-Sementes), and
merger of provincial units for different inputs (e.g., m.o. no 64/86, Agriculture, creating Agriser Zaire, art. 3).
102. For 
example, the light and food industries were dependent on agriculture inputs. For years the Ministry of Inrhudry fought to be
allowed to manage plantation PEs aiming the supply of industry. Still, although agriculture PEs did not supply the inputs, nobody else was
allowed to try to achieve the task. Later part of these industries were integrated into the Ministry of Agriculture (e.g, the Joint m.os
10.9.1980, Industry and Agriculture, transferring to the latter four food industries).
103.E.g. from Internal Trade to other ministries, e.g.: the PE Angodiplo (supplies to diplomats) to the hfmistry of Foreign Trade (Joint
m.o. no 61 84, Foreign Trade and Internal Trade) and Internal Trade got, e.g.: the vegetables PE Encodipa from Agriculture (Dec. no
15 82). Local govenunent lost the control of small electricity local units to the Ministry of Energy (at the time Industry and Energy, m.o.
no 48 77, PM) but later, under LW, began to control local enterprises directly (e.g., accounting PE Huilaconta, moved from Ind ustry to
the Huila Provincial Commissariat, Exec.Dec. no 20/88, Inductry).
104.LPE 77, arts 45, 46, 13 and 47, respectively. See Table 2.
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state bureaucracies were enabled to interfere in some area of PEs management. These
developments meant increased difficulties for managers, who lost decision-making powers
while, simultaneously, becoming accountable to a large range of controllers.
The branch minister appointed (and dismissed) directors of PEs. 105 Under the
individual direction, the collective decision-making organs lost their powers, concentrated
in the director, who was dependent on the minister. m6 The scheme reinforced the powers
of ministries over PEs, the dependence of PEs on political struggles within the state and
the party, and, also, the clientelism of managers who often had to act as proxies of
ministers, who, on the other hand, appointed by the PR after approval by the party, were
strongly dependent on the latter. PEs with bargaining power, and aware of the
consequences, including uncertainty, of the appointments regime, tried to get their
directors elected by the CM. Only Sonangol, the oil PE, succeeded, given its substantial
bargaining power.107
The pattern established in LPE/77 and 'functional legislation' meant allocation of
powers over the enterprise to different bureaucracies which invaded all the management
areas. Table 2 illustrates the situation in early 1987, relating decisions to state organs
entitled to interfere on them, referring the legal source of power allocation and the
instruments used by the state in decision-making. The footnotes at Table 2 summarise the
legal regimes explaining the scheme in a more detailed way.
Many ministerial orders illustrate the exercise of these concrete powers by the
branch. Given the state of disorganisation of some PEs, and even eventual reluctance of
105.LPE 77, arts 36/1 and 3612. Under Law no 3/76 the government delegate in PEs was appointed by the CM, aiming to avoid his/her
subordination to the branch minister.
106.LpE 77, art. 37.
107.Decs no 977 and Dec. no 26/80 establish ed that Sonangol was managed by a gateral-director and deputy directors, appointed by the
0,4 (art. I).
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managers to adopt organisational so lutions not pleasing them, 108
 published orders have a
great detail, for example: i. demanding the PE to perform some (non-statutory)
activities, 109
 ii. changing their names, no
 iii. creating PEs agencies in some areas of the
country, Ill
 iv. transferring workers from the enterprise to other entities, n2 v. withdrawing
financial participation in mixed enterprises managed by the PE," 3 or vi. changing the PE
objects clause."4
Legislation also established machinery for a posteriori controls. These regulations
contain claims for provision of information, demanded by different and competing
entities. 115
 As a result of the regime of control of PEs established, the managers of PEs
instead of making decisions, actually made elsewhere, became essentially producers of
information required by the controllers, and negotiators with the different holders of a
priori control powers. The contradictory position led many managers either to associate
with foreign firms or to initiate demands for larger autonomy, which culminated with the
economic reform.116
108.For example, m.o. no 10678 (Internal Trade) ordered PEs of the branch to have meetings of the council of direction (see subsection
3.4.4.), (alt. 1) which, albeit advisory, seemed not please autocratic managers; the m.o. also stated the agenda for some meetings (art. 2)
and ordered PEs to supply minutes of meetings (art. 3); also m.o. no 87/79 (Fisheries), ordered PEs to insure their assets, including
vehicles, and for work accidents (art. 1). Still non published instructions contained a substantial detail, for example in the area of
'requisitions', see section 5.3.
109.E.g. m.o. no 53 78 (Construction), providing that a PE, ENAS (for water) ensured the operation and maintenance of residual water
devices. something that, according to the preamble, had not been established in articles of association (Dec. no 64/78).
11 °. Exec.Dec. no 5 79 (Internal Trade), changing the names of gross and retail PEs since the previous were "considered very complex and
causing ambiguities" (preamble).
111. E.g.. Exec.Dec. no 11/79 (Internal Trade), creating an agent of Edinba (trading of industrial consumer goods) in the northern
provinces,
112. E.g.. m.o. 2.8.79 (Health), ordering the heath personnel of Diamang. a mixed enterprise under the supervision of Industry, to
integrate the NHS.
113.E.g.. m.o. no 40 89 (Industry). repealing m.o. no 60'87 (Inchictry) on the transfer of state financial participations in WA to the PE
pa-Panga (art I). On fmancial participations and their allocation to PEs, see section 7.1.
114, E.g.. Exec.Dec. no 30/80 (Industry), adding new functions to the PE Recor.
115.See section 7.3_ (information).
116.See Chapter 7 and section 8.1.
182
Planning system
4.3. Pitfalls of the planning system: resource-constraints and information
dependence
Kornai dealt with the problem of shortages in socialist economies approaching
them as a characteristic of these systems (1986: 6-31). 117 Looking at the limits to increase
production, he defined socialist economies as 'resource-constrained' contrary to what
happens in 'demand-constrained' capitalist economies. 118 Indeed, the socialist economy
assumes as an ordinating principle the 'permanently improved satisfaction of increasing
needs', which means that demand will be ever expanding, whilst changing its structure.
Although the shortages economy in Angola was the consequence of the low
degree of development of the country, the allocation of resources to defence and the war
itself, many aspects referred to by Kornai appeared as an outcome of the socialist option.
Firsly, the there were shortages of all kinds of inputs, from materials, semi-finished
products, parts, spares, equipment, construction, technology (these items dependent on
resources in foreign exchange), plus electricity and water arising from war destruction and
sabotage, transport and roads to market products and, finally, labour. Secondly, manager
had to resort to forced substitution, n9 for example the resort to technical assistance
117."We keep encountering shortage phenomena not only as consumers but also as produces. Hindrances are not rare in the supply of
materials, semi-finished products and parts. Shortage of construction and installation capacity is conspicuous in investment processes. In
addition to all this, labour shortage increasingly retards the expansion of production ... The 'reproduction' of the title refers to the fad. that
we are not faced with temporary, provisional, occasional events but with a complex of phenomena that constantly reproduces itself under
specific circumstances. it is not just a case of 'shortage-breeding-shortage' although such self-movement and self-generation can also
feature. Shortage is continually reborn out of social conditions and certain characteristics of the economic mechanism. ... Shortage is the
collection of millions of submicro level elementary shortage events: i. somewhere, some product or service is not available, when the buyer
firm, non-profit institution or household wants to buy exactly that product or that service exactly at that place; ii. some input is not
available at the workshop ... when the firm would need exactly that input for its activities, iii. the firm, non-profit institution or the
household effectuates improvised forced adaptation in order to mitigate the consequences of ternporary shortage. This may happen either in
the course ofthe purchasing act, or in the course of utilisation." (Komai, 1986: 6-7 and 11).
118."Resource constraints (refer to): the use of real inputs by produdion activities cannot exceed the volume of available resources. Those
are constraints of a physical or technical nature: the stock of labour of different qualifications available momentarily for production, the
quantity of materials, semi-finished products and parts in stodc, the capacity of machines and equipment ready for operations in factories,
the usable space in factory premises ... A socialist economy is, in its classical form, a resource-constrained economy.... it should be noted
that if an economy is qualified as a resource-constrained system, this does not mean that in such an economy all resources are utilised at
100% at every moment" (Kornai, 1986: 8 and 10). On capitalism as a "demand-constrained' system, see op.cit. 9-10.
119. Economic units of any type, including firms and households, adjust to shortage by "forced substitution and forced spending
permanently absorb the purchasing power that its holder cannot spend in accordance with his original purchasing intention" (Komai, 1986:
11).
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contracts (TACs) by PEs. Thirdly, there was a 'quantitative drive' meaning increased
demand for inputs due central orders to increase production and to soft budget constraints
(Kornai, 1986: 22), motivated in Angola also by the need to substitute the
obsolete/destroyed 'inherited' equipment and to ensure stocks under uncertainty of
procurement. The 'quantitative drive' reinforced shortage of hard currency. Fourthly, there
was the 'expansion drive' and related 'investment hunger'. 120 Lastly, soft budget constraints
were reinforced by the non-compliant behaviour of firms in the area of payments. These
factors combined with a constant reinforcement of the 'great dimension' and allocation of
decision-making to central state bureaucracies, 121 as well as paternalism reinforced by
information constraint S.122
4.3.1. Resource constraints
In the resource-constrained Angolan economy the mechanism of 'shortage-
breeding-shortage' played a crucial role and conditioned the availability of inputs as the
main constraint to the performance of PEs. Taking industrial PEs as an example, the
collapse of agricultural production had a serious impact in the food and light industries
while the shortage of food undermined the availability of incentives industrial PEs could
use to attract labour and thus led them to face its shortage.123
120. "If economic policy wishes to extend production at a forced rate, it will usually determine ambitious investment targets with input
requirements vvhich exceed the available supply of investment goods. Investment actions keep hitting the physical resource constraints of
investment ... the expansion drive does not need to be forced by cartral instructions ... There is an inner force which promotes expansion
drive. Every firm without exception wants to grow, and their 'representative', the superior authorities, also with their sector to grow.
Investment hunger is general, and rises again and again.... the most important (motive for inner expansion drive) is identification with the
firm or, in case of a superior organ, with the sector under its control" (Kornai, 1986: 23). See, e.g, the mechanisation of agriculture as a
case of investment hunger (see subsection 6.1.1.).
121. The working of administrative planning demonstrated the reinforcement of centralised decision-making under the argument of
complexity and knowledge involved in processes of allocation of resources while central bureaucracies did not actually cope with complex
problems (see Table 2) and apprcpriated 'micro' decision-making powers of lower units which did not demand these levels (since not
'aggregate') of centralisation.
122. Since managers and workers had no access to relevant information, they were not able to make decisions, or they made decisions
considered incorrect by the holders of information, even when related powers were allocated to them; this meant that the degree of
paternalism in the relationship between enterprises and the state authorities (see note 82) was higher than in fact could be deduced from the
legal framework, for example, in the draft of enterprises plans.
123.See sections 5.1., 5.2., and Chapter 6 (collapse of agriculture).
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The shortages of inputs were reinforced by the import policies: planning
authorities, faced with pressing needs in (productive or not) consumption goods, preferred
to use scarce hard currency resources to import finished goods instead of inputs for the
national industry, 124
 and buyers and users also preferred to import new instead of repairing
the old, notwithstanding protests. 125
 Under the shortages economy, PEs got a reputation
of inefficiency and underperforrnance while often they were not responsible. The plan
indicators fixed under quantity drive and shortage of adequate information also
contributed to the poor reputation of PEs.126
An example of the problems referred to above is the manufacturing industry and
the plan in 1981. In that year the relative weight (output index) of the three branches of
industry was: i. food, 30%; ii. light, 53%, and iii. heavy, 17%. In manufacturing industry
the planned output by sector was: i. PEs,_about 64% (as contrasted with 58% in 1980), ii.
mixed enterprises 11% (as contrasted with 12% in 1980) and, iii. private firms, 25% (as
contrasted with 30% in 1980). The planned labour for the three sectors was: 75% in the
public sector, 8% in mixed enterprises and 17% in private firms (which, as compared with
the planned output, means a higher productivity of the mixed and private sectors). Labour
was divided in: i. food industry, 39%, light industry 40% and heavy industry, 21%.
Industrial firms concentrated in Luanda/Bengo, Huambo and Benguela which accounted
for 92% of the national manufacturing industry (Kabulu, 1982: 28).
124.FFor example, "in 1984 Irnportang imported for Internal Trade about 20,5 Mn litres of bottled wine which cost about USD 10 Mn. In
1980-84, our wine factory, Vininorte (a PE), was paralysed for about one year and a half due to shortage of wine to bottle. With the money
the country spent in the purchase of mark wine, Vininorte could re-equip its plant with USD 2 Mn, keeping the other 8 Mn to buy and
bottle wine: it would so bottle 60 Mn litres, three times the imported bottled wine" (3 [I] Comercio Extern°, 1987, 27).
125. 79 [9] Novembro, 1984, 16. "We have to fight this resignation, (inferiority) complexes, shyness, the gratuitous and alienated
acceptance that everything which comes from abroad is good. And if we loose one battle we need to have the inner certainty that we will
win the war. When we do import Coca-Cola and we leave our factories paralysed (by shortage of imported inputs), when we import
furniture with suds wood we have in Mayombe, vvhen we buy cars to clean the streets having so muds labour tmderanployed, when we
buy factories without taking into account raw-materials, when we damage the producer to facilitate (the work of) the middleman, we make
our enemies huger. ... This is a problem of principles and cultural identity we must defend_ And should not be misunderstood as an anti-
Coke position." (Ocirema, JA, 15.3.1988).
126.See subsection 4.3.2.
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Industrial firms did not attain the 1981 plan targets and they had to be changed.127
The causes for non-performance were listed by the branch as: i. shortages of inputs arising
from the paralysation in import licensing, 128 ii. constant cuts of water and energy, iii. war
and bottle-necks in the energy and transport networks, iv. poor social conditions of
workers, v. absenteeism, which had a rate of about 15-20% in the manufacturing industry,
given difficulties in the supply of food, and, vi. organisational problems of enterprises with
discontinued functioning of production (Kabulu, 1982: 30).
Fisheries had a similar picture in the same period: i. the national fleet only reached
58% of the plan target, 129 because "many ships are stopped due to lack of capacity of
shipyards to ensure maintenance and repair ... to insufficient technical-material (inputs)
supply, shortage of food and high degree of absenteeism", ii. the fish manufacturing
industry had fulfilled 72% of the plan target, due to "irregularity in the supply of raw-
materials, and, in the case of canned fish, (only 60% the target reaching only 50% of
national needs) due to these factors and also the shortage of package, and, iii. the plan of
distribution of frozen and fresh fish only reached 71% the target due to the low level of
2 Product 1 2
127. 1981 , 1st semester:
Product
cloth 80 76 matches 75 76
shirts 65 64 tobacco 87 92
skirts 69 66 soap 32 32
trousers 46 56 wood tile 23 18
shoes 68 68 paints 80 81
cloth shoes 51 62 packaging 33 46
plastic shoes 23 19 plastic bags 66 80
blankets 32 33 plasibottles 30 57
1 .	°0 fulfilment plan target; 2. revised plan as % of initial target; Source: Kabulu, 1982: 36.
128.From April to October 1980, "which had as a by-product a cyclic bottle-neck of ports and the temporary paralysation of enterprises"
(op. cit., 30).
129.With 73.7°0 to the state sector, 24.2°0 to the private sector and 2.1% to co-operatives (Guerra, former minister of Fisheries, 52 [6]
Novembro, 1982, 18).
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catch by the national fleet, delays in contractual deliveries by the foreign fleets, shortage of
transport and war.130
But later the picture worsened. As industry became progressively more dependent
on imports of all kinds of inputs, 131 the 80s crisis on oil prices reinforced shortages: from
1985 the imports/foreign exchange budget of industry was six times lower than in the
period which preceded the crisis. 132
 The planning system also contributed to the
difficulties of industrial PEs, increasing the average time of execution of each import, due,
among other things, to the "inertia in the grant of import licences", reinforced by the poor
functioning of the national shipping lines and response from ports services, and by
problems in access to credit lines in the country of origin. 133
Later, non-performance of PEs was a justification for privatisation, while the state
committed itself to build up the infrastructures necessary to a good performance of private
and foreign enterprise. As to the background of strategies of development, "to reach the
(colonial) 1973 levels of production", and related policy measures, notwithstanding
isolated voices, 134
 they were not questioned when the central command economy
130.Guerra. loc.cit., 18-19.
131."The majority of the managers of our enterprises ... is always fighting against all kinds of shortages which either effect the daily work
or put the equipment in a more or less extended way at risk ... All these ridiculous examples (of shortages of imported inputs) derminstrate
the incoherence in the supply of the market, whidi causes that an enterprise only had guaranteed through the imports plafond its specific
equipment, but the most elementary complementary goods are never guaranteed (by the import authorities). This state of affairs, lasting for
years, generates a sequence of 'sdiemes' (informal supply arrangements, either by firms or by consumers) between national and foreign
flans ... And (foreign trade authorities) please do not forget the supply of the market in office materials whose cost is certainly smaller ...
than the agricultural machines whith stay in the port at the rain and sun." (70 [71, Novembro, 1983, 66).
132.Onambwe, former minister of Industry (JA, 26.1.1989); as a result there was in 1988 a choir of complaints of PEs on shortage of
inputs, e.g.: i. AAA, edible oil, was 1.5 year paralysed by shortage of raw-materials and needed to secure 20 times more the quantities of
raw-materials it acquired in 1987 to guarantee a profitable exploration (JA, 23.2.1988), ii. under the workers production contest in a cloth
and furniture factories in Benguela the targets were not readied because there were no raw-materials (JA, 15.3.1988), iii. the PE for school
equipment, Lumel, produced at 50% capacity due to shortage of wood (JA, 26.1.1988), iv. in 1987, the inputs supply plan of PE ENE
(electricity) just readied 7% of needed imports (JA, 23.3.1988).
133.Onambwe, loc.cit.; according to him, in 1988 (already under the economic reform) all the industrial branch has been operating below
the installed capacities and there was a strong decrease on investment; the territorial dispersion of industries, their dependence on external
supplies for subsidiary and raw-materials, spares and parts, the problem of the imports bureaucratic process, difficulties of transport and
withdrawal of commodities from customs were 'permanent worries for managers" (JA, 26.1.89); see, e.g, Kornai, 1986: 64, on similar
statements. See also section 8.1.
134. Novembro argued: "a simple but significant example are the materials for the manufacture of furniture for our offices, whether
national or imported. Usually everything has synthetic (materials) from metals to cloth, which are a logic consequence of the development
of industrialised countries - metallurgy and petrochemicals - but never of the development of a country as ours. ... If our towns had been
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collapsed in the late 80s and even justified adhesion to IMF and the restructuring
according to given patterns.i35
4.3.2. Information
"Information is the essential ingredient of choice" (MacKaay, 1982: 107), that is,
an input for any decision-making process. 136
 The wider availability and quality of
information, the wider the 'selection power' information represents, in any area of
decisions. 137 The information environment, especially the conditions on which information
is produced and acquired, may reinforce dependence of UDCs by imposing say,
inadequate institutional frameworks conflicting with national interests, 138 use of
technologies whose implementation implies increased resort to imported goods, 139 and the
creation of new forms of dependence.' 4 From the perspective of national development
built according to the natural reality - abundant space and weak tedmical mastering - they would have been conceptualised in the
horizontal, with simple and adapted to the climate buildings. But never at the image of Europe with large population concentrations. ... Our
office (or our home) is now ... in such a way that nothing (since the walls to the interiors materials) has a national origin. ... Although the
'mimicking alienation' - imitation of concepts and/or parameters of her realities (usually industrialised countries), different and distant
from the national context - does not allow the majority (of people) to realise (that), we are surrounded by objects and solutions which do
not represent the natural evolution of our national wealth" (88 [10] Novembro. 1984, 16).
135.See Chapter 8.
136. Thus the availability of information is a necessary condition for the achievement of democracy, economic or political. In political
terms, 'glasnost' and or some freedoms (of information, of press, etc) or some areas of legislation suds as consumer protection or
advertising, reflect demands from the citizenry on increased 'selection power'. Concerning the state, and economic law, in planning the
control and flows of information are crucial for the direction of economic processes and related allocation decisions. In the assessment of
the relationship between representatives and represented, owners and managers, principals and agents, information plays a crucial role as
well, which is somewhat veiled by the emphasis of control powers by those entitled to than: the exercise of control powers presupposes
adequate information, a need reflected in law under the obligations of information. For a definition of data, information and knowledge,
see, e.g. MacKaay, 1982: 108-109.
137. Information as a selection power is approached by Cherry, quoted in MacKaay, 1982: 117. See also, e.g., Williamson, 1983 (on
opportunism in transactions) and 1981, on idiosyncratic transactions, and its impact in the choices of institutional arrangements by the
parties involved in transaction; Breton, 1974, on informational constraints in the measurement of the output of bureaucracies and thus their
control and Ruffolo, 1979, on the problems of democracy raised by the planning system and the control of information.
138.For example, the quantity of obligations of information by the lower levels of the Angolan planning system was totally inadequate to
an UDC capacity, although, eventually they could be adequate to countries with substantial expertise, the institutional framework set up by
laws and regulations forced enterprises to allocate their few everts to the work to fulfil their obligations towards planning boards; the
latter, incapable of processing the information supplied, had to resort to outside expertise to store and process accumulated information,
something which meant the convesse flow of data towards developed countries (an issue dealt with by, e.g., Helleiner and O'Brien, 1983:
15) and increased power of foreign advisers and their employers.
139.Lack of information on all the consequences of use of a tedmology frequently means that the introduction of this technology in, say,
industry, will mean additional expenses ofthe country in imports of raw-materials, intermediates and/or expertise, besides equipment, while
use of proper information could permit the resort to other teclmologies without these effects.
144)
	 example, the so-called 'aid to development', implying the further purchase of spares, intermediates and tedhnology supplied by the
donors of initial equipment, a sdieme which could be avoided if there were sufficient information on the consequences of this kind of
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and more fair international contracting, the imperfections of the information environment
are reinforced in UDCs by factors such as: i. investments in the creation and/or
dissemination of knowledge are discouraged due to resource constraints, 191
 the
obscurantist policies of some governments, or even to plain repression by dictatorships,
when access to information is arranged, the first factor leads to situations where there is
no capacity to use information and where it exists the balance of power in the country may
prevent this use, iii. systematic resort to outside expertise, besides the eventual
reinforcement of dependence and risks of manipulation, may prevent, or make it difficult,
the dissemination of information since the frame of references may not be adequate to the
prospective users.
The importance given here to the problems of information is motivated by the
extreme dependence of Angola in information produced abroad and the impact of this
dependence in the performance of economic law. 142 Also, as this work analyses, as a part
of Angolan economic law, the planning system, a reference to the information problems is
essential. Information is an essential element of planning and the planning system is, as
INCs, 'information dependent'. 143 The success or failure of planning is strongly affected
by the availability and quality of information. However, as referred to above, the
institutional framework for rights and freedoms did not encourage the local production of
information and knowledge. 144 In the working of the economy, information constraints
projects and existing alternatives; experts sent to UDCs often contribute to this state of affairs by transmitting information on what they
know (for example, market opportunities from their countries of origin) while omitting what they do not know (other available
alternatives).
141. including externalities from, say, the IMFYVVB package compelling to decreases in public expenditure in the area of education and
research and development
142. If we look at economic law from an information stand-point, it is one of the branches of legislation more concerned with the issue,
either providing obligations of information of all kinds to feed the needs of regulators and planners, to prevent distortions of competition or
to protect consumers, minority shareholders and workers, regulating flows of information to implenent given control systems within the
public sector.
143.On TNC's dependence on information, see Helleiner and O'Brien, 1983:4.
144.See subsection 3.4.5.
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prevented 'power over events', allowed the shifts of decision-making from enterprises to
bureaucracies and added uncertainty to a situation of already very incomplete information.
As uncertainty is costly, this meant responses from economic agents which may not be in
the interest of the country, say, integration into foreign firms.
The legal regimes described at the notes of Table 2 illustrate the information needs
of the Angolan planning system, the complexity of the productive process involved and the
overlapping of obligations of information from enterprises to competing bureaucracies to
feed the needs of all kinds of planners and regulators. Still, the latter seemed not capable
of using the information gathered (but not processed) in the definition of policy goals,
many suffering from 'error in goals', as the very organisation of the planning system
demonstrates. Also, in the choice of plan targets, the indicators fixed to the branches were
usually decided with quantity and expansion drives, inadequate to the actual state of the
economy and the war prevailing in the country. Adding to other aspects related to
bureaucratic power, the persistence of state bureaucracies to commit themselves to 'micro'
decisions on the management of PEs may also appear as a response to their incapability to
gather and process the information necessary to cope with aggregate decisions:
"Until now the Plan has been no more than an agglomerate of some
proposals from the sectors (branches) and whose indicator of production is
its weight in the foreign exchange plan. The rates and proportions which
should relate the macroeconomic variables and would reflect, by the end,
the quantified political options and the balance between the capacities and
human and materials possibilities of the country, are pure and simply
substituted by the foreign exchange plan. In the absence of macroeconomic
indicators making possible the direction and control of the economy and
(since) we do not foresee the effort to create systems for its calculation by
the implementation of national accounts; taking also into consideration that
the main instruments of direction of the economy such as the Budget, the
Foreign Exchange Plan, the Balance of Incomes and Expenses of the
Population, are not used in an integrated form, it is easy to conclude that
the making of fundamental decisions, especially on investment, grounds
often on subjectivism, something which certainly prevents the use of
scientific techniques in the direction of the economy.”145
145
. Dos Santos in 1985, when assessing the working of the planning system (PR to the MPLA National Conference, January 1985,
quoted in 81 [9] Novembro, 1985, 29-30). See also note 5 and Table 2 (aggregate plans).
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On the other hand, state bureaucracies holding information did not transfer it to
managers and workers,' 6 who were kept in a state of ignorance on the working of similar
firms, the market for inputs and outputs, the state of the branch and the national economy.
This meant that the powers allocated to participatory organs such as the workers
assemblies were undermined, and as for the managers of PEs their dependence on the state
bureaucracies, was reinforced. Again, foreign enterprises working with some PEs under
TACs, supplied Angolan managers information they needed which, if did not enable them
to make decisions (since they had no substantial decision-making power), at least gave
them the opportunity to make proposals.
Sparse legislation tried to ensure the supply of information to the planning
authorities, illustrating the problems of information search, and processing. 147 The
compulsory flows of passive information from below for control by state bureaucracies
seemed not work, either by eventual deliberate omission of those under obligations of
information, 148 or by difficulties in producing the information. 149 From 1979 regulations
146.As the secrecy of the plan law shows (see note 5); when working in an emergency prograrnme neither I nor my colleagues had the
opportunity to see the plan to which the programme related; the directives of MPLA Congresses on Guide-lines for the economy were
publicised by the party (published under the name OFDES); but the annual plan laws implementing these directives were kept secret; these
attitudes and behaviours are not a result of naivete with dealing with the information problems; indeed, "the form to monopolise
information (as the foundation of power) ... is the authoritarian and hierarchical division of labour ... (and) the possibility to maintain the
monopoly of the source of information is connected to the capacity to divide information in the hierarchical pyramid, in order that the
active and syntactic roles concentrated in the apex are distinct from those executive and analytical, distributed among various levels in the
base." (Ruffolo, 1979: 208).
147.E.g.: from 1976 m.o no 83'76 (Planning and Economic Coordination) ordered a survey to all 'productions units' (industry, agriculture
and fisheries, art 1) and stated that those who supplied false information, did not answer the survey or made it difficult would be "severely
punished" (art. 10). Exec.Dee. no 28/85 (Planning), on information tedinology, created a national commission (art 1) to study the
definition of a policy of information technology (art 2).
148. For example, oil companies were from 1979 under the obligation to supply to the Ministry of Oil the maps of execution of their
foreign exchange plans; still, in 1980 the ministry of Oil complained (Exec Dec. no 43/80, Oil) that firms did not send the maps, ordered
the companies to deliver to the ministry the name of the employee responsible (art. 1) and provided for fines; but in 1981 Exec.Dee. no
32/81 (Oil) continued to complain that the oil companies did not respect the ternis for delivery of maps, and fixed new terms, later a new
system was approved for oil companies (System of Information of Oil Operations), providing for fines in case of non-compliance (Joint
Exec.Dec. no 7/88, Finance and Oil). See section 7.1. (other obligations of information by foreign firms) and subsection 7.2.1. (oil
companies).
149.For example, in Agriculture dependent enterprises should deliver statistics to the ministry every month (m.o. no 92'79, art 1); the
m.o. provided for penalties for directors of GPUs and national PEs and to heads of the planning and accounts departments of the firms (art.
3 a); if the information was not supplied For planning organs, the difficulties to respond to the needs of higher organs were immense, due,
among others, the shortage of skilled persoimel at the lower levels; for example, economists working at a Plan Office in the 80s told that
before engaging themselves in their tasks, aggregating plans, they had to check all the calculations of the plan forms sent by enterprises
whidi often contained substantial mistakes.
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made the managers of enterprises liable for the omission to supply reports.'" But shortage
of information, and the decision-making 'micro' powers allocated to the planning
authorities, had the consequence that they were incapable of processing the information
sent from below by firms and making the statutory decisions on their plans. Omissions
related to the plans of PEs meant a substantial insecurity and, eventually, strong barriers in
their access to inputs. So in 1982 Dec. no 6/82 (Statute of Prioritarian Enterprises)
established that selected enterprises, actually the largest PEs and mixed firms with
bargaining power towards the state, had a statutory right to the inclusion of their targets in
the Plan, and consequential allocation of resources by the plan law. This scheme worked
also as an incentive for these enterprises to produce the reports provided for at the
decree.'51
But the problems encountered by managers in the supply of information to higher
levels of the planning system, were also faced by the economic bureaucracies, the
government and the party. For example, all the plan laws, on their published part,
contained obligations of ministers to supply the reports of execution of the NP for the
concerned year, 152 which were crucial to a posteriori control of the execution of different
plans by the CM and the PA and to the draft of the next years plans. Still, even these
reports often were not supplied and, as with the performance of PEs, scapegoats were
made liable.153
150.Dec. no 194 79, stating that directors of PEs, co-operatives and intervened companies were responsible for the correct management
and execution of budgets (art. 1) and should supply reports (cm execution) to the financial authorities (arts 4-11) and paialties in case of
omission.
151.Dec. no 6 82, arts 4 I a, 7,8 and 10 (on penalties for ommission to supply reports), respectively.
152.E.g. Law no 317, approving the 1987 Plan, art. 6, compelled the ministries to deliver monthly reports on the execution of the NP;
also, Law no 6'89, approvingthe 1989-1990 Plan of Economic Recovery (PER), art. 4/2 (on monthly reports);
153.For example, m.o. no 2'85 (PR), stated that "the totality of organs of the central structure of the state apparatus and local govenunent
did not respect that established in the law (the obligations of report production established at Law no 9/84, on the 1984 Plan), a situation
i.vhidi prevented the production of the general report of the execution of the 1984 Plan by the Ministry of Planning" (preamble ciLm.o.); the
m.o. thus considered the directors of the brandies and provinces PLCs responsible for the absence of reports and ordered the ministers to
ptmish them (art. I).
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As the power of planning authorities grounds in information, soon they had to
resort to all kinds of external assistance to process information, draft the related policy
measures and cooperate in the decision-making process related to the powers allocated to
these authorities. 154 A consequence has been the 'converse flow of information', 155 while
Angolan managers, researchers, and citizens, were barred access to information.
4.4. Changes and struggles for the control of the economy
Under agrarian rule, corruption spread, legitimated by agrarian approaches to state
property as 'people's property' and as 'their property' since members of the 'people'. In the
scheme of priorities of allocation of 'people's property' they assumed themselves to be
entitled to priority allocation given their participation in the struggle for independence.156
An example of agrarian management is housing in the early 80s, where bribery and
nepotism 157 played a significant role in house allocation. Agrarian attitudes towards public
assets, and the fact they controlled a part of state apparatuses, raised substantial problems
for the working of the planning system. Also, much conflict arose, because, when sacked
from posts on grounds of unlawful use of public assets, agrarians did not accept it as such,
took the measure as unfair 'political persecution' and reacted accordingly. As the process
of takeover of management of PEs was completed, conflicts within the state were
expressed by the interference of entities with arbitration powers, 158 or 'reallocations' within
the public administration.159
154• From everts from the USSR Gosplan to foreign private or public firms and to international organisations. See section 7.3.
155. See e.g. Helleiner and 0' Brien, 1983: 15.
156.For example, by appropriating, through the scheme of recquisitions, the PE,s output of consumer goods, see section 5.3.
157.Applicants to state housing who bribed officials of the housing authority would be granted a house very rapidly, since these officials
would fmd out a house unlawfully occupied by squatters, expel them, and allocated the house to those with 1)ttrchasing power', while less
fortunate people would have to wait years for a house (51 [5], Novernbro, 1982, 7). Those with connections got 'preferential allocation',
and in some cases eves) lawful tenants were expelled from their state rented houses so the house could be granted to candidates with the
'right contact' (JA, 2.10.1988).
158.E.g..
 Pres.Dec. no 88/81, dismissing the Minister for Oil because "he did not supply valid reasons to jIidify his disobedience to the
instructions of the PR related to the exercise of his function as Minister for Oil and taking into consideration that his behaviour is
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From the early 80s functional bureaucracies started to implement slight changes in
the overall framework for financial control and planning. In planning, from 1983
intersector 'emergency programmes' aimed a less centralised and more operational
approach to the execution of the plan. 160
 The programmes were initially headed by leaders
of MPLA, who coordinated the activities of concerned state apparatuses and PEs. It was
an element more in the control chain and reflected demands from the party for increased
control over the state. Still, although the scheme did not challenge the powers of branch
and functional ministries, from 1987 the supervision of emergency programmes was
transferred to the state.161
4.4.1. Financial cleansing
More significant were the steps made in financial control, the 'financial cleansing'
which gave the name to the economic reform, aiming to rationalise the activities of PEs
and public administration in the area of payments. From 1983, PEs and mixed firms had
new obligations of information in order to produce accounts. 162
 In 1985 legislation on the
payment of debts among enterprises, including PEs, the debts of public administration, and
on administrative adjudication of conflict was enacted. 163
 However, the 'soft constraint'
deteriorating the relations between the Ministry and the PE Sonangol, causing a breath of authority and discipline in the oil branch."
(preamble Pres.Dec.).
159.E.g. the Pres.Dec. no 56 ,86, stated that the deputy minister for Coffee should subordinate directly to the Minister of State for the
Productive Sphere (instead of the Minister of Agricuhure) while "the conditions which determined the creation of the Coffee Emergency
Programme remain" (art. 1).
160.E.g.. for: i. the recovery of heavy equipment, machinery and transports, ii. primary health care and struggle against large endemics, iii.
marketing in the countryside (see section 6.1.), iv. supply of essential goods to the population (divided in subprograms such as edible oils,
soaps and fats, textiles, milk and substitutes, etc), v. increase of the production of salt; vi. education; vii. recovery and maintenance of
electricity equipments, viii. increase of the production of essential goods; and, ix. increase of coffee production (m.o. no 7/87, PR).
161 • M.o. no 7/87 (PR) appointing ministers of state and ministers to supervise the programmes.
162.Dec. no 104/83, art. 1; accountancy PEs were created in the early 80s to support other PEs (e.g., m.o. no 14.5.1981, Internal Trade).
On the financial problems of PEs in the late 70s, see subsections 4.2.1. and 5.3.2.
163.Dec. no 41/85; the decree applied to all kinds of enterprises, providing terms for declarations of credits (art 1); a Cabinet of Financial
Cleansing analysed debts and had powers to solve conflict between PEs (art. 2/3); PEs should negotiate agreements on the payment of
debts (art. 41/a) and if they did not, the ministers of Finance and branch settled the conflict (art. 4/1/b). If, after these decisions, the debtor
PE did not pay within a tenn. the minister of Finance could order the compulsory transfer of amounts of debts from bank accounts (art.
6/1); bank accounts of debtors who did not pay could be frozen. Belated payments paid interest (art 8/2) and the director of the PE could
be under disciplinary liability (art. 81). Concerning debts outside the public sector, there was resort to courts, but voluntary payment after
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behaviour of enterprises, whether PEs or private, local or foreign, did not change
significantly. Notwithstanding these attempts, in the late 80s there were still adverts in the
press urging debtors (buyers) to pay. 164 Rationalisation of financial management also led
to changes in former regimes of amortisation, allocation of PEs profits, and compulsory
delivery to the Budget of PEs' profits from financial participation in mixed firms or joint-
ventures. 165
 From the early 80s the prices regime changed, with the adoption of four types
of different prices. The compulsory sale of enterprises' production according to plan
instructions was softened for some enterprises. 166
4.4.2. Centralisation of decision-making
While functional apparatuses made the first steps towards a restructuring of the
planning system, the political struggles at top level of the state reflected in administrative
planning. Indeed, from the mid-80s fast changing organisational rules allocated (economic)
power to newcomers. Patterns were different from the strict political area, and meant
essentially the shift of branch and/or ministers powers to higher levels of the system
a contract of debt reschedulling ratified by the ministers of branch and Finance was accepted (art 11 and clause 10 of the standard, contract
appendix to the decree). hi the case of debts of public administration, the minister of Finance might order an investigation to debtor
institutions (art. 14) and if the debt was certified, it would be paid by the Budget (art. 15). The system of the decree, applicable only to
debts not paid until 120 days before the entry in force of the decree (art. 1/1), left open the problem of further payments. Exec.Dec. no
15 87 (Finance) warned firms whose debts had not been claimed to make the register of the extinguished (by cachicity) values.
164.For example, in 1988 an hotels PE (Angotel) published a list of debtors (debts amounting to kz about 174 Mn, USD about 5 Mn)
including from local subsidiaries of TNCs to ministries, PEs, many private local and foreign firms and even associations; some of these
debts were in hard curraicy (JA, 21.9.1988); JA conmianed at the time: "foreign firms (Brazilian Odbrecht and Fumas Centrals, oil
companies Braspetro, Elf Aquitaine and Texaco) and the Portuguese Soares da Costa and Teixeira Duarte (debtors of Angotel) whose
image of efficiency is given to our consumption in their different advertising ... (do not pay debts to PEs). By this picture we may note that
the practice bobody pays to nobody, often under the awkward argument that 'it is state's', still persists within us and transcends the borders
of Angolan anerprises and organisations. ... To the creditor, the deficits acaunulated to low levels of production and thus sales, the
increases in production costs and other factors, make the situation intolerable.... (a situation) which impacts in the whole monetary system
and the national economy" (Freitas, JA, 9.10.1988).
165.Exec.Dec. no 52/85 (Finance), for mixed firms and joint-ventures created under LFI179: the shareholder PE should annually deliver
to the Budget 'The profits, dividends and other incomes" from its financial participations" (art. 2/1) and also to financial entities the annual
reports and accounts of mixed firms, and the minutes of the general meeting which approved the distribution of profits. The PE could
require the minister of Finance to keep up to 10% of profits from mixed firms. Foreign partners only could transfer profits abroad after its
partner PE delivered to the Budget the profits due (art. 4); another guarantee of this regime was the joint liability of the director of holder
PE and the Angolan directors of mixed vultures, for the delivery of PE's profits (art. 5). See Table 2 and on financial participations see
sections 7.1. and 7.2.
166.See Table 2 and sections 5.2. and 5.3. (prices and 1:11anned marketing.).
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(whether collective or individual), instead of the necessary decentralisation (on provinces
and enterprises) which contradictorily was decided almost simultaneously.167
In the 1986 reorganisation the state ministers coordinated the activity of members
of government and subordinate adrninistrations. 168
 Apparently, some state ministers saw
themselves as substitutes of eventually incompetent branch and functional ministers. The
most controversial document on their perceptions of the post was a short-lived m.o. where
a minister of state self-appointed to manage directly the foreign exchange plan, a power of
functional entities. The 'concentration' approach to the role of the ministers of state is also
evident in, say, the investments regime approved from the mid-80s.169
The emergence of CDS as a substitute for the CM, led to more restricted decision-
making in the areas allocated to the CM. After the creation of the Economic Commission
of CDS, 170 the PR, and staffs (including the CM Secretariat), 171 became more directly
involved in economic management. 172 Indeed, from the 1988 Economic Commission got
management powers previously allocated to specific economic ministries or other
institutions, although at the same time the decree stated that the commission could not
"exercise any functions inherent to the powers of its members as leaders of ministries or
other central organs". The most important function of the commission was to supervise
the implementation of the economic reform (SEF), for which it got a staff (Technical
167. Under the form approved by the 1985 MPLA Congress, see Chapter 8.
168.Dec. no 10'86. arts 1/b and 11
169.M.o. no 20 86, Minister of State for the Economic and Social Sphere, repealed two months later by the CM (Resol. no 1/86, art 7).
See Table 2.
17°. Resol. no 1/86 (CM). arts. 1 and 2/a. See subsection 3.5.
171.For example, the secretary ordered the division of national PE ENAS into a Luanda PE EPAL (m.o. no 12/87, CM Secretary), against
the powers of founders to determine divisions (see subsection 4...).
172.For example: I. interference in the managemart of the central bank (m.o. no 6/88, PR, art. 1, authorising a PE, ENANA, to keep its
earnings in foreign currency, a power of the central bank), and, ii. Pres. Dec. no 62/89, ordering the management of the Ministry of
Industry by a troika instead of the 'constitutional' minister (under CL under art. 61, "ministries and other central organs are led by members
of the CM, according to the principles of individual direction and personal accountability").
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Commission) appointed by the PRY/ 3
 From 1989 a new staff of the Commission, the SEF
Technical Secretariat, became responsible for the draft of 'restructuring measures'. 174
 In
the late 80s the trend for centralisation meant thus the direct intervention of the PR, or his
staffs, in many areas of decision-making previously allocated to functional and branch
ministers.
Although these shifts demonstrate the difficulties of coordination between the
branches and the functional organs, in the context of political struggles, they also reflect
the fact that, by the mid-80s when the economic reform was adopted, the control over PEs
instead of being simplified was worsened by the increase in hierarchical levels they had to
deal when, for example, needing an imported input.
4.4.3. Management by fear
But in the mid-80s there was also the consolidation of agrarians in repressive
apparatuses, especially through the ministry of Interior and SIC. The latter allowed
agrarians to try incursions in the fields of economic management, especially international
contracting, a much envied area. Using SIC agrarians were able to disturb PEs with a
strong international component (for example, Sonangol and Endiama). 175 In a framework
where the system could not be challenged and an analysis of the real causes of PEs
problems was a taboo, SIC, defined managers of PEs and the branch ministries as the
scapegoats for the working of the economy.'76
173.Dec. no 32/88, arts 5, arts 3/c and 9-10, respectively.
174.Dec. no 39,89, arts 1-2 and 11 and 6, respectively.
175.For example, a SIC report on diamonds concessions, allegedly smuggled from the office of the state minister and published in the
Portuguese press, draws a list of 29 top managers, experts and workers of the Angolan holding diamonds PE and an official of BNA, as
liable for alleged losses of the country in foreign exchange, as a result of the execution of the contract with RST (Independente, 13.7.1990).
176.Suds as the investigation against a vice-governor of the central bank in the mid-80s; acUially these practices had been (re)introduced
in the early 80s by the then minister of Security of State (later head of SIC) in a case in Huila, while an agrarian was the provincial
commissioner, who made the provincial delegate of the Mini.stry of Industry to go under trial at the People's Revolutionary court under
alleged economic sabotage because state entities had not been capable of distributing in time imported goods; after many months of arrest,
he was acquitted by the court When provincial commissioner in Benguela the later head of SIC also ordered the arrest of the provincial
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So, from 1986 PEs, besides the set of controls referred to above, were under a
new form, the 'management by fear' caused by the permanent threat of an investigation by
this special police. 177 In practice this could mean: i. the arrest or suspension of managers
and workers for unlimited periods until released usually because no evidence had been
produced, 178
 ii. the allocation of the scarce skilled personnel to investigation activities, iii.
the uncertainty on PEs procurement and contracting, and, iv. personal damages, such as
libel, social blame, prohibition of their families to travel abroad, and, in some cases,
dismissal and unemployment, with no state liability or compensation.
In short, the system was not rationalised but discretion reinforced. To the already
impoverished PEs SIC added, by its activities, costs of uncertainty and while allegedly
fighting for better international contracting, SIC did not care that foreign partners would
make Angolan firms pay for their costs arising from the permanent investigations and
related uncertainty in contracting. As happened with colonial state and with the TG, the
post-colonial state was not capable of making a proper analysis of the country' problems
and conflicts, and when this analysis was made it was repressed by competing groups.
Indeed, the socialist option, with its development and welfare goals, generated,
and the war and underdevelopment reinforced, the phenomena agrarians identified as the
'counter-revolutionary' motives of 'unfaithful' managers:
delegate of the Ministry of Inrhigrry since the latter refused to sell to ODP non-planned goods (see subsection 5...., en allocation of PEs
output). The argument for the arrest was, according to rumours, that the provincial delegate had misrespected a member of the CC. Under
the law protecting the reputation of the members of the leadership, the provincial delegate was convicted by the Regional Military Court in
a trial he did not even know that was taking place; be was later released under the special powers allocated to a special commission to
revise the decisions of the regional military courts; the list of investigations is long, with no relevant results. The scapegoats approach was
not softened by the economic reform: even in 1990 the minister of Trade and Inclwdry (merged in the late 80s) was accused of "sabotaging
the implementation of SEF" and the minister of Transport was dismissed due to "the slowness in carrying out the CDS decisions in the area
of transport and communications" (Publico, 31.10.1990 and AED, 11.6.1990).
177.SIC was linked to the State Security and created new apparatuses which extended into the branch and functional ministries, and some
large PEs.
178.E.g.. Dos Santos declarations on investigations on alleged corruption in public administration during 1991: "there was no material
evidence to accuse anyone" (quoted in PrIblico, 4.6.1991).
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"Such conflicts do not stem from the faults of a particular manager, from
bad planning or bad style of work. The cause lies deeper than those, in the
power structure of society and the form of ownership and institutional
system in it. ... If reality involves contradictions, a decision-maker must
inevitably face dilemmas ... In everyday economic affairs in strict sense,
such as subsidies for health and housing services or the salaries and
bonuses of business executives are concealed fundamental dilemmas: the
conflict of demands that can be made on society and obligations towards
society, between security and the stimulation of performance, and a number
of other, graver political, social and ethical problems." (Kornai, 1986: 3-
4)179
As for the Angolan PEs, approached as the 'sources' of inefficiency of the system,
their managers, labelled as incompetent and lacking managerial knowledge, and workers,
'unskilled', so as to legitimate privatisation and neocolonialism, they suffered unde the
agrarian era a permanent shortage of all kinds of resources which made it impossible for
them to compete with mixed firms and foreign enterprise, with access to resources, and
ultimately financed by the country's indebtedness and regarded as the ultimate expression
of managerial success.
4.5. Conclusion
This chapter dealt with the relations between PEs and state bureaucracies,
describing the mechanisms used by the state to substitute PEs in managerial decision-
making, and aimed to demonstrate how state bureaucracies empowered themselves to
exercise powers of ownership over means of production. As indirect control of these
means of production was neither possible nor rewarding, state bureaucracies moved to
direct control through administrative orders. They transformed the economy into an
immense hierarchy where decision-making instead of being decentralised was
progressively concentrated in the higher levels of the system. In a resource constrained
economy where resources were increasingly imported, management powers over PEs
meant as well involvement in their processes of international contracting for inputs. The
179. Conflicts refer to, e.g.: full anployment generating shortages of labour and unernploymart on the job, guarantee of sustained growth
leading in the long run to shortage of inputs, to fiction in adjustment an ultimately to hindrance of growth, etc (Kornai, 1986: 3).
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crisis in oil revenues, evident from 1982, and the problem of inputs supply, legitimated the
takeover of the area of international contracting by the top levels of government, while a
segment of state bureaucracies became, through different mechanisms, the middlemen
between foreign capital and the national state.180
The feedback by economic agents to the minor status on which the system had
located them became apparent in the informal economy, whose functioning is described in
the next chapter, from the stand-point of the attempts of the state to deal with provisions
and shortages.
180. As an Angolan economist has put it: "From independence the state got the possession of vast means of production, and consequently
the administrative sector expanded. The latter, interpenetrated as well by the growing party and union apparatuses, fastly transformed itself
in an enormous network which soon controlled all the economic and social process, burocratizing the productive and trading machineries to
such an exireme point that the adoption of any criteria of econotnic rationality was impossible." (Mario Nelson, 1991: 44).
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TABLE 2
MANAGEMENT DECISIONS OF A PE
Decision Decision-power Source Instrument
volume Prod. 1 Branch PL/82 plan
range Prod . 2 Branch LPE/77 instruction
stocks3 Branch LPE/77 instruction
equipment4 Branch PL/82 plan
spares/mat s5 Branch PL/82 plan
technology6 Branch/BNA misc. author.
imports"'
recruitment s
Br/FT/Plan/Fin,
Labour
misc,
decree
plan/licensing
order
training9 Branch/Education decree monopoly
directors'' Branch LPE/77 order
heads PU 11 Branch LPE/77 order
planners 12 dir/Branch decree authoris.
foreign labour° Branch/Plan/Coop decree authoris.
budget 14 Br/Finance/Plan misc. plan
wages/salaries 15 Br/Plan/Fin/Lab law order
amortizations' 6 Plan/Finance law order
prices" Branch/Plan/Fin decree ex. dec.
sales' s Branch PL/82 plan/ec. cont.
profits 19 Finance misc. order
investment20 misc. instr. plan/authoris
1 . See Chapter 4, notes 5 and 6.
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2.LPE/77, art. 31.
3. LPE/77, art 32/1. See Chapter 4, note 5.
4. As Angola does not produce relevant equipment, its purchase usually means international contradin& the purchase of these goods and
connected services (post-sale assistance, training. ac.), was one of the heaviest areas of Angolan economic law; this item refers to decisions on
purchase, without relating them to imports, which are dealt with in the next note (see also note 20, on investment); the brands ministry made
decisions here under its powers to approve plan indicators, see Chapter 4, note 6 (PL/82, art. 18/1/h).
5.See Chapter 4, note 6 (P1)82 art. 18/1/i). on the plan indicator for supply of technical-material resources.
6. See subsection 7.3.1. (tectmology contracting).
7.All imports were subject to a 4 levels system of authorizations: i. resulting from planning (since the imports plan, IP, was a part of Plan, and its
counterpart in hard currency was contained in another plan, the budget for international payments, BIP, involving the ministries of Foreign
Trade, Finance and BNA) .
 ii. licensing of importers (activity), iii. related to self-allocated powers of authorization of contracts by the ministry of
Foreign Trade, and iv. licensing of operations a new authorization for each single import For the imports plan, Law no 3/79, Law of
International Payments Budget, Dec. no 7 82 (art. 3/2/d), P1)82 (art 26/e), m.o. 25.9.82, Foreign Trade, on plan of commercial operations, PCO
(on allocation of 'imports plafonds' for semester and trimester utilization), and Exec.Dec. no 24/85 (Foreign Trade), Norms for the Execution of
the Imports Plan (arts 9 and 10). During the phase of draft of plans, the PE or mixed enterprise had to apply to the branch ministry, firstly, and
with its approval and that BNA, had to apply to Ministry of Foreign Trade to be authorized to become an importer, under the licensing of activity
(Exec. Dec. no 980, Foreign Trade, Regulations for the Licensing of Importers and Exporters) even to perform a single operation, the enterprise
had to go first through beaming of activity (cit. exec.dec., art 4); this licensing referred to the enterprise capability to perform the operations, to
the type of goods it might import, defined by the minister of foreign trade (cit. exec.dec., arts. 12/d, 18/1 and 19), after the presentation by the
enterprise of an estimate by products, quantities and values (arts 12/c and 13/b); the licence only was valid to the types of commodities it referred
to (art 15). Pluriannual contracts for the import of some types of products (discriminated in plans) were authorized by the Ministry of Foreign
Trade. Each single import from kz 2,500 (USD 83) had to be licensed by Ministry of Foreign Trade under licensing of operations (Exec. Dec. no
10 80, Import, Export and Re-export Licensing, arts 1/1, 1/2 and 2). For this licensingthe enterprise had to fill 10 application forms and supply 5
pro-forma invoices (cit. exec dec., art 3). In some cases the application was delivered to the branch Plan Office, for a preliminary authorization,
before that of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (Exec.Dec. no 24 85, art. 14). After this authorization the enterprise had to go through BNA for the
licensing of hard currency. The import of equipment had to comply with these regulations and with a special regime established in 1978 (Exec.
Dec. 14 78, 2nd Vice PM) and reinforced in 1982 (m.o. of 25.9.82, Foreign Trade), with a priori control of contracts by different public boards,
according to the value of contracts.
8.See subsection 5.1. (recruitment legislation).
9.Dec. no 11083, on training, arts 2 and 10.
10.See subsection 4.2.2.
11.LPE 77, art. 372 x; the minister appointed the heads of units of production under proposal of the director of the PE.
12.Dec. no 782 established that 'the appointment or dismissal of heads of planning organs of subordinated units will be done after compulsory
favourable advice from the PC of the branch" (art. 22/2) and "experts working in the units planning organs cannot be dismissed without
compulsory favourable advice of the (branch) Plan Office" (art 22 1); the last norm actually aimed to protect the experts against unlawful
dismissal by the directors of enterprises in case of conflict
13.The recruitment of resident foreign labour should be included in a plan (Dec. no 11/86, Regulations on the Contracting of Resident
Foreigners, art 4 1) drafted by the Secretary of State for Cooperation and the Ministry of Planning (art 1); all the contracts had needed
ratification by the brands ministry of the employer and the Secretary of State (art. 5); a standard contract was enacted from 1976 (Dec. no 99/76,
and later Appendix to Dec. no 11/86, which followed 12w no 6/86); Law no 7/86, ruled the recruitment of non-resident foreigners.
14.The budget of PEs was a part of the ageregate financial plan (and so included in the planning framework) and had connections with the
Budget, since part of its revalues came from PEs (profits) and a part of expenditure related to subsidies for investment and losses; as seen above
(see Chapter 4. note 6) the PE plan had compulsory fmancial indicators such as the volume of mercantile production, the wages fund, the global
value of profits, payments to the NB and subsidies from it and volume of investments  (P1)82, art. 18/1 als b, e, C g and h). Every PE had to draft
annually a proposal of financial plan (12w no 2077,/ arts 15/3, 20 2 and 6/3, Dec. no 181-B/80, arts 2/3/a, 4/h and 26/a and Dec. no 7/82, art.
3/3 c). The PEs' financial plans had the following regime of a priori controls: i. the director of the PE was responsible for the draft of this plan
(LPE 77, art. 37/2 a) and had to discuss it with the Council of Direction (LPE/77, art 41/2/a); ii. the branch analysed the draft plan and salt it to
the Ministry of Finance (Exec.Dec. no 20/86, Finance, art. 3/1 and Dec. no 7/82, art 13/6/b); iii. the Ministry of Finance analysed the financial
plans and the investment plans (Dec. no 181-B/80, art. 26/c); iv. Ministry of Finance made the draft Budget based on the 'sector budgets' (which
included public administration and PEs), (Law no 20/77, arts 14/1 and 14/2) and "establishes the corrections to make (in the draft plans) and
proposes measures to ensure the balance between budget revenues and expenditure" (Exec.Dec. no 20/86, art 6/2); v. the Ministry of Finance
son the draft budget and plans to Ministry of Planning (Dec. no 7/82, art. 3/2/b); vi. the draft Budget was sent to the CM (Law no 20/77, art.
143) and by this to the PA (CL, art. 38 d and 58/e, Law no 20/77, art. 2); after its adoption by the parliament the Budget is a law. After the
approval of budget by the PA, the Ministry of Finance allocated resources as estimates of profits deliveries to the PEs financial plans (Dec. no
181-B 80, art. 2 2 e and Dec. Exec. 60/80, Finance, art. 8).
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15.See section 5.2., on the Wages Laws.
16.From independence PEs were not making amortizations; Law no 2/79 allocated to ministries of Planning and Finance wide powers on the
issue: established rates and criteria for the PEs amortization (art 1) and decided on the distribution and utilization of the values allocated to the
PE amortization fund (AF), under proposal of the branch minister (art. 2); under Exec.Dec. no 2/79 (Planning and Finance), 700 0 of
amortizations were delivered to the Budget (art 3/1) and the remaining 30% could be used only for "great repairs according to instructions of the
minister of Finance" (alt 3 1/b); the branch minister had powers to 'redistribute' the values for amortization "among enterprises of the same
branch" (art. 5). From 1986 (Joint Exec.Dec. no 6/86, Planning and Finance) PEs got the management of their amortization funds (arts 22 and
2/3), but accordingto the give criteria.
17.The price fixing for some products existed already during colonialism; after independence some prices were centrally fixed aiming their
articulation with wages (Law no 20/77 (art. 21, allocated powers to fix prices to the ministries of Planning and Finance; shortage of goods made
price-fixing irrelevant (see section 5.2.) and led to heavy losses of PEs, whith were sometimes forced to sell at prices inferior to the costs. From
1984 the prices system was rationalized with the regulations on the New System of Prices (NSP, Dec. no 17/84); NSP provided for 4 types of
prices, in function of the type of goods or services to whidi they related: i. goods essential to consumption of the population (including fuels) had
prices centrally fixed by the CM (it was forbidden to sell at prices inferior or superior to those established, NSP, arts 1/3, 2/1, 2/3 and List A,
appendix); ii. goods or services "strategic for production and essential to consumption" were under the regime of 'controlled prices' (that is, a
maximal price or a minimal price was established, and in maximal prices the sale at inferior prices was allowed, NSP, aft 1/3); in this regime
might be included: "goods and services locally produced and consumed" (NSP, art 3/3) and "agricultural production of peasants origin" (here a
minimal price was fixed and all entities were forced to buy at this prices, NSP, art 3/3); the Minister of Planning established which goods and
services were included in the regime and the prices were fixed by the ministers of Planning. Finance and branch (NSP, arts 3/1 and 3 5); in this
case the enterprise producing the goods or services might make proposals on prices (NSP, arts 3/2, 3/4, LPE177, art. 37/2/g); in. products
marketed by wholesale or retail import enterprises had 'marketing margins' ("maximal value, established in absolute or relative terms, which
might be added to the prices of purthase", NSP, art 4/1) for commodities having no fixed prices under the two previous regimes, established by
joint order of ministries of Planning and Finance, after favourable advice of the "concerned brandies" (NSP, arts. 4/3 and 4/2); enterprises
interested in changes on their marketing margins made proposals to the brandi, which sent them to MPL and Ministry of Finance (NSP, art 4/2);
iv. goods and services which did not fall in the categories referred to above, ("non-strategic means of production and with a weak impact in
further stages of the economic circuit" and "consumer goods not essential to the population", NSP, art 5/2) were under the system of 'declared
prices': the ministries of Planning and Finance established by joint order which goods and services fell under the category (NSP, art. 5/3);
interested enterprises proposed the prices to the branch (NSP, art. 5/1); the latter communicated to the Ministry of Planning and if this ministry
did not object in a 30 days delay, the price was considered ratified, and the branch minister should accept it (NSP, art. 5/1); on the late 80s new
prices system, see subsection 5.2.5.
18.See Chapter 4, note 6 (indicator of mercantile production), and section 5.3. (planned distribution and economic contracts).
19.PEs had to deliver all their profits to the state (Law no 20/77, art 28 and LPE/77, art. 25/1); from 1985 the Ministry of Finance implemented
a more careful approach to the issue since PEs were not pleased with the stheme-, Exec.Dec. no 55/85 (Panning and Finance) provided for some
guarantees of PEs in the profits allocation (although the volume of profits remained centrally fixed in the plan, see Chapter 4, note 5): i. 50°e, for
the Budget, according to an annual plan, divided in trimesters (arts 3/1/a and 6/1); ii. 45% for an investment fund of the PE (arts 2/1 and 3/1/b)
but whith could net exceed 150% of the annual amount of amortization (art 3/2/a); the Minister of Finance could authorize, after application by
the PE, a different allocation of profits to the investment fund (art 4); iii. 5°o to the Social Fund (fund of PEs to finance workers welfare sdiemes,
see subsection 3.4.4., note 152), (art 3/1/c) but only 30% of the amount could be used during the concerned budget period and the remaining
70°0 of the SF quota was to be used in the next year (art 5); iv. if the real profit was superior to the planned, the difference went: 50% to Budget,
20% to social fund and 30% to investment (Dec. no 250/79, Instruction for the Execution of the National Plan of Accounts, art. 6); on the
compulsory delivery to the Budget of profits resulting from financial participations of PEs in mixed enterprises, see section 7.1.
20.Regulations on investment have been in force as 'esoteric law' (not published norms Ming social relations which should be regulated by law).
Within its powers to "enact instructions compulsory for the ministries" (Dec. no 7/82, art. 4/1), the Ministry of Plarming enacted by 1985 the
'General Bases for the Regulations of the Investment Process' (GB!), which it forced PEs to comply with in their investments; the Bases were not
even known by many managers of PEs, given their secret diaracter. However, they not only allocated extensive powers to different bureaucracies
on investment, but also contained norms making the validity of investment contracts depend on complex authorisations; GBI, although very
complicated and going against the documents on the economic reform adopted in the 1985 MPLA 2nd Congress, were transformed (just with
slight differences) into law by Dec. no 12/87 and were repealed by the new planning legislation of 1988 (see subsection 8.1.4.). Here is referred
to Dec. no 1287, whidi applied to all investments except in defense (art. 2/a), hydrocarbons, diamonds or other mineral resources (art. 2/b). The
legal defmition of investment was itself very wide (arts 3/1 and 3/2). The unities intervening in investment decisions were: i. the CM (that is,
CDS), ii. jointly, the ministers of State, iii. the minister of state, iv. the Ministry of Planning, v. BNA, and vi. the branth ministry. To achieve an
investment there were 2 different processes of approval (a priori control) by these entities: i. planning (draft of control cypress for brandies and
indicators, arts. 17-34), and ii. approval of 'executive projects' (sets of actions and contracts to implement the investment, after it has been
included in the plan) by the minister of state and the branch minister (ans. 35-44). The regulations also provided for a posteriori controls. This
legislation, in the case of a foreign investment, should apply with the related legislation (see sections 7.1. and 7.2.) and the imports regime, if it
waste case.
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CHAPTER 5
THE PROVIDENTIAL STATE AND THE ECONOMICS OF SHORTAGE
The post-colonial state conceived itself as providential, within the frame of promises
made during the struggle for independence and the conditions of takeover of abandoned firms
and institutions. The Angolan post-colonial state is 'providential' in the sense that it aimed to
supply and control everything, although having no resources. The providential character of the
state probably had an additional function: to reinforce legitimacy, since the image of
independence in common Angolans was one of magical free provision by the state and little
work. This was one of the most significant constraints the post-colonial state had to face:
independence was a magic formula to solve all problems and given the promises of all
movements involved in the competition for power and the permanent emphasis in the wealth
of the country, individuals were expecting an welfare state grounded in oil surpluses and not
on their work.
The provision of all kinds of goods and services by the state meant the emergence of
the problems of growth of state bureaucracies referred to above.' The administrative planning
system implemented from 1977 to 1988 was partially motivated by these goals, especially to
guarantee the access of the population to scarce consumer goods. But a common problem of
poorest countries is the endurance of shortages. Added to the 'shortage-breeding-shortage'
mechanism, as referred to on the supply of inputs to PEs, the reproduction of the shortages
economy also played a role in the failure of the attempts at centralized distribution of scarce
goods and services.2
This chapter deals with the attempts of the post-colonial state to manage some areas of
the shortages economy. Three main aspects are referred to: i. the shortages and related control
I . See Introduction, notes 15 and 16.
2. See subsection 4.3.1. and section 5.2.
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of labour, ii. the system of prices and wages, and, iii. the centrally planned marketing of goods
and the provision of welfare services, their failure and the responses of sellers and buyers.
5.1. Facing the shortage of labour
In the post-colonial society, the shortages of labour remained, because: i. the
disruption of the economy led workers to return to their societies of origin, and, ii. the
implementation of the planning system reinforced the needs for skilled personnel, whose
shortage, emerging from the system itself, was more acute due to the massive flight of
settlers.3
Legislation adopted in the post-colonial period on the control of waged labour applied
essentially to industry and services workers, since agriculture was mainly under self-
subsistence. 4 The adoption of the 'work card' 5 and the linkage of employment to access to
rationing cards attempted to use forms of economic coercion implemented by the state to
ensure the supply of labour and to avoid the massive resort to non-economic coercion.
Nevertheless, job mobility was repressed by criminal legislation. Also, legislation on state
control of recruitment attempted to prevent the emergence of a free market for labour. From
the early 80s, new legislation, adopted under the pressure of UNTA, provided for a right to
unilateral termination of the employment contract by workers, allowing thus a certain labour
mobility, within the boundaries of control of recruitment by the state. But from the late 80s
this control was reinforced for some categories of skilled workers. In a better situation were
those self-employed or associated in co-operatives, with access to rationing cards and allowed
to move from one job to another.
3
. See section 2.2. and Chapter 4. •
In 1980, the overall picture of the Angolan labour was: 74% in agriculture (as contrasted with 79% in 1965). 10% in industry (as contrasted
with 80o in 1965) and 16% in services (as contrasted with 13% in 1965) and the percentage of active population was 52% (as contrasted with 54
in 1965); active population: from 15 to 64 years (World Development Report, 1988). See also subsections 3.4.4. (for UNTA figures) and 1.2.3.
(for the figures during colonialism).
5
. From 1976 any worker had to carry a work card (Law no 57/76) which functioned as an identity document within the work place and as a
mean of access to rationing cards (these informally ruled by the ministries directives).
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Control of labour: recruitment and termination of labour contracts
Recruitment legislation demonstrates the efforts of the state to control the direction
and flows of labour, especially skilled labour, in a context of non-market fixed low wages.
From 1976 a decree established that all recruitment was made through the Ministry of Labour
and recruitment by other means was "null and void". 6 Employers reported needs to the
Ministry (Employment Centres), where applicants for jobs applied, and the ministry allocated
the employees.7
Foreign firms, which devised a string of schemes to get the labour they needed, were
under these duties as well. The legislation on foreign investment and oil compelled firms to
recruit Angolan labour.' Although some foreign firms with bargaining power got an exemption
of compulsory recruitment through the state, 9 even in 1987 regulations reminded foreign
enterprises that they must recruit personnel through the employment centres while providing
for penalties to firms breaking the regulations.1°
In fact there was a relative freedom in the application of the recruitment legislation due
to the incapacity of the state to perform its control functions, from both the demand and
supply sides. Also, in early years a majority of salaried employees with bargaining power never
6. Dec. no 1576, arts 1 and 4; the measures were due to "serious WICIIIploymair and "scarcity of skilled workers ... motivating private
enterprises to resort, by their own means, to the most diversified forms to find out the employees they need ... These conditions, besides
speculation in wages and salaries offered by these enterprises, cause a bad distribution of existing human resources and their consequential
underemployment." (preamble). The desperate situation of imemployed labourers at the time is illustrated by an article of the regulations
developing the decree: "Since the Angolan People walks with dignity in its struggle for progress and welfare, notwithstanding the difficuhies
imposed by the colonial and imperialist wars, it is forbidden to employment candidates to stay overnight in the pavenaent in front of the
employment centres." (art. 8), (m.o. quoted in JA, 27.2.77).
7. Ca.• dec.. arts 2 and 3.
8.Law no 10 79, art 27, and Law no 13 88, an 33, (both on foreign investment): also Dec. no 20 82. art 133 (on the obligation of recruitment
of Angolan personnel by oil companies operating in the country); later regulated by Exec.Dec. no 125 82 (Oil). See Chapter 4, Table 2 and
sections 7.1. and 7.2.
9.For example, the firms involved in the Capanda project; see section 7.1.
10.Exec.Dec. no 27 ,87 (Labour), arts 1-2 and 4-5.
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went through this recruitment scheme, which functioned more at the level of waged labour for
industry and services (recruitment for agriculture being out of control)."
Job mobility was repressed by criminal legislation which worked not at the level of
recruitment but on the continuation of the employment relation, whatever the wages paid and
employment conditions. The unilateral termination of the labour contract by the employee was
considered crime of 'passive resistance'. Powers related to the labour relation and employment
lay essentially either in the state or the employer, with consequential imbalance against
workers. The latter could not leave employment without agreement, but employers could sack
them if they had the approval of the union comtnittee. 12 From 1981 GLL established the right
to leave employers by a unilateral decision of the employee." GLL established some degree of
freedom of work, job security and a balance between employer and employee by instituting
contracts for all categories of personnel and professions. Any waged/salaried person working
permanently should have a written contract. If not, there was a presumption of the existence of
a contractual relation. Also, term contracts had the limit of three years, after which if the
employee remained working, his/her employment was under the regime of permanent contract,
meaning that he/she only could be dismissed on grounds of 'technical or organisational
restructuring', non-performance or disciplinary offences. Also, sackings needed the prior
consultation of the union."
11.See Chapter 6.
12.Who usually strongly fought any attempt to sack employees, whatever the reasons.
13.GLL also established the following rights: i. right to work, developing CL, art 26, in two directions - non-discrimination (CL, art. 18 and
GLL, art 2 1) and providing for an obligation of the state 'to create the conditions needed for each citizen to occupy a poat according to his/her
opacities (alt. 2/2); the Report on the Draft Law referred that the right to work includes 'the right of choice of profession and place of its
exercise" (cit. Rep., 3/81, Trabalho, 1981, 41); ii. right to training (arts 82-7), iii. right to promotion (arts 88-9), iv. guarantees on the annual
assessment of work (arts 90-101) by a committee composed by representatives of management, union and "a skilled worker of the department ..."
(art 95), v. rules of the fixing of wages to the principle of distribution according to the quantity and quality of labour supplied (arts 102-16, see
section 5.2.), vi. limits to the duration of weekly working time (arts 117-25), vii. right to annual holidays (arts 124-131), viii. right to work
safdy, prevention of work accidents and professional diseases, as well as insurance of workers in this area (art 133-41), ix welfare rights (art.
142), such as maternity leave (arts 157-58), x. right to social and cultural improvement funded by the social fund, including firm restaurants,
housing and house repairs programmes, nurseries, consumers cooperatives, holidays centres, firm transport when public transport does not work,
sports clubs, dance and music groups (arts 144-152); the law also established special rules for minors workers (arts 159-62).
14.GLL, arts 23-44.
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The freedom to leave employers was not welcome by many sectors, for example
agrarians and orthodox bureaucrats, used to compulsory work guaranteed by the 'passive
resistance' legislation. The opposition to the GLL regime even led the Minister of Labour to
produce the so-called 'dialectic m.o.', aiming to prevent the immediate application of GLL
principles and norms favouring workers for the sake of development." To reinforce discretion
in recruitment and termination of labour contracts, the interpretative ministerial order was
complemented with esoteric directives establishing that employers only could recruit a worker
if he/she produced a 'release letter', from the previous employer and stating that the former
labour contract had duly terminated.
As workers in high demand are the skilled ones, in the 80s, functional organs ('skilled
labour hungry') 16 began to control supply with the informal power to allocate all those who
had finished higher and professional education degrees. Again, employers reported their needs
to Ministry of Planning which allocated at discretion the personnel it had in 'portfolio'. As after
this 'compulsory choice of employer and/or career' employees fled their jobs, in 1987
legislation of a dubious constitutional status, made students and trainees pay for their
education with compulsory work in employers chosen by the state. 17 The 1987 law established
a system of compulsory work going from seven to one year, covering all kinds of skilled
personnel, from post-graduates to waged workers who went under training. 18 The law was
enforced by a set of sanctions: i. contracts between a recent trainee or graduate and any
15.M.o. 30.11.1981: 'the matters ruled in GLL and the scope of its provisions shall be interpreted in a dialectic way. according to the economic
and social conditions of PRA and related legislation" (no 2).
16.See subsection 4.3.2. (the planning system and the needs of production of information).
17.Law no 487, art 1, which conflicted with the right to education granted by CL art. 29. The ministries of Planning and Labour had powers on
the issue (cit. law, arts 12 and 13).
•
18.Periods of compulsory work under Law no 4/87: i. graduated in the country without scholarships, 5 years for higher education (art 2 a) and
3 years for technical schools (art 2/b); ii. graduated abroad with a scholarship, 7 years for higher education (art 3/a) and 5 years for technical
schools (art. 3/b); iii. worker/students benefiting from a special labour regime, compulsory work as many years as the course (art 4/1); and
workers/students not benefiting from the special regime, 2/3rds of the course duration (art. 4'2) iv. post-graduates had compulsory work 2.5 times
the duration of their course if they had a scholarship and 1.5 times the duration if they had no scholarship (art. 5 1); v. those who wart under any
kind of training would have compulsory work for at least one year (art. 5/2). Both categories of workers/students might be allocated to employers
different from these where they worked "when the state, due to relevant reasons, is interested in their employment in another enterprise" (art. 4/3);
in this case they should work for 7 or 5 years, as if they had graduated abroad with a grant (art. 4/4).
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employer without respecting the law were null and void, ii. the employee must sign a contract
with the employer allocated by the state, and, iii. contracting recent graduates or trainees
breaking the law "is considered crime of passive resistance, established and punished by Law
no 11/75".19
Control of labour: 'crimes against production'
The rules on termination of labour contracts were enforced by legislation enacted from
December 1975 providing for a set of negative sanctions: the law on 'crimes against
production' and disciplinary offences, which in fact aimed at the resort to direct coercion in
some labour matters, such as workers protest, mobility and deviant behaviour within the
enterprise. Law no 11/75 aimed to prevent and repress the results of anomie prevailing in the
country, such as drunkenness and use of drugs at work place. It punished absenteeism and the
unilateral termination of the labour contract by the employee, considered 'passive resistance'
was punished with imprisonment. Also, the law considered a crime the "paralysation or strikes
not led by unions or by unions committees where they exist". 20 In the 70s workers went under
trial in special labour courts21
 but later they were judged by common criminal courts. To
prevent civil disobedience, the law considered accomplices those who did not report to the
police the 'crimes against production' of which they were aware. Also, those who did not apply
the penalties provided for in the law for disciplinary offences committed a disciplinary
offence. 22
Information on the application of this criminal legislation is scarce: the only cases
reported are the strikes in a Luanda enterprise, SIGA, in 1976, where some workers were
19.Law on the Discipline of the Productive Process; cit. law, arts 15/1, 16 and 17, respectively.
20.Crt• . law, art. 1. Crimes under Law no 11/75 were usually punished with imprisonment and the investigation was made by the Ministry of
Labour (art. 7) and later by the Criminal Investigation Police (integrated in the Ministry of Interior, Law no 6/82, art 1).
21.Dec. no 3'76, art. 3.
22.Law no 11/75, art 18 (as changed by Law no 4/76) and 17, respectively; art. 18 referred to "members of union committees, unions,
managers of enterprises or heads of public administration services"; penalties for managers for non-application of disciplinary legislation were
fines;
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sued for unlawful strike, 23 and the sentencing and arrest of three experts who in the early 80s
left their jobs in the Ministry of Construction without the employer's authorisation and so were
convicted of 'passive resistance'.
The involvement of UNTA in disciplinary boards alienated many workers from the
union and gave unionists a bad reputation. 24
 So, in 1981, when new labour legislation,
especially the GLL, was adopted under the pressure of UNTA, the union was partially
released from its direct functions of repression of workers. 25 Nevertheless, although GLL
repealed the part of Law no 11/75 on disciplinary offences, the part on 'crimes against
production' remained in force during the period studied.
After GLL campaigns tried to bar the mobility of labour, considered a result of
activities of firms which paid wages higher than those fixed. 26 Incapable of controlling the
supply and flows of labour, from 1987 the state promoted a campaign for the return of exiled
Angolans27 aimed at increasing the supply of the cheap Angolan labour. 28 Still, the basic
conditions which motivated workers to flee employers, especially the public ones, remained:
job dissatisfaction due to low pay, discrimination under the party leadership scheme, nepotism
23.Mo. 30.6.76 (Labour) ordered all SIGA workers (a packaging factory at the time the only producer of bags for coffee) to return immediately
to work "notwithstanding criminal suit which may arise on grounds of the Law ... (Law no 11/75), (art 1). See also subsection 3.4.4. and on
other strikes. Cahen, 1985.
24.Cahen. 1985: 19, on unionist being called 'informers' of the police. See subsection 3.4.4., on changes in UNTA strategies.
25.Law no 981 (on Industrial Justice) allocated the power to apply disciplinary penalties to the management, with appeal to a court of industrial
relations (dealing with appeals related to disciplinary offences and also with all kinds of conflicts arising from the execution of employment
contracts); this court was elected at the workers assembly, an composed by a representative of management and three representatives of workers;
from these courts there was a right of appeal to the provincial commissions (composed by a representative of the Ministry of Justice, another from
the ML and a provincial secretary of UNTA, Joint Exec.Dec. no 46/81, Labour and Justice, regulating art 9 of Law no 9/81) and from these to
the national commission. See subsection 3.4.4.
26. "Problems (on cadres) remain, and enterprises and central organs persist on failing to satisfy their needs in labour force; the anarchic
fluctuation and recruitment of workers and the inducement of senior cadres by private firms, foreign companies and even PEs continues, in a
clear violation of the legislation in force in PRA, as the Ministry of Labour does not exercise the authority allocated to it by law. I remind the
competent entity the to need to govern and not to follow passively the events which counter the interests of the state." (Dos Santos to the 1st
Methodological Meeting of the Cadres Department of MPLA-PT, quoted in 74 [8], Novembro, 1984, 27).
27.Declarations of the minister of Finance to 0 Jomal, 12.4.1991.
28.The system of fixed wages, and related criteria, plus the problems related to the actual purdiasing power of workers in the context of
shortages, led to strong discrimination against Angolan labour in pay. For example, for the same years of professional experience, in 1986 an
expatriate graduate could earn about USD 3,500 under a TAC, while an Angolan post-graduate would earn about kz 26,000, that is, less than
USD 1,000 at the official exchange rate, and less than about USD 100 at the black market exchange rates. See section 5.2.
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in promotions, and food, transport and housing difficulties, etc. 29
 Apart from job mobility,
workers responded to the economic crisis and deteriorating living standards in diversified
ways, including by activities in the informal economy.
5.2. Wages and prices: workers responses to the economy of shortage
Higher wages have been the most important demand of Angolan workers during the
period of civil liberties and even led to criminal suits against workers after independence. To
prevent widespread demands for wage increases while simultaneously the country was
undergoing a severe economic crisis, from 1976 the Ministry of Labour enacted regulations
barring negotiations on wage increases or wages improvements through arbitrary
classifications of personnel. It also established that wages were centrally fixed by the
government and UNTA. 30 The unions were thus co-opted to control this area of labour
relations, and UNTA appeared as an essential link between the government and enterprises,
and a part of a system where conflict and different interests were supposed not to exist.
Initially wages were fixed by the Ministry of Labour, during the functionalist phase by the
ministries of Planning, Finance and Labour and later by the ministries of Planning and
Labour,31
 according to detailed regulations which formally did not allow room for manoeuvre
outside the state. 32
 Nevertheless, many employers simply ignored the wages regulations.33
29.Workers left PEs by inexistence of social conditions, and even left their careers, moving to different professions on whith they had no skills
(Guerra Marques to JA, 30.10.88, on LEA, a PE for engineering consultancies). In Luanda in 1986 every 14 out of 100 workers changed
employers (98, Novembro [11]. 1987) something which made it very difficult the control of rationing cards.
30.M.o. 30.6.76 (Labour).
31.E.g., m.o. 10 76, Joint Exec.Dec. no 55/84 and Joint Exec. Dec. no 26-B/89.
32.Laws no 6/79 and 8/81 (Wages Laws), developing CL, rut 26, on the principle of distribution according to the quantity and quality of labour
supplied (see subsection 3.1.4.) The fixing of wages and salaries involved operations of information gathering and processing too sophisticated
for the country: i. definition of occupational categories (e.g., Law no 6/79, art. 11), ii. description of iobs (e.g. cit. law, art 6) whith conditioned
the integration of posts in iii. wages, salaries scales established according to "die complexity of posts and coefficients expressing quantitative
relations between the group of the smaller complexity and her groups" (of a scale of 24 groups for the national eccoomy under Law no 6 79,
art. 4) and iv. tariffs expressing the "fundamental part of income received by the labour performed in a given unit of time and which may relate
to complexity or abnormal working conditions", including "extra qualificatory ccaditions" for some brandies or 0C0110MiC sectors" (cit. law, art
9); the system was complemented by prizes "aiming increases in productivity and work in special regions (cit law, art 10). Wages and salaries
were quantified by time, production or both (e.g., Joint Exec.Dec. no 41/84, Fisheries and Labour). it seems that some enterprises were not
willing to perform the calculations of wages the CM ordered the "suspension of payment of wages earned with contempt for the wages
legislation" (Resol. no 4/83, CM, art 1) and established fines for employers violating the law (art. 4).
33 .52, [6]. Novembro, 1982, 66.
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Immediately after independence there was also an attempt to reduce salaries and wages
of privileged segments of labour, by cutting some rights acquired by civil servants or
employees of large industries, such as the holiday allowance and any additional payments for
work in the public sector, while lifting wages at lower levels. 34 The scarcity of all kinds of
resources leads to 'miserablist' approaches to production and distribution reflected in strategies
aiming, for example, to promote a more egalitarian distribution by an wide downgrading of
living standards to the lowest levels of income instead of upgrading the standards of these in
the lowest levels of income, while simultaneously downgrading the few top groups. That is,
instead of improving the living standards of the population, a minimal target of making
everybody a poor seems to have been established. As a consequence, living with stringent
shortages of consumer goods and services provision appeared as the outcome of any attempt
of radical change of income distribution.
5.2.1. Prices
Prices were also centrally fixed aiming to ensure a given balance between the latter and
wages (actually included in a plan, the balance of monetary revenues and expenses of the
population). In fact, prices centrally fixed were low, as were wages, and would permit
reasonable (for an UDC) living standards if goods and services were available. 35 Essential links
of this scheme were the marketing PEs aiming to fill the gap in the trade network caused by
the flight of settlers and to implement a proper control of prices. Within this frame labour
supply was controlled, and compulsion to work achieved, through economic mechanisms by
coordinating supply of consumers goods and services by PEs and linking access to these
3'1 Dec. no 8 75, cutting holiday and Christmas allowances paid by private firms to workers earning more than kz 10,000 month (art
1/1 a); reducing these allowances to 50'Y° to wages between kz 10,000 and 3,500 (art 1/1/6); and maintaining them for other lower incomes (art.
11 'c) and foreign workers (art. 3). The decree ordered private firms to deliver the amounts of allowances for a special fund for national
reconstruction. also, m.o. no 27/78 (PM).
35
. If the socialist sector' worked, the low pricks practiced not only in the people's shops' but also in housing. electricity, water, etc., added to free
education and health care, it would be possible to live on the fixed wages. See Chapter 4, note 6, Table 2 and subsection 4.3.2. (Dos Santos
continents on this plan).
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goods and services to rationing cards supplied by employers. Simultaneously, collective
incentives linked to profits were established.36
The rationing cards control did not work well, firstly due to falsification of rationing
cards by either non-workers or starving workers aiming to get an increased supply. 37 But the
shortage of food and all kinds of goods soon jeopardised the whole scheme. Besides war,
legislation enacted by agrarians prevented links between country suppliers of farming products
and the towns supplying industrial goods, acting as a disincentive to attain given levels of
production. The barriers to the movements of persons and commodities reinforced shortages
and the supply of consumer goods became heavily dependent on imports, a state monopoly.38
Food products, imports value, Mn USD, CIF estimates
1971 1976 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
57.0 79.7 195.5 258.9 238.3 235.1 217.6 277.3 343.9 268.8
Source: UNCTAD Commodities Year-book, 1988
5.2.2. African traders
From the expulsion of settlers from the towns slums and their expulsion and/or flight
from the bush, African traders occupied their space, selling at prices higher than those fixed.
One of the reasons of the acute statism of trade PEs was, in some degree, the response to
these practices. 39 These African traders needed to build links with the state and/or PEs to get
an appropriate supply. These connections were actually implemented through all kinds of
mechanisms, from plain theft of containers in ports to corruption of civil servants and PEs
36.See subsection 3.4.4., note 152 (social fund).
37.As referred to by the preamble of Exec.Dec. no 36/84 (Internal Trade).
38.See Chapter 6 (collapse of the food production), subsection 3.4.5. (control of movements) 4.2.2. (state monopoly of foreign trade), section
5.3., espec. notes 73 and 74 (food imports under austerity) and Tables on food production.
39.For example. in 1978. the ministry of Internal Trade, while creating a commission for the study of the network of industrial goods in Luanda,
Rated: "Luanda was one (of the provinces) more sharply affected by the practice of illegal trade after the occupation of shops abandoned by
colonialist traders ... the overwhelming majority of individuals who occupied these shops aiming unfair profit, committed themselves to
speculation and hoard".
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workers, who prevented the marketing of products according to planned allocations and
directed them to the informal economy. 40 Progressively, while the state supplied less goods
through the rationing system, the informal economy expanded until it became 'the economy':
from water to OKs in international and domestic flights, to informal taxis, private nurseries, in
every area where the state failed to meet demand the gap was filled by (forbidden) private
competitors. 4 ' The high prices set by the informal economy led to the collapse of the fixed
wages scheme. 42
 Indeed, in 1986,
"It is certain that struggle against incompetence increased, but nepotism
resisted with all its weapons, the purchasing power of workers decreased, but
black marketing increased, the distribution of spirits decreased but alcoholism
increased, construction decreased, but divorces increased, public transport
decreased, but the number of private cars increased, the transfers of foreign
exchange are suspended, but TAAG flights to Lisbon are overbooked ... Let's
stop here. "43
5.2.3. Self-consumption, village kin and the informal economy
From the late 70s, the industrial working class, actually urbans with lowest incomes,
reinstated demands for wage increases, now through the mediation of UNTA. These demands,
within the frame of actual 'freezing' of wages, were solved in two ways: i. reclassification of
personnel allowing upwards mobility in the scale groups, 44 and, ii. the so-called 'self-
consumption' scheme.
4o
. Cases provide a picture: i. workers of Angoy Francas, a 'dollar shop', embezzled a container of beverages, divided the content and sold the
product at the parallel market, after having contracted two drivers (JA, 10.4.1988), ii. police in Kvvanza Norte confiscated consumer goods
smuggled from the 'official circuit (JA, 8.9.1988); iii. court convicted workers of a sugar PE because they embezzled 25 tonnes of sugar
falsifying doctunents in name of a client and sold the sugar in the black market at speculative prices (JA, 22.4.1988); iv. civil servants in
Kwanza-Sul were convicted by embezzlement of goods and money (JA, 15.3.1988); for theft of medicines, see section 5.4., and other cases of
embezzlement, subsection 4.2.1.. In short., "in neighbourhoods such as Sambizartga there are rumours on the existence of genuine kings of crime
some of them ex-civil servants. It is believed that these (individuals) are the bosses of the 'parallel mark& who succeed in withdrawing from the
Luanda port containers full of commodities (and) still sealed" (0 Jomal, 12.1.1990); a funny case is a printing PEs whose managers collaborated
with the "Luanda gambling mafia" printing cards for underground casinos instead of planned printing (51 [5] Novernbro, 1982, 6).
41.See, e.g.. South. June, 1990. See also section 5.3.
42.See notes 48 and 52.
43
.94 [10], Novembro, 1986, 50.
44. For example, Joint Exec. Dec. no 17/83 (Planning, Finance and Labour), on the salaries of tecfmicians, provided that workers after 15 years of
experience, demonstrating competence and at a post superior to their training, might be allowed to got the salary for the occupational post
"%ahem possessing the general knowledge demanded in the respective occupational qualification"; but the power on the issue was allocated to
the Ministry of Labour, under favourable advice of LTNTA (art. 12/1); technicians could go upwards in the scale without the time restrictions
established in the exec.dec. if again, the Ministry of Labour, under favourable advice of UNTA, so decided (art. 12/3 by reference to art 6). In
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Self-consumption is an unique scheme where employees of PEs had the right to buy a
quota of the weekly production. An hypocrite solution, since the PE sold the production to
workers at fixed prices, sometimes not meeting costs, so workers could resell the goods in the
black market at speculative prices and have an income to add to their fixed wages.45
According to studies made in the early 80s, the highest (actual) incomes in the waged/salaried
personnel were in the beverages and tobacco industries. 46 'Self-consumption' allowed the
system of fixed wages to survive with no significant workers protest. As some industries could
not sell their production in the 'parallel market' (for example oil), the system created serious
differences between the different components of the working class. Top officials of the state
and party devised a mechanism, 'requisition' of PEs' production, which may be approached as
'self-consumption' of the central command economy.47
Employees with no access to these special schemes, could not survive on their
wages. 48 Some (re)established connections with the village kin to get supplies of farming
products to trade in towns. They managed to survive if they had the possibility to travel to
bring food,49 which meant complicated activities to get permits and transport. 5° They also got
fact, these regulations meant that personnel policies, and especially the powers to reward special workers, were allocated not to employers but to
the ML and LNTA, with the risk of generating clientelisrn. There are many examples of exemptions of the system of fixed wages (e.g., m.o. no
35 87, Labour, allowing some employees of the Ministry of Construction to be paid the salaries of technicians).
45.E.g., workers in CUCA, a beer factory, under self-consumption participated in black marketing during the beer shortage by selling their quota
of beer at about lcz 5,000 the package (52, [6], Novembro, 1982, 6-7); see note 57, on beer trade.
46.A confidential study made by Angolan experts from the Ministry of Industry, showed that in these industries workers had a money income
more than ten times higher their fixed wages. This study was 'discovered' by the WB officials working in the country in the late 80s and the data
published abroad as their fmdings (African Business, June 1990).
47.See section 5.3.
48
.There are few places in Africa where wages mean less than in Angola. Officially, the monthl y minimum wage remains at kz 5,000, that is,
USD 160 at the official rate (about kz 30/1 USD) or USD 1.60 at the unofficial rate. ... The problem, according to a WB report (see note 58, on
WB discoveries), is that while higher-paid and better-connected employees can spend lcz 8,000 in the state shops, the average worker gets no
more than kz 300 worth of goods. The rest is presumed, has to be bought at the open-air nuirkets ... where a shirt costs kz 11,000, a fish kz 4,000
and so forth." (African Business, June 1990, 11).
49H•
. The Highlands city of Huambo was described as the Beirut' of Africa where the government builds by day and the guerrillas destroy by
night. ...(and) the Ovimbundu who have moved to the capital have recreated a whole new caravans network of long-distance trade similar to the
peat commercial systems which they pioneered in the 18th and 19th centuries. The first step in the rebuilding of the caravan nmworks was based
cm road transport ... After independence chops, fish and beer continued to be driven long-distance until the civil war began to make ... networks
unsafe.... Quicidy Ovimbundu merchants began to grasp opportunities of air transport to ferry goods to the archipelago towns ... Boeing jets fly
to all parts of Angola carrying ... caravaneers and market mammies ... Air caravans which replaced the 19th century headporters and the 20th
century Portuguese trucker are not confined to domestic trade.... Angolan textile merchants ... operate within the African subcontinent and across
South Mantic. Ultra cheap soft currency air farm mean that goods can be profitably bought and sold in Brazil and Brazilians have re-established
the old Portuguese specialism of producing alcoholic rotgut for the African market, Meat ... is flown from Zambia. Pharmaceuticals, on which
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involved in the informal economy. After more than one decade of attempts at state control of
trade, the (informal) market managed to integrate even those benefiting from special supply
schemes as well as those who had connections with the village kin. Putting it differently the
mammies selling at the towns markets proved to be better traders tban tbe state apparataiilcs,
and satisfied essential needs, even under strong constraints which included police violence."
5.2.4. Dollar shops and foreign enterprise
As the years passed, and living conditions worsened, groups with no access to 'self-
consumption' and/or trading activities had their living standards strongly deteriorated with the
progressive expansion of the informal economy. 52 In the 80s, the responses of these groups
were demands for higher pay through the machinery of the wages legislation. Some categories
of workers indeed got their incomes improved through the legal mechanisms of 'complexity of
work 1, 53 while others incomes remained frozen.
As wages and salaries were very low, the access to state shops, where fixed prices
worked, was crucial to maintain given living standards. But since 'people's shops' did not
satisfy survival needs, workers began to demand access to special shops. Special shops were
Angola is chronically short, are regularly embezzled and diverted to hard currency outlets in Kinshasa. The old border markets of Zombo and
Noqui thrive on border traffic as never before." (Birmingham, 1988: 5-6).
50.In 1982, as to buy tickets in trains from Luanda to Malanje was very difficult (given their shortage), black marketers invaded the trains and
paid a fine (La 1,700, a 'price' higher than the air ticket for the same trip, scarce and unavailable as well); still, there was also a black market for
train tickets, with prices 3 times the fixed ones; given the 'fines' scherne, each train which should carry 700 passengers, took 2 or 3 times more (52
[6], Novembro, 1982, 14-17); the problems of transport reflected in prices in the informal market: "for quitandeiras (the mammies in the black
market) the candongueiro (black marketer) is the middleman to whom they pay transport" (JA, 26.1.1988); in Narnibe quitandeiras complained
that the high costs of private transport forced them to sell at higher prices (82 [9] Novernbro, 1985, 27). See subsections 3.4.5. and 5.3.1.
51.As Novembro put it, arguing against the police practice of assaulting and burning markets and arresting traders: "repression will not solve the
problems of the black market, when production is low and there is no sale organised in the traditional forms; (repression) means plain ignorance
and sometimes badly hides attitudes which are typical of authoritarianism or fascism_ ... Encoclipa (the PE for dairies and vegetables) has already
demonstrated it has no capacity to ensure the supply of a few hundreds in its Cofa shop. ... If we repress quitandeiras, who will link the producer
(the farmer of the city belt) and the (urban) consumer? The way to solve the problem of the desperate walks to Cafunfo & Cia (established
parallel markets in Luanda) is to set up vegetables and fruit shops, whim may be private. ... To batter the quitandeira when we depend on her for
the Saturday's funge (Angolan cassava meal) is not the wisest policy" (70 [7], Novembro, 10, 1983).
52
.1n 1984 a family with a monthly income of kz 8,000 needed 13,000 to survive (UNTA figures) but in 1987 there was a need for a monthly
kz 150,000 wage for a five people family to survive and the average urban wages rated at about 10-12,000 (Pfiblico, 12.11.1990).
53
. Under GLL, art 122, allowing "tariff increases due to complexity ... for posts, working centres, branch or economic sector"; e.g, Dec. no
1682, Dec. no 105 82, Dec. no 104/82, Joint Exec.Dec. no 33 83 (Planning. Finance and Labour), providing for wages increases in specific
industries and professions.
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those for leaders and the shops selling in hard currency, initially for foreigners and later
extended to some categories of Angolans. There a wide range of consumer durables and non-
durables could be purchased. Vouchers granted by employers and related to a part of the
wage/salary gave access to dollar shops (that is, a part of the salary was in fact paid in
dollars). 54
 This system was implemented by oil companies, including the PE, and some foreign
companies. It proved better than self-consumption, giving direct access to essential goods with
no need to resort to the time-consuming 'sell-to-buy' activities of the working class. Still,
people with access to dollar shops could barter some products in the informal markets at
profitable conditions.
As a result of this scheme new elites arose: the employees of foreign firms, and
associated national firms, 55 and the reduced number of Angolans working in government with
access to dollar shops. These shops expanded favoured by the government from the mid-80s,56
became the 'American dream' of Angolans, 57 while the national currency and production
54.The majority of special shops. and people's shops as well, had a ceiling up to which employees of might buy; the ceilings in dollar shops were
related to the level of wages or salaries of concerned individuals, not following thus the patterns of people's shops (where every worker, whatever
the income and or size of family, had the same quota). Although some special shops only supplied personnel of involved firms, some dollar shops
were open to any holder of hard currency, whatever its origin, promoting the black marketing of foreign exchange.
55.Including Angolans working there, e.g.. "in these (oil) companies work about 2,000 Angolans, the majority of them from the Soyo county,
(and) the population of the county is estimated in 90,000 individuals. The social benefits of these 2% of Soyo population working in the oil
industry are no doubt very superior to these of other workers, and thus people interested in getting a job there are quite above the figures of those
who actually have the jobs" (JA, 20.4.1988); workers at Fina PetrOleos (an oil company operating in the zone) even benefited from a housing
programme of the company. in a 30 has area, including electricity and water infrastructures, a cultural centre, sports devices, a market and a
children's park (JA, 22.4.1988).
56.From 1986 some services could only be supplied in USD, that is, only the holders of hard currency had access to them; for example Dec. no
386 established that residents and non-residents should pay services in the country's best hotels in foreign exchange (alt 1); dollars shops had a
privileged status: Resat. no 3'86 (CDS) established that dollar shops Lojas Francas, a PE associated to Yugoslavian Brodokomerc in mixed
Angoy Francas sold duty free (arts 1 and 2), had priority in customs (att. 6) and had the right to a grant of a renewable permanent loan of USD 2
Mn from the central bank (art. 7); also Exec.Dec. no 2/87 (Finance); Resol no 9/89 (CDS) ordered the ministries of Trade, Finance and Planning,
and the central bank, to draft a programme of expansion and diversification of "Hard Currency Commercial Undertakings" (HCCUs), (att. 1),
"promoting competition among HCCUs" (ibid.), providing shops for HCCUs by selling, after tender, the state shops to investors (art 2); sale in
HCCUs was made through credit cards, granted to those with access to the shops (art. 3).
57."In Angola there are two with well-defined borders: that of USD, reserved to foreigners, top government officials and black marketers, and
that of lo.vanzas, for the common population ... (as) on the other hand Lojas Francas are well supplied There you pay in USD, or with special
cards, the desired 'golden card'. This makes a fracture in this society. Foreigners, who dispose of dollars, and an Angolan elite, to which belong
the top civil servants and members of the party, with living standards much higher than the majority of the population. ... what a foreigner pays
for a dinner in dollars, is more than what an Angolan family of four has to feed for a whole month.' ... In this society, the social status of an
individual is also measured by the quantity of beer (imported) to which his/her card gives access ... (and) this beverage may become a valuable
exchange good" (Caires. 0 Jomal Ilustrado, 21.6.1991).
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became the striking image of the failure of the country and individuals with no access to
USDs.58
To respond to the shortage of labour, foreign and some national private enterprises
paid wages and salaries higher than those fixed and provided for other incentives. In some
cases they consisted in fringe benefits such as holiday allowances abroad, or simply the
payment abroad of a part of salary. This led, besides the 'food impact' in the 'parallel market',
to further mobility to these enterprises. As the incentives, and actual better industrial relations,
practiced by foreign enterprise, reinforced the shortage of labour in the public sector, in 1983
legislation ordered foreign enterprises to pay only the fixed wages in national currency,
forbade the payment of any extra income and naively ordered workers to return to the state
the amounts in hard currency paid by employers. 59 These regulations, and the fact that strikes
and workers demands outside UNTA were forbidden, made PRA a good host of foreign
investment, with the state preventing foreign employers from paying higher wages and
salaries.60
5.2.5. Changes in wages and prices
The rise in fixed wages and prices remained on the agenda since a substantial number
of employees could not resort to the alternative mechanisms. The freeze of wages lasted for
more than five years and never met the real increase in prices. So, under the economic reform,
58.As US!) provided access to the dollar economy, it was in high demand, e.g.: "at the official rate, now icz 60 value one USD. But, even in the
streets, one USD values at least kz 800. And a good bargaining with the dealer may even get higher values. ... (in the Luanda slums) three fat
Angolan mummies (traded hard currency) in the street, in front of FAPLA. It is called an illegal operation of foreign exchange. (but) 'Everyone
makes it because there is a brutal disparity between the official rate and the real value of the Angolan currency" (Caires, 0 3omal Ilustrado,
21.6.1991).
59.Joint m.o. no 15 83 (ML and Finance). arts. 2, 1 and 3, and art. 5.
60.See Chapter 7. Actually often foreign firms were redistributing gate payments from their government contracts.
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in 1988 many prices were freed 61 and in 1989 fixed prices got a general increase of 44%,62
with the effect of making the economy more transparent and eventually benefiting PEs and co-
operatives selling related products at fixed prices. Also, in 1989 the price-fixing system was
rationalised and included the category of 'free prices'.63
In 1989 wages and salaries in some categories got a near 100% increase" while
remaining almost constant in others (actually the lower levels). 65 The 1989 regulations
provided for differential wages and salaries in public administration (higher) and enterprises,
"aiming to attract experts to the state", 66 facing shortages of labour and the competition of
foreign and/or private firms. Nevertheless, everybody, even with cosmetic increases, remained
badly paid.
5.2.6. Social outcomes
After years of working with a system of fixed wages and prices, within a frame of
stringent shortage of consumer goods, the relations between the different social groups were
61.Prices of 52 vegetables and similar products; the measure was naively explained as "conducing to the establishment of more fair competition
nibs between the different types of economic formations which should compete in the market to achieve the full working of the supply and
demand law as an essential element to the regulation of consumer prices" (preamble Joint Exec.Dec. no 17 88, Planning. Finance and
Agriculture, freeing prices); the measure was expected to impact "the increase of the number of people committed to production, the decrease in
the agents in the marketing chain, a more fair distribution of income to producers in the countryside and the free movement of commodities"
(declarations of the deputy Minister of Agriculture, 0 Jomal, 2.9.88). On prices in the 90s, see subsection 8.1.6.
62.Resol. no 489 (CM). justifying the measure on grounds of increases of production costs, leading to losses by enterprises, and increases of
wages without the correspondent increases in productivity, which even decreased (preamble cit. resol.).
63.Dec. no 14 89. on the new prices system; prices were divided into: i. fixed prices, maximal prices of goods and services fixed by the ministers
of Planning and Finance "according to regulations to be enacted by the Economic Commission" (art. 2), ii. girarantied prices, minimal prices of
purchase of farming/ranching products (art. 3/1/a) and maximal prices for the sale of some products to peasants (art 3 1/b), both for goods and
services established by the minister of Planning (art 3/2), and fixed by the Ministry of Planning, after consultation of the branch and local
govenunent, and under proposal of the 'economic agents' (art 3/3), iii. marketing margins, to add to the purchase price for gross trade and
retailers (arts. 4 1 and 4/3), fixed by the minister of Planning (art 4/2), and, iv. free prices, established by producers (art 5); provincial
commissioners might fix prices of products under fixed, guarantied and margins regimes not centrally fixed (art 6). On the former price system,
see Chapter 5, Table 2, note 17.
64.Appendixes to Dec. no 44/89 (on minimal wages and salaries for the different categories of personnel), and Joint Exec.Dec. no 26-8/89.
65.For example, the minimal wage for workers in enterprises remained la 4,500, a misery wage; in administration and services, the 1989 tables,
when compared with the 1984 tables of wages and salaries for telecom workers (Joint Exec.Dec. no 55/84) or the 1982 tables for miners (Joint
Exec Dec. no 11/82), or for tedmicirms, were maintained as well; however, the salaries for leaders and managers of the public administration
increased from, e.g., lez 26,100 for group XV (as fixed by Dec. no 10 87) to 44,350.
66.Preamble Joint Exec.Dec. no 26-B/89; according to the Appendixes to Dec. no 44/89, in the state: leader kz 72,000, expert kz 59,500; in
enterprises the wages and salaries for the same categories are lower (respectively 40,000 and 35,000), including in PEs and co-ops (Joint
Exec.Dec. no 26-B 89, art. 3).
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reshaped but not in the direction intended by the socialist option. Indeed, part of the working
class were integrated into the speculative market in a permanent relationship, as part of state
bureaucracies and employees of foreign firms and international organisations. In these
activities, everybody, although eventually for survival reasons, cooperated in the extortion of
the meagre incomes of less fortunate waged/salaried labour.° Thus statist socialism, and the
maintenance of the system of fixed prices and wages pairing with shortages, widespread
corruption and lack of capability of the state to ensure minimal levels of supply, had as a by-
product the emergence of a powerful trading stratum linked to the 'new elites'. 68 This stratum
made a substantial accumulation and became one of the candidates for privatised PEs, that is,
to employ waged labour beyond the use of (non-paid) labour of the extended family.
In this process, PEs, either industrial or farming, forced to sell at fixed prices their
marketing production, made losses since, among other reasons, they had to pay (at domestic69
or international pricing) some inputs or to maintain employed absent personnel. These losses,
financed by the budget (which paid the losses of PEs forced to practice centrally fixed prices)
meant that in practice the budget was indirectly subsidising the informal economy, to which a
part of PEs production was channelled via 'self-consumption', corruption and theft. This
'differential treatment' against PEs was one of the motives of their association with foreign
partners and the autonomy claims which led to the economic reform.7°
5.3. Control of trade: agrarians and bureaucrats images of planning
67.Traders in the informal economy. while providing an important service, do not work under fair rules of supply and demand: indeed, to keep
prices high in the 'parallel market', they restrain quantities when supply increased, at the price of deterioration of already rare products; the same
happens with small producers, such as fishermen or some farmers. So they are quite capable of extorting a rent by manipulating supply, as an
exampk on the eve of the change of currency (see subsection 8.1.6.) in Luanda bars the price of beer jumped from Icz 1,500 to 25,000 and in the
next day products had disappeared from the parallel market (PUblico, 24.9.1990).
68.Black marketers had amazing amounts of money in their hands when money was dianged in 1990: the biggest deposit at the time, according
to official sources, kz 340 fvfn was largely superior to the cash flow of many PEs (Expresso, 29.9.1990); these `new rich', added to top party and
government officials, are called the 'new class' created by the central command economy and the war.
69.To face the shortage of inputs to PEs some managers had to resort to the informal economy, which the state network was incapable of
procuring: the dilemma of PEs managers was to choose between paralysation of the enterprise due to, say, lack of a spare sold in the informal
market, or to break the law by buying in the informal market at 'market prices'. See subsection 4.3.1.
7°. See Chaixers 7 and 8.
220
Providential state
The marketing of consumer goods illustrates the working of the central command
economy and explains present outcomes of economic policy. As the years passed, a permanent
shortage of goods was reinforced by the dramatic increase of demand after independence and
the collapse of national production.7'
Per capita food production, % growth
1961	 1970	 1980	 1982	 1983	 1984	 1985
1970	 1980	 1985	 1983	 1984	 1985	 1986
1.3	 -3.0	 -2.2	 -1.6	 -2.3	 -2.3	 -2.5
Total food production % growth
1961	 1970	 1980	 1982	 1983	 1984	 1985
1970	 1980	 1985	 1983	 1984	 1985	 1986
2.8	 0.2	 0.3	 0.8	 0.0	 0.1	 0.1
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1987, Supplement
From the mid-80s, the fall in oil prices, the almost single hard currency sourcen and
financing imports of food, led to further restrictions in consumption 73 and to the need of
external emergency food aid. 74 The oil crisis and austerity measures meant that the marketing
71.For example. the consumption of sugar per capita (kg) was: 7.3 in 1975; 15.5 in 1980; 11.8 in 1983; 12.3 in 1984 and 11.4 in 1985
(Source: UN Statistical Year-book 1985-86); in the supply side, for example, total fish catch fell from 559,000 tones in 1972 to 191,000 in 1985
ith Angolan ships catching only 62,500 tonnes (South, June 1990, 88); also "the volume of maize marketed through state charm& dropped to a
mere 11,935 tons in 1985, compared with the 227,522 marketed through colonial guild in 1973/74" (Hodges, 1987: 33). See also Chapter 6 and
the	 table on food imports at subsection 5.2.1.
72.From 1982 oil prices began to fell (from USD 26-27 a barrel to 8 a barrel in 1986): according to Dos Santos the fall in prices cost the country
USD 600 Mn in 1986 (AED, 15.3.1986 and Hodges, 1987: 68-9); in 1986 the 'policy of austerity was adopted (see next note); still, despite
increases in oil exports, the deficit of Angolan balance of payments "widened from the 1981 USD 100 Mn" and imports, mainly for defence and
food, were likely to fall (AED, 25.2.83, quoting declarations of the Minister for External Trade).
73.Austerity measures included: i. suspension of travel abroad and transfers for family travel, ii. reduction of diplomatic expenditure, iii. review
of re-insurance policy, iv. "rapid and significant" cut in the foreign labour, v. review of TACs, vi. "promotion of foreign exchange control for the
acthity of foreign fimts or their agencies or subsidiaries", vii. redefinition of the investment policy to make it more 'realistic', and, viii. stress on
the production for exports and import-substitution (AED, 15.3.1986); austerity also led to the maintenance of the same levels of hard currency
emenditure when prices of imports rose meaning increased shortages: e.g., preamble Exec.Dec. no 36/84 (Internal Trade) stated that the
rationing card did not work properly and "given the low levels of our agricultural and industrial production, and the increases on prices in the
international markets, especially primary needs goods, it is necessary to adopt a new system of supply capable not only to guarantee the vital
minimum to the committed and conscious workers, but also capable to finish all the manoeuvres around provision, which are a result of
disorganisation"; still, imports of consumer goods were in 1986 50% these of 1985 (PR to the SEF Seminar). On the continuing austerity in the
late 80s and early 90s, see subsection 8.1.6.
74.Lopo do Nascimento stated in the early 80s: 'The mot-d'ordre at the world level is to tighten the belt and some UDCs are already 'eating the
belt'. Significantly, our country becomes included in the list of countries with such a low level of domestic production that they need international
aid in a situation on which it is politically bargained. FAO estimates that Angolan production of cereals added to its imports will have a food
deficit of about 200.000 tonnes, that is, eadi Angolan will consume daily, in average, 220 gr. less than the minimal level for a food diet" (JA,
9.5.1982). See also Chapter 6.
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PEs had progressively less goods to sell while the parallel market increased its share in the
marketing of all kinds of goods. From the late 80s, having already forgotten the 'wild
capitalism' patterns of behaviour of Angolan traders,'" under the restructuring programme the
government implemented the privatisation of all retail trade, actually just making the reality
transparent.
5.3.1. Statisation and monopolisation of trade
As stated above, immediately after independence PEs began to organize to control
marketing, motivated by statist approaches and also by the behaviour of the settlers traders.
Besides participating in the unequal exchange, from 1974 some traders also involved
themselves in at least support for terrorist groups and in sabotage activities such as the closing
of existing shops in towns. 76 The gap in gross and retail trade was formally filled by PEs, while
some previous private traders remained operating in the country and a new group of traders
arose in the parallel market:77
Following the general trend, the state tried to perform in trade the most detailed
activities, by the mediation of all kinds of public institutions. Commissions to organize the
marketing of some products78 were ancestors of later PEs, and emergency measures were
75.Who persisted in channelling to the black market goods distributed by the state to be sold at fixed prices, e.g.: some private restaurants
supplied by the beer factories, as they decided a weekly procurement to hotels and restaurants, closed restaurants saying that there is no beer
supply and saved allocated beer to black marketing, so a barrel of beer reached kz 25,000; (52 [6], Novembro, 1982, 6-7).
76. For example, a decree of the High Commissioner during the transitional period (October 1975) showed the picture: "many trading
aiterprises, individual traders and catering undertakings are closing their businesses wider the pretext of holidays or other motives. ... many of
these motives are not true and they are a genuine sabotage against the economy of the country, by the enormous damages they cause to the
public" (preamble of Dec. no 135 75, suspending some norms of DL no 3671, 1966, on commercial licensing); the decree forbade traders to
close businesses (art 2), ordered these closed to reopen (art 4/1), and provided for penalties for law-breakers (arts 3/single par. and 4/2); see
subsection 1.1.2.
77.See section 5.2.
78.E.g. m.o. no 36'76 (Planning). on a 'working group' which "disciplined and organised the marketing ciraiits of cattle and meat ... (and)
studied the creation of a PE (Dinaprope)" and had 'to implement the mechanisms allowing the control and regulation of movements, sale,
purehase, import and export of cattle and meat and milk and dairies" (art 1).
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initially taken to reopen closed shops. 79 When the gross and retail PEs were created, they had
no organisation or experience for the business and the previous PE had been extinguished.80
They were under an almost complete control by the branch which exercised owners rights and
supplemented the PEs incapacity to perform their functions. 81 Quite often, interministerial
commissions were set up to support trading PEs.82
Although trade PEs did not perform their tasks in an adequate way, from independence
they (and varied entities marketing other products), began to claim for monopolies. From 1975
EMPA got the monopolies of marketing of some consumer goods, and the prohibition of their
sale by producers. 83 Other entities, for the sake of a planned distribution, also got monopolies
79.E.g. m.o. no 26 76 (PM). creating the 'supply brigades' for the increase of shops and marketing of products in Luanda; the brigades included
members of the ministries of Construction, Transports, Trade and NPCs (art. 1); in each neighbourhood a brigade was in charge of bread shops,
popular markets, butchers and retail shops (art. 2); NPCs appointed two or three individuals to work permanently in supply (art. 2); the project
was financed by the budget (art 3).
80.E.g. Edinba. for the distribution of food (Dees no 777 and 83-A 78). Edinbi for consumer durables (Dees no 7/77 and 83/78). the 29 retail
PEs created by m.o. no 141 78 (Internal Trade). See also subsection 4.2.2.
81.Mo. no 15 77 (Internal Trade) established: i. national wholesales PEs should "acquire, according to contracts agreed to with external trade
and national productive PEs, the consumption goods ... and market them to the gross internal trade PEs according to the National Plan for
Marketing providing for the necessary transports" (art. 1); ii. gross PEs should "acquire goods to the national wholesales PEs and to the
production entesprises of their area, providing for the transports adequate to the marketing and also planning properly their activities and needs,
aiming the correct fulfilment of the plan approved from above" (alt. 2); iii. retail PEs should "acquire consumption goods ... and market them in
shops, and direct and control the activity of these shops" (art 3). The need to enact these norms shows how managers were unaware of their
fimdions and the existence of eventual conflicts between PEs; in this case, the former managers of the PE which worked from the transitional
period to 1977 had been arrested under false accusations (see subsection 4.2.2.); the argument of shortage of managers often worked just an alibi
for upwards mobility of incompetent or for association to foreign firms.
82.E.g., m.o. no 36 77 (PM), creating the Commission for the Study of the Supply Network of Luanda which included also commissariat and
NPCs (art. 1). to "inventory shops, rninimarkets, markets, supermarkets and sales stationers" (art. 2); m.o. no 42/77 (PM) creating the provinces
supply cormnissions, which included also members of MPLA departments(arts 1 and 2); the commissions aimed the purchase of peasants
production while supplying them products (preamble m.o. and art 1) and were supposed to organise the 1st Campaign for Marketing in the
Countryside (art. 9), to market agricultural surpluses (see section 6.1.) restoring the marketing circuits destroyed by the war and the flight of bush
traders.
83.Mo. no 23 75 (Planning). arts 1 and 2; "(since) products are marketed in a disorganised and undisciplined way, leading to the practice of
speculation and to a bad marketing at the settlement zones" (preamble), marketing by producers was forbidden. See also subsection 4.2.2.
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on sale,84 purchase85 , or use of some categories of goods. In the early 80s some agencies
persisted on attempting to get monopolies on non-essential goods.86
Government agencies also established restrictions on the timing of marketing 87 and
movement of goods, the latter strongly damaging the intensity of exchanges between towns
and peasant societies. 88 Other instrument to monopolise trade were the compulsory
authorisations from public entities to sell or to perform pre-sale activities. 89 The black market
for hard currency, or just the parallel market, also justified further restrictions, especially
making some transactions difficult.9°
84. E.g. m.o. no 97 78 (Internal Trade and Transports): the sale of cars spares and accessories was a monopoly of the shops of the Ministry of
Transport (art. 1).
85. E.g.. m.o. no 11677 (Internal Trade): all salt producers, either public, mixed or private, were "compelled to sell their total production to ...
Edinba" (art. 1), the sale to enterprises using salt as a raw material was outside this scheme, but these firms should sell their surpluses to Eclinba
(art. 2); still, industrial enterprises using salt as a raw material needed an authorisation from the gross PEs to buy the product (art. 4); m.o. no
113 76 (Agriculture): all private coffee producers or exporters must sell production to ICA (a marketing board for exports), (art 1).
86. An example is the control of craftsmanship by the Secretary of State of Culture, which self-allocated the marketing of crafts and vigorously
attacked private traders (m.o. no 20/78, Culture).
87. E.g. m.o. no 4876 (Agriculture), stating that the frozen meat for the supply of Luanda only might be distributed when the related agency
(the working group for meat) so decided (single art) since "die meat will only guarantee the supply in Luanda for one or two weeks ... (and)
people are trying to create conditions for the continued supply without which any distribution will be demagogic and will create in the popular
masses expectations which cannot be satisfied ... (given the fact that) information on the arrival of the meat will generate strong pressures for its
marketing" (preamble cit. m.o.).
88. From 1977, any truck driver carrying farming products had to exhibit an 'interprovincial travel permit' (m.o. 2.9.77, Internal Trade, art.
1/1/a), granted by the ministries of Agriculture or Internal Trade (art 2/a) or, when there were no local delegations, by the local commissioner
(art. 2 b); the missing of this permit was considered 'economic sabotage', and as such punished under Law no 57/76 (cii m.o. art. 7); this system
was reinforced by m.o. no 160/78 (Agriculture), providing for the apprehension of commodities transported without the permits and the ban of
their marketing (art 4); by 1982 regulations from the ministries of Interior, Agriculture and Internal Trade, prevented the transit of farming
goods from the produdion areas to the consumer towns and their sale (Exec.Dec. no 34/82); m.o. 10.6.82 (Interior), and provided for the arrest
and criminal suits of truck drivers not complying with the ban of transit of some products or travelling without the permit (art. 1); in 1986 the
interprovincial movement of goods was restored, with the repeal of the 1982 regulations (Exec.Dec. no 35/86, Interior, Agriculture and Internal
Trade). See also, subsection 3.4.5. (movement of persons).
89. E.g, m.o. no 7676 (Planning) stated that private cattle ranchers could not sell, transport or abate cattle without the permit of the 'working
group for meat' (art 3) and provided for confiscation of cattle and/or meat in case of conterrqrt for the m.o. (art. 3.4); m.o. no 13/77,
(Construction) forbade the sale of bricks without the authorisation of the provincial delegates of the ministry (art. 1); m.o. no 16/79
(Construction) forbade producers to enter into agreements related to obligations to supply "significant quantities of building materials" without
the authorization of the Ministry (art 1).
90. E.g.. m.o no 4176 (Finance and Communications) established that air tickets could not be sold without proof of residence (art 1) and non-
residents had to pay them in hard currency (art. 3), "in order to avoid currency speculation" (preamble); m.o. no 36/76 (Finance) forbade the
movement of tobacco from Luanda to Cabinda (art. 1) actually to prevent its smuggling to Zaire and Congo; m.o. no 37/76 (Planning), forbade
the movement of medicines to Cabinda on the same grounds, and stated that only authorized agencies might transport the medicines to the
province (art 2); m.o. no 76/76 (Planning) forbade the transit of cattle from some provinces (art. 2) and established marketing points for sale and
functioning of abattoirs (art. 1), to prevent the spreading of animal diseases and "anarchy in the purchase of cattle and consequential rise of
prices, indiscriminate abating, precipitate decapitalisation" (preamble m.o.).
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All these regulations aiming at the supply to consumers of ever shortage goods, had
the dysfunctional impact of empowering the related segments of bureaucracies committed to
unlawful activities through their links to the informal economy.
5.3.2. Protocols and contracts regulating transactions within the public sector
The emergence of centralised marketing was followed by widespread financial chaos of
the concerned PEs, which were not willing to pay to suppliers, an attitude shared by their
clients. 91
 From 1977 interbranch agreements, the protocols, between central organs of public
administration tried to regulate exchange relations of subordinated enterprises. The first is the
1977 protocol of Internal Trade and Finance, providing for credit facilities at low interest rates
for trade PEs and subsidies from the Budget for their investments.92
To ensure a regular procurement, from 1977 the Ministry of Internal Trade entered
into agreements with its main potential suppliers, the industrial, agriculture, 93 fisheries94 and
external trade95
 branches. The first protocol between the ministries of Internal Trade and
Industry, on the centralised allocation of the industrial production, was then adopted.
According to the protocol, the industrial PEs should deliver all their production to trade PEs,
but industrial PEs managed to keep the marketing of beer, bread and soft drinks. The Protocol
also stated that payments for sales of industrial PEs was made through the banking system.96
91.See subsections 4.4.1.
92.Protocol 24.2.77 (Finance and Internal Trade).
93.Protocol 21.6.77 (Internal Trade and Agriculture). The protocol divided marketing activities of the brandies PEs, provided for deliveries
from agriculture to internal trade PEs according to a trimester plan, and Agriculture compromised to grant travel permits for the carriers of
fanning products; the purchase of fanning products was financed by loans granted by the cartral bank (nos 2, 3, 4, 7 and 11, respectively). As
internal trade PEs could not reach many peasant societies, Agriculture became the agent of trade PEs, while the need for formal contracts was
emphasised (nos 14 and 17); the Protocol allocated the marketing of thy products, including palm oil, to internal trade and dairies and vegetables
to apiculture trading PEs (no 5); on other attempts to ensure the supply of farming products to trading PEs, see, e.g., sections 6.1. and 6.2.
94.Protocol 29.7.77 (Internal Trade and Fisheries); divided markets, where Internal Trade kept thy fish and Fisheries marketed fresh and frozen
fish (no 5), provided for the grant of travel permits for interprovincial transit (no 7), the planning of deliveries (nos 2, 3 and 4) and resort to the
central bank loans for the payment of Internal Trade purchases (no 10/a).
95.Protocol 1.10.77 (Internal and Ddernal Trade); subordinate PEs imported consumer goods accordingto a deliveries plan sent by the Ministry
of Internal Trade (no 1) and within the general framework of the Imports Plan (see Chapter 4, Table 2); the protocol also ruled fonns of payment
and the reschedulling of debts, using soft loans granted by the central bank on financial clauses (no 6).
96.Protocol 21.6.77 (Industry and Internal Trade). no 5-8.
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The protocols continued in the following years. 97 But as relations became more
permanent, the ministries began to resort to economic contracts to regulate the supply of
goods to Internal Trade PEs. In 1983 the ministries of Industry and Internal Trade enacted the
first standard economic contract, whose acceptance and agreement was compulsory for the
dependent enterprises. The standard contract was a planned contract, and cut the initiative of
the parties in the contractual relation. 98 Indeed, there was an obligation of sale and terms for
delivery of the total production of an industrial PE according to its plan. The standard contract
also ruled quality, prices, delivery, payment and compensation for non-performance. Contracts
needed the authorisation of the plan cabinets of related ministries.99
An innovation of this standard contract within the system of administrative planning
was to provide resort to courts in case of conflict not solved by agreement. Until then, and
actually only from the PEs law of 1988, conflicts between PEs, or these and public
administration bodies, were settled by the administration, such as the case for debts. wo From
the 80s trade PEs had their previous preferential access to cheap credit ruled by the common
regime, given the repeal of the related protoco1.101
The planned distribution of goods did not work properly for many reasons, e.g.,
scarcity of goods and worsening of the country's economy, the fixed prices scheme, theft,
97.E.g. Joint Exec.Dec. no 52 78 (Industry and Internal Trade). (flanged the 1977 protocol: I. transferred to Internal Trade small businesses
under the control of Indoory, such as coffee shops (art. 3), ii. divided marketing, where Internal Trade got the right to the total production of
industrial consumer goods PE,s (art. 5/1), excepting timber, beer, soft drinks, tyres, electric wires and bread (art 5/2); industrial PEs, when they
used sugar as a raw material, were allowed to buy sugar directly to PEs (art. 6/2) and Internal Trade compromised to supply sugar to industrial
PEs not located in the provinces of producers (art 6/2); iii. established the principle that exchange relations must be ruled by contracts whidi
could not counter the interministerial agreement (art_ 8).
98.Joint Exec.Dec. no 31/83 (Internal Trade and Includry). approving the standard contract for sales of indildry to trade (arts 1-3); see Chapter
4, notes 4 and 5. The 'planned contract', as contrasted with the 'economic contract strict° sensu' (both integrating the category of economic
contracts in planned economies), provided for a detailed regulation of contractual relations according to administrative acts of planning so,
agreement was compulsory and the quantities to sell, the prices, the specifications of products, the terms of delivery, etc., had to reproduce the
plan indicators of producers and buyers.
99.Standard contract, clause 1 and instruction 6, clause 3, clause 8, clauses 5 and 7, clause 9, clause 10 and clause 18, respectively.
10
°. Standard contract, clause 16; standard contracts also aimed to attenuate the widespread non-performance within the state sector (see, e.g.
subsection 4.4.1., on the 80s financial cleansing); in 1983 the Ministry of Inductry adopted another standard contract to regulate the relations
between industrial PEs in the area of services (Exec.Dec. no 83/83, Ind o4ry); in this inside-branch standard contract, conflicts were solved by the
PLC (clause 15), thus resorting to administrative settlement of conflicts.
101
. Joint m.o. 14.8.82 (Finance and Internal Trade), arts 1 and 2.
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bureaucracy and the deprivation of producers decision-making power. The unwillingness of
enterprises and consumers to pay for products and especially some services, also worsened the
picture. 102 Also, the system did not please many bureaucrats, who saw planning as an alibi to
legitimate their privileged access to scarce goods. With these goals, the requisition scheme
was implemented: deviations from planned allocations could be authorised by the branch
and/or local authorities. This gave some ministers a substantial political leverage, stronger
than, for example, being a member of the CM. Indeed, they could provide access to goods and
services supplied by the branch (or local) enterprises, especially PEs, to selected categories of
consumers and they even could bargain trade-offs at other levels. So the practice of
authorisation of requisitions by ministers, commissioners and/or provincial delegates spread.103
Attempts made by radicals to get rid of their 'requisition' allocation powers, were not
welcomed by many of their agrarian peers.1°4
Under the regimes above described, the role of producing PEs was, in marketing, to
obey the orders of planning bureaucracies (which enacted the indicators of mercantile
production) or the orders for sales under requisition. In some cases production of, say,
industrial PEs, never reached shops. 105 Simultaneously, the high demand consumer goods
were available in the 'parallel market' at high prices, to which those with purchasing power
resorted.
102.An example of the attitude of consumers are electricity and water bills; consumers in Luanda paid very small amounts for electricity and
water (e.g,, Icz 50 month), causing losses to supplier PEs, which also could not calculate the bills properly (78 [8], Novembro, 1984, 14); m.o. no
7/84 (Finance and Energy.) implemented a new scheme (of contracts) to prevent 'The accumulation of debts by consumers" to the power industry
(preamble cit. m.o.); on debts between enterprises, see also subsections 4.2.1. and 4.4.1.
103.E.g. m.o. no 7 79 (Internal Trade): the sale of alcoholic drinks and industrial goods under the 'requisition scheme' needed the authorisation
of the Minister and was channelled to his/her Cabind (art 1); the m.o. also defined as a disciplinary offence the sale without the authorisation
(art 2).
104.When I worked in Inchldry in 1985-86, top officials of the ministry, including minister, deputy ministers and plan cabinet personnel, were
trying to get rid of their 'requisition' and administrative planning powers, among other reasons to avoid the ever present claimants for requisitions,
especially drinks for parties; at the time they were not successful since the system was institutionalised everywhere and some entities, benefiting
from it, did not want it repealed while countering all attempts in this saise; the majority of defenders of the 'requisition' scheme were top level
agrarians, who, as I noticed, have an unlimited capacity for demand (since they are responsible, under tradition, for the supply of endless
(Paraded family or sets of villages) and did not want to bargain their purchases with the managers of enterprises; so they resorted to their peers; it
seems that agrarians even campaigned for the dismissal of 'anti-requisition' bureaucrats and politicians.
105. As a manager of a PE said: "we (the workers of the PE) would be very pleased if we saw our products in the shops stalls, because it would
signal us the social utility of our work".
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5.3.3. Regulation of private traders
The statisation of trade was complemented with commercial licensing adopted from
1982. To perform activities private traders: i. needed a licence of activity, granted for fixed
periods, renewable when the legal requisites were fulfilled and technical specifications
respected, ii. should comply to the branch directives on planning (sales and prices), and iii. if
misapplied the branch's orders, the licences were cancelled. 106 The integration of private
traders in planning meant: i. state organs controlled their sales, when marketing goods
supplied by gross trade PEs, and, ii. they should respect fixed prices and sell only to people
exhibiting rationing cards. The patterns of behaviour of private traders within this framework
were not those expected. Besides the cases of uncontrolled sellers, 107 even 'entrepreneurial'
traders tried to escape the trade regulations, which led to further administrative involvement in
their activities. 108
As a response to the acute statism of the internal trade state apparatuses, together with
a growing scarcity of goods, the economic reform made significant changes. There was an
attempt to solve the problems of marketing and to control the informal economy by incentives
to private traders. Privatisation of people's shops and other property under the control of the
Internal and External Trade apparatuses, or the transfer of their exploration under lease
106.Dec. no 28 82. arts 34 and 34 1, 81 and 8 2, respectively; commercial licensing existed in Angola from 1966, under the licensing policies
of the colonial state; see subsections 1.1.2. and 1.1.3.
107.Uncontrolled traders often were: i. 'ambulant traders' ('re-forbidden' by Law no 10/87, see subsection 3.4.5., and beaten by the police), and,
ii these who occupied abandoned shops; these traders escaped licensing and any attempts of control due to their mobility and support from the
population. Still, mos illustrate the 70s attempts of the state, e.g.: "many (abandoned) commercial undertakings are in an unlawful situation ...
(since) these establishments are the property of the state and not a property of those who occupied than and are exploring (the shops) illegally ...
(since) it is necessary to control the commercial network, by its listing ... avoiding the spreading of opportunists and speculators whose counter-
revolutionary practice substantially conditions the consolidation of the revolutionary conquests already got." (preamble m.o. no 119/77, Internal
Trade, compelling traders to exhibit licences to the Ministry within a given term); also, m.o. no 12/79 (Internal Trade), ordered all traders to
renew licences "to increase the degree of combat to unlawful trade practices which led to hoard and speculation and, thus, to the increase in
living costs" (preamble cit. m.o.). But the official journal cannot picture the reality: for example, private traders, owners of water tanker trucirs,
sold in the Luanda slums water directly extracted from the river and spreading all kinds of diseases; see also section 5.2.
108.For example, m.o. no 6/79 (Internal Trade), mentioned that "a substantial part of private importers marketed their imported commodities in
an improper way, benefiting some people while damaging the majority of the population, so favouring speculation and hoard" (preamble m.o.);
they should thus report to the Ministry when they withdrew imports from customs (art 1). Also some activities were banned, such as in the
diamonds producing province Lunda Norte, where, due to alleged connections of private traders to diamond smuggling, private trade was
forbidden (Exec.Dec. no 34/78, Internal Trade, art. 1).
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contracts, were also decided, partially to respond to demands of the agrarian/trader strata.109
The decision of the state to get rid of ineffective undertakings such as the people's shops was a
wise one, since it could not manage them adequately, as the picture above described shows.
Also, it adjusted legal regimes to the real organisation of the economy.
5.4. Welfare provisions
The supply of goods and services to the population was complemented by the welfare
provisions related to the economic and social rights. Economic and social rights were
approached in CL as positive, implying action from the state. Here education and health care
are referred to. The fact is that Angola is an UDC and the war prevented a good quality of
related public provision However, in the early years of independence there were great efforts
to guarantee "the access of all to education and culture" and health.m
Nationalisation of education, the abolition of fees and the free provision of materials
(books, etc.) in the lower levels of education were the first measures adopted after
independence. 111 Also, when students had to move to towns to further education, where
possible free housing, food, cloth and pocket money were supplied. Compulsory schooling
remained at four years, but in villages there were campaigns to convince parents and elders to
allow students to travel to towns to continue schooling. I12 The most important investments
centred in literacy campaigns, primary and secondary education. I13 Also, employers had to
authorise workers to further their education.I14
109. See section 8.1.
110. CL, arts 29 and 27.
111. Law no 4/75 declared education a public service and nationalised all schools and related estates; from 1982 foreign students were not
entitled to free education (except for the four first years of schooling) and had to pay fees, except these belonging to liberation movements,
political exiles or students under cooperation treaties (for example, these from the ex-Portuguese colonies); also, their entry to schools was
conditioned by quotas (Dec. no 107/82, arts 1, 2, 3 and 6).
112. Made by committed teachers and higher level students during holidays.
113. For example, in 1984 the total expenditure with education was 5.2% of GNP and 11.5% of total government expenditure and the current
expenditures with education were 5.1 of GNP and 15.6% of govertiment expenditure; in 1982 there were 1,178 430 students at the 1st level
(536,105 women), 131,918 students at the second level (124,858 in general education, 3,141 in teachers training and 3,919 in other 2nd level
education). At university or equivalent institutions there were 2,674 students. Although teaching was one of the most badly paid professions,
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Thus in 1985 the distribution of students, as a percentage of the age group, enrolled in
the different levels of education was: 93% at primary education (as contrasted with 39% in
1965), 13% at secondary education (as contrasted with 5% in 1965), and 7% at tertiary
education (as contrasted with 0% in 1965). 115
 These figures show the progress made after
independence, even in the difficult war conditions."6
Nevertheless provision of services could not meet demand, due among other reasons,
to the working of the shortages economy." 7
 To face the shortage of teachers, from the late
70s the government adopted the movement of 'mobilisation for education'." 8 However, it did
not solve the problem of qualified teachers, especially in rural areas: in many villages the local
teacher had often less than six years of schooling, influencing the quality of education at all
levels. '9
there were 32,004 teachers at the 1st level and 316 for the 3rd level (UN Statistics Year-book, 1985-86); official data for 1985 stated that the
number of people registered for the 1984 , 85 academic year was 5 times the 1977/78 level and 3 times the 1974/75 level (86 PO], Novernbro,
1985. 44).
114 . Dec. no 74 76 established that civil servants and PE employees must be, when possible, authorized to go to school during the working time,
up to a limit of 9 hours per week (art 1/1) which they had to compensate (art. 1/2); Tito. no 28/77 (PM), extended the regime to private and
mixed enterprises.
115 • World Development Report, 1988.
116. Some sources blame Angola because there are only. according to their data, 28% literate people (e.g., South. June 1990, 79): these figures
were already stated for 1980 (Guia Do Terceiro Mundo, 1986, 25) and so their use as 1990 figures does not seem accurate. Also there has been a
massive inflow of illiterate refugees (about 1 Mn refugees entered the country .); population jumped from about 6 Mn in 1975 to about 11 Mn in
1990. It is estimated that from 1976 to 1986 about one million of individuals had literacy schooling (Cadernos do Terceiro Mundo, loc.cit.).
UNESCO awarded PRA the international prize of literacy campaigns; literacy training took 6 months, 6 hours/week; from 1987 literacy in some
regions was made in national languages; literacy teachers organised in brigades and worked in cormection with the JMPLA and OMA (JA,
8.9.1988).
117.The gap between demand and supply in education became very serious and in 1983 Resol. no 2'83 (CM). besides decentralising the
management of 1st level schools in local govemment (art 1), ordered many ministries to adopt measures to protect and develop educational
structures, including allocation of resources for school building by the plan (art. 7); the measures resulted from a report "Present Situation of
Education and Teaching and Emergency Measures" (preamble cit. res.), whirl', as usual, was not published; but in 1987 the PC was still ordering
the fulfilment of the 1983 measures enacted by CM (Resol. no 5 87, PC, art 1) and compelling the CM "to prioritize the acquisition of means for
education" (art 2), to specialize a building enterprise in school construction (aft 3), to study the creation of a national indwary of school
materials (art. 5), etc.
118.Educated Angolans had, when asked, to teach, or, if these tasks were not compulsory for some categories of workers, they could be
performed in voluntary work. Dec. no 44/79, on the Plan for the General Mobiliz at ion of National Teachers and Recruitment of Foreigners,
stated that workers of MPLA-PT, members of FAPLA, workers of JMPLA, OMA and L TNTA and professional cadres of unions, civil servants
and employees of PEs or co-operatives had the duty to teach, if so ordered (art 1); tmjustified refusal might be punished with dismissal of the
public sector employees (art. 6 c).
119, 5,1.o. no 108 83 (Education) banned the recruitment of teachers with less than 6 years of schooling.
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Under the planning of education, actually to deal with the shortage of high schools, an
administrative system of selection was established from the late 70s, the 'drivings', where
students entering technical schools or Alevels were allocated to careers and schools. 120 The
worsening of economic conditions and the permanent increase in demand furthered
restrictions. From 1982, free provision of materials was abolished. in From 1986, barriers
related to age and marks were established. Also, students coming from professional education
had to work for two years before being accepted at the university. 122
Education became thus such a scarce good that from 1987 the legislation on the
compulsory allocation of graduates to jobs chosen by state organs reinforced authoritarianism,
while discrimination in access to scholarships abroad was adopted. 123
 Also, the IMF package,
and related cuts in public expenditure, and reformist elitist approach to economic and social
rights, led to further restrictions on the free provision of education. 124 From 1991 private
education was approved, aiming to 'divide state responsibilities' with other organisations. 125
 As
Angolan schools became worse, and although privatisation was adopted only in 1991, from
the mid-80s schools for the 'dollar economy' opened, giving the holders of hard currency
120.The allocation of students was made by the Ministry of Education (and zone, pluriprovincial, commissions) and often did not respect their
choices; there was not formal machinery of protest on the decisions of the administrative boards; m.o. 4.7.81 (Education) created a central
commission (composed by top officials of the ministry) to approve the final allocations of candidates (art. 5 and 61g).
121.Although exemptions of payment were possible, at discretion (m.o. 28.9.1982, Education, arts 1, 2 and 4). However, in the next years
educational structures could not market books and materials properly (marketing initiated in 1981) due to shortage of transport, theft,
deteriorating storage conditions (72 [8], Novembro, 1983, 24-6).
122.Dec. no 18/86 established the criteria for priority of access. Discrimination against students coming from professional education in access to
the university existed from 1982 (m.o. no 77/82, Education).
123.Dec. no 5 82, Regulations on Angolans Studying Abroad with Grants (later dianged by Dec. no 38/89), established a sat of political
restiictions on access to scholarships to study abroad. See also section 5.1.
124.1n the academic year 1988-89 60% of students 'driven' to university and 43°/o of students registered at A levels and technological education,
could not study due to shortage of infrastructures. Measures proposed then were to: i. revise the criteria of access to school from the 5th class "in
order to establish a perfect harmony between professional training. technological and higher education, caring for a more correct professional
pyramid", ii. integrate education as an emergency programme in PER, "in order to balance the growth of students with that of physical strudures
and increase of teachers numbers", ui. establish quotas for the different sectors, iv. be
 more selective in students evaluation, and v. institutionalise
professional careers (communiqué of the 'drivings' ad hoc commission, JA, 26.10.1988).
125 . mica, 21.2.1992 and declarations of the minister of Education, referring especially to the churches (quoted in 0 Jomal, 17.5.1991):
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access to better quality and to future professional opportunities. 126 The restrictions on
education will thus contribute to reinforce social differences and the control of students.
Concerning health, nationalisation of health care and the creation of the national health
service aimed to provide free health care which included free provision of medicines at
hospitals. 127 There was a serious shortage of doctors, since only about 70 doctors remained in
the country in 1977. 128 Due to this and to populism as well, health care in the NHS came
under the control of nurses and its quality progressively deteriorated. This led doctors to flee
the country or move to the army, and people to try, when possible, other (better) health
systems. From 1984 the government had to allow the creation of health centres in enterprises,
which employed part-time professionals from NHS. 129 From 1986 the free supply of
medicines, which did not work properly due to high demand and theft, was substituted by a
scheme restricting free provision to some categories of illness, 130 which also did not work.131
The practice of unlawful medical profession by nurses, and even lower-level health personnel,
using equipment and medicines stolen from hospitals, was widespread and usually
unpunished. 132 The worsening of living and sanitary conditions, and the withdrawal of Cuban
126.For example. the Portuguese and French schools, paid in hard currency.
127. Law no 9'75, on the National Health Policy-, Dec. no 8/76 established licensing of private health centres by the Ministry of Health (alt 1)
and fixed prices for health care there (art 9); Dec. no 29/77 abolished private health care, except in multinationals, churches (art. I), dentists and
chemists (art 1/1); all the other health personnel integrated in the National Health Service (NHS), (art. 1/2) and the recruitment of personnel by
private companies for their health services was subject to agreement by the Ministry of Health (art. 3), but in 1980 the Ministry was still arguing
against foreign personnel who left the NHS to work for multinationals or churches without its authorisation (m.o. 17.11.80, Health); unlawful
practice of health care was punished with fines and confiscation of materials (arts 8 and 9); health care abroad, when not possible in the country
was also free (e.g., Joint Exec.Dec. no 11/84, Health, External Relations and Finance); health care abroad works in a super bureaucratic scheme,
inherited from the colonial practice of resort to care in Portugal.
128. m.o. no 7/77 (Health) reclassifying existing doctors, stated that in May 1977 there were 62 (from graduates with internal practice of one
year), of whom only 2 graduate-doctors.
129.Joint Exec.Dec. no 6/84 (Health and Labour, art. 1).
130.Dec. no 16/86, Regulations on Medical and Medicines Assistance, arts 14, 17 and 21.
131. "When there is no penicillin at the hospital Josina Mackie!, the doctor sends a messenger to Roque Satter° (an 'informal fair' in Luanda with
the name of an hero of a Brazilian TV soap). Because he knows that, in these trays exposed to very high temperatures, incredible rates of
humidity, wet dust and clouds of insects, we may find all kind of medicines. The doctor signs the prescription, the black marketer sells.
Somewhere, the ill person either worsens or goes better. Full loads of medicines for the hospitals disappear by mystery from the Luanda port and
appear again in the shops of this clandestine market. Aspirins, used as exchange money in times of scarcity, vitamins, almost all the pills are
taken out from the package and sold by pill. ... And the prescription is given (by the black marketer), by 'hearing', or based on the complaints,
according to the good Angolan tradition. ... Various black marketers are in the trade of medicines, which, according to rumours, is one of the
most profitable 'schemes' of the underground markets." (Caires, 0 Jomal Ilustrado, 21.6.1991).
132. According to Novembro, in 1986 medicines stolen mainly from the warehouses of the Ministry of Health (and hospitals) were sold in the
black market: "how the medicines arrive to clandestine health centres we agree that it is probably through some nurse who works at some hospital
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doctors, led to further deterioration of health care and in 1991 doctors protested against the
working of the NHS .133
5.5. Conclusion
This chapter dealt with the attempts of the providential state to supply everything while
managing the shortages economy. In a certain way, the status of economic agents coincided
with that of citizens as referred to at chapter 3. The extended functions of the providential
state did not here even bold the 'great dimension', unfeasible, but had as a consequence the
growth of state apparatuses, bureaucratic rule and centralisation.
This chapter showed how law faced the shortage of labour and the impact of its
reliance on essentially negative sanctions, in a system where incentives for Angolan labour did
not work. It also demonstrated the attempts of the state to satisfy demands of access to goods
and services through the statisation of almost all areas of marketing of consumer goods. As
the attempted equilibrium between wages and prices failed, workers resorted to alternative
means to ensure their survival which meant a given degree of integration into the informal
economy, feeding its processes of accumulation. As a result, the relative balance between the
two competing sectors, the formal and the informal economy, initially favouring the state was
changed with the informal economy progressively filling the spaces on which state supply
failed. It may thus be concluded that the main failure of the central command economy was in
the market for consumer goods and services. In this market, the agrarian/trader strata
established successful links with state bureaucracies and was capable of doing an alternative
or (regular) health centre and that takes them out by fraud. ... (in Mardi 1986) were under trial at the People's Revolutionary Court (TPR)
defendants who allegedly embezzled (in October 1983) a substantial amount of medicines from the National Deposit. According to the hearings,
TPR found out that a part of the stolen medicines was channelled to candonga (black market) and the remaining targeted smuggling to Zaire."
(891101 Novembro, 1986, 10); in 1988 the situation remained the same, with the press complaining that medicines sold in the parallel market
were imported by PE Angomedica and the smuggling of medicines to neighbouring countries continued, while nurses made patients pay kz 1,500
for an injection (JA, 9.10.1988).
133 . Southern Africa Chronicle, 12.2.1990; for example, the situation in the mid-80s (data of 1986) was: i. life expectancy at birth, 45 years
women (37 in 1965) and 43 men (34 in 1965), ii. infant mortality, per 1,000 live births, 139 (192 in 1965), but one of the highest rates in the
world, iii. births attended by health staff (1984), 15%; World Development Report, 1988.
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use of the machinery of the central command economy, whose final goal was precisely
satisfying the demand of consumers.
234
CHAPTER 6
PEASANTS: RUPTURE AND CONTINUITY
It was said that in Angola there is no land problem.' Indeed, it is a large country with a
low density of population and disposable lands,2
 some of them inaccessible by road. However,
there are differences of productivity of soils, due especially to differences in access to water
and climatic conditions. So, there is a land problem: who will get the best lands and who will
get the worst, who will be near the markets, roads and railroads and who will be so faraway as
to be forced to subsistence farming.
In this context, expropriation of land and the unequal exchange between peasant and
urban societies has been a constant feature of colonialism. Peasants reacted with violence to
the occupation of their land and changes in their forms of organisation, waging wars and
rebellions against settlers and the colonial state. 3
 With the land question on the agenda,4 the
post-colonial state made significant attempts to change social relations in peasants societies,
resorting to the mechanisation of agriculture, the statisation of large plantations and the
promotion of farming co-operatives. However, these attempts of rupture with the colonial
'inheritance' were not successful. Firstly, because the post-colonial state had to face a
catastrophic situation in agriculture. Land expropriation and compulsory cropping for TNCs,
disrupted the development of Angolan precapitalist formations and caused serious food
problems. This process was reinforced by the resettlement policies of the colonial state after
the emergence of the independence war. In 1975 settlers fled massively leaving not only
I . Pelissier, 1978, 155, referring to the scarcity of land.
2. Population: i. 1985 - 9 Mn, 1990 - 10 Mn and 2000 - 13 Mn; average annual growth of population: 1965-80 - 2.8% and 1980-85 - 2.5°o;
density of population (inhabitants by square km): 7 in 1985 (8,754 thousands inhabitants for 1246,700 square kin); sources: WB Report, 1987
and UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, Supplement, 1987.
3.See sections 1.2. and 2.1.
4.See subsection 2.1.3. and section 2.2., note 46 (MPLA Programme).
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agriculture paralysed, a consequent food crisis and the disruption of trade networks, but also
of emptiness of organisational forms which would take years to overcome.'
In addition, war devastated the countryside again, destroying human lives and
infrastructures. Peasants were the major victims of the war waged by RSA and UNITA against
the post-colonial state. As agricultural production fell, due among other reasons, to the
physical impossibility to crop in war zones, peasants were reduced to starvation and had to
migrate to towns, 6
 while the country became an international beggar. 7 The severity of the
shortage of food caused by the post-independence war has never been known in modern
Angola, except in zones more affected by the resettlement policies. It had as a consequence
the collapse of connected supply of consumers goods and industrial policies while undermining
the MPLA legitimacy. War also reinforced migration to towns, putting further strains on the
already severely inadequate levels of employment, housing, transport, and education
infrastructures. Flight to towns undermined traditional power and tribalism, and may constitute
a base for a restructuring of social structures in the countryside. 8 Also, starvation caused by
the disruption of agriculture and UNITA attacks to peasants, led social banditry to re-emerge
in its traditional zones. 9
 War and the failure of the agricultural and food policies also
5.Rella pictured the countryside economy in 1974-75 as divided in entrepreneurial agriculture for export, concentrated in a small number of
products, small family cash crop enterprises (composed by Portuguese, Cape-Verdian and Angolan small fanners), a vast rural marketing
network linking producers to consumer centres (about 28,000 bush traders), and about I Mn of subsistence peasant units in transition to
mercantile production. "And suddenly, between July and September 1975, all this system fell apart." (1992: 231-34). See also Chapter 4, note 1,
on Mario Nelson account.
6.Marketed production decreased about 90 0 0 from 1975 figures and in 1990 about 800,000 Angolans were "in the limits of survival", there were
tens of thousands of disabled from war "with no possibilities of social-professional reintegration and turned beggars", tens of thousands of war
orphans while health conditions deteriorated (Expresso, 27.10.1990); drought victims were about 2.5 Mn, while 2 Mn cattle died (Expresso,
16.6.1990); in the province of Benguela (population about 1.5 Mn), 400,000 peasants were directly affected by war, there were about 224,000
war refugees, and until July 1990 about 11,000 died of starvation; 25,000 cattle died, 103 sthools had to close and about 31,000 students (on
about 70,000 registered) could not study (Pnblioo, 9.12.1990, quoting data supplied by the provincial commissariat). See sections 5.2. and
5.3.(food) and 8.2. (data on urban population);
7.As Cardinal Nascimento characterised it, when referring to the UN programme for the victims of drought and starvation in Angola, which
would cover about 1.9 Mn people, supplying a daily ration of about 400 gr. maize, 30 gr. beans and edible oil, and also water, seeds, machinery
and heath support (Pnblico, 19.10.1990).
8.For example, the very war waged by UNITA undermined its ethnic social base, by forcing Ovimbundu peasants to migrate around the country
and establish in towns; on UNITA tribalism, see sections 2.2. and 6.3.
9.The 1989 and 1990 drought in the south caused the emergence of social bandits who were promoting inter ethnic theft in the despair of
starvation; simultaneously, in the coffee provinces, small farmers were rejecting  SOViot goods they disliked due to their 'poor quality (Expresso,
16.6.1990); on social bandits in southern Angola, see Clarence-Smith, 1979.
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reinforced the weight of small and medium farmers, whose impact in the 90s policies should
not be underestimated.
Thus, besides having to face the task of 'decoionising' social relations in peasant
societies, the post-colonial state had the immense task of 'putting in motion' the whole
agricultural production of the country. It revealed itself an impossible task in the war
conditions. Faced with overwhelming tasks, to transform social relations in the countryside
according to its Programme, to restore and reorganise trade networks and farming production,
the post-colonial state showed changing attitudes towards agricultural policies. 10
Progressively, former goals related to peasant societies (improved democracy, changes in
social and technical division of labour) were abandoned and the post-colonial state began to
adopt the late colonialism policy measures in agriculture, while the second process of loss of
their land by Angolan peasants is taking-off
This chapter describes post-colonial agricultural policies, as an example of the
connections between both societies, the barriers to change (and rupture), and the continuity of
forms of social relations. Although privatisation is dealt with at Chapter 8 (on reforms), this
chapter refers to it as well, to illustrate the point of continuity.
6.1. The agricultural policies
More than 75% of Angolan population lived from farming and ranching. 11 As stated
above, the process of development of capitalist relations in the countryside resulting from
colonialism led to a strong dependence of peasants societies, which in some areas were in a
process of shift from subsistence to integration in mercantile production. These societies were
the first victims of the 1975 war, as they had been in the independence war. The expulsion of
Ovimbundu working in coffee northern areas by FNLA in 1974, unemployment in industry and
1 °. The only systematic work on the Angolan post-colonial agricultural policies is Rena, 1992.
11 . See subsection 1.2.3.
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services, the Mbundu tribalism in Luanda in period immediately before and after independence,
forced many migrant workers to return to their regions of origin, which were no more capable
of integrating them.12
6.1.1. Nationalisation and mechanisation
The generalised flight of settlers led to the abandonment of plantations and farms. To
decide on the issue the leading party was caught between the agrarian nature of part of its
followers, the precedents of demands concerning landed property either by ruined aristocrats,
small farmers, precapitalist formations claiming their traditional territories, MPLA political
indebtedness for peasants participation in the independence war, and, simultaneously, the
urban demands for a socialist strategy, and related MPLA indebtedness for the urban residents
role in its 1975 victory.
The 1975 version of CL reflected these influences. 13 However, no policy on land
ownership was defined during the period studied although a draft land law was ready by the
end of 1975
aiming to respond to some questions raised by demands of some peasants on
lands taken by settlers, especially in the coffee areas. (Cruz, 1985: 13)14
The draft land law provided for the nationalisation of land and its concession "under
the form of free use to ... the public sector, and co-operative and private undertakings" (Cruz,
1985: 13). In 1976, the 'provincial land commissions' attempted to draft a land law and "to
reactivate production in abandoned farms and inform the government on situations of potential
12
.A number of tributary societies, structurally deformed to the point of depending heavily on the central society, had considerable difficuhies
when the 'unequal exchange' typical of the colonial period collapsed" (note Heimer, "practically the whole rural population was affected by the
shortage of food and of essential goods such as clothing and medicine") and "at the same time they had to reabsorb greater or lesser numbers of
people who had fled from the towns since 1974" (1979: 84).
13.See subsection 3 1.4.
14.In the 70s there were about 6,500 agricultural enterprises, covering about 4,5 Mn has, with an average of 770 has per enterprises. However,
any about 20°o were cultivated and three crops (coffee, ootton and sisal, accounted for 77% of the cultivated area (Rella. 1992: 232).
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nationalisation"." Solutions anticipated by the branch did not please some groups I6 and, at the
level of legislative production, state omissions persisted. The land law was announced only by
the end of the 80s, while from the mid-80s sparse decrees regulating the land question in some
areas began to shape a framework for future legislative developments.
The nationalisation of abandoned farms advanced according to the possibilities of the
state to reach them." Some workers of abandoned plantations and farms remained there in
subsistence production and others returned to their areas of origin, while an agrarian elite
began to assert itself (Sarapu, 1980: 55). Still, the policy adopted in the 70s was to transform
large plantations into PEs, integrating workers as waged labour. The later farming PEs began
as 'groupings of production units' (GPUs), merging abandoned farms and plantations to the
large number of enterprises, the shortage of labour, especially agricultural experts and
managers, and the shortage of "material means". I8 The GPUs were created by the minister as a
second best solution when farming PEs could not be set up. They were composed by
"reactivated production units and/or new units", and constituted an "economic entity" but had
neither corporate personality nor administrative or financial autonomy. The head of the GPU
was appointed by the provincial delegate of the Ministry and all GPUs were under strict
supervision by a National Direction (ND). It was stated that GPUs should progressively
evolve into provincial or national PEs, according to their dimension and national impact.I9
After the adoption of this form of organisation in agriculture to coexist with co-operatives,
15.M.o. no 52 76 (Agriculture), preamble and art. 1.
16."Land belongs to the People and the state has the power, through its adequate organs, to grant concessions on the use and enjoyment to whom
directly works on it (the land) under organised forms already defined (private entities, production co-operatives and state enterprises)", (preamble
m.o. no 119 77, Agriculture).
17.See sections 4.1. and 4.2.
18.E.g., preamble m.o. no 78/77 (Agriculture), on the organisation of GPUs; no 1 provided for criteria to group fanns into GPUs: I. their "socio-
economic importance"; ii. location of the production units; iii. "socio-economic importance of productions, sudi as grains, vegetables, ranching ...
aiming the satisfaction of the food needs of popular masses and the progressive improvemart of their diets"; iv. "availability and rational
utilization of human and material resources"; v. "affinities of the dominant activity within the production units"; vi. "relative geographical
continuity of production units"; and vii. careful establishment of new production units.
19. CIL' m.o., no 31/2 and no 2, 3/1/1 (the GPU was an "entity for planning, management and control") and no 3/1/2, no 3/1/3 and no 1,
respectively.
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GPUs were created in many provinces, some concentrating a substantial number of farms.2°
After the enactment of LPE/77, farming PE had the organisational framework of industrial
PEs. 2 ' Medium and small farms were allocated, where possible, to farming co-operatives
(Cruz, 1985: 13).
Mechanisation and the shortage of labour
In the management of nationalised plantations the state had to face, besides problems
common to all PEs, 22 specific problems of Angolan realities. One of them was the shortage of
voluntary labour to work in nationalised plantations, in a context of very reduced incentives.
The impact of the colonial labour relations in the post-colonial society was such, added to war,
that the agricultural mercantile production in 1979 was 7% that of 1973. 23 The impossibility of
maintaining a given level of non economic coercion for the work in nationalised plantations,
the shortage of cadres, the failure of incentives such as the 'rationing card' scheme as industrial
consumer goods could not reach the countryside, the low level of wages paid, 24 led to the
collapse of entrepreneurial productions traditional in Angola which added to the poor
performance of PEs.25
Coffee production, based on 'contract labour' is an example. In 1973 coffee production
was 280,00 tonnes, in 1975-76 it fell about three quarters and "continued to slide down
although sales from stocks tended to conceal this decline". In 1981 production was about
25,000 tonnes, less than two-thirds the plan target. State plantations accounted for 12,000
20.E.g, mo. no 97177 (Agricutture) merging 18 farms in the Ganda (Benguela) GPU.
21.On PEs organisation under LP1/77, see subsection 4.2.2.
22.see, e.g., Chapter 4 and section 5.3., on the problems of PEs.
23.Cruz, 1985, 17; also the production of maize was 800,000 tonnes (120,000 exported) in 1973 and 59,000 expected in 1982, (53 16]
Novembro, 1982, 21); on food, see also sections 5.2. and 5.3.
24.minimal wage in farming. Kz 4,000 in 1976 and kz 5,000 in 1989; on wages see also section 5.2.
25.After attempts to increase food production with resort to mechanisation and the expansion of production in abandoned firms, soon it was
evident that the income generated by farming PEs did not cover its costs, many in hard currency such as salaries, equipment, chemical fertilizers,
ete. (Rella. 1992: 235).
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tonnes and 'co-operatives', small farmers and capitalist entrepreneurs for 9,500. 26 From 1982,
UN food aid was linked to the coffee production, as an incentive to labour, especially
Ovimbundu. 27
 Still, in 1989 production fell to its lowest level since independence.28
To avoid resort to non economic coercion in agriculture the post-colonial state
adopted a policy of mechanisation, 29
 which was a failure and raised substantial conflict. Still,
the intentions were:
If we do achieve these tasks, we do not need to fear the problems expected in
an industrialisation movement: man will leave the countryside, the rural areas,
and will enter into industry without knowing centuries of worries and turmoil's.
In the short and medium run there will be an urban sub-proletariat of peasant
origin, and youth will respond to the new needs of industry. We think that the
harmonious solution of this problem passes, before anything, through the
development of agriculture, placing 80% of our population in the pre-
industrialisation era. (MPLA leader, quoted in Sarapu, 1980: 69)
The attempts to mechanise collectivised fanning, reflected a genuine 'investment
hunger' motivating massive state imports of agricultural equipment. Although there was a
significant demand from peasants," the imported equipment was soon destroyed by users,31
paralysed by lack of assistance,32
 rotten in machinery parks near ports without having been
26.ALD. 15.6.1985 (quoting declarations of the Angolan vice-minister for coffee) and AED, 20.8.1982; the buyers of Angolan coffee were in
1985: East Germany, 61 0 0,
 West Germany, 26% and Portugal 5% (AED, 15.6.1985).
27. According to the vice-minister for coffee, "People are also encouraged to move from central Angola to the northwest to work in the
plantations, where special homes were built for than. About 40,000 persons already work in the indoorry (coffee production) but 30,000 are
needed for the rehabilitation programme of coffee to succeed" (AED, 15.6.1985 and 20.8.1982).
28. 3,156 tonnes less than half the 1985 level and provided for less than 5% of exports earnings while it was about 20 0 0
 1974 exports
(declarations of the director of Cafangol, AED, 15.1.1990); Hodges states that in 1985 coffee production was 5.3% of the 1972/73 (1987: 33).
29. Sarapu quotes a leader of MPLA who declared in 1976: "The first task, prioritarian, is the development of agriculture, which means to
introduce the mechanisation at the countryside, to break the vicious circle of subsistence economy, to proceed massively with the education and
teclmical training of the agroherding base, to take man away from the plough and to supply him the tractor." (1980: 69). See also Rella, 1992:
235.
30.Mainly due to he expectations generated by independence and the promises by MPLA and co-operatives dynaznisers (see section 6.2.).
31.Who did not follow the rules for the use of equipment or maintenance conditions, used machinery in ends different from their end, for
example using tractors to transport people from one village to the other instead of working the fields; "The waste of our economy ... in agriculture
may be illustrated with the massive import of machinery which overwhelming majority does not even reach amortization" (76 [8], Novembro,
1984, 66).
32.Poor after-sale assistance, even when it worked in towns, could not reach the machinery parks in distant places; e.g, farming PE at Lucala
complained it could not fulfill the plan (emergency programme) due, among other reasons, to the lack of technical assistance to the 70 Soviet
agricultural machines (77 [8], Novembro, 1984, 26).
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distributed, while PEs complained about tardy delivery. Moreover, if there was no tractor,
usually peasants did not work in land identified as 'state property' (Rella, 1992: 275). In short,
Today, thousands (actually millions) of USD wasted in farming machinery
turned into refuse spread around the whole country, as a result of ambitious
and gigantic projects, not workable since with no links to the Angolan reality.33
But the problems of farming enterprises in supply of inputs went far beyond the
destruction of machinery. Indeed, PEs and co-operatives had to face all kinds of shortages:
labour,34 fuels," herbicides, fertilizers, seeds (and also their poor quality), food for workers,
and transports to market production.36
To face the shortage of voluntary labour, besides the attempts of mechanisation, the
state resorted to the harvest campaigns. 37 In the campaigns the costs of labour were
transferred to the employers of campaigners, many of them industrial PEs. 38 Until the late 80s
the system remained essentially the same, with some improvements.39
From the 80s, the importance of supply of industrial goods as an incentive for
subsistence peasants to market productions and for enterprises to recruit labour motivated the
33.91 [10], Novembro, 1986, 46.
34.For example. a GPI; in Cambambe complained about the shortage of labour (77 [8] Novernbro, 1986, 26-7); SEF reinforced this shortage by
cutting the number of workers in fanning PEs (JA, 17.3.1988, referring to the Camuvi Complex, at Benguela); see section 5.1. (shortage of
labour) and subsection 4.3.1. (shortages economy).
35.For example, the director of a fanning PE complained in the 80s that the Sonangol marketing division did not perfonn its contractual
obligations (towards the Ministry of Agriculture) related to the supply of fuels (9 months delay) while supplying private fuels stations (77 [8]
Novembro, 1984, 26-7).
36.Loc. cit.; on the marketing of production. the Cambambe PE argued that if its production could reach Luanda and Dondo, which the
commercial network of Kwanza-Norte proved incapable of doing, the problems of supply of consumer goods in the two towns could be
minimised (ibid.).
37.Organs' ed from 1976, the harvest campaigns aimed also to channel production to trading PEs; to organise the campaigns there was a network
of commissions (national, provincial and county) composed by representatives of the state (see, e.g, nto. no 52/77, 3rd Vice PM, on the 1977
coffee harvest campaign).
38.Mo. no 27/77 (3rd Vice PM). single art: "all the workers who participate in the 2nd harvest campaign of coffee will continue to receive,
during the period of participation, the total wage or salary paid by their employers", since "it is a duty of all the people to contribute to the
increase on its (coffee) production".
39.E.g. m.o. no 9 87 (state minister for the Productive Sphere), on the organisation of the campaign and integrating transports and trade
authorities in the commissions.
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campaigns of marketing in the countryside. 40 They were an attempt by the state to restore the
trade network, disrupted by the flight of settlers and the war and, simultaneously, to compete
with a new group of bush traders, now African. Indeed, from the settlers flight, middlemen
usually the former Angolan drivers or assistants of Portuguese traders ... using
the links and the transport means abandoned by owners, developed a complete
commercial network parallel to the state (trading) structures. (Sarapu, 1980:
61-2)
In the campaigns the state tried to exchange the crops of small farmers and co-
operatives with industrial goods desired by peasants, but
organisational problems at the level of coordination of action between the
central and local state apparatuses, and the worsening of the military situation,
especially after the RSA invasion of August 1981, did not allow to reach better
results, either in the marketing of crops or in the support and consolidation of
co-operative work in the countryside.4'
As the campaigns had no sufficient goods, 42 and/or were not capable of channelling
them to peasants, from the late 80s additional incentives for agricultural production were
adopted: the liberalisation of the prices of many farming products and the grant of access to
the 'dollars shops' and/or import licences to farmers.'" Still, access to dollars shops and/or
import licences, the ultimate expression of success, in fact targeted entrepreneurial farmers
who travel to towns. The incentives covered selected products needed by the population,
industry and/or to export.'" Ranchers and farmers had thus access to the shops according to
quotas linked "to a percentage of value, or quantities, of exports achieved or products
delivered. "45
4°. Programmed from the 70s and initiated in 1981 in Uige, Malanje, Kwanza Sul and Huila (Cruz., 1985, 18). See 	 section 5.3.
41.PR to the 1985 Seminar of Agrarian Development (90 [10] Novembro, 1986, 47).
42. They were nevertheless going on during the late 80s, in some cases with EEC support for, say, supply of fertilizers, mills or even
infrastructure facilities (JA, 26.2.1988, for the Kwanza Sul programme). On shortages of inputs in general, see subsection 4.3.1.
43.Rol. no 11/89 (CDS). on the Directed Programmes for Farming/Ranching Products; see Chapter 4, Table 2 and subsections 5.2.1. and
5.2.6. (prices), 5.2.4. (dollar shops).
44.Coffee, bananas, fruits, flowers and small animals exported, as well as cattle ranching. tobacco, cotton, sait and dried fish appearing as
substitutes for imports (appendix citsesol.).
43 . Cit. Resol., art. 2.
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Other attempts to incentive farmers related to the patterns of exchange in some areas,
for example, coffee. From the early 80s, compulsory sale to trading PEs was lifted and farmers
were free to sell their production to private middlemen, a measure which, isolated, meant the
restoration of colonial trading pat-terns.46
State bureaucracies, the importers of equipment for the mechanisation of agriculture
and potential suppliers of other inputs, also turned to agribusiness by contracting equipment
and services supplied by foreign firms. 47 These investments had no significant returns: for
example, the pineapple project in Kwanza Norte, the cotton mechanisation project in Catete
and Baixa de Cassanje,48 the rice project in Camabatela.49 The failure of projects led to
criticisms on:
"disordered and hasty mechanisation of agriculture which, attempting to solve
one problem, created hundreds of others".5°
The failures of PEs and co-operatives to ensure an adequate supply of food and raw
materials to industry, a by-product of war and the failure of mechanisation, led the state to
change strategies of development and agricultural policies: i. successive reorganisations of
involved PEs and apparatuses, with decentralisation in lower units, 51 ii. a shift on the emphasis
of state support on equipment from PEs and co-operatives to private farmers, iii. attempts to
46.E.g.. m.o. no 47 83 (Agriculture). changing the system of compulsory sale of coffee to the trading PE Encafe to sale to retailers, including
private firms (art 1 3), either in bush shops or in rural markets (art. 2) existing in the zone of producers (art 1/1 and 1/2); also m.o. no 100/85
(Agriculture) freeing the sale of wood by forestry firms directly to consumers and lifting the compulsory sale to PEs. See subsection 1.1.2.
47.See Chapter 4, on PEs association with foreign firms to face shortages of inputs; an example here are the contracts (a package of USD 10
Mn) signed in 1982 with a subsidiary of Brazilian Cotia, for the reccxistruction of farms destroyed by war, the package of services included
tedmical assistance. agricultural equipment, bought in Brazil; the projects for Kwanza-Sul included the plantation of 3,500 has of maize, 400 has
of cassava, 500 of soy beans and 4,000 of forage crops (AED, 24.9.1982).
48.90[10] Novembro, 1986, 46; with the cotton project, for example, the state intended to compensate peasants for the colonial cottoncracy.
49."(Projects) whose production did not reach the consumers table. All contracts benefiting the suppliers (of goods and services), but not the
contractor, the Angolan state. Although the NB expenditure for investment in agriculture was about 8% and expenses in hard currency about 5°o
and are very low figures when compared with investment in other sectors ... the sector and subordinated enterprises were not capable of returning
them (and) the majority are considered lost" (90 [10], Novembro, 1986, 46, on the declarations of the PR to the 1 st National Meeting on the
Perspectives of Development of the Agrarian Sector).
50.Loc. c.a.
51.See subsection 4.2.2.
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implement incentives in farming PEs by supplying consumer goods, and, iv. privatisation of
farms and plantations.
6.1.2. Land, state omissions and ad hoc legal regimes
The need for legislation on land ownership was emphasised as a condition for the
certainty of possession of land by peasants and consequent investment of labour and other
inputs in land, beyond the self-subsistence scheme. Certainty about the land regime works thus
as an incentive for production while guaranteeing the rights of peasants traditionally occupying
land against expropriation.52
But no land law was approved during the period studied and the 80s different
regulations (not formal law) on land property show changing attitudes on the problems at
stake. They demonstrate the rise of agrarian conceptions on agricultural policies, meaning a
progressive abandonment of state support to poor peasants (subsistence and associated in
some kind of new organisational form), towards a system aiming essentially to set up the
conditions for the 'take-off of the social strata in which the socio-political groups of agrarians
are rooted (that is, the trader/small fanner strata). Indeed, in political terms, the regulations
coincided with the rise of Mbundu Agrarians in the state and party, many of them involved in
the farm business.53
The 1982 land regulations m approached the allocation of land in an apparent attempt
to soften statism while reinforcing socialism. The 'socialist discourse' of the regulations was,
however, countered by the elitist character of procedural rules. The regulations aimed a
redistribution of occupied and new land around Luanda to entrepreneurial farmers, including
52.See section 8.2., on the constitutional guarantee and Rella, 1992: 251, who discusses land concessions as incentives.
53.On fanning by party officials, see, Expresso, 16.7.1990, on criticisms to the leadership by MPLA militants.
54.Resol. no 8 82 (CM): the preamble explained reallocation of land: "since the majority of farms in the Luanda Green Belt is abandoned, due to
shortage of water and support structures and ... (given) the poor use of existing improvements by present users (actually mainly war refugees and
state party connected individuals) who possess them just as 'weekend zones' or for the recollection of permanent crops they found there",
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'collectives' of workers in industry and services fighting with shortages of food, and farming
co-operatives. 55 The concessionaires had incentives such as access to bank loans and state
grants of transport, equipment, seeds, animals, etc.56
This policy, which meant a new approach to the organisation of agriculture, was
furthered in 1984 by provisions reflecting the dismissal of the state as far as poor farmers are
concerned. The new regulations protested against
"the indiscriminate occupation (of abandoned farms) accelerated by the
pressure of demand of farming products in a frame of very limited supply ...
And if for many the occupation of former farms was an attempt of family
survival, diversification of activities, or even to use (the farms) as weekend
houses, for other people this type of occupation was a way to get a fast, easy
wealth without taking economic risks. ... a situation which must be regulated
and disciplined to use the potential of private initiative to create a disciplined
system effectively leading to the improvement of the living conditions of the
working classes."57
The regulations provided for the allocation of land, in a precarious title, 58
 to: i. "Large
state (farming) property", ii. "other state property composed by farming and cattle ranching
units delivered to PEs to minimize their needs in food", 59 iii. "co-operatives, composed by
collectives of workers in enterprises and public administration institutions or by a set of
individuals associating to develop production in collective bases", 6° and, iv. "precarious
ownership, ... the use of a given area, by an individual or non-public institution duly entitled to
the land". 61 However, the emphasis on the collective character of prospective concessionaires
55.Land was reallocated to: "a. collectives of workers of the productive sector, b. collectives of workers of services enterprises, public
administration institutions and masses organisations, c. farming co-operatives, and, d. private undertakings (individual or entrepreneurial), with
capacity for exploration" (cit.resol., art. 2).
56.Cit. Resol., arts 3 and 1/d, respectively.
57. "Regulations for the Use and Exploration of the Luanda Green Beh", approved by Joint Exec.Dec. no 40/84 (Provincial Coordination,
Finance and Agriculture); preamble cit. joint exec.dec., which also stated: "even recently some important economic units aiming to supply their
workers food levels ensuring assiduity and a reasonable productivity, initiated, directly or by people fronting for them (they refer to foreign firms
who needed people fronting) the economic exploration of farms in this zones.".
58.Cit. Regulations, arts 3 and 4.
59.Area allocated maximum 1 ha for each 5 potential consumers.
60.Area allocated maximum 10 has and a minimal number of member of 20.
61.Area allocated maximum 10 has for those exploring the land as a professional activity and 1 ha for those exploring it for leisure.
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of land does not veil: i. other requirements, for example "financial capacity" (which co-
operatives may not have), "former experience in farming," or "availability of fixed means", ii.
the discretionary powers allocated to the Luanda Provincial Commissariat to grant
concessions,62 and, iii. the omission of rights, and proceedings, of appeal from decisions of the
administration.
Concessionaires had some obligations from the grant, which included the payment of a
royalty established case by case, of taxes and marketing restrictions aiming to ensure the
supply of trading PEs. 63 Non-performance of these obligations and non-exploration for six
months was punished with revocation of licence. Concessionaires were entitled to state aid,
especially access to inputs supplied by the state if they drafted 'annual programmes', and to
bank loans. 64 The control powers over these undertakings, and these related to the allocation
of inputs from state assistance, were decentralised in the Luanda Provincial Conunissariat, but
until the late 80s its activities were not brilliant.65
Former occupants of reallocated land should register 'occupied property' in a three
months term. The terms and requirements for the register were discouraging to poor peasants,
eventually illiterate, mainly war refugees who had occupied land. Indeed, there was an
obligation to supply information such as the location and area of their unit, with appropriate
designs and topographic data, impossible to poor peasants. If peasants did not provide this
information they would lose the land they occupied. 66 Although the Regulations provided for
state assistance with the registry formalities by the Luanda Commissariat, it is doubtful that the
62. cit
.. regulations, arts 6 5 and 6/6, respectively.
63.Cit. regulations, arts 71 and 7,2. On marketing restrictions: i. collectives of workers could not market their production and surpluses should
be delivered to the state (cii regulations, art. 10/1/a), ii. co-operatives and private firms must deliver 60% of crops to PEs, and the remaining
40°0 might be marketed freely (arts 10/1/b and 10/1/c), but private firms only might sell their production to licensed traders (att. 10/1/d) and, iii.
'weekend producers' could not market their production (art. 10/1/e).
64.ct.
regulations, arts 11/2, 11/3, 8, 9/1 and 8/6, respectively, the process was very bureaucratic since loans needed the favourable advice of
the Luanda Commissariat and the Ministry of Agriculture (att. 8/7).
65.E.g,. 90 [10]. Novembro, 1986, 44).
66.CIL' regulations, art. 6/2, 6/2/b and 6/7, respectively.
247
Agriculture
institution had the capacity to perform these functions, even if interested in it. 67 So, as with the
colonial regimes, bureaucratic demands were used to bar the access to land. 68 But,
notwithstanding the regulations, land occupation continued. 69
 As for 'privileged farmers',
especially these with purchasing power and connections with equipment suppliers, many had a
behaviour of 'wild capitalism' not socially desirable. For example, in a situation of dramatic
scarcity of water, some farmers installed water pumps forcing their neighbours to drought and
to buy them water at 'neighbours prices'," showing the prospects for fair business relations in
a future of small farmer dominance.
The approach to land became even more restrictive in later regulations on irrigated
land in the Bengo area. The 1988 regulations for land concessions within the Kilaud project71
are a new shift towards favouring private and foreign firms. The regulations provided for the
rent of irrigated land to "individual and corporate persons satisfying the requirements of the
Commercial Code." 72 In practice this meant that only private undertakings (partnerships,
companies and individual licensed traders), mixed firms or 'hidden' PEs, 73 had access to
irrigated land. The incipient and struggling post-independence co-operatives, whose activities
were ruled by informal norms and not by the Commercial Code, could thus be barred access to
67.The Luanda Commissariat is known for its shortage of capacity to cope with the town problems: for example, in the 80s it contracted a
foreign firm to clean the streets of the town; see also note 82 on its performance on the supply of water.
68.See subsection 1.2.2.
69. "These %Nilo answered the appeal of land are not a few. The return to land is sometitnes turbulent, with a taste of reconquest, of rush to
Eldorado. The idea of possession, pairing with dreams of churrasco (barbecue), pigs toasting on Sunday mornings and the eyes lying in the good
green ... The dynamics of land occupation is like that to suds a point, breaking the general inventory of farms, their location, type of exploration,
ownership and improvements" (90 [10], Novembro, 1986, 43, as the Luanda Green Be/t).
In 1986, Nkz 10 to 15 for 7 litres (90 [10]. Novembro, 1986, 43), while in 1990 the Luanda slums consumers were paying kz 1,000 for 800
litres, to satisfy the needs of a family of 4/5 (Southern Africa Chronicle, 12.2.90).
71.Resol. no 2 88 (CDS) and Dec. no 988; Kikuxi is an area between the Kwanza and Bongo rivers irrigated under an enormous public works
project initiated by the colonial administration covering an area of about 60/70 km large, with 3,000 has already under specific projects in 1988
(1st phase) with some investments (equipment and studies) funded by haly, under the condition that equipment and services were supplied by this
country (JA, 21.10.1988).
72.Regulations for the Use of Irrigated Perimeters, approved by Dec. no 9/88, art. 1.
73.That is, the PEs under the form of company, allowed by LPE/88, see section 8.1.4.
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irrigated land. 74 The 'collectives' entitled to land under the 1984 Green Belt Regulations, were
also forgotten in the 1988 norms, while foreign firms got access to it." Still, the regulations
provided for preferential rights of access to "corporate co-operatives", 76 farming partnerships
and companies with more than five members, and "enterprises whose owners undertake
exclusive farming activities." 77
 Land was allocated after public tenders. Rental contracts were
agreed to for a two year period, automatically renewable. 78 Tenants were entitled to state
technical assistance and equipment supplies, and could market their production freely. 79 The
Ministry of Agriculture managed the Kilcuxi irrigated perimeters, including rent contracting.8°
In the first phase, equipment from state assistance under the project was supplied to a
"paralysed co-operative" and four national private firms.81
The 1984 and 1988 regulations were followed by directives to privatise either the
nationalised colonial plantations or smaller undertakings. State bureaucracies were among the
most enthusiastic supporters of privatisation in agriculture. 82 The sisal plantations provide an
74.On co-operatives legal regime, see section 6.2.
75.Dec. no 988, art. 2; foreign investors also benefited from land in the Luanda Green Belt
76. "Corporate co-operatives" were ruled by the Commercial Code, part on company law, whose norms were repealed by Dec. no 114 75 (see
note 126), the post-TG legislation on co-operatives which broadly repealed the legislation on a different organisation and functioning of co-
operatives (art. 14); so it was a meaningless concept in the Angolan legal order in 1988. The regulations on the irrigated perimeters had other
problems: for example, lease contracts for the use of land are called 'hiring contracts', for movables, instead of 'rent contracts, for immovables
(Resol. no 2 88, arts 4 and 5).
77.Dec. no 9 88. art. 4.
78.Resol. no 2 88, art 2 and Dec. no 9/88, art 5; respectively-, tenants paid a royalty fixed by the ministers of Agriculture and Finance.
79.Crldec. arts 7/a and 7/b; concerning obligations, tenants must adopt an exploration plan established at the lease contract (art. 8/b), register
with the Ministry of Finance (art. 8/h), and abide to regulations on the use of water (art 8/c). The 'foreign investment' approach to these
regulations is transparent in norms stating that tenants shall respect legislation in force in PRA (art 8/g) or to pay taxes (art, 8/i).
80.Resol. no 2 88, arts 1,2 and 7.
81.One at least anployed waged labour with no rationing cards; this farmer, beneficiary of equipment supplied by the state, declared: "I will
deliver my production to COFA (a PE), if they support me and market my production directly", and on a land exact with an individual
claiming the property of his plots: "what is farmed here is the fruit of my work and that of my friends (probably the poor relatives within the
extended family relationships) as well as my employees. This individual did not listen to Comrade President A Neto when he said that land is to
whom works it" (JA, 21.10.1988). This statement provides an example of the appropriation of 'socialist discourse' by the emergent African
bourgeoisies (which is not an exclusive of Angolan agrarians).
• Privatisation of small enterprises is far more evident in Lubango than in Angola's capital. Officials here like to show a farm renowned for
ignoring price controls and other regulations in order to rim a successful business ... The same officials are openly critical of the government
agricultural policy, which has only belatedly tried to help small farmers" (South, June 1990).
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example of state attitudes and behaviour. A production formerly dominated by German and
Portuguese settlers which fluctuated between boom and crisis according to change of prices in
the world markets, was sold to Belgium, Germany, Italy, Holland and Portugal, while
supplying small factories in Benguela. After the abandonment of the majority of these
plantations by settlers, reinforced by the RSA occupation of the zone in 1975, sisal farms were
more or less nationalised, but PEs were not capable of recovering production due to shortage
of equipment and infrastructures of all kinds and UNITA operations in the zone. They have
been under a plan to re-convert production of 10,000 hectares which was a failure since only
150 has were achieved. As in other areas, PRA began to import sisal to supply textiles
factories and in 1988
"the provincial delegate of the Ministry of Agriculture considers that ... there
are no perspectives of improvement of production by the state. The Budget
barred any funding to the recovery of the sector which would mean some
investments. ... As the state has no capacity for these investments, the sisal
farms will be transferred to the private sector according to our programming.
The state will keep only the factory of ropes and carpets at Cubal".83
The trend to sell plantations and farms to foreign firms was reinforced in the early
90s," while the privatisation of the 'coffee industry' was decided. 85 Later, the state accepted
the transfer of the plantations and farms back to settlers who abandoned them in 1974-75 and
accepted offers of investors interested in a large number of abandoned state fanners.86
However, not only peasants associations maintained the land allocated to them, but in some
cases former land allocated to PEs was distributed among former workers and poor
83.JA, 23.4.1988; prospective owners of privatised sisal plantations shall be "experimced farmers who will have the guarantee of state supplies
of inputs" (ibid.); on sisal, see also, Hodges, 1987: 33.
84.For example: i. in 1990 there were negotiations with Lonhro and Tate and Lyle, who were interested in agricultural projects near Luanda
(African Business, June 1990). See, also AED, 20.3.1989 and AED, 26.2.90.
85.According to the director of Cafangol, a coffee trading PE "government (had) plans to hand over large plantations to private finis ...(and)
three foreign firms, two French and one from USA have shown interest", (AED, 15.1.1990 and 21.5.1990); in 1991 the government decided to
Privatise some coffee plantations "in a bid to regain its position as a major world producer" (declarations of the minister for coffee, Independent,
3.8.1991).
86.See subsection 8.1.6.
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peasants, 87 and in some case former PEs were transformed in peasants associations (Pacheco
and Morais, 1991: 31).88
6.2. The co-operatives movement
The co-operatives movement, initiated immediately before independence was,
notwithstanding the errors made, one of the most interesting post-colonial attempts to change
social relations in agriculture. It is also a striking example of the difficulties of transforming
many forms of social organisation in UDCs, especially in a poor country such as Angola which
was just leaving colonialism. Simultaneously, it represents rupture which, although with set-
backs, contains the seeds of future.89
Although facing many social and economic constraints the farming co-operatives
movement is an area where the efforts of some of the best, at least in terms of commitment,
cadres of MPLA, the post-colonial state and churches were concentrated. 90 These cadres
found strong opposition to their work and ideas from UNITA, local chiefs and the 'agrarian'
wing of MPLA itself, besides objective constraints, such as peasants illiteracy, difficulties in
acquiring inputs and selling outputs.
6.2.1. The organisation of co -operatives in the 1970s
The movement of co-operatives and association began in 1975, when political activists
and religious institutions created the first peasants consumer co-operatives in the provinces of
Kwanza-Norte and Malanje. In 1975 an government agency, CADCO, was set up to support
87.For example. the former PE Complex° do Camuvi, Benguela, transferred 2,600 has to peasants, keeping only two production units, reduced
its personnel while having to face shortages of inputs (machinery, spares and medicines), (JA, 17.3.1988).
88.Data of the survey on co-operatives in Huila, Huambo and Malanje refer to 16% of Huila's peasants associations arose from former PEs.
89.For an history of fanning co-operatives in Angola, see Padieco and Morais, 1991: 10-21.
90.See. e.g.. Cruz, 1985: 10; some of then paid with their lives, imprisonment, exile or dismissal their commitment; for example. the Bask
priests who after independence promoted the creation of co-operatives in the Malanje region, in 1976 were forbidden by the Catholic hierarchy to
exercise actntities in Angola and had to leave the country; or local political activists of MPLA as Fackirio Muteka who was murdered by UNITA,
or LibOrio, shot dead by local powers under alleged involvement in the 1977 coup.
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the creation, management and access to funding for all types of co-operatives, and
subordinated directly to the MPLA PM in the TG. CADCO centred its activities in the
creation of peasants consumer co-operatives in Kwanza-Norte, Malanje, Kwanza-Sul and
Luanda. At the time of the extinction of CADCO (in 1976), it had created 233 first degree co-
operatives and 122 second degree co-operatives. 91 However, the co-operatives movement
faced many constraints and these co-operatives did not achieve a significant participation of
peasants at the level of production (Pacheco and Morals, 1991: 10-12).
Many difficulties faced by the dynamisers of post-colonial co-operatives resulted from
their own perceptions of peasants as 'naturally good', as 'automatically revolutionary' (which
also meant democratic) 92 and from the shortage of information on precapitalist formations
arising from colonial obscurantism. Still, the basic problems were rooted in the structure of
these formations and state policies towards peasants.
Peasants perceptions were a serious problem: i. "the national liberation war had not
given an actual political awareness to the rural population," 93 ii. "peasants perceived the 'co-
operative' as the means (almost the only available at the time), to get state aid (industrial
consumer goods, equipment and other inputs). Often peasants even identified the 'co-
operative' as a state organ where they should work if they wanted the support they needed so
badly, and sometimes they 'created' the 'co-operative' or collective land with these goals
(Sarapu, 1980: 56 and Rella, 1992: 275). 94 As a consequence, 'collective land'
91.Fanning co-operatives were divided in two types: i. 1st degree co-operatives were "a kind of services and consumers co-operative", also called
'peasants association', and ii. 2nd degree co-operatives were a "form of collective exploitation of land and abandoned plantations, inspired in the
Soviet kolkhoze" (Pacheco and Morais, 1991: 11).
92.In the tradition of Voice of Angola, see section 2.1.1.; all the MPLA discourse emphasised this point, given peasants participation in the war
for independence.
93.Sarapu, 1980: 64, referring to the peasants praxis in associations and co-operatives.
94.MPLA promises on co-operatives played a role on peasants expectations: "it is necec gory that we transform our economy in order to
constitute ... production co-operatives.... (private property) cannot even use the tedinical means we may dispose.... Today we can, for example,
use tractors in agriculture. Even here the comrades of this region have been asking for tractors. How many (private) owners, how many peasants,
can afford to buy a tractor? In our market a tractor costs now 600,000 escudos. If an individual earns 6,000 a month, how long does it take to
pay a tractor? If he/she neither eats, buys shoes or suits ... it takes more than eight years to pay a tractor. Who can afford this? But suppose that
100 peasants associate to set up a co-operative. How long will they take to pay a tractor? Without calamities, epidemics, or parties, I think that
they may Pay a tractor in two years. And when I talk about tractors I mean machinery ... since to produce well it is neeeuory to have equipment
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"resulted from the occupation of new land95 but never from the delivery for
joint-ownership of individual parcels, and (collective land) was often perceived
as a mean to increase the surfaces (of individual parcels) where peasants
continued to work individually". (So), "'collective land' was just the
overlapping on new individual plots divided among the members of co-
operatives. In the latter, the production process maintained its parcelled form.
As it was the case for some of the coffee and cotton 'co-operatives' created
during the colonial period." (Sarapu, 1980: 56-7).
It seems that the only cases of second degree farming co-operatives were the
abandoned small and medium sized undertakings granted by the state to former waged
labourers, sometimes associated to members of nearby villages (Sarapu, 1980: 57), who
appear as more qualified to collective organisation than subsistence and/or small farmers.
Other problem was the conflict of the new organisation (attempting democratic
decision-making) and competing powers:
"enormous conflicts arose. For example, in some villages there were conflicts
between the old traditional chiefs of the village and the head of the MPLA
committee, usually younger, (conflicts) which extended to the co-operative"
(Sarapu, 1980: 67).
Isolation of peasants societies, as a consequence of the 1975 war, until they were
reached by co-operatives dynamisers, or any party/state organisation, also led these societies
to adapt to the new situation (that is, the flight of settlers and the reality of abandoned farming
undertakings) according to non-egalitarian patterns:
"farming workers of colonial undertakings abandoned by their owners either
stayed there producing only for subsistence, or left to their villages of origin. ...
The tragic events of war allowed, in some regions, the emergence of 'local
elites', who tried to appropriate abandoned assets and become the 'new masters'
while maintaining the other farming workers as waged labour." (Sarapu: 1980:
55)
Democratic functioning of co-operatives also faced many constraints: i. membership of
women was denied: they worked in 'collective land' and in 2nd degree co-operatives but
... Let us make a large cotton co-operative. Let us make a centre where the population lives and we may more easily solve problems (such as
schools, hospitals, transport, water supply). Otherwise the population does not produce properly. It cannot produce properly, as each has his/her
small plot, near the lake which is at a 18 km distance, each one had two goats to ranch, some 20 or 30 hens, thus having a very small production.
We may put together, in this principle of union, the work comrades should adopt." (Neto, to the peasants of Mazozo, JA, 9.11,1976).
95 . Abandoned colonial farms granted by the state or newly occupied non-farmed lands.
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"usually only men were considered members", ii. discrimination led women, especially
widows, to protest supported by some "committed cadres", but only in a few co-operatives did
women succeed in getting membership rights, iii. it was very difficult to implement collective
decision-making in organs such as the assembly, to function as the co-operative decision-
making centre, since people were not used to participatory democracy, even MPLA cadres, iv.
illiteracy of members prevented the complete implementation of statutory organs such as the
management committee, as in many co-operatives all members were illiterate and in others
only some few could read, and, v. while elections should work as the form of selection of
management and control boards, in many cases these organs were 'self-appointed', either by
'election' at the assembly or by literate members imposing themselves to the illiterate (Sarapu,
1980: 60-3).
As to the role of the state in this context, peasants expectations (and demands) of the
providential state in the early years were not realistic, but they were nevertheless reinforced by
the 'discourse' of many cadres attempting to dynamise co-operatives: many promises and later
few achievements.96
Inputs, marketing and prices
One of the areas where the problems of peasants organisation came to surface was in
prices. As seen above, the unequal exchange between town and countryside, was particularly
harsh during colonialism due to the monopoly of bush traders. 97 In the post-colonial society,
shortage of industrial goods, difficulties of communications and marketing and price fixing for
96."When the first NOLA and state cadres arrived to the villages, they were welcome and, usually, received with enthusiasm by the peasant
mass, since demands to make them were very numerous and prioritarian. The discourse of these cadres, to motivate peasants to organise in 'co-
operatives' in order to get aid and solve their problems, was usually welcome. The enthusiasm of peasants in these first contads often led some
cadres to a false interpretation and to nourish hopes which afterwards were not realised. From these 'speeches' of first contacts peasants perceived
firstly that they would have what to eat, to dress, to work with, and finally that they would be capable to sell the productions deteriorating at their
households" (Sarapu, 1980: 55-6).
97.See subsection 1.1.2, on exchange relations.
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agricultural products, undermined the relationship of co-operatives with the state and had an
impact in their exchanges.98
Indeed, as fixed prices were very low, 'co-operatives' where peasants associated in
order to get state support while maintaining the individual forms of production and
distribution, in many cases preferred to relate to the private trade network (that is, the informal
economy) for the marketing of their products. Firstly, because private traders paid prices
higher than marketing PEs. 99 Secondly because the private network proved more capable to
supply the co-operatives industrial consumer goods they needed, although a substantial part of
them were imported or produced by PEs. Marketing PEs engaged then in a struggle with the
competing private network, including by attempts of integration by services contracts, while at
the top, state bureaucracies fought as well to control the marketing of fanning products.100
The low level of prices for farming products and the difficulties of marketing conditioned by
restrictions to the movement of commodities, had a wide impact on co-operatives and some
practically turned into subsistence fanning" (Sarapu, 1980: 60-2). Also, the preferential
allocation of industrial consumer goods to farming PEs (and actually they did fight with a
stringent shortage of goods) led many members of co-operatives to leave and become waged
labour in farming PEs (Sarapu, 1980: 61).
The expectations of peasants in mechanisation were also frustrated due to scarce
resources allocated to the co-operatives programme. Shortage of machinery, the weakness of
the state itself in areas such as, say, technical assistance, supply of spares, etc., were reinforced
by the ignorance of members of co-operatives to use equipment. As tractors were one of the
greatest incentives of peasants to organise in collective forms of production, their destruction
98.1he suppliers of the marketing PE in 1979 were: i. peasants (subsistence, family units and small farmers), 58.7% ii. farming PEs, 26.9°0,
co-operatives, 11.4%, and, iv. private (entrepreneurial) 3% (data supplied by the marketing PE, quoted in Cruz, 1985: 17).
"• •	 •	 '. Lying in the actual economy', lcandongueiros, the traders in the 'parallel market' could transfer the prices they had paid to consumers in the
informal town economy, while keeping substantial profit rates (see sections  5.2. and 5.3.).
PEs had to follow purchase and resale prices centrally fixed (see Chapter 4, Table 2, and section 5.3.).
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or underemployment, the failure of mechanisation, was discouraging. Also, it seems that
criteria for the use of parks of equipment favouring some PEs and second degree co-
operatives even led to conflicts with neighbouring associations with no access to the parks
(Sarapu, 1980: 58).
The behaviour of some bureaucracies also caused difficulties to the relationship
between the state and co-operatives, as in the case of linking access to some kind of state
support to impossible tasks. For example, in planning, regulations demanded co-operatives to
draft a plan. As the majority of members of co-operatives or associations were illiterate and
only a few co-operatives had a minimal capacity to ensure the production of simple accounts,
the plans were drafted by cadres of the Ministry of Agriculture "and afterwards presented and
discussed with members of co-operatives" (Sarapu, 1980: 57).
"The plans were often too ambitious and unrealistic and, so, made promises
which, the majority, could not be satisfied later. Still, the 'Plan' came to awake
'modernity' and 'mechanisation' for the sake of increased production and
productivity. But these changes, too abrupt, were not always understood by the
members of co-operatives. The tractor, for example, was often and firstly
perceived as reducing the pain of human beings and not as a factor of increased
production. (Sarapu, 1980: 57-8 and 63)"
Also, when we contrast the number co-operatives and resources in 1979 the shortage
of all kinds of inputs for non-privileged co-operatives programme are evident.
State resources for the co-operatives movement
rural dynamisers	 500
skilled farming workers 	 35
skilled personnel (12 years education)	 3
graduate farming experts	 0
motorbikes
	
280
jeeps	 15
Source: Cruz, 1985: 17, data from 1979
Pacheco and Morals argue that during the late 70s and 80s the state always
approached co-operatives in a 'dirigist' and centralising way and at the level of economic
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policy the system instituted "prevented any possibility of self-development by the communities
and associations" (1991: 15).
Legal omissions and informal law
Concerning the legal framework for the co-operatives movement, until 1989 no
legislation had been enacted to replace Dec. no 114/75. 101
 The latter was adopted during the
transitional period by pressure of CADC0. 102 From independence the decree was no more
applied, it seems on grounds that the regime for co-operatives there established was not
'sufficiently socialist. 103 But no new legislation was enacted, demonstrating the doubts, or
even conflicts, on the issue which meant state 'non-decisions'. 104 The omission of state
legislation was filled by 'party law'.
The 1976 Declaration of the MPLA Politburo on the organisation of co-operatives
included a Model of Articles of Association of Farming Co-operatives', 105 which worked as
'informal law' enforced by a system of guarantees linked to the control of the state by the
party. Indeed, it was adopted as a paradigm by state organs, including those with powers to
supply inputs and/or funds, and so became compulsory for the organisation of co-operatives.
101.Although. under the m.o. style of legislative production, in 1987 the Ministry of Fisheries enacted a "Model for Fishermen Co-operatives"
(m.o. no 58 87, Fisheries) aiming to face 'The transitory inexistence of (co-operative) legislation" (preamble ciL m.o.), rifling the functioning of
co-operatives in a more accurate way (for example, providing for statutory funds for amortization and reserves, art. 34) while changing the 1976
models concerning statutory- organs: the assembly (arts 17-23) and the management committee (arts 17 and 24-32) were maintained, but the
auditing powers of the control committee, an elected organ, were allocated to the branch ministry (art 41). See also subsection 3.2.3.
102.M.o. 21.8.1975 (MPLA PM), arts 1,2 and 12; CADCO made a good work in COEISUrfler and fanning co-operatives and was extinguished in
1976, on grounds of the need of its division into agriculture, trade and industry branches and "notwithstanding the historical role it had
performed" (preamble m.o. 26.3.1976, Planning and Economic Coordination, extinguishing CADCO).
103.Dec. no 114 75 just established the principles to which co-operatives should compel (art. 4), e.g., democratic organisation, returns according
to "effective participation and not to capital apportations", etc., without providing for any special organs (for example, it said nothing on the
assembly or management committee); the decree also forbade the transformation of co-operatives into a partnership or company (att. 1), while
establishing the freedom of association of co-operatives into unions and the democratic organisation of the latter (art 11); it also included an
obligation of the state to support co-operatives by funding, tedmical assistance and "dynamisation and transformation of productive forces (art.
13).
104.Still. a draft law on co-operatives was ready in the late 70s.
105.Here referred to as 'Model'; the Politburo Declaration also included a model for consumers co-operatives; the 1976 Model for farming co-
operatives was partially changed by the 1st Seminar of Fanning Co-operatives in 1978.
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Still, the problems of application of the Model are also examples of resistance of recipients to
legislation not adequate either to their goals or system of values.
The Model established as principles of organisation of fanning co-operatives: i. free
adhesion, which found strong opposition as far as women are concented, m6
 ii. democratic
management, other area of difficult application, 107
 iii. distribution of returns according to
labour,'" other area of problematic implementation due to the difficulties of calculation of
labour supplied, iv. mutual assistance, education and support for members and their families,
and vi. co-operatives association. The Model also established 'principles of national
integration', ruling the relations of co-operatives with the state: i. integration in planning,
which gave rise to substantial problems, 109 ii. compliance to taxation, to prevent the traditional
resistance of peasants to pay taxes, 10 and iii. respect for the allocation of abandoned farms, to
prevent occupation.'
6.2.2. The 1980s developments
From 1977 MPLA changed its approaches to the co-operatives movement and defined
a new organisational form, simpler that the previous scheme, which should precede steps
towards co-operativisation. Only after associations it was consolidated peasants would move
to co-operatives. However, the problems of co-operatives above described remained and from
1983 MPLA decided to concentrate efforts in a focused decentralised experience where the
106.Model, arts 19,3 and 8.
107.Meaning the election of all co-operative organs at the assembly, according to the rule 'one person, one vote'; arts 3, 19/d and 21; the
assembly also had powers to: change articles of association, approve plans, budgets and reports, and enact internal rules of organisation and
functioning (art 19); other statutory organs were the management committee (arts 26 and 27) and the control corrnnittee, an auditing organ (art.
27).
108.Arts 7/b and 35/c; the Model also provided for statutory allocation of part of surpluses to an investment fund and a social fund (arts 35/a
and 35/b); on the social fund, see subsection 3.4.4., note 152.
109.Arts 7/1, 7/j and 7/h, respectively.
110.Declaration on the Model.
111.According to the nationalisation law, nationalised firms could be allocated by the CM to co-operatives (Law no 3/76, arts 7 and 8). and
actually was for medium and small sized farms (see section 4.1.).
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scarce resources would concentrate. It was the Malanje project. Former failed co-operatives
were transformed in associations due to the reality of non-collectivisation. The main
innovation were the annual meetings at the associations, counties and provinces to analyse the
results of the year, the prospects for the next year and to elect the organs of the associations.
Usually younger members integrated the management committee and 'elders' and chiefs the
control committee. The associations were supported by new PEs (EDAs) which supplied
technical assistance and other inputs (Pacheco and Morais, 1991: 12-16).
The problems of co-operative production remained in the 80s. For example, dispersed
data show that: i. the state trade network for industrial goods could not meet peasants
demand, ii. although the machinery parks supported co-operatives and associations, they could
not respond to peasants demand for mechanisation, and, iii. the fulfilment of plan targets
situated at about 35% and 45%. 112 This situation depended on whether or not there were
EDAs in the province. In many associations, especially those created in the 70s, peasants
continued to keep a 'collective field', usually to have access to funding and equipment
(Pacheco and Morais, 1991: 19).
After some years of silence on the co-operatives movement during the 'agrarian era',
the late 80s saw a revival of the issue, in more realistic terms. The goals were to promote
peasants associations and not strictly co-operatives. With the increased importance peasants
under unrestricted elections, and the expansion of small farmers economy around towns and in
the northern provinces (coffee production), peasants were finally divided in two groups: i.
medium and small farmers, and ii. co-operatives members and subsistence farmers. n3 The two
latter in 1988 were integrated in an association, UNACA, promoted by MPLA and resulting
112
.
 M. 20.10.1988, for Kwanza-Norte; in Huambo the problem also existed: peasants associations fought with shortages of inputs and
con su mer goods, with "a negative impact in production" (JA, 10.9.1988). Also. for a general picture, Pacheco and Morals, 1991: 19.
113 .LA, 9.10.1988.
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116.Law no 10 88, LEA, arts 42 c and 7/1; see section 8.1.
117.Citlaw, arts 21/1 and 24/1/a, respectively.
118.Mo. no 9 89 (PR).
119.E.g. m.o. no 21 89 (Agricutture), on the liberalisation and planned allocation by the state of inputs to be sold to peasants by "private (bush)
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from the First National Assembly of Organised Peasants. 114 UNACA aimed at a wider
participation of peasants in political and economic activities (Pacheco and Morais, 1991: 21)
The UNACA assembly in 1988 also discussed a draft law on farming co-operatives.
But as no law was enacted, even the machinery for the organisation of UNACA arose from
MPLA initiative again. 115 Also from 1988 one of the laws implementing the economic reform
integrated co-operatives in the category of 'enterprises', thus entrusted to state protection.116
The law, concretising art. 9 of CL, also provided for the obligation of the state "to promote
and dynamise the creation of co-operatives committed to the exercise of economic activities,
in order to enlarge socialist relations of production". Also, a law on co-operatives should be
presented to the CM in a six months term. 117 But hesitations of the state, reflected in omission
at the legislative level when co-operatives are in the agenda, continued and in 1989 the PR
was again ordering the draft of a law on co-operatives. 118 The adoption of a co-operatives law
was important in the context of privatisation since the state is transferring PEs to various
economic agents. Without a proper legal background, co-operatives were not able to compete
with small farmers, black market capital and foreign firms in the allocation of privatised
undertakings. Still, they have preferential rights on the issue, they probably do not exercise in a
degree which would be desirable. Also, the 90s policies of supply of inputs seem to favour
private firms. 119 However, the associations seem to benefit from a greater involvement of
NGOs in the country.
114.JA, 	 and 27.10.1988.
115.Legitimated by the Ministry of Justice: Exec.Dec. no 8'89 (Justice), on the control of UNACA by party organs under the creation of CNAC
and CPAC (national and provincial commissions for peasants associations).
traders and carriers in their 'areas of action'".
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The cooperatives movement in the 90s
Pacheco and Morais study on the co-operatives movement in three provinces (Huila,
Huambo and Malanje) shows that in the 90s the peasants associations had undergone some
significant changes. The movement was expanding, with an increase in membership and new
associations, except in Malanje. The membership of women increased, as well as the
participation in the association's organs which integrated 44% women in Huila, 33% in
Huambo and 17% in Malanje (1991: 32, 24, 63-4). 120 Also, the years of schooling of the
associations members increased, which allows them to deal with the written information
needed, with no resort to civil servants. Some associations integrated war refugees in (67% in
Huila, 55.6% in Huambo and 41.7% in Malanje; in Huila a significant number of associations
was composed only by Ovimbundu refugees), which gave them a multi-ethnic character. There
were some conflicts in Huila since members carried different forms of organisation. For
example Ovimbundu are farmers and Nanyeka-Humbe are agro-herding groups, but the
integration of the members of different ethnic groups in the associations was strong and no
ethnic discrimination was noticed even at the level of election to the management boards
(1991: 26-7, 64-5).
Peasants had in the early 90s a more clear idea of the interest of membership, which
was access to land by war refugees and to inputs and consumer goods (1991: 33-4). Also, the
assemblies have been meeting at least once per year, and it was in Huambo that meetings were
more frequent. The main subjects of these meetings were production and supply of inputs,
organisational matters and the finance of the association. The management and the control
committees were renewed but many management committees kept in office for a large period,
120.
	 % of members of co-operatives
Huila Huambo Malanje
Male 61.7 42.5 57.0
Female 37,3 57,5 43,0
Source: Pacheco and Morais, 1991:24. The higher % of women in the Huambo associations is due to the war (ibid.).
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"which may facilitate the control of the association by a restricted group" and the little value of
assemblies for the members (1991: 34-9). Although the associations maintained organisational
problems and a tendency for clientelism, their prospects for self-development seemed
improved in the 90s, with the retreat of state excessive control on their creation and
organisation.
TABLE 1
Peasants associations in 1989/1990
Province	 Associations	 Members
Bengo	 143	 17,178
Benguela	 174	 9,809
Bie	 141	 18,142
Cabinda	 107	 15,281
Cunene	 12	 1,541
Iluambo	 71	 12,720
Iluila	 374	 39,174
Kuando Kubango	 49	 4,245
K‘kanza Norte	 142	 13,126
Kwanza Sul	 236	 11,940
Luanda	 9	 1,800
Lunda Norte	 87	 8,879
Lunda Sul	 88	 8,323
Malanje	 289	 21,197
Moxico	 57	 3,069
Namibe	 20	 842
1:ige	 113	 16,039
Zaire	 31	 2,687
Total	 2,142	 205,974
Source: PLA, National Direction for Farming Co-Operativisation, quoted in Pacheco and Morais, 1991: 18.
6.3. The other Angola: UNITA controlled territory
With the 'late colonial war' waged by RSA developed, the post-colonial state had to
face, as did the colonial state, the problem of two Angolas, divided in different jurisdictions.
Still, the other Angola of the 80s had a converse nature to that of the 60-70s liberated zones.
The 80s 'other Angola' was under UNITA rule, which created there pre-state
structures. In a place near the Caprivi strip, UNITA build up a small town, a sanctuary
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protected by RSA armed forces stationed in Namibia. ul According to available sources, in
UNITA's 'liberated zones': i. a military dictatorship headed by Savirnbi was implemented,
whose real organisation and working was not transparent, 122
 
ii. violations of human rights had
as targets captured MPLA members, war prisoners, population arrested and forced to
conscription and slavery, 123 and also UNITA members, 124
 iii. alliance with chiefs maintained
their privileges, if they collaborated, and the social organisation of peasants, 125 iv. the
economy of 'liberated zones' had a 'subsistence sector', a trade area where South-African
products were bartered with surpluses of peasants living under UNITA rule, and, during the
occupation of Namibia, an exports sector, selling diamonds and ivory, 126 v. as for ideology,
121.E.g.. Femandes, 1988: 26-7; Jamba (12,000 inhabitants, according to UNITA sources) concentrated its administrative offices in a small
building, while had two airports and the town was surrounded by doors controlled by soldiers; visitors were invited to stay in their neighbourhood
"when they had no UNITA leader with them" (0 Jomal, 20.1.87) while South-Africans staying there hid (Fernandes, 1988, 26); in the late 80s, a
propaganda campaign with unknown funds transformed the place in a tourism region, where the 'Jamba tours' organisation carried political
tourists from South-Africa, occupied Namibia and Zaire (e.g., 0 Jomal, 29.7.88).
122.UNITA dissidents, who fled Jamba, reported the practice of the 'Red Meetings" led by Savimbi where "enemies of the revolution" were
accused and beaten (Expresso. 30.4.1988); some declared that "(UNITA) is Dr Savimbi, a personality who imposes himself through sudi a
system of intelligence (security) which does not allow the open debate of national problems" (Ptiblico, 6.3.1991); a leader of FDA (see Appendix,
Chapter 8), Chicoti, declared: "We (FDA) could never have talks with them (UNITA) since they do not accept that the leader is contested and we
think that all issues should be contested (Pliblico, 22.3.1991).
123 • The reports of International Amnesty on Angola refer to execution of war prisoners by UNITA; see, e.g., JA 29.3.1988, on forced labour of
Angolans with no pay in Namibia. Also, section 8.2., on the post-election crisis.
124.UNITA dissidents denounced in 1988 the killings and 'missing of the main guerrilla commanders of UNITA (e.g.. Xandovava, Vakulukuta
and Chindondo), some of them, according to UNITA, dead by accident or disease; the dissidents had such a terror to their former organisation
that "fled Portugal, after a short period of clandestinity, by fear of 'retaliations" (Expresso, 30.4.1988); Sousa Jamba, a writer dissident of
UNITA, denounced the arrest of dissidents (Chingunji and Wilson). FDA in 1991 demanded the release of "all prisoners of consciousness, either
by MPLA or UNITA" (Paha), 9.3.1991).
125.UNITA claimed an alliance with chiefs, some of whom supplied soldiers to its army. while some were present at its 1991 Congress (Pfiblico,
12.3.1991): the conditions for this alliance are not known, but it seems that in the late 80s some 'allied chiefs' thought they were still fighting
against colonialism, and "almost do not know NiPLA or Cubans (who did not reach the region). Just by some bombings at plots and some mines
in the trails" (declarations of Tshokwe chief Samuyuleno, Fernandes, 1988: 27); in passing, as the chief declared FAPLA had not readied the
region, doubts may be raised on who has put the mines in these trails, since UNITA used anti-personal mines in the bush, which victimised
peasants (see, e.g., Fernandes, 1988: 30).
126.Peasants under self-management in zones occupied by LTNITA exdianged their surpluses with UNITA officials, who bartered salt from
Namibia and cloths; women worked as porters to carry bartered goods (Fernandes, 1988: 27. 36). In Jamba: "There is no money. Everybody
depends on the movement (UNITA) to dress, have a house, a radio and nerve.. silly batteries, to smoke, drink a beverage. But UNITA is aware that
this is transitory, and there are people who bet that in the future the introdurtion of money will be one of the problems to the Jonas Savimbi
movement ... there had been attempts to introduce money, but they were abandoned due to the issues raised. So, to an war economy a family
subsistence economy is added, with products going from the ground to the table and what is not produced is rationed at the central warehouses ...
one has to say that at Jamba nobody smokes a cigarette, drinks a coke or a beer which is not manufactured in South-Africa" (0 Jomal, 20.11.87).
Through occupied Namibia and having Portuguese, many former settlers in Angola, as middlemen, UNTITA had two math exports: diamonds and
ivory. As the destruction of elephants and sale of recollected diamonds were net sufficient, from the mid-80s UNITA began to attack the diamond
mines in Lunda Norte, an activity which lasted until 1993, when the cease-fire was already agreed to. Although UNITA officially states that it is
for the creation of co-operatives, in its controlled territory there is no notice of any co-operative and, also, UNITA harshly persecuted co-
operatives dynamisers.
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propaganda for peasants based on tradition (and terrors) was actually effective, 127 but UNITA
preached 'democratic socialism428
 while practicing 'personality cult 1129 and discriminating
against women in education,'" and vi. the ethnic approach to nationality, based on the racist
concept of 'genuine Angolan', remained.'31
UNITA's activities while exploring the resentment of peasant societies prevented the
success of attempts to transform social relations in the countryside, either of a socialist or a
capitalist nature. The impact of the late colonial war in post-colonial peasants societies was
similar to the colonial war: forcing peasants to move backwards in time to subsistence
economy and increased poverty.
6.4. Conclusion
The contradictory character of the agricultural policies during the period studied arose
firstly from the enormous task the post-colonial state had to face: to put in motion the whole
production and marketing networks. This problem was aggravated by the endurance of war.
127.UNITA manipulated tradition according to its interests, for example, burning peasants as witches when they refused to collaborate (see
section 2.2.). On LN1TA policies on the so-called witches, see Femandes, 1988: 37.
128.UNITA has changing 'self-labelling': in 1987, for example, Sevin :1bl was a socialist: "Do not bring us Cuban, Russian, Portuguese socialism.
Even the Portuguese we want to come to reconstruct Angola, because I think that Angola only will be feasible with the Portuguese, (we) do not
(want to) bring us Portuguese socialism. Socialism will be built by Angolans. I am even beginning to study the problem of our peasant, which
cannot be made in Portugal. This opening to socialism allows us different interpretations. But it is socialism. ... I do not want this socialism (with
a single party). So it is necessary open tnind. Our socialism is freedom. And the freedom to accept an individual who thinks the contrary we do. In
the moment we do think we have the talisman of socialism, it is finished - dictatorship comes." (Savimbi, 0 _Tomei 20.11.87). In 1991, Savimbi
declared he was "centre with a trend to the left" (Savimbi on his political position, Expresso, 9.3.1991, where he also stated that "MPLA is
communist, whatever it says, and FNLA was right").
129.See note 121, on the role of Savirnbi within UNITA and the grounds of his power. Journalists who visited Jambe and witnessed the
meetings, report the slogans: "Savimbi is the poet of the Angolan revolution", "Savirnbi is our guide. The guide" (Fernandes, 1988: 32-3); in
1991 a joumalist repotted that "(the 1991 UNITA Congress) began with a religious service where Savimbi had the honours of prophet ... Behind
us were the rhythms of Kuando-Kubango as this choir of UNITA youth repeating "holy the hour on which we were born in your hour, doctor
Savitnbi" (Paha:), 2.3.91, on UNITA 7th Congress).
130.In Jambe there were welfare devices such as hospitals and schools; education of girls and boys was separated and women discriminated:
"tradition is present, having the family as social base and the very specific place women occupy in the family, a place leading, for example, to the
fact that there are boarding schools for boys but not for girls - the orphan girls are delivered to families to be educated according to tradition. And,
the most striking, Latin is taught at the Jambe National School. Imagine six trunks at the floor, where students seat, a blackboard hang in a tree
and a choir of 'rose, rosae" (0 Jornal, 20.11.87).
131.In 1991, UNITA continued the claims for division of Angolans into 'genuine' and 'non-genuine' and accused Dos Santos of being a
S.Tomean: "we are more genuine Angolans than Eduardo dos Santos ... a genuine Angolan is the one who was born, grew up and has generation
(sic) in Angola. We will not insist any more in the 'S.Tomean' (calling Dos Santos) because the new president of &Tome, Miguel Trovoada, is a
very close friend of mine. When I will arrive to Jambe, I will say That's over' (the S.Tomean slogan against Dos Santos). But we will go on
calling him a big boss (caudilho mor)." (Savimbi. Expresso, 9.3.1991).
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But it also resulted from the sharp conflict which opposed radicals, reformists and agrarians in
an area which was politically sensitive, especially for agrarians given their expectations from
independence and the importance of the control of peasants for their political ambitions. A
significant factor in the failures of agricultural policies during the period of central command
has been the difficulty of the post-colonial state to deal with which appeared as 'transitory
formations', that is, a social space which escaped statist simplifications applicable in industry.
Indeed, the radical project of rupture in agriculture demanded a reappraisal of the modes of
articulation between state and non-state forms of organisation of agriculture and the
awareness of the mediatory role of the first periphery. Having to face this problem, the
patrimonialism underlying agrarian options led to the statisation of farming production which,
a target for alternative use through theft and smuggling, soon created the conditions for
privatisation, as happened in trade, while simultaneously reinforcing agrarian political power.
At the level of law, the ambivalent character of agricultural policies is patent in state omissions
to enact formal law on significant and necessary areas as land and co-operatives, a situation
which contrasts with the detailed regulation of other economic relations.
As for the cooperatives movement, although it appears as having failed as well, 132
among other reasons due to absence of proper state support to its development, peasants
perceptions on its role and excessive expectations from co-operatives dynamisers. However,
the endurance of peasants associations during reformism shows that, although with setbacks,
the process of change of organisational forms among poor peasants is progressing.
The continuities of the Angolan history had as a consequence that, notwithstanding the
project of radical change of social relations in the countryside, the post-colonial state had to
face the rebellion of sections of the second periphery, led by anti-urban and ethnic-based
agrarians supported by foreign powers and fuelled by the failures of the post-colonial state to
respond to the demands and expectations of peasants on independence.
132 , Rella points out that one cannot argue that co-operatives in Angola failed because they were no yet co-operatives but 'collective fields and
was significant in terms of dominance of agricultural production were the PEs (1992: 275).
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CHAPTER 7
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
The relationship between the state and foreign enterprise, and also between foreign
enterprises operating in the country, remains shrowded in secrecy. Although legislation
ruling the activities of foreign enterprises may give some information, contracts and
related data usually are not available making it difficult to assess either the impact of
foreign enterprise in the country's economy, and social life, or the real efficacy of adopted
solutions. Nevertheless, and with these risks, a reference to the relationship between the
providential state and this type of enterprises seems important. Indeed, no underdeveloped
economy may ignore the international context and the more or less intensive integration of
a country in the world system.
The process of transition from metropolitan dependence to the integration in the
world system, and related presence in the country of non-Portuguese firms, had some
consequences for the post-colonial economic policy. When enterprises were abandoned in
1975, mainly by local and Portuguese capital, many non-Portuguese firms remained in the
country especially those involved in natural resources.' Given their characteristic
(concessionaires or mixed enterprises) operating in the export sector of the economy, they
entered into negotiations with the new government and were not nationalized, even on
grounds of strategic importance to the national economy. 2
 Moreover some of them, within
I . See subsection 4.1.2.
2 . Law no 316, art 1, allowed this possibility (with compensation) which was rarely used; examples of foreign firms which remained in
the country are, besides oil companies (e.g., Gulf; Texaco, and FINA), Tanks (subsidiary of Societe Generale de Belgique, SOB)
associated to the state in the Benguela Railways CFB, paralysed due to UNITA attacks; De Beers, though MATS (mining technical
assistance) at Diamang Heineken in breweries, etc. (see, e.g., subsection 4.1.2.).
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mixed enterprises such as CFB and Diamang, got access to soft loans from the central
bank, which partially financed their recovery.3
The post-colonial state concentrated on the recovery and management of
abandoned assets. Also the constitutional policy directives pointing to economic
independence,4
 and later the option for a socialist strategy of development, meant little
interest, at the legislative level, for the production of norms regulating foreign investment
and the activity of foreign firms. The active nationalism of many radicals, the belief in the
possibility of achieving a self-sustained path of development, lack of experience, and also
uncertainty about the future directions of international economic relations in a context of
boycotts, 5 divestment and war, also probably conditioned the legal vacuum on which
foreign firms worked until 1978, when the first legislation on natural resources was
enacted, followed in 1979 by the law on foreign investment.6
The attitudes of foreign partners also conditioned these outcomes. The MPLA
reputation of 'left winger' and related media campaigns, uncertainty caused by war and
government policies on nationalisation and transfer of profits, discouraged foreign direct
investment. So, independence had as a consequence a retreat of capital penetration and, in
a certain way, a step backwards in the country's position in the world economy:
exploitation came back to trade, as Angola became heavy importer of all kinds of goods,
whose range and quantity increased as the economy deteriorated. Simultaneously, the
range and quantities of exports diminished until the only significant activity was oi1.7
3.E.g.. m.o. no 22 75 (Planning and Economic Coordination) ordering BNA to grant Diamang a loan of about USD 2 Mn (art. 1).
4. See section 3.1.4.
5. See, e.g.. subsection 7.2.1., espec. note 72 (boycotts); also, in 1986 the US goverrunent banned the sale of Boeing planes to Angola
(AED, 31.1.1987).
6. Law no 1378, Law on Oil Activities (LOA). Law no 5/79, Law on Geological and Mining Activities, (LGM) and Law no 10/79, on
Foreign Investment (LFI/79).
7. On the structure of opoits during colonialism see section 1.1. For example, the official data for 1982-84 show a structure of main
imports in 1984: i madfinery and transport, 22%, ii. food, 23%, iii. raw-materials, 17 0/e, goods of large consumption, 14%, spares 13%;
the structure of main exports was: i. crude oil, 86.5%, ii. diamonds, 3.3.%, iii. coffee. 3.9%(1 Ill Comercio Extemo, 1986, 5-7).
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Emphasis in purchase abroad, instead of more problematic local production, led to
the emergence of specialised apparatuses claiming for monopolies and in constant conflict
with buyers, especially PEs in need of inputs, including raw materials previously produced
in the country. 8 The conditions of contracting in imports were unfavourable to a recently
independent country and emerging from a devastating war: without access to short-term
credit, at eventually unfair prices and conditions. 9
 A factor reinforcing, during the 'trade
phase', the opportunism of foreign partners was the ideology of being boycotted, caused
by the isolation of the country immediately after independence.") Information
asymmetries" also contributed to the problems of quality and prices of imports and
suppliers non-performance, 12 and to a trend towards monopolisation of both sides of
transactions: not only domestic buyers were significantly concentrated, in agents and
volume of purchases, but also a few sellers were selected as preferential suppliers of a
significant range of non idiosyncratic goods available in competition at markets world-
wide. To face poor contracting, in the late 70s controi of imports by a third-party was
adopted. 13
The dominant perceptions of Angola as a socialist-oriented country acting in the
'Soviet sphere of influence' could lead to the assumption that foreign trade was diverted
8. See Chapter 4.
9. 'Most business from 1975-79 (in Angola) was done on a cash or confirmed basis. The later part of 1979 saw Angola move towards
demanding short or longterm credit facilities." (AED, 6.12.86).
1 °. E.g.. difficulties of recognition by foreign governments and international organisations such as OAU; see e.g., Hodges, 1976.
11. on
 the impact of information asymmetries on the balance o power in contractual relations see, e.g., Williamson, 1975 (general
background of the impact of uncertainty, bounded rationality, small numbers and opportunism in contractual relations). Mackaay, 1982
(sales contracts and consumer protection), Daintith, 1986 (assessment of long-term contracting in mining), Ghai and Choong„ 1988
(management contracts), and Helleiner and O'Brien, 1983 (international contracting between poor and rich countries). See also subsection
4.3.2.
12. E.g. the government complained it bought food abroad, credit letters were paid and the food did not arrive to the country because it
was diverted to neighbouring countries, either by the action of external agents or due to possible internal complicities involved in a network
(Expresso. 8.12.1990).
13.The Swiss firm SOS, before the shipping of commodities.
268
1970 1980
Developed countries
Total 94.0 79.4
Europe
Total 74.5 62.8
EEC 70.6 54.0
USA Canada 11.0 9.6
Japan 4.3 7.0
Others 4.1
Socialist countries
Eastern Europe 0.1
De% eloping countries
Total 5.8 15.6
OPEC 1.5
America 0.2 10.1
Africa 2.2 0.1
West Asia 1.7
South East and SE Asia 1.7 3.0
1981
82.4
57.4
51.6
19.1
5.9
0.1
12.9
0.4
7.6
0.9
2.0
1970	 1978	 1981
92.4	 76.9	 67.9
	
67.0	 24.6	 29.3
	
66.2	 20.6	 26.6
	
17.6	 51.8	 37.2
	
6.5	 0.5	 1.3
	
1.2	 -	 -
Developed countries
Total
Europe
Total
EEC
LTS.A.,Canada
Japan
Others
Socialist countries
Eastern Europe 0.4 5.6
Developing countries
Total 6.4 16.3
OPEC 0.5 5.2
America 0.6 8.3
Africa 4.6 7.2
West Asia 0.9 -
South East and SE Asia 0.2
2.0
28.0
1.6
25.4
2.2
0.1
0.1
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from the traditional partners during colonialism. In fact, former relations were maintained
with no significant changes towards, say, socialist or Southern countries.
TABLE 1
Import structure by main regions of origin (%)
TABLE 2
Export structure by main regions of destination (%)
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade and Statistics, 1987, Supplement.
During the late 70s, uncertainty about transfer of profits, under discretion of the
central bank, led foreign firms with participations in mixed enterprises to get returns from
Angolan subsidiaries by selling services, technology and materials." Contracts between
14
. For example, a contract between an Angolan mixed enterprise and the Portuguese parent company agreed to in 1977 (renewal of an
1967 colonial contract) provided for a technical assistance contract, on the shadow of a patent license contracts for ten years with the USA
holder of technology to ensure the working of the tyres mixed industry, in a moment where the transfer of profits abroad (if any at the time)
was rather uncertain; when the set of contracts was renewed in 1987, an exhausted (more than 20 years old) Portuguese patent (of the US
company) was under a new licence; according to business sources, the US company had also a management contract with the Angolan
subsidiary.
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domestic and foreign firms according to these patterns expanded in the 80s and culminated
with direct investment in privatisation during the 90s, although the sale of goods and
services component of contracting persisted. This trend back to a more intensive
integration in the world economy paired with the progressive indebtedness of the
country" and the need of rescheduling and related membership of IMF network, meaning
an additional pressure for an increased role of foreign firms.
7.1. The general framework for foreign investment
From 1975 the property of foreigners was guarantied by CL art. 10, 16 with the
limits of resources under public domain described in CL art. 11 and, among them, "all the
natural resources existing in the soil and subsoil". Until 1979 the legislation specifically
oriented to foreign firms, except in the area of natural resources, 17 aimed the a posteriori
control of ownership and management. Legislation enacted by the TG compelled foreign
enterprises with subsidiaries operating in Angola to transfer headquarters to the country. 18
In 1976 new regulations ordered foreign firms with headquarters in the country to deposit
shares in local banks and supply information on entitlements. Transactions of financial
participations without previous authorization of the Ministry of Finance were prohibited.19
15. Debt figures in the 80s: i. total amount active debt (Mn USD) was 193 in 1975; 317 in 1980; 810 in 1982; 782 in 1983; 819 in 1984
and 1106 in  ii. debt in % of GNP was 7.1 in 1975; 5.0 in 1980; 10.8 in 1982; 10.9 in 1983; 11.7 in 1984 and 15.8 in 1985; iii. the
total amount of debt service (Mn USD) was 18 in 1975; 102 in 1980; 208 in 1982; 224 in 1983; 252 in 1984 and 347 in 1985; iv. the
debt service as % of exports was: 1.4 in 1975; 6.4 in 1980; 11.0 in 1982; 11.1 in 1983; 10.3 in 1984 and 13.3 in 1985 (source: UNCTAD
Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1987, Supplement); debt readied 5 bn in 1988, 6,300 Mn in 1989 (AED
9.10.1089) and 7 bn in 1991.
16.See section 3.1.4.
17.See section 7.2.
18.The terms for the transfer provided for in previous decrees were not respected and Dec. no 2/76, established new terms for the transfer
of headquarters; in 1976 legislation on members of the companies boards referred to in the transitional decrees granted the government "the
right to refuse to accept as mambas of boards or corporations, companies or enterprises with headquarters in Angola, those individuals
whom, by their strong connections with the many, are considered undesirable" (Dec. no 102/76, art, I); the latter should leave the country
(art. 2); according to the preamble of the decree, some foreign firms "were sending to Angola, as members of their corporate boards,
individuals considered undesirable in the country by their comedians with the many"; these norms proved later to have some grounds: it
seems that trade between Angola and RSA after independence breaking the sanctions against the latter was made by some foreign firms
which imported (cheaper) inputs from RSA (with falsified certificates of origin); on sanctions, see also note 91 (oil embargo).
19. Dec. no 70-A176, arts. 2 and 3; the decree aimed to prevent the sale of financial participations susceptible of confiscation by abandon
under Law no 3/76 (preamble, see subsection 4.1.2.); breaking the law was punished with the loss of shares to the state (art 4/2/b) and
inhibition of membership of corporate boards for 10 years (art 4/2/a); in 1986 some shareholders of RNA Petraleos de Angola (see note
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The 1979 law on foreign investment reflected the initial ambitions as to control of
'commanding heights' of the economy which guided the reserves legislation. 2° LFIl barred
foreign enterprise to exercise the activities of. defence, financial institutions, insurance,
foreign trade, telecommunications, press and publishing, radio and television and public
services, such as education, health, postal service, supply of electricity and water to the
population, sanitation and drainage.21 Foreign investment, and related contracts, were
submitted to a regime of authorizations where various state bureaucracies intervened.22
The law favoured the association of PEs with direct foreign investors, establishing
their compulsory association 23 as a form of control and providing for an additional control
reserve related to the participation of involved PE, at least 51%. 24 Investment for the
creation of private firms could be authorized by the CM if the new firms either
"contributed to the social and economic development of PRA" and "produced goods
5) lost their shares for the state under this legislation (Joint Exec.Dec. no 50/86, Finance, Energy and Oil and Justice, art 1). On
unauthorised dealings of financial participations, cit.dec., art. 1.
20. The preamble of LF1/79 explained the underlying reasons for the approach to foreign firms: "During the period of colonial occupation,
the colonial power resorted to foreign investments as a form to associate them in the exploitation of the national territory and, so, to engage
these capitals in the defence of its interests. These investments were channelled to domains allowing the acquisition of the highest profits,
underestimating the interests of the Angolan people and so creating serious distortions between the various sectors of the national economy
and imbalances between the different regions of the country. By an heroic stniggle, the Angolan People, guided by MPLA, conquered the
political independence thus creating the bases which will permit to conquer the economic independence, to overcome underdevelopment
and to move decidedly towards socialism. To reach the goals defined by our Party and taking into account the low tedinical capacity of the
country, the scarcity of financial resources, the reduced skills of Angolan labour, there is a need to resort to capital, equipment and
technology imported from abroad. However, foreign investment only will be authorized for projects included in the National Plan and, so,
which contribute to an actual development of PRA and serve the superior interests of the Angolan People." On state reserved areas, section
4.1.
21. LF1179, art. 5.
22. Foreign in
. vestment was under the CM a priori control, after a joint proposal of the ministers of Planning. Finance and branch (LFI179,
art. 20); the CM decided on "all the essential elements of the concesned investment and date of beginning of implementation" (art 222);
since the law required the "favourable advice" of involved bureaucracies (art. 22/1) LF1179 fixed terms for the production of opinions (four
months, art. 22/1) and to communication of decisions to the applicant (six months, art 23/1); related contracts (of association of Angolan
entities and foreign paitners), needed the joint authorization of the ministers of Planning. Finance and the branch (art 24/1).
23. LF1/79, arts 8/1 and 10/2., on the compulsory association of foreign investors to PEs through mixed firms (corporate persons) and
joint-ventures (defined as long-term contracts without the creation of a corporate person).
24. c,t. law, art 9/1; this norm had a safeguard clause empowering the CM to authorize the formation of mixed companies where the
participation of the Angolan PE was less than 51% (art 9/2); an example is Petromar, the law also established rules to ease the investment
capacity of the PE, by compelling the apportations of capital by the local PE to include "land, buildings, machinery and devices existing in
the country as well as expenses in national currency" (art 9/1).
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exclusively for export", responded to needs related to "the volume of investment andlor
the technological complexity" or led to "a significant decrease in imports".25
The rights and guarantees of foreign investors under LFI179 were: i. long term
contracting,26 ii. export of net profits,27 iii. right to compensation for nationalisation
according to special criteria established in LFI179, 28 iv. access to domestic loans, and, v.
access to external loans and guarantee of transfer abroad of interests and reimbursements
owed. 29 LFI179 had as other incentives to foreign capital a single negotiated income tax
and exemptions form income tax and customs duties, which seemed widespread in the
country's international contracting. 30 The specific provisions on duties aimed to ensure the
financial accountability" and rules for the management of local subsidiaries of foreign
investors. 32 In labour, there was the obligation to recruit and train Angolan personnel and
to pay centrally fixed wages, while foreign personnel might have a different pay, a regime
25. Cii law. arts 11/1, 11/2 and 11/3.
26. "A period of activity from 10 to 15 years, from the signing of the contract", which could be extended (cii law, art. 12/a).
27. "The transfer abroad of annual profits, duly authorized by the Ministry of Finance after payment of taxes and deduction of amounts for
compulsory funds, up to 25°0 of invested capital, according to that agreed to in contracts, in specific cases" (art 12/c).
28. See subsection 4.2.1. (nationalisation with right to compensation); Law no 3/76 did not provide criteria to fix compensation and left the
matter to the discretion of the CM; LF1179 provided criteria for compensation to foreign investors: i. agreed to by the parties, ii. in the
agreed to or invested currency, iii. never under the difference between the invested value plus interests fixed at the interest rates practiced in
international markets and the part of that value already reimbursed; interests were evaluated from the date of the implementation of
investment up to the date of payment of agreed compensation (cit law, art 12/b). In the late 80s there was nevertheless a trend to negotiate
interstate agreements on this area, e.g., Germany and Angola were negotiating an agreement on the security of German investments in
Angola and on compensation to German subjects for confiscation of their assets (interview Loy, minister of External Relations, quoted at
JA, 15.3.1988).
29. LF1179, arts 12/d and 14, respectively.
313 . Cit. law, art. 17, on the single income tax for foreign investors; the same article established that the rate of the tax was agreed to in
contracts according to: i. "the importance of investment to national economic and social development", ii volume of production to export,
volume of investment nerPcssiry to the project, iv. tedmological level demanded, v. terms for reimbursement of invested capital, and, vi.
plans for the training of Angolan personnel (art 17/2). Exemptions or reductions of taxes could last for 5 years (art. 13/1/a); exemption or
reduction of customs duties covered imports of equipment, spares, raw and other materials not existing in the country (art 13/1ib) and/or
exports and "the value of non paid customs will reflect in the producer benefits" (art 13/1/c); the Ministry of Finance had the power to
concede exemptions or reductions, after favourable advice of the branch ministry (art 13/2). On the oil and minerals regimes, see section
7.2. See also section 7.3., on the Ministry of Finance control of contracts on grounds of abuse in exemptions explained in the preamble of
Exec.Dec. no 24/84 (Finance): "since some sectors have been contracting with foreign enterprises and entities the most diverse legal
instruments which usually contain clauses involving the concession of customs duties benefits, especially exemptions".
31 . LFI179, arts 16 and 18/1.
32 • For example, to: i. "draft annual plans, aiming a constant increase of production and productivity, according to the instructions of
competent authorities" (art 18/1/d), (see Chapter 4, note 5 and Table 2), ii. ensure the safety and protection of workers against professional
diseases and work accidents (art 18/1/f), and, iii. adopt measures against pollution and for the protection of nature (art 18/1/e); although
the norms of LFU79 had in mind mixed companies, art. 18/2 extended these duties to contractual joint-ventures.
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different from that of oi1. 33
 Conflict of the parties was settled by negotiation. 34
 Still, the
CM had powers to sanction breach by foreign investors with revocation of the contract.35
The law relied on contracts for the regulation of other matters, that is, on the
regimes arising from negotiations and the intervention of bureaucracies with a priori
control powers. LFI179 aimed the creation of an uniform regime for foreign investment
and established that its norms prevailed over the special oil and minerals regimes in case of
conflict. 36
 Still, the impact of LFI179 in the two branches restrained itself to the areas of
rights and obligations of foreign investors, while meaning a reallocation of the powers of
intervening bureaucracies.37
7.1.1. The application of LFI179
There is little information on the application of LFI179 as well as on the volume
and origin of foreign investment, except in the natural resources area. However,
regulations on the matter, including changing approaches either to the role of PEs
involved in corporate or contractual joint-ventures or to the application of the general
regime for companies, signal that relations with foreign investors have been strained.
The less risky path to implement a direct investment under LFI179 was the
association with PEs. So, during the 80s new mixed companies joined those arising from
nationalisation or created during colonialism. Company law applied to these flrms. 38 Still,
33 . Art. 27/1 only stated that mixed companies and joint ventures arising from foreign investment should employ and train Angolan
personnel but did not fix any compulsory rate; it allowed firms to recruit foreign personnel "if sufficient Angolan workers are not available"
(alt. 27 2); foreign personnel "will not submit to the fixed salaries and wages for Angolan workers". See sections 5.1., 5.2. and 7.2.
34. Cu.. law, alt 31; except in labour, where it stated that industrial action followed legislation in force in the host country (cit. law, art. 30).
35. Cit. law, art. 33; in case of "serious breath of contractual clauses or (clauses) of the articles of association".
36. LFI/79, art. 39.
37. For example, the ministries of Planning and Finance saw their powers increased in, say, the area of approval of contracts in oil,
formerly a power of the branch minietry, see section 7.2. (contract approval under LOA and LF7/79). See also section 7.3., on the powers
to approve contracts with clauses related to foreign exchange.
38. LFI/79, art. 8/1: mixed enterprises resulting from foreign investment should have the form of company (limited liability).
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usually articles of association did not follow the organisational rules of the Commercial
Code and contracts regulated matters such as who appointed members of the board and
directors. 39 When we compare the articles of association of mixed companies created in
the 80s, the problem apparently is the low bargaining power of involved PEs vis-a-vis the
branch ministry to appoint autonomously their own representatives in mixed firms. Indeed,
the company law process of selection of members of corporate boards was in some cases
substituted by direct appointment of PE representatives by the branch minister.
An example are the memorandum and articles of association of Paviterra, 4 ° a
roads and dams construction company by shares associating PE Prefabricados (51%
shareholding) and Portuguese Mota & Companhia, Ld (49% shareholding). Paviterra had
a four members board of directors (called council of direction) with two directors
representing the PE (the general director and the administrative director) who, instead of
being elected at the general meeting (something which informally meant their appointment
by Prefabricados, the holding PE), were appointed by the bcatioh ininistes . The kattes also
appointed the chairperson and one secretary for the general meeting and the president and
a secretary of the audits council. Also, although Prefabricados had a majority
shareholding, in the board there was symmetrical representation, thus favouring the
foreign partner. 41
In a context of restrictions in the powers of PEs managers, especially the strong
dependence of the general director on the branch minister, the inclusion these powers for
39. There are exceptions, such as the articles of association of Petromar (approved by Dec. no 23/84), a venture of French Bouygues
Offshore and Sonangol to produce equipment for the oil inrh urtry, where the awortation of Sonangol was land (10% shareholding) and
Bouygues provided other inputs (90 0 0 shareholding), (articles, art. 4/b); established under the form of company by shares strictly followed
the Commercial Code on compulsory organisation for this type of companies: i. general meeting (articles, arts 6/1/c and 9), board of
directors (loc.cit., arts 6/1/a and 7) and audits council (loc.cit., arts 6/1/b and 10); also the election of members of the boards in the general
meeting. but Bouygues appointed two directors and Sonangol one (loc.ciL, art 7/4), while Soriano! appointed 2 auditors (loc.ciL, art
10/1).
. Approved by Dec. no 181-A/80; memorandum, arts 5 and 19, articles, arts 8/2, 17 and 18, respectively. Also, the articles of association
(approved by Dec. no 23/86) of Angov Francas (managing 'dollar shops.), a company associating PE Loias Francas (75% shareholding)
and Yugoslavian Brodokomerc (25°a), (att. 5/1) provided for a different framework.
41 . On different composition of the board in minerals corporate joint ventures in Third World countries, see, e.g., Schanze, 1981.
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mixed ventures in violation of company law reveals a certain degree of tension between
PEs and the branch. It also appears as an attempt of the latter to control directly mixed
enterprises with foreign partners when legislation on foreign investment, due to its own
rationale, did not provide for direct control by the public administration.42
As for the quality of the work of these state representatives, including their
functions of control of the activities of foreign partners, legislation itself pictured the
suspicions of the state on the role played by local managers on 'effective' decision-making.
Indeed, under Exec.Dec. no 52/85 (Finance), the PE would only retain a part of their
profits from financial participations "according to the effective degree of intervention of
the PE in the management of the mixed enterprise or joint-venture". This norm reflects the
fact that although in many joint ventures the state had competent managers representing
the national PE, the appointment of many individuals due to political reasons also led to
situations in which they were directors only nominally and all decision-making in fact lay
in the representatives of foreign investors. This kind of managers even showed a
clientelism on both the branch ministries and foreign investors which did not favour the
interests of the companies they were supposed to manage.43
LFI/79 had in the role and organisation of PEs an impact not foreseen by LPE/77:
their transformation into a partially holding entity with the task to manage participations in
mixed ventures resulting from foreign investment" and their role as privileged middlemen,
42. As the majority of foreign investors to attract by LFI179 came from capitalist systems, the law needed a frame of references
understandable by them (that is, with some connection with parent legal systems of foreign investors) while, at the same time, satisfying
their demands, or erqiectations, of the lowest possible degree of state intervention in their activities; LFI179, and economic legislation on
enterprises, did not please foreign investors who got, under contracts, exemptions of application of legislation in force (see, e.g., the case of
the Capanda project).
43. Cit. Exec.Dec., arts 3/1 and 3/2.
44. LPE/77 expressly excluded from its application PEs with foreign firms as operators (see subsection 4.2.2), probably having in mind The
oil and minerals sectors; however, the law did not foresee the possibility of groups under the control of a top PE, whether holding or the
socialist trusts and oombinats. Some mixed fimis with foreign partners remained thus autonomous, directly linked to the branch ministry
but by the late 80s there was an effort to allocate the management of their financial participations to a PE. For example, Dec. no 28/88
allocated the financial participations at Cimangola, Dyrup, Decorang and Fabirnor to PE Encime (see note 50) and to the Ministry of
Industry, respectively (arts 2/1 and 2/2). Exec.Dec. no 45/86 (Industry) allocated state participation at breweries Nocal to PE Cerval (art.
1) and ordered Cerval to appoint a representative at the board of directors (art 2).
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at least in the operations stage, in significant international economic relations. 45
Legislation on natural resources had the same consequences when compelling foreign
investors to associate with PEs. However, although small groups led by a PE emerged in
the 80s, no legislation regulated the entity 'group of enterprises' and the emergence of
firms subordinated to other enterprises. As a result, and within the patterns of financial
behaviour of firms, some PEs did not deliver to the NB the profits from shareholdings in
mixed firms.46
Used to rule the management of PEs without restraints, the branches moved to
direct interference in the relations between PEs and their mixed subsidiaries. This is
evident in the mid 80s published orders. In some cases competition between the branch
and subordinate PEs for the management of financial participations in mixed firms and,
eventually, fear that informal holding PEs became too powerful could be the rationale for
measures adopted. Also, the attitudes of some branch ministries towards holding PEs may
reflect the conflict between the agrarian component of government and the MGM
enlightened managers of some holding PEs, as well as the uneasiness of agrarians to cope
with international relations. An example of these attitudes of the branch is the split of the
Prefabricados group. Prefabricados was a construction materials PE which progressively
build up a small informal group by associating with foreign investors: it created
Tecnogiron (an Angolan-Cuban mixed venture for construction), Paviterra and Ecocampo
(an Angolan-French mixed firm). In 1987 the new minister for Construction changed all
the PE representatives in mixed firms. 47 In 1989, the ministry of Construction went
further and promoted the liquidation of the PE and the reallocation of its assets (including
45 . While LPE/77 gave a substantial control, even invasion of management powers, of PEs by state bureaucracies, LF1/79 provided for a
scheme entitling PEs some room for manoeuvre while managing mixed companies, making it possible, in a certain way, demands for
autonomy grounded in applicable commercial law and eventual alliances of PEs managers with foreign partners (see section 4.3.1.).
Candidates to a comprador class within date apparatuses, or even the party, had thus to face this uneasy mediation.
45 . See subsection 4.4.1., on the regime of Exec Dec. no 52/85 (Finance); in mineral resources, Dec. no 15/89, ordered Sonangol to deliver
to the NB its incomes as national concessionaire of hydrocarbons (art. 1) and allowed the PE to keep 10% of these incomes to face the
expenditure with the auditing of operators (att. 4).
47
. M.o. no 13/87 (Construction).
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financial participations in the mixed firms). 48 In passing, as the national companies were
extinguished under ministerial decisions, they were progressively substituted in the
building market by foreign firms, which began by getting huge state contracts until they
had settled and performed even simple repairs.49
In other cases apparently the conflict was with foreign partners. 5° Problems also
arose from lack of knowledge of the realities of companies and mixed firms, 51 and alleged
improper behaviour of involved parties. 52 Also, one of the rationales for the creation of
mixed firms, sharing risks, often was not accepted by foreign investors, who used mixed
companies to sell services and materials. An example is the contract of association
between Prefabricados and Mota and Cia establishing: i. the prices of building contracts by
the mixed firm (actually resorting mainly to state contracts) "will be fixed, work by work,
in order to ensure profits to the enterprise (Paviterra), according to the average
productivity established and in order that the net profits on each of the first five years will
be, at least, 20% of invested capital", which meant that the state would be forced to pay
48. Dec. no 20 89 dissolved Prefabricados and divided its material assets among: i. new PEs which would emerge from factories of
Prefabricados (art. 3), ii. existing PEs of the branch (art_ 4), in. future PEs (art 2). Conning the financial participations, Dec. no 20 89
contained an odd provision stating that the assets of the PE in mixed firms would be distributed by the minister (art 3 single par., later
corrected to financial participations); Exec.Dec. no 10/89 (Construction) allocated the shareholding of Paviterra to PE Constroi, while the
ministry kept to itself the financial participations at Ecocampo and Tecnogiron (art. 3); Exec.Dec. no 36/89 (Construction) later allocated
the financial participation at Tecnogiron to ether PE, Geotecnica (art 1).
49. See sections 7.3. and 8.1.
5°. An eventual example may be the cement mixed firm Cirnangola, arising from the partial nationalisation of Cimento Secil (see
subsection 4.1.2.). In 1980 a new mixed firm was created, by association to Danish firms Hoeigaard Shultz and Smidth and COA (Dec. no
44-A 80). Foreign partners ran the firm under a three years management contract, which included training and production targets, but
found diffictat to cope with local personnel (about 650-800 workers), since they could not provide food; part of canent was bartered with
other firms and the main production wan to exports while the internal market faced stringent shortages (AED, 7.6.1986). In 1988 the
financial participation at Cimangola was allocated to cement PE Encime (Dec, no 28/88, art 1), but soon the mixed firm was dissolved
(Dec. no 39/88, approving the Agreement for the Dissolution of Cimangola, entered into between Encime and the Danish partners) since
"the results which motivated the creation of Cimangola were not attained by its activities" (preamble ciLdec.). Encime kept the assets of the
dissolved mixed company (cit dec. art 2), but in 1989 m.o. no 66/89 (Construction) was creating a commission to implement measures
decided by CDS to solve the problems of (former) Cimangola: in fad, an eventual association with Portuguese capital, a consortium of
Cimpor, Secil and Banco de Foment°, competing with South-Korean and Scandinavian groups for the new mixed firm (49% foreign
capital), (Pablico, 5.2.1991). .
51. For example. in 1979 it seems that the role and powers of the state representative in mixed Cimianto's boards was under discussion:
m.o. no 143/79 (Construction) defined the powers of the state delegate as those of the same entity in intervened companies (art 1, see
subsection 4.1.1.) while for duties it applied legislation on PEs (art 3; see subsection 4.2.1.).
52. An example may be a coffee evort PE. Uigimex, authorised in 1987 to associate to UK Bozzo Angola, Ltd, in a joint-venture for the
marketing of coffee from the province of Uige (Resol. no 6/87, CDS); in this very year the PE was forbidden to export coffee since it
allegedly made exports violating the regulations on the issue (m.o. no 40/87, Agriculture).
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for the works an amount to guarantee the reimbursement of investment in 5 years,
whatever the quality of works and management of the firm, ii. "in case of damages they
constitute a burden of the Angolan firm", and, iii. the mixed firm was free to contract
technical assistance, after the authorisations provided for at law.53
Another possible source of conflict was the preferential regime of mixed firms as
contrasted with PEs. A striking example are planning regulations. While PEs were subject
to the dictates of branch and functional bureaucracies, P1182 implied that plans of mixed
firms were negotiated and performance was linked to incentives. 54 Nevertheless, functional
organs tried to increase their control over mixed firms, especially in the area of
international contracting. The esoteric directives on investment represent an attempt of
tight a priori control over investment projects and, although applying to all kinds of
enterprises, affected the relations of foreign investors, and their local partners with
concerned bureaucracies.55
The response of foreign partners, and eventually involved PEs, to the discretionary
powers and related struggles of state bureaucracies for the control of international
economic relations, came from the energy sector. Indeed, the legal framework for the
implementation of the Capanda project opened a systematic exception to the control
machinery in force and created a precedent later reflected in PSAs and legislation.
The Capanda project (1986/90) is the largest post-colonial project. It aimed the
construction of an 520-MW dam in the Kwanza river, the largest in the country, to supply
energy to the provinces of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malanje, MOXiC0 and Bie, doubling
53. Dec. no 181-A/80, arts 10/2, 10/3 and 14.
54. P1182, art. 12, by reference to art. 5/1/d, included in the planning system PEs and mixed Smis but art 22/2 had a differential regime:
"The ministries, secretaries of state and provincial commissariats must analyse as well the plans of mixed and private (enterprises) in order
to, in contact with them. agree the respective plans, aiming the more rational use of material and financial resources, the increase in
production and productivity, the decrease in production and services cogs"; also incentives for performance were, as seen above, negotiated
in contracts.
55. See Chapter 4, notes 5 and 6, section 4.2. and Table 2.
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the national production of energy, providing for the country's needs and eventual exports
to Namibia. The project, which included the building of roads and a village for about
6,000 inhabitants working in the site, had an estimated cost of USD 900 Mn in 1984, with
a share of 700 Mn for Bra7ilian firms (construction works and technology transfer, about
USD 600 Mn for private firm Odebrecht, and technical assistance to GAMEK by Furnas
Centrals, the Brazilian state holding for electricity), 200 Mn for an USSR firm
(electromechanical equipment, including generators and geological and hydrological
studies). In 1989 costs were estimated at USD 1,000 - 1,230 Mn and the first stage of the
project was to be operational in 1994. The project was mainly funded by Angolan oil
supplies to the Brazilian oil company Braspetro, although suppliers credit accounted
initially to about USD 100 Mn, later USD 100 Mn from Brazil and 247 Mn from USSR.
The construction of the dam was decided by the 1st Extraordinary Congress of MPLA and
raised substantial criticisms from Portuguese interests (it seems that supported by WB
which considered the project unfeasible).56
The "Special Statute for the Capanda project" 57 exempted involved parties from a
substantial part of legislation on a priori controls in force: i. exchange control and
mediation of BNA.," ii. licensing of foreign trade," iii. contracting of foreign and Angolan
56. AED. 23.11.1984, 30.11.1984 and 6.1.1989, on the project, declarations of the minister of Energy to Expresso, 22.4.1989,
Independente, 3.2.1989. Portuguese firms had previously been related to the project and lost in competition with Brazil (it seems because
no fmancial support had been granted by the Portuguese authorities (ndependente, 3.2.1989). In 1992 the project paralysed after UNITA
invaded the site, killing Angolans, kidnapping Brazilian and Russian personnel, and destroying the equipment and facilities which had been
built.
57. Approved by Dec. no 26/84, art. 3; the decree approved the agreement between PRA and USSR on the issue (art. 1) and the contract
between the ministry of Energy and Oil and the Capanda Consortium (USSR Tedmoprornexport and Brazilian Odebrecht), for the
construction of the Capanda dam (att. 2); the 'special statute' was applicable to: i. "GAMEK, a public agency for the project (created by
Joint m.o. no 14/86, Energy and Oil, Planning, Finance and MFT), benefiting from the sdierne for its own activities, and enterprises and
personnel it contracts, and ii. the Capanda Consortium, enterprises composing it, subcontractors and their personnel" (dsoutP, art. 1). The
incentives scheme for the project provided that all activities "directly or indirectly related to the Capanda project".
58. Cri dec., arts 3/1 and 3/3. See Chapter 4, Table 2.
59. The statute granted to all involved firms a general licence to exercise import activities (art 4/1) and a "permanent and open"
(automatic) licence to "import any goods directly or indirectly related to the execution of the project" (art_ 4/2/a), which under the general
regime was granted case by case by the Ministry of Trade (see Chapter 4, Table 2). Also an agricultural and cattle ranching project linked
to the energy project "shall have priority treatment by the Angolan concerned entities" (art. 10/2); art 12/2 authorized importers to sell in
Angola "goods, materials and equipment, used or not, acquired under the Capanda project" (art. 12/3) and provided for payment of taxes
and duties by buyers (art. 12/2) or exemption of these charges if goods were classified as obsolete (art. 12/3).
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labour,6° iv. control of movements of persons abroad and within the country, 61 v.
international and domestic transport contracts, 62 vi. control of imports of cultural goods,63
vii. national health service64 and education. 65 Companies involved in the project were also
granted a general exemption of all taxes, national or local, and customs duties.66
The impact of this 'special statute' on the effectiveness of legislation in force, the
balance of relative positions of enterprises, including foreign firms operating in the country
and only enjoying the 'special regimes' provided for in contracts, plus its underlying
philosophy, makes it appear as the "legal programme of foreign investors" which
influenced the late 80s legislation, although the Statute was enacted before any formal
intention to engage in economic reforms.67
Since the Capanda regime impacted on the prices of execution of projects, by
decreasing transaction costs, before significant changes in legislation took place in the late
80s it was followed for other projects, such as that for the Ambriz area, PSAs and the
1988 legislation.68
60. Cit. statute, arts 5 1, 5 2. Firms involved in the project could also contract Angolan labour directly (statute, art. 6 1), and define its
own labour policies on holidays and work timing (arts. 6/3 and 6/2) "according to the needs of the project". See Chapter 4, Table 2, and
section 5.1.
61. Statute, art. 5 4 and 5/5. See subsection 3.4.5.
62. "Free contracting, as well as priorities and facilities for evartual use of Angolan transport means" (art. 7 3); this provision related to the
planned transport accorclingto instructions of the branch.
63
 . Liberalisation concerning the reception, from the countries of origin of foreign entities involved in the execution of the project, of
culture materials, such as books, magazines, other published materials, recorded tapes, TV programmes, films, records and others of the
same nature" (art. 8 5).
64. The statute granted a licence for the practice of health care and related activities (art. 9/1) and exempted involved foreign citizens from
the control of health authorities in the domain of medical and nursing practice (art 9/2); imports of medicines and hospital equipment got
an ope legis licence (art. 9/3). See section 5.4.
65. The reserve in education (see sections 5.4., general, and 7.1., reserve for foreign investment) was withdrawn concerning education (art
11/1).
66. Statute, art. 2.
67. A norm of the special statute summarized the image of the working of the system of control of the eccoomy at the time: "All
government organisations and entities interfering in any of the mattes established in this Special Statute, (and) related to the execution of
the project, are authorised to provide fast proceedings aiming the fast grant of licences, exemptions, facilities and properties referred to in
this Statute." (art. 12 4).
68. E.g,. the PSA for Block 8 (oil) and Law no 13 88 (LFI/88). See subsection 7.2.1. and section 8.1.
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In the late 80s there was a converse movement of investment, with Angola making
some investment in developed countries, for example Angolan enterprises buying financial
participations in Portuguese companies. 69
 However, the efforts of investment in more
developed countries may have high costs. For example, the scheme for the purchase of
shares in the privatisation of Petrogal by Sonangol, the Angolan NOC and apparently
entitled to exclusive rights on oil concessions, could mean the privatisation of the Angolan
NOC itself, since the seller, the Portuguese state, argued for a scheme of cross
participation.70
7.2. The 1970s legislation on natural resources
It is not by chance that the first legislation on natural resources and foreign
enterprise rules oil activities. With the collapse of agriculture, especially coffee in the area
of exports and the import-substitution industries, oil revenues were crucial for earnings in
hard currency and to supply the internal fuels and gas markets. Due to the importance of
US companies operating in the country, with Cabinda Gulf with a major share,71
immediately before and after independence the companies were under pressure of the US
government to abandon production and royalties payments. US boycotts lasted under new
forms (credit bans) until the 90s.72
69 . "Allowing Angola to manufacture in Portugal proclucts to sell in the Portuguese market made with Angolan raw materials... (using
means such as) financial participations ... in the area of treatment of diamonds Diapele, Diagal, the area of furniture production, Interforma
and FOC, and Petrogal (oil)", (Loy, quoted in JA, 12.3.1988). To manage financial participations abroad a hidden PE was created, OBC
(Overseas Business Company, SA), whose creation, and organisation as a holding company, was authorised by CDS (Resol. no 4/87, arts 1
and 2).
7°. Ptiblico, 22.6.1991.
71. 71% of total output in 1985 (Hodges, 1987: 58).
72. On the 1975 boycott, see subsection 2.2., and Hodges, 1987: 53. Also, for example, in 1986 the USA Congress banned Eximbank to
finance Angolan projects and the US oil companies were under pressure to divest from Angola:, many projects (e.g., the Takula fields
projects for the Sonangol/Cabgoc joint-venture) were then made possible EEC loans (from the UK Lloyds Merchant/ECGD, French
Parisbas Coface. Credit Lyonnais and Societe Generale and Dutch Middenstandbank) with separate credit lines for Sonangol and Cabgoc
(AED. 6.2.1987, JA, 1.10.1988 and Joint m.o. no 26/87, Planning and Finance).
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7.2.1. Oil
The 1978 basic law on oil reinforced public ownership of hydrocarbons,
nationalizing previous concessions and establishing that a PE, the national oil company
(NOC) Sonangol, had exclusive concession rights. 73 However, concessions were granted
for each single case by the CM for an area defined by the branch minister. 74 In the
concession decrees the state transferred to the NOC its mining rights on hydrocarbons.75
The terms of concession are usually tied to related long-term contracts between the PE
and foreign partners for the concerned blocks.76
LOA had no provisions on the payments for the concessions and relied on
contractual regulation, sometimes grounded on colonial legislation. When avoiding the
definition of different payments in formal law, LOA probably aimed for flexibility
according to changes of bargaining power favouring the country. However, the effect of
contractual regulation in many contracts was to 'freeze' the taxation regime, protecting it
from future changes of legislation. Usually the concessionaire paid a 'production tax'
73. LOA, arts 2 1 (exclusive rights) and 2 2 (nationalisation): "From the entry into force of this law, all the grants of mining rights for
exploration and production of hydrocarbons to foreign companies or entities are considered with no effects since extinguished. 3. The
mining rights referred to in the previous number are transmitted, without formalities, to Sonangol." On the eventual waiving of the reserve
in the 90s, see section 8.1.
74. LOA. art. 3.
75. LOA. art. 2. Art. 5 of WA defined the content of mining rights: "Mining rights granted to Sonangol include the powers of use,
enjoyment and management of public property on liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons. 2. Mining rights are granted to the following ends: a.
exploration and development of hydrocarbons; b. production of hydrocarbons; c. other conned.ed ends. 3. Within the powers granted to
Sonangol are included the transformation or diange of the natural structure of soil and subsoil, (but) in compliance with the enactments of
art. 132 (maintenance of reserves of hydrocarbons and protection of environment)." Art 6 contained a safeguard clause, providing for
powers of the CM to rule by decree in a different way "the content and ends of mining rights" referred to in art 5 "for special cases" This
gave the CM a substantial power of discretion when making decisions on the matter, since "special cases" are not specified in the law.
Sonangol exclusive rights on oil concessions seem to have been repealed by LEA (see section 8.1.), art 18 referred to art 26 of the same
law; however. recent decrees approving the concessions seem to assume that the 1978 legislation was still in force (e.g., the preamble of
Dec. no 52/89, on Block 8) but, as in the application of other economic legislation, the ban of exclusive concession rights for national
enterprises is probably 'dormant', waiting changes in power to be effective. The transfer of mining rights granted to Sonangol under WA
was forbidden (LOA, art. 4), but contracts stated that associates would "cooperate with the NOC in the exercise of these rights" (e.g., Dec.
no 50 81, alt 3, approving the PSA between Sonangol and Cities Service and Marathon).
76. WA provided for a fixed term (art 7), divided into 2 phases (exploration and production, art 8) established in the contracts (art. 9/1)
but the concession might refer only to one period (art. 10). The branch minister had powers to lengthen these periods under application of
interested parties and if contractual obligations had been fulfilled (arts 9/1 and 9/2). E.g., Dec. no 52/89 (on Block 8), art. 6/1; although
PSAs are usually not published, except for the parts dealing with taxation, exemptions, foreign exchange and prices, a published PSA, Dec.
no 50/81. shows a duration up to 5 years (renewable for more one year in case of commercial finding) for the exploration stage and 20
years after commercial discovery (art. 3).
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(called 'concession rights' in the law), the taxes on oil income and on oil sales. 77 The area
of taxation in oil was thus very flexible because it did not follow tight post-colonial
legislation, which was applied to other economic activities, subject to the general fiscal
regimes. However, whether this flexibility, which is counterbalanced by a certain degree of
uncertainty arising from the absence of stand legislation, is (or has been) working in the
interest of the country is an open question since there are not available studies on the
subject.
Other obligations of the concessionaire, shared by foreign partners in joint-
ventures,78 were the exploration, production and recovery of fields, the production of
natural gas, and the protection of oil reserves and the environment. The concessionaire
and its partners in joint-ventures had also to follow technical rules for oil exploration and
production and the 'good oil field practice'. 79 Notwithstanding these norms,
77. In taxation. contracts, either for concessions or joint-ventures with foreign fims, used colonial legislation, Dees. Law no 41,356 and
41,357, on concession royalties and oil income tax, as bases for bargaining, but in some cases this scheme was not applied. For example,
Dec. no 584, on the "Cabinda Taxes Regime" provided for payment of concession rights (production tax, here 20% of the quantities of
hydrocarbons produced or sold, arts 3/1/a and 5, by reference to Dec. no 41,356) and taxes on oil incomes (over profits, arts 3/1/b and 6,
by reference to Dec. no 41,357) and transactions (art. 7), exemption of any other taxes, except stamp taxes, a statistic customs duty and the
payments for training under Dec. no 20/82 (see notes 5 q and 90. ), (art 3/3). The 1984 legislation for the Cabinda offshore concessions
(in the 90s the association Sonangol/Cabgoc-Chevron/Agip) contained a safeguard clause to the interests of foreign investors, stating that
future taxes legislation "will be drafted and applied safeguarding the economic conditions now granted and with due respect for their rights
and obligations ( of oil companies referred to in the decree) emerging from the present decree" (art. 8); Dec. no 29/86, approving the
concession of Cabinda areas to Sonangol and association with Cabgoc repeated these provisions, including the safeguard clause (art. 15
and Appendix B). However, Dec. no 52/89, on the concession of Block 8 (Porto Amboim) and approving the association and PSA between
Sonangol, Total Angola, Petrofina and BP, provided for the payment of a single income tax, 50% of profits (art. 15/2); as in the Cabinda
arrangements, the concessionaire and associates were exempted of any other taxes and an article safeguarded the interests of involved
parties concerning future fiscal legislation (art. 15/7). In the frame of the income tax, the definition of deductible costs, and consequently
taxable income was important Although it is not a purpose of this work to deal with oil taxation, it should be referred to that the variance
on the listing of costs included in the estimates of gross income for taxes purposes, in the concession and association contracts (e.g. in art. 4,
Appendix B of the Cabinda contract, and arts 3-5, Appendix C for the Block 8 contract), may relate to eventual different bargaining
positions of the partners, arising from their economic power versus this of the country at the periods of negotiation and celebration. So, for
example, art. 4/3/a of the Block 8 contract (Appendix C) established that donations and payments of that type will be considered
'recoverable costs' (and so included in the value of crude for the recovery of investment by foreign partner and deducted from taxable
income, art 4/1) if the concessionaire so agreed, as well as "expenses of advertisement and public relations, including the costs emerging
from relations with government" (art 4/3/b).
78. Decrees approving concessions to Sonangol usually use the language "the concessionaire and operator(s)" or "associates", when dealing
with rights and duties; e.g., Decs. no 50/81 (concession of Block 9 and approbation of PSA with Angola Cities Service and Marathon
Petroleum Angola, art 3 and appendix PSA), no 12/82 ( concession of Block 1 and approbation of the PSA between Sonangol and Agip,
arts 4 and 5; in passing a PR decree instead of a CM decree), no 5/84 (special taxation for Cabinda, arts 1, 3-4), no 9/86 (concession for
Block 5 and approbation of PSA with Conoco Angola, arts 4/1, 10-11), no 29/86 (concession of Cabinda areas and approbation of joint-
ventures with Cabgoc, arts 8-10, 14-17, Appendix B, arts 2), Dec. no 52/89 (concession for Block 8 and approbation of PSA with Total
Angola, Petrofina and BP, arts 5/2 and 5/4 and 11-15).
79. WA, arts 13 1, 13/2 and 14. Also, Sonangol and associated operator must deliver to the brandi ministry a plan of utilization of natural
gas of related fields and "it is expressly forbidden the burning (of gas) without the previous authorisation from the branch ministry." (alt.
14). The violation of art. 13 "is subject to sanctions provided for in law and regulations, even if they are not established in contract clauses"
(art. 13/2); mining rights may be suspended or revoked, totally or partially, if "serious risk for the life and health of population or other
force majeure cases occur" (art. 15/c). See Hodges, 1987:61 and 69-70.
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the rule has been the burning of gas. The levels of reserves, on which there is little
information, were an area of conflict among civil servants dealing with the problem and
between the latter and some foreign companies, interested in recovering investments in the
shortest period.80
Foreign enterprises, but only those with "recognized good reputation and technical
and financial capacity", had to associate with the national oil company (NOC). Association
could be set up under the forms of mixed enterprise, contractual joint-venture, production
sharing and services contracts. 81 Contracting had detailed regulations: i. compulsory
clauses for contracts between Sonangol and foreign firms, ii. authorisation of contracts by
the branch minister, but the CM might at any time allocate to itself this power, and, iii. if
there was a foreign investment, it followed also the general regime of authorisations.82
LOA provisions on the content of contracts tried to enable the NOC to participate
in operations and in technical and managerial decision-making: i. any form of association,
as defined in art. 17, was jointly managed and the NOC had "the right to participate in the
direction of oil operations, according to the terms established in contracts", 83 ii. the
minimal financial participation of the NOC in any type of association was 51%, and the
participations should be revised periodically, under initiative of the parties or proposal of
80. Concerning the environmental aspects, there is little control by the bureaucracies, due to shortage of information, which also
influences the attitudes of involved population, actually struggling against starvation and so not interested in environmental issues.
Nevertheless, immediately before independence, two laws on the subject were enacted: i. Dec. no 146/75, on sea waters and shores
pollution, providing for fines for water polluters such as tankers and allocating control powers in the matter to the Ministry of Transports
(Shipping Direction), and, ii. Dec. no 151/75, on the continental shelf; providing for fines for polluters and allocating control powers to the
oil administration and Ministry of Transports; there is no information on whether or not this legislation was (is) applied. But attempts in the
90s to enact legislation on prevention and repression of oil pollution faced serious opposition from foreign companies and were not enacted
up to the end of 1993.
81. LOA, arts 161 and 17, respedively, the association only could take place in areas under concession (alt. 16/2) and art 29 gave
powers to the CM to authorize other contractual forms "which do not counter the principles of public ownership of hydrocarbons fields and
the exclusive entitlement of related mining rights by Sonangol" (cit. art.); see Hodges, 1987: 53 (joint-ventures and PSAs), 55-6 (data) and
55 (legal regime and taxes).
82. WA, arts 18, 20-29 and 18'2, respectively. See section 7.1., on authorisations under LF1179 and 8.1., under LFI/88.
83. LOA, arts 18/1 and 21.
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the branch minister, 84 iii. foreign partners took the financial risks for the exploration and
development stage and if there were a commercial discovery, they were entitled to the
reimbursement of previous expenses and "to share the benefits from their capital
applications", according to clauses of contracts, iv. all contracts should have a clause of
'independent risk', meaning that in case of conflict on the definition of a commercial
discovery, one of the parties could develop the concerned field at its own risk, v. resort to
funding implying the participation of third parties in the associations needed the
authorisation of the CM, vi. Sonangol had a preferential right in the acquisition of crude
belonging to the foreign partner "when strong reasons of national interest occur", 85 and
vii. conflict among partners in associations or other contracts was settled by a third-
party. 86
In the 80s, as the oil sector expanded and the NOC gained experience, 87
 sparse
regulations specified the obligations of foreign firms operating in the area. Besides
obligations related to their involvement in foreign trade activities, legislation concentrated
on: i. obligations of information towards the state, especially on foreign exchange,88
recruitment and training of domestic personnel, with compulsory training of all categories
84. Except in off-shore over 150 ms depth (cit. law, arts 20 and 27): in the case of participation under 51% the CM fixed the share of the
NOC in the association (art. 202). Law 00 27/91 changed art 20/2 of LOA extending the powers of the CM to establish a participation of
Sonangol under 51°13in any case.
85. LOA, arts 22, 23. 25 and 29, respectively, the law also regulated the measurement of crude for the purposes of distribution among the
parties sharing it (art 26).
86. Arbitr
- ation according to the content of contracts, WA, art. 30.
87. On the expansion of the Angolan oil industry and Sonangol, see Hodges, 1987: 52-70.
88. See Chapter 4, Table 2 (common regulations for importers and exporters) and subsection 4.3.2. (Exec. Dec. no 43/80, Oil, on
information).
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of local personnel by the employer, 89 iii. guarantee of equal pay, fringe benefits and
opportunities for local personnel," iv. ban of the sale of Angolan oil to RSA and the
supply of water, fuels or any services, to tankers carrying oil to RSA, and compulsory
clauses for oil export contracts to control the effectiveness of the ban.91
In some contracts from the mid-80s Sonangol apparently linked participation in
joint-ventures in oil concessions to direct investment by foreign partners in projects
beyond the oil sector. 92
 Also, it seems that it tried to get opportunities to its local
subsidiary ESPA (an attempt of the NOC to move into execution of operations), to work
as operator in concession areas.93
The regime of exclusive concessionaire of oil mining rights gave the NOC an
improved status as the oil sector expanded. Sonangol was privileged among PEs given its
89. Dec. no 2082, arts 4-13. The decree applied to all companies operating in the oil sector, including sub tractors and companies just
having financial participations in joint-ventures (art. 1/2); the training plans, and reports for performance control, also needed the previous
advice of Sonangol, acting here as a control firm (arts 8 and 9); the NOC may request foreign oil companies to train, or finance training, of
its employees (art 12) and the ministry had the final decision on "training programmes ... to adopt and which companies or entities will be
liable for their performance" (art. 6/3). Oil companies in the production stage should pay every year 15 cents/per barrel for training,
companies in the exploration stage about USD 200,000 and other companies an annual sum fixed by the ministers of Oil and Finance (arts
13 1 and 132); these revenues were to finance the education and training of Angolan personnel in the country and abroad, on-job-training
participation in scientific meetings in Angola and purchase of books and periodicals (art 13/3); companies not complying with Dec. no
20 82 could have their contracts revoked under LFI179 (art 33) or pay a fine fixed by the Ministry of Oil (art 11); training and
recruitment of domestic personnel was also regulated by Exec.Decs no 124/82 and 125/82 (Finance and Oil).
90. Dec. no 20'82, art. 3; access to fringe benefits included housing and special food shops (see subsection 5.2.4.) or restaurants, and
excluded special allowances due to expatriate condition; the balance between foreign and domestic personnel was, under the decree,
controlled by the Ministry of Oil, to whom foreign companies should supply lists of personnel, job specifications and demanded skills (art
2).
91. Dec. no 10683; the decree aimed the implementation of UN and OAU resolutions on the oil embargo to RSA; a special committee, the
Commission for Coordination and Control of Oil, created in 1977, controlled the implemartation of the decree (arts 9 and 10); the decree
also stated that UN'TA should cooperate with the commission supplying information or mobilizing workers to refuse work in tankers or
companies involved in violation of the embargo (art 11) while providing for sanctions such as arrest of vessels or other transports breaking
the embargo, revocation of contracts with law-breakers and blacidisting for contracting and general business purposes, of companies
involved, directly or indirectly, in breaking the international oil embargo (art 8); at least one tanker was noticed by the Netherlands control
group as leaving the Angolan port of Soyo in 1983 carrying oil to South Africa.
92. For example, at the negotiations for Block 6 Sonangol asked the consortium Conoco/Unocal (Conoco 75%, with 5% for Citizens
Energy and Union Oil Company of California 25%) 'to finance in agriculture and inchictry as a part of the agreement ... Sonangol partners
are frequently obliged to invest in Angolan schemes near their oil operation areas, but there are indications that the Conoco-led consortium
is being asked to manage than as well. Angop told AED that such direct foreign investment in local projects - if they were confirmed -
could be seen in the context of greater private sector involvement in the economy and liberalisation measures" (AED, 11.9.1987).
93. In the bids for the onshore exploration in Cabinda, "the successful bidder will be expected to appoint ESPA as operator. Observers have
noted that this arrangement means companies will not need large numbers of workers in the field ... But industry sources say this clause is
mainly to give ESPA - a joint-venture of Sonangol (51%), Brazilian Braspetro and Belgium Petrofina (both 24.5%) - which is operator in
Block 4 where drilling has disappointed. ESPA would be operator on a contractual basis in the PSA, but would not take equity interest.
This would serve the dual purpose of keeping the local company active and limiting the foreign work force." (AED, 31.1.1987).
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higher bargaining power (in relations with state/party bureaucracies) as the almost single
supplier of the country on hard currency, and dealing with the simultaneous application of
PEs and natural resources legislation, Sonangol was able to, say: i. have directors
appointed by the CM, ii. recruit almost freely its personnel and to avoid political criteria in
recruitment, iii. resort to incentives such as access to food in 'dollars shops' and so to have
wider possibilities of selection on bases of skills and control absenteeism, and, iv. use its
social fund and oil companies sponsoring in its own successful sports club and social and
cultural initiatives, promoting the image of the NOC among workers, the government and
the community. Concerning inputs, the very association to foreign firms in oil activities
meant supply by foreign partners whose bargaining power, and autonomy in related
decisions, could not be challenged by an UDC state bureaucracies. Also, working more as
a control company (except in the distribution of fuels and domestic gas), negotiating oil
exploration and production contracts and managing participations in oil joint-ventures,
Sonangol also got access to all kinds of consultancies for specific activities. Struggling
against functionalist organs, which attempted more to get involved in decision-making
than properly to control the implementation of the oil policy, Sonangol became the most
important PE, notwithstanding its cash flow constraints and conflicts with state control
boards.94
7.2.2. Minerals
When the oil legislation is contrasted with the minerals law, the former appears as
more flexible in some areas, for example concerning the stage of exploration, while in
some other areas, such as personnel and information, the mining legislation does not
contain any regulations developing the general framework of formal law.
94. In 1985 the NOC had its amounts and reports under discussion at the People's Assembly, 87 [ 1 0] Novernbro, 1986, 38). On SonangoL
see Hodges, 1987: 53-67.
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The 1979 law on minerals, LGM, established the state reserves of ownership and
exploration of minerals and provided for the grant of concessions to PEs. 95 As in oil,
concessions were granted by the CM for a period, but tied in principle to the exhaustion of
related minerals, and could not be transferred. 96 Contrary to the oil regime, LGM
allocated to public administration boards the activities related to exploration and the
concessions only aimed development and production. The state could enter into
agreements for exploration with national or foreign firms but only under the form of
services contracts. 97 The state had thus to finance exploration to allocate, if there were
findings, the development and production to a PE which in practice associated to a foreign
firm for the production stage, without benefiting from the allocation of risks to the foreign
partner used in oil contracts. 98 Also, LGM expressly dealt with reserves of natural
resources, creating a commission of control with ratification powers when decisions
affecting reserves were at stake.99
Exploitation rights conceded to PEs included extraction, transformation and
marketing of minerals. Apparently PEs had no special regime of payments for these
concessions and were submitted to the general regime of delivery of profits to the Budget.
PEs duties were "the protection of nature and environment" and compensation for
95. Law no 5/79, Law on Geological and Mining Activities. Ownership (public) referred to all mineral resources, excluding hydrocarbons
and the soil as "living layer of the Earth ground" (cit law, art 2/2); exclusive production (by PEs) did not apply to some materials used in
construction and to "main raw materials for national manufacturing industries" (arts 8/1 and 8/2), where mixed and private firms might
compete with PEs for licenses granted by the branch minister (Ini lnery at the time), (art 8/2).
96. LGM, arts 8/1 (powers of the CM). 10/1 (duration of concession), 10/2 (safeguard clause on concessions for a fixed term) and 8/4
(prohibition of transfers of concessions).
97. LGM, arts 4/1, 5/1; exploration rights could also be granted to PEs if they had already production rights (art. 5/2).
98. LGM, arts 13-22 (association of concessionaire PEs to foreign firms).
99. LGM, art 6/1 and 6/2: "the definition and evaluation of reserves and changes on their estimates ... need the ratification of the National
Commission for Minerals Reserves and later approbation by the Minister supervising geological activities"; "any plan of exploration of
mineral resources may be implemented without the previous approval of the evaluation of related reserves", (alt 6/3); Exec.Dec. no 12/83
(Industry) implemented the Commission.
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damages to life or health of persons or animals and to soils, waters, vegetation or other
"natural elements".loo
LGM established a control reserve, providing that foreign enterprises had to
associate to concessionaire PEs. Contracts of association, which included services
contracts, were approved by the CM. In joint-ventures, the control reserve implied at least
a 51% participation of the national PE, revised periodically by initiative of the parties or
the branch ministry. Also, national PEs participated in management: mining was directed
by a "joint organ" and the local PE had the right to participate in the direction of
operations. 101 LGM, within this broad framework, relied on contractual regulation of
other aspects of relations between national and foreign enterprise, including the rates of
the single income tax and the forms of return of investments. 102 Conflict was settled by a
third-party.103
Mining worked in the late 70s with the intervention of foreign firms, such as in
Diamang 1 " and the iron ore industry."15 The activity was strongly affected by the war and
100.LGM, arts 9, 11 and 23, respectively. See Chapter 4, Table 2.
101. LGM. arts 13-16 and 19 1, respectively; resort to financing by third parties implying their participation in the associations also
needed the approval of CM (art. 18).
102. LGM. art 14 1: "the types of services in the association will be these resulting from agreement between the interested parties"; "the
nature, composition and functioning of the association, and the rights and obligations of associates must be present in the contract title" (art
142); "the right of foreign company or entity to recover the costs and receive the benefits resulting from (its) capital application is
recognized, according to the clauses of contract titles" (sit 17); "(but) PEs, when strong reasons of national interest occur, are granted the
right to acquire the percentage of mineral resources allocated, by the contract title, to their associates" (art. 19/2), The fiscal regime of
foreign entities referred to at art 13, will be contained in the respective contract title, notwithstanding tax obligations established in the
legislation on foreign investment in PRA" (art. 20).
103. LGM, art. 22, mutual agreement as a 1st step, and arbitration if there was no agreement; the law applied for contracts and
associations is the host country's if no other legislation provides otherwise (art. 21).
104. From independence and after the nationalisation of Portuguese shareholdings (see subsection 4.1.2.) Diamang was linked to the De
Beers group (1981 five-years TAC with UK based MATS) and marketed its production through CSO; from 1980 earnings from diamonds
fell 75°0, output also went down in 1984 and prices practiced by CSO also dropped from USD 158 a carat in 1980 to 91 in 1983 and
64.24 in 1984; smuggling accourged for losses of about USD 3-4 Mn a month (declarations of Diamang director, AED, 8.6.1985). From
1986 Diamang was dissolved, under proposal of the state holding Endiama (77.21% equity) accepted by shareholders Societe Generale de
Belgique (11.49% equity), Sibeka (5.95%), Diamond Corporation (subsidiary of De Beers, 1.67%) and Morgan Guarantee Trust
Company (1.11°0). The diamonds industry was then restructured and the mining province of Lunda Norte divided into blocks contracted to
foreign partners wider PSAs, following the oil scheme; acoording to AED, the then minister of Industry, Onambwe, was avoiding to give
CSO the monopoly ofmarketing of Angolan diamonds and foreign companies which entered into agreements were supposed to make their
own marketing ammgernents. RST (a subsidiary of ITM, a firrn with interests in Zambian mining, and linked to financial group Maiden)
entered into a PSA for the Cafunfo mines and an US company, SAT, got the contract for the transport of materials for the mining rime and
was later accused by Washington sour= of helping the government by carrying weapons to face UNITA aggressions to the diamonds
zones (AED, 26 7.1986 and 15.11.1986). From 1987 Indian IVIMTC (PE Metal and Mineral Trading Corporation of India) entered into an
agreement with Fricliania to provide tedmical services and facilities to diamonds production and to buy rough diamonds (AED, 10,4.1987
and 14.3.1987); Angola entered then in negotiations with Lonrho (AED, 14.3.1987) represented in Angola by Lusolanda. Also, in 1987
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the joint-ventures were a target for RSA and UNITA attacks. In this context, an
assessment of the working of LGM, with its broad flexibility, and related contracts seems
impossible. Nevertheless, within the general framework of strong central intervention in
the management of PEs, LGM reliance in contractual regulation of mining activities is only
apparent, since it meant in fact strong discretion powers for state bureaucracies to fix the
adopted regimes, within the limits of their bargaining power towards foreign firms and
also their own internal balance of power.
In 1987 LGM was changed by Law no 11/87. Although repeating that exploration
rights were an exclusive of a public board, the new legislation allowed the CM to concede
rights on these activities to PEs or "foreign entities", but maintained the previous rule that
individuals who found out mineral resources must communicate to the public
administration his/her findings and "will be entitled (only) to a money reward". 01 6 The
previous exclusive rights of PEs on concessions for the production of mineral resources
were also waived but the beneficiaries of the new regulations were only foreign firms.1°7
The 1987 legislation only demanded a contract for the performance of mining activities by
Portuguese SPE was contracted by Endiama, the diamonds PE for the operations of the Lucapa zone (AED, 2.12.1988). As a result the
production of diamonds began to rise. As the monopoly of CSO ended in 1985, from 1987 Angola became The only significant gemstone
producer not to market through the organisation (CSO)" (AED, 12.6.1989): dealers were invited to a monthly or bi-monthly tender in
Luanda, with the reserve price set by UK Diamond Counsellor International, working as an independent consultancy for the govenunent;
according to industry sources, Endiama got "very good prices as a result" (of tenders) and "premiums were reported to be significantly
above CSO selling prices", while the most successful dealers in tenders were UK-based Industrial Diamond Corporation and Antwerp
based Steinmetz-Evans Diamonds, which got about 90% of stones and provided for training of Angolan experts (AED, 2.12.1988); still, in
1989, after the closure of the Cafunfo mine (RST block) due to UNITA attacks (AED, 11.9.1989) De Beers was back, when a declaration
of intent was signed by Endiama and CSO aiming also the exploration of the kimberlite mines (AED 12.6.1989); on the Mum of De Beers
in the 90s see section 8.1. SPE associated in 1993 with Endiarna, the state holding, in a mining venture for the Lucapa concession, whith
was the only company operating during the post-elections war.
105. mm• eira
. do Lobito was nationalised and PE Ferrangol associated with Austria PE Austroznineral to rehabilitate the iron ore
production at the Kassinga mines in the south; about 1.1 Mn tonnes a year was estimated production to sell mainly to Europe and Japan;
the last ewort of Mineira stocks was in 1981. The recovery works began in 1981 but in 1982 RSA attacked the iron ore mines seriously
damaging equipment and rehabilitation was delayed; in the meanwhile Austromineral made studies for the than more secure Kassala-
Kitungo area (Malanje) which showed possibilities of open-cast mining (AED, 24.6.1983); still, by 1984 the Kassinga mines had not
recovered from the RSA and (later) UNITA attacks (the latter to the railway) and the exports of iron ore were not significant during the
period studied, although about USD 25-28 Mn were estimated to be invested in the rehabilitation of mines and 21-25 Mn in the railway
(AED, 27.4.1984).
106.LGM, arts 5/1, 5/2 and 5/4, as revised by Law no 11/87.
107. LGM, art. 13, as revised by Law no 11/87: "Any foreign company or entity, with a certified probity and tedmical and financial
capability, intending to exercise in the national territory activities of exploration, development and production of mineral resources, only
may do so under a contract agreed to with the National Geology Institute or with state enterprises holding the corresponding mining
rights"; previously the art. was: "only may do so in association with state enterprises holding the corresponding mining rights".
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foreign firms and allowed any type of contractual relations. 108 However, art. 15, while
intending to permit the participation of Angolan firms below the previous ceiling of 51%,
seemed to have in mind joint-ventures, PSAs and also concessions. Indeed, "participation"
of the "Angolan party" (a PE or the Geology National Institute) meant, in the legal
definition, "the financial participation in costs and benefits or just the participation in
benefits (and) this differentiation will be a result of the concrete type of contract".1°9
Simultaneously, the law stated that "the activity of associates shall be led by a common
organ". In joint-ventures the Angolan party had the right to participate in operations. An
innovation of the 1987 legislation was the adoption of the oil regime on risk clauses
related to costs of the exploration stage." 0 LGM was repealed by Law no 1/92, which
although resorting to a substantial amount of contractual regulation, nevertheless has a
strong emphasis on the legal regulation of the most important aspects of mining activities.
7.2.3. Fisheries
In 1980 legislation reinforced the state "sovereign rights on the exploration,
maintenance, management and disposal of biological water natural resources ... up to 200
nautical miles", forbade foreign vessels to fish there and perform connected actions.' 11 A
regime of concessions for foreign vessels was established and the 1980 legislation
allocated to the branch minister powers to regulate these activities. The decree provided
for concessions under contracts and/or international agreements." 2 Concessions were paid
usually by a share of the catch. In 1986, the Ministry of Finance enacted regulations on the
108.
',Gm. alt. 14, as revised by Law no 11/87: "1. Contractual forms may be, among others, joint-ventures or mere services contracts. 2.
The mere services contracts will be authorized by the ministries of Planning. Finance and branch. 3. All the other contractual forms shall be
approved by the CM."
109.wm, art. 15/3, as revised by Law no 11/87.
110.LutA, arts 15/4, 16 and 17, as revised by Law no 11/87, respectively.
111.Dec. no 12-A180, on the protection of fisheries, arts 1 and 2. In 1979 legislation on fisheries on the protection of species regulated by
international boards was adopted (m.o. no 43/79, Fisheries).
112.Cit. dec., arts 5 and 5 1, respectively, the branch ministry powers included regulating "the conditions for the grant of licences", and the
specifications for grants.
291
itional relations
forms of payment of concessions by foreign entities "given the diversity of accords and
contracts ... to rationalize and unify ... payments". 113 The new regulations established that
foreign entities paid "fishing rights" in kind or money, according to percentages agreed to
in contracts. PEs acted as trustees of the perceived income. 114 The role of middlemen of
PEs meant that the majority of payments were done in kind and traded by marketing
PEs.115
Dec. no 12-A180 provisions were guaranteed by payment of fines and cancellation
of licences of foreign entities breaking the law. 116 The control of territorial waters by
national authorities for the purposes of the fisheries legislation in a new country with so
extended shores was difficult and there were complaints that foreign vessels did not
respect regulations on the protection of natural resources. 117 So, in 1989 foreign vessels
were forbidden to fish within 12 nautical miles from the coast and the area up to 3 nautical
miles was reserved to small boats. 118
 Concession contracts were also revised, followed by
a change in the role of the sector PEs and, later, privatisation.119
113. Exec.Dec. no 12 86 (Finance). preamble.
114.Cit. exec.dec., arts 2-4.
115. Besides fixing criteria for estimating prices (art. 4 a) and payments to the NB (art. 4/b), the 1986 regulation established terms and
proceedings for deliveries of revenues to the budget (arts 4/c, 4/d and 5) and fines for delays on payments of fishing rights (art 6); on
fisheries, see also subsection 4.3.1.
116.Cit. dec., arts 8-12; fines are applied by the ports authority (art. 17) but in a further stage there is resort to the courts (arts 18-25).
117. Dec. no I2-A/80, art 3; over fishing. even lawful, was sudi that if quotas to foreign fleets were not cut, Angola could become a fish
importer in three years (AED, 14.1.1983, quoting Novembro); so, for example, in 1983 the Soviet-Angolan fisheries commission discussed
the reduction of Soviet fishing quota (ibid.); the fisheries agreement with Spain also reduced this countrys quota from 18,000 tons to
10,000 (AED, 11.1.1985). 	 •
118. Exec.Dec. no 42/89 (Fisheries), arts 1 and 2, which stated the intention to diange fisheries legislation "aiming its nearing and
adequacy to the universal principles of New Eoanomic Order for fisheries" (preamble citexec.dec.).
119. In 1988 a commission to revise fisheries contracts was set up; later it was reorganised as the central commission for investment,
coordinating provincial commissions, with the task to propose "the forms of association between the gate and national and private firms, to
identify potential partners and to select proposals, and to submit the proposals to the minister" (m.o. no 47/89, Fisheries, arts 1 and 3). Dec.
no 58 89, allowed PEs to sell their damaged vessels to private firms, after authorization from the branch minister (art 4). See section 8.1.
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7.3. Regulations on foreign enterprise, contracting and information
As stated above, the contractual conditions after independence were not
favourable to Angola. Nevertheless, foreign trade (imports) expanded mainly through the
mediation of state bureaucracies, especially the Ministry of Foreign Trade. In natural
resources, the oil sector went through a fast expansion, which motivated the inflow of a
range of services companies working in the industry and sponsored by parent state and/or
companies and by the NOC as well.
The relations of post-colonial PEs with foreign firms began under a relationship
buyer/seller for direct purchase of inputs and recruitment of personnel, through eventual
discrete transactions, except in mining, where the joint-venture form prevailed. The
directives for the reconstruction of the existing industrial park and for, in general terms,
the achievement of the 1973 levels of production, led to the reinforcement of the relations
of the country with colonial suppliers of equipment. 3- 20 The latter, directly or through
subsidiaries and/or sub-contractors, in many cases supplied technical assistance for
production and acted as middlemen in the purchase of intermediates and spares. This
factor conditioned the choice of contractual partners, which was also influenced by credit
lines. In this framework the colonial partnerships were partially restored and the
contractual conditions were also in many cases reproduced. 121 Also, PEs entered into a
permanent relationship with suppliers, conditioned by the shortages economy.
The directives of economic policy raised the problem of the skills of Angolan
workers to substitute settlers. The policy choices operated against Angolan workers since
120. see, e.g.. Bhagavan, 1980. Foreign firms seem have been confident in the outcomes of the process: "Angola cannot afford to lose
West technology and managemart skills. 'They may try to isolate the US politically in the UN', a US banker said, but they cannot afford to
break economically" (AED, 11.9.1981).
121.For example, Portugal maintained its position as privileged seller imports from Portugal were 50,420 in 1989 and 57,690 in 1990
(Mn escudos) and exports to Portugal were 8,131 in 1989 and 12519 in 1990; Angola was in 1991 the most irrq,ortant buyer of Portugal
in Africa (followed by Morocco and Cape Verde) and the 5th African supplier (preceded by Nigeria, Algeria, RSA and Egypt), (0 Jornal,
7.6.1991).
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the reproduction of the colonial economy did not call for the skills they had. 122 So, in an
earlier phase there were attempts of individual contracting of experts as employees of
enterprises or public administration, without resorting to consultancy or recruitment firms
and using a decentralised process. Still, the regulations on recruitment 123 countered this
tendency and soon PEs were resorting to the so-called technical assistance contracts
(TACs) to face the barriers to the supply of inputs and the shortage of skilled personnel.
All kinds of services contracts expanded 124 and became the formula for the implementation
of new projects or the reconstruction of war destruction, far beyond the sale of equipment
and materials, but still without engaging foreign firms in direct investment.125
The progressive inflow of all kinds of foreign partners was reinforced by the aid
schemes, which implied contracting firms of donor countries. This trend was visible from
the 80s and multiplied foreign firms and regulations for different controls over them. Soon
foreign firms had an established status, contrasting with their low profile in the 70s and
appeared as competitors of PEs in some branches, for example construction. Many factors
contributed to the privileged situation of foreign firms and they are referred to in this
section.
122. And as for these skills, the expansion of metropolitan economic activities led to the devaluation of African skills and potential.
123. On recruitment of foreign personnel, see Chapter 4, Table 2; experts sent tender cooperation agreements, in the early years mainly
from socialist countries, were not subject to the recruitment legislation.
124 . State bureaucracies, either having internalised propaganda on the low skills of Angolans, given plain bribery or interest in destroying
the public sector, often worked against PEs in their competition with foreign finns and complaints in the press did not lead to significant
changes; for example in construction Novembro denounced in 1983: 'the delays in the introduction and/or dimension of TACs or in
creation of mixed firms did not allow a fast response to the numerous demands, always urgent (?) at a time hard currency was easy to
spend, originating the entry of various foreign firms.... capacities of national firms in construction were not increased in order to decrease,
in the medium run, the presence of foreign firms ... a second mistake is to allow the continuous deterioration of working conditions of these
PEs which, disposing of kwanzas (and not always) for everyday business, have no capacity - human, technical, material (since this also
costs USD) - to compete with their foreign partners and are, notwithstanding all their efforts, banned from works they could build ... this
incapacity to allocate resources to PEs in order to avoid the constant resort, and for the easiest construction works, to foreign firms, wastes
foreign exchange where one could spend lcwanzas and withdraws all the possibilities for experience to Angolans working in this field.
Among various examples we have Geotecnica, where brakes for its TAC degraded the PE, made it accumulate in portfolio non-performed
works and prevented the PE to participate in works such as the reconstruction of Lomaum or the geotechnical studies for the improvement
of the Cambambe dam, allocated exclusively to the Portuguese firm which should be the teclmical support (under TAC) of this PE. ... a
third mistake appears, not to provide for priority allocation of our scarce resources to the con.struction PEs, so they may face contracts (and)
instead we have to contrail foreign firms all the time, spending a much higher amount of foreign exclumge. All this situation generates a
vicious circle, always putting national constructors in complete disadvantage towards the foreign ones, and (also) damages our prestige,
when even these works which may be made with a 100% national participation are allocated to foreign firms, as recently happened with
works for the textiles factory in Malanje" ("Investing better", 68, Novembro, 1983, 66).
125 . For example, turnkey contracts (e.g. the contract for the supply and install of a gas turbine power plant (AED, 6.12.1986),
management contracts (e.g., the contract of General Tyre at Mabor, AED, 11.9.1981).
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From independence state bureaucracies attempted to control international
contracts, something which meant more acknowledgment of their existence and clauses
than properly to control international contracting, a skill-intensive activity. From 1976
international contracts agreed by the government needed the ratification of the Ministry of
Finance, which had a direct interest on the issue as supervisor of the foreign exchange
plan. In 1980 the ministry reinforced its powers, getting the right "to participate in the
works to prepare negotiations, and in the draft and/or revision of contracts" involving
enterprises with special regimes. 126 From the early 80s it co-operated in some cases to the
Ministry of Planning in the analysis of some kinds of contracts and in the late 80s the
powers of the latter constantly reinforced. 127 Some branch ministers allocated to
themselves the approval of international contracts, 128 and the central bank had the control
of international payments and hard currency licensing and thus no contract with payments
in hard currency could be signed without its authorisation. 129 From the 70s the Ministry of
Foreign Trade enacted a set of regulations aiming to: i. compel foreign firms to provide
information on their activities, ii. licence their activities, iii. decrease the costs of imports
protecting the national insurance PE, and, iv. ban imports of some products to protect
national producers.13°
126.M.o. no 11076 (Finance) and Dec. no 18I B/80 (Organic Law of the Ministry of Finance), art. 49/i, on the powers of the Department
for Enterprises with Special Regimes, a board making the fmancial control of: i. enterprises with special taxes regimes, ii. enterprises with
participation of foreign capital, iii. mixed enterprises, and, iv. other enterprises allocated to their control; also, e.g.: Joint m.o. no 38 83
(Planning and Finance) stated that any contracts with foreign firms on "organisation, financial management, data processing and accounts
of enterprises, after approval by the Ministry of Finance shall be sent to BNA for analysis of financial clauses" (art 1); Exec. Dec. no
24 84 (Finance) established that "any contract or other instruments of similar legal nature including customs clauses granting any kind of
duties privileges (beneficios pautais), especially the exemption or reduction of duties and her customs obligations, cannot be signed
without previous written advice ofthe Ministry of Finance" (see note 43 for the preamble); also Chapter 4, Table 2.
127. See section 8.1., on reforms.
128.See subsection 4.2.2., as an example of powers of the branch minister.
129. See Chapter 4, Table 2; BNA also authorised the opening of agencies of foreign banks, which were banned to buy shares or any
equity in national firms, to buy buildings, to participate in the purchase of shares and bonds of any enterprise (Exec.Dec. no 75/84,
Finance, arts 1 and 2); foreign banks agencies were forbidden to perform any kind of banking operations or services reserved to national
banks (see subsection 4.1.2., on the reserve).
130.Respectively, m.o. no 186/78 (Foreign Trade), on the control of agents and franchised of foreign firms; Exec.Dec. no 57/84 (Foreign
Trade), on the licensing of agencies and franchised of foreign firms; m.o. no 172/79 (Foreign Trade), ordering imports to be made C&F
and insurance to be held by ENSA (art. 1) and threatening that no operations licence was granted to CIF imports (art. 2); m.o. 8.3.1980
(Foreign Trade) providing that licensing of imports of pesticides and herbicides only was authorised when the applicant supplied evidence
that national procurement was impossible, in order "to protect industries installed in the country whose production saves hard currency and
employs national labour" (preamble cit. m.o.).
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But it was in construction that most restrictive norms aiming at the protection of
national firms were enacted, since there PEs were attempting to set up a national industry
by associating with foreign partners. From 1982, when competition with Portuguese firms
which settled in the country became sharp, 131 regulations ordered private and foreign
firms to provide information on their projects. 132 Later, when state contracts, some of
them financed by international funding, became more significant, regulations established
the compulsory participation of national firms in tenders and their preferential rights in
equal circumstances.'
The purchase of technology and information
The impact of the costliness of information 134 in the relative power balance in
different social relations made possible its sale in packages (e.g., Helleiner and O'Brien,
1983: 7). This is a relevant aspect when we approach information as a commodity,
allowing producers to extract a surplus from the possession of this product. And although
legislation of many countries forbids tying different types of information in packages, in
North-South relations often the behaviour of sellers is not under these constraints, due to
lack of a legal framework which would appear as disincentive for foreign investors. Also,
lack of knowledge in exchanged technologies, may allow opportunism (Williamson, 1981:
131. In 1988 the construction market was concerning foreign firms, highly concentrated, with only 6 firms operating: Portuguese
construcEoes Tecnicas (Interfma group), Soares da Costa and Teixeira Duarte, italian Astaldi and UK Wade Adams (AED, 21.10.1988).
Progressively Portuguese firms got the bulk of construction works (except for the Capanda project), where they made good profits, e.g.: i.
Construes Tecnicas had in 1988 aggregate profits four times these of 1987 while "Angola is the African market with more guarantees"
(Diirio de Noticias, 3.4.1989), and ii. Soares da Costa in 1988 made about USD 54 Mn (8 bn escudos), a part in Angola, and later
diversified activities there to fisheries and sales of cars and equipment, associated to Salvador Caetano (Expresso, 11.3.1989 and
3.9.1988). The reconstruction business and EU funding made the prospects for constructors good in the 90s.
132. M.o. 6.1.1982 (Construction), on the compulsory delivery of plans of works and needs of inputs by foreign and private firms to the
ministry.
133. Resol. 2/87 (CDS), art. 1, on the compulsory participation of national enterprises (PEs, mixed or private firms with "effective and
actual headquarters in Angola", art. 2) in the tenders for allocation of government contracts: i. national firms could associate to foreign
companies if they had no capacity for the works (art 3); ii. associated foreign companies could not apply autonomously for tenders (art 4)
and, iii. there were preference rights in the allocation of contracts in the following order: 1. PEs, 2. mixed enterprises, 3. national private
companies, 4. associations national/foreign companies (art 6); the minister of State for the Productive Sphere could authorise exceptions
(art 5). It seems that the scheme was working: for example, Portuguese Soares da Costa associated in a joint-venture to a local fuln had the
lowest bid in a tender for an EDF supported project (USD 3.5 Mn) of reconstruction and improvements in Namibe (AED, 21.10.1988).
134. Information relates here not only to the "knowledge, tedmiques, symbols, models, in short forms of thought" (Ruffolo, 1979: 207).
See section 4.3.
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45-6 and 1983: 3, 9.) of suppliers to spread: for example, it is frequent to sell in the Third
World as secret, and thus under contractual obligations of confidentiality and non-
dissemination, information which is public in developed countries. The same happens,
mutatis mutandis, with the problem of assessment of suitability of the information
acquired. The difficulties of fixing a price for some kinds of information, and the
oligopolist character of the related market, allow very costly purchase by users who are
not familiar with the issues at stake. The market for information products is thus one
highly imperfect, especially when we focus in international relations. The characteristics of
the information market, or the idiosyncratic character information has for users from
UDCs, calls for repeated transactions with the same supplier (MacKaay, 1982: 114 and
Helleiner and O'Brien, 1982: 14-15), being thus a relevant strength pressing for economic
integration of UDCs firms into information (mainly technology) producers (e.g.,
Williamson, 1983). That is, the shift from market regulation to TNC subordination and
from supervision by the national state to supervision by the TNC hierarchy andlor other
organisations supplying information. The Angolan developments confirm the points made
above. 135
There was no formal protection of industrial property since the colonial Code on
Industrial Property was considered repealed under art. 85 of CL. 136 In the mid-80s there
were discussions on whether or not the code was in force: a part of the state bureaucracies
argued it was. The problem was raised by foreign partners who were trying to get
royalties on the use of (colonial) marks by PEs (nationalised industries) from
135. On imbalance in contractual relations see, e.g., Williamson, 1975 (general background of the impact of uncertainty, bounded
rationality, small numbers and opportunism in contractual relations), Mackaay, 1982 (sales contracts and consumer protection), Daintith,
1986 (assessment of long-term contracting in mining), (Thai and Choong, 1988 (management contracts), and Helleiner and O'Brien, 1983
(international contracting between poor and rich countries).
136. CIP, Dec. no 30,697 (1959); CI? protected patents, (arts. 4-36), utility models and industrial designs (arts 37-73), registered trade
marks (arts 74-126), awards (arts 127-140), names and labels (arts 141-164) and indication (certificate) of origin (165-171); a set of
norms guarantied rights on industrial property qualifying as unfair competition the unlawful use of industrial property, also including
confidential information (arts 211-229). On CL, art. 85, see section 3.1.
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independence, in a situation in which the mark was almost irrelevant. 137 Some foreign
firms put as a condition for further contracting (including of technology) the prior
payment of royalties and in some cases they were paid. 138 In general terms foreign
partners, suppliers of (usually obsolete) technology the country almost does not produce,
ensured their other rights to industrial property through contracts for licences of know-
how on which they treated as secret information which was patented abroad or was in the
public domain. 139 TACs acted as the general legal institution within which the (some false)
know-how contracts were concluded:
"the absence of regulation and the confusion between technical assistance
and know-how either in the concepts, or in the forms of contracting and
performance by the parties, caused an uncontrolled increase in this type of
contracts which, by the easiness of their approval, became a source of easy
and without risk incomes for foreign enterprises, distorting the very
indirect transfer of technology among enterprises, damaging the country
not only on high costs but also on scarce results obtained". 14 0
TACs also interested PEs to face the hazards of administrative planning and
uncertainty on supply of essential inputs and in many cases they appear as forced
substitution. TACs aim at the supply of public information and training of personnel. But
in the Angolan context they had new functions. Firstly, TACs were often paid in a lump
sum, which made it possible, for firms with financial capacity and/or good management of
the contract, to import of all kinds of 'simple' inputs for the 'assisted' PE, without resort to
the imports authorities or to face situations where imports were denied. In many cases the
137. The problem was discussed at an Enlarged Consultation Council of the Ministry of Industry in 1985; as the nationalised industries
had no foreign currency to pay royalties if they had been aware of their supposed obligations they would have changed the mark to a new
(and national) one. The information value of marks, and the related construction of ownership rights and exchange legal framework may
be meaningless in countries such as Angola, where the scarcity of goods is suc:h that consumers will buy any product for sale, whatever its
mark; also, consumers in regions of the country not readied by international advertising (the majority) ignore the very existence of foreign
marks, by which eventually local producers will be paying royalties: buying Dior or buying no brand means the same in information terms;
the tying of licences for know-how to licences for marks, quite spread in the country's international ccntracts, is thus a way of extorting a
rent from the local producer, resulting from the imbalances of bargaining power (including those arising from unavailability of adequate
information on the problem).
138.For example, the preamble of Dec. no 4/87 expressly stated that the country has been contracting "patents, marks and know-how".
139.And though subject to obligations of confidentiality and non-dissemination.
140. Preamble Dec. no 4/87, "Regulations on the Contracting of Foreign Technical Assistance" (RCFTA); RCFTA followed the Brazilian
law on technology, except on allocations for the control powers.
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entering into a TAC meant access to food supplied by the foreign partner, at least for
senior management of the contractor. 141 Secondly, TACs had a duration of usually two
years, renewable, which was more secure than the annual bargaining of planned inputs and
as indeed they related to packages of supplies, they saved the costs of negotiation of
imported isolated items through, say, the licensing of operations schemes in foreign trade
and foreign exchange. Lastly, TACs were legitimate, given the dominant perceptions of
Angolans as 'unskilled' or at least incompetent. 142 Also, until 1987, TACs (as such) were
deregulated given the lack of interest of functionalist boards in the problems of
tecluiology. 19 3
As TACs spread, in 1987 the government regulated their contracting, while
differentiating them from know-how contracts. 14 4 The Regulations provided for
compulsory clauses in TACs, 14 5 forbidden clauses and ruled also the content of some
clauses. 14 6 The regulations also forbade the automatic prorogation of contracts. National
PEs and mixed enterprises could not contract technical assistance with their foreign
partners in the joint-ventures and mixed enterprises created under the LFI/79. 14 7 The
branch minister, BNA and the ministers of Planning and Finance had powers to decide on
141. For example, foreign finns set up special food supply for the senior management of related PEs and mixed firms, and even devices
such a video club.
142. see.
 e. g
., section 8.1., on the absence of an 'Angolan entrepreneurial class as contrasted with the problems of managers referred to at
Chapter 4, espec. at section 4.3.
143. However, the first norm on TACs was enacted in 1979; Exec. Dec. no 1/79 (Industry) compelled 'recurrent' technical assistance and
other services contracts to include "the training and professional improvement of Angolan workers by the foreign partner".
144. Defined as contracts "whose subject-matter is always non-patented and secret and unavailable in the open market knowledge" (cit.
preamble); foreign TACs were defined as "contracts having as subject-matter the acquisition to non-resident entities of specialised technical
sea-vices, necessary to maintain, improve or increase the capacity of production, either of goods or services, and to increase the level of
professional training of workers." (RCFTA, art /1).
145. RCFTA, art. 7; e.g.: i. "detailed definition of the object of the contract" (art. 7/1/b), ii. specification of expected results and the
guarantee that the form of delivery and the content of services will be sufficient to obtain the predicted results" (art. 7/1/c), and,
"obligation of the contractor to supply all the necessary information and technical documents which it will use in the services" (art. 7/1/h).
146. RCFTA, art 9; it was forbidden, e.g.: i. restrictions to the free use, by the national partner, of technical information (art 9/d), ii.
payments "characteristic of other types of contracts, for example royalties" (art. 9/e), iii. clauses reflecting an imbalance between the
reciprocal deliveries of the parties (art 9/c), iv. non determined, aleatory or composite prices (art 9/b). On the the hand, some clauses
should have a given structure and content, for example, the price in a lump sum (art. 10/1) divided into components as : i. price of foreign
labour (art 10 2/a), and, ii. costs and profit of supplier (art 10/2/b).
147.RCFTA. arts 12 and 4/2, respectively, on LFI179, see section 7.1.
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the contracting of TACs, after international tenders. 148
 Contracts breaking the regulations
were null and void and the "heads of national entities who conclude or authorize technical
assistance contracts against these norms" had criminal and civil liability. 14 9
The 1987 regulations also established that TACs in force at the time should be
revised. Special committees headed by representatives of the MPLA, were set up in 1988
to renegotiate TACs in construction, industry, energy and oil, agriculture, transport and
communications and fisheries. 150 The new regulations established that TACs would be
transformed into: i. direct foreign investment, ii. services contracts, and iii. new TACs.
The commissions also had directives to try to ensure the strict implementation of RCFTA,
redesign the object of contracts avoiding clauses of non specified subject-matter, end the
practice of introducing addenda to contracts and reduce the price of contracts.151
The use of TACs to respond to the needs of inputs of PEs illustrate the point that
information asymmetries, whatever their degree and including those related to the working
of the very economic system, and the costliness of information allows its sale, by
producers, in packages. Moreover, the characteristics of the information market, and/or
the idiosyncratic character information has for users from UDCs, calls for repeated
transactions with the same supplier, being thus a relevant strength pressing for integration
of UDCs firms into information (mainly technology) producers, which in Angola later
148. RCFTA, arts 16/2, 16,3 and 16/4, 20, and 21; the national enterprise (buyer) and the brandi ministry supervised the performance of
contracts (art 24). RCFTA provided for international tenders when the value of contracts was over USD 100,000 (kz 3 Mn) with at least 3
competitors for contracts above USD 300,000 (la 9 Mn), respectively-, gave powers to branch ministers to authorize contracting below
USD 33,000 (lcz 1 Mn), but on the limit of the plan allocations of the sector in the concerned year (art 3).
149.RCFTA. arts 25 and 26.
150. cfl.
..reg,, att. 27; Dec. no 18/88, "Directives for the Renegotiation of TACs"; the decree provides an image of the roles allocated to
ministries: i. the branch supplied information on the values involved in projects to which the contracts referred to and on the degree of
implementation (art. 4/lib), ii. the Ministry of Finance and BNA supplied data on payments in national currency to foreign partners (art
4/1/c), in ML supplied information on the number of workers, and their wages and salaries, covered by TACs (art 4/1/d), and iv. Ministry
of Planning made the "critical qualitative and quantitative analysis of each contract" (art 4/1/a); also, to the information thus supplied
should be added "all the subjective information (news, opinions, etc.) about each of the contracts which is possible to obtain" (art 5); after
this step the commissions drafted proposals to the ministers of Planning. Finance and branch (art 6) and after the approval of proposals
entered into negotiations with foreign partners (art 7).
151
.aec' ., arts 10.i and 9, respectively.
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appeared as candidates to the purchase of privatised PEs. This means the shift from
market regulation to subordination to information sellers and from supervision by the
national state to supervision by the TNC hierarchy.152
As the years passed, a new form of intervention of foreign firm developed: their
participation in the decision-making process through consultancy contracts for the
definition of economic policy measures and appraisal of projects. Although in some
branches PEs for the production of information had been created, 153 their shortages of
inputs and personnel made it impossible towards counter the trend to the establishment of
foreign firms as the main sellers of information," 4
 a situation which was combined with
the reinforced devaluation of the knowledge of Angolans and the constraints to the
production of knowledge. Under the feasibility studies and the appraisal of projects,
foreign firms establish the direction of acquisitions, the type of technology and equipment
to be used, and the potential suppliers, the sources of funding and contract conditions.
Very little was left to national firm or authorities, meaning additional losses of decision-
making power as integration in the world economy became more intensive.'
The role played by foreign firms, especially from the moment the main funding for
projects came from international institutions and the EU, should not be neglected. Indeed,
since in tenders, for example, proposals are often assessed by foreign consultancy firms,156
152.On the progressive integration of Angolan firms on TNCs through permanent contracting, Coelho, 1984.
153. For example, GEPPI in industry (a PE for studies and engineering) or LEA in construction (a public board for engineering).
154. For example, UK Dar al-Handash, was contracted in the late 80s by UNDP to produce a study on a rehabilitation programme for the
provinces of Huila, Namibe and Cunene (USD 450,000-500,000 projects) and also to recruit Angolan personnel for a regional planning
unit; the consultancy argued for the restructuring of the agricultural pricing structure and development of social infrastructure, including
health and education facilities (AED, 26.7.1986); the same firm made in 1982 the feasibility study for the expansion of Cimangola (AED
7.6.1986); 'left foreign partners tried to counter the marginalisation of Angolan firms from this business; for example, Energoinvest and
Gosa (from Yugoslavia) were in 1988 studying the possibilities of carrying out civil engineering and plant construction studies and
projects associated to local partners (AED, 29.7.1988).
155. In some cases the resort to foreign firms in this areas also appeared as an expensive (in hard currency) form of arbitration of conflict
(among state bureaucracies and between them and PEs); while the 80s saw the shifting of decision-making powers on the economy to
higher levels of the system to, among other reasons, solve conflict between state bureaucracies, the contracting of foreign firms, for example
to recruit personnel (see note 177) also appeared as a mean to solve conflicts on, say, the 'kin/clients' issue.
156. Funding of projects under the Lome Convention was mainly assessed by EU consuhancy firms which established costs, beneficiaries,
requirements for tenders, while some were involved in direct technical assistance to government programmes, e.g., /Lillian firms Bichara
and Consulint, Portuguese IPE, UK ORT, Belgian Haecon, French Sogreah (for EDF funded projects), German Africa Asian and
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by a coincidence related projects were allocated to foreign firms, in a process where
Angolan firms appear as marginal since for Western firms they are not capable of
competing in 'international' projects. The 'reconstruction' business, worth about USD 2 bn
in 1991, 157 led to a harsh competition between foreign firms, which had, as private
traders, to establish links with state bureaucracies to be able to participate in projects.158
7.4. Conclusion
When we approach this period through the angle of rupture and continuity, we
may conclude that the main interest of foreign investors remained, as in the past, in
mining, where there was significant direct investment. In other areas, exploitation centred
essentially in trade, which was diversified and included an expanding range of services.
As the country's indebtedness called for its restructuring, the role allocated to
Portugal within EU led to demands of a different role of former colonial firms, which
during this period had been essentially involved in trade exploitation. Reinforced
Portuguese Profabril (for assistance to govemment, four contracts USD 4.7 Mn, two awarded), (AED, 23.9.1988); in some cases, aid was
linked to "political, legal and tedmical situations (related to the Benguela railway) to be clarified" (on EEC funding of the SADCC
programme for the Lobito corridor, ibid.); see also section 8.1., on tenders for privatisation; the choices made by consultancy firms are not
exempt of suspicions of EEC firms themselves; for example, under EDF funding, the reconstruction project for the hospital Americo
Boavida in Luanda was allocated to a Belgian firm, hi Delens, which, according to AED, was the 4th lowest bidder (USD 16.3 Mn) while
an Italian firm (Rizarmi) had a bid of USD 15.0 Mn and "it is not clear why the Belgian offer was accepted" (AED, 19.6.1989); in this
case, Portuguese sources argued that their construction firms were discriminated against by ELT (since 2 were disqualified although with
top places in the tenders with prices lower than the Belgian firm) and that the decisions on the project were the result of activities of the
Italian lobby in Luanda, since the Belgian firm was expected to sub-contract Italian Astaldi; the EU argued that that Portuguese firms got
about 58°0 of total EU aid projects in Angola and that it was nerf-mary a more balanced presence of EEC firms of other nationalities in
tenders (0 Jomal, 23.3.1989 and 31.3.1989).
157. Dos Santos (quoted in PUblico, 1.6.1991); a bad example of the 'reconstruction business' is the case of recovery of the Hotel
Presidente in Luanda (later under a management contract by Meridian): the ministry of Internal Trade contracted a Brazilian firm, Sisal, to
restore the hotel; the price paid was USD 20 Mn and competitors (Portuguese sources) argued later that this price was 'The amount needed
to build a new hotel of the same standard" and as such the price of the contract was denounced by the PR and the party (53, 6, Novembro,
1982, 6-7).
158. According to foreign sources to perform economic activities in Angola, investors and sellers need to have "the right contact" in the
public administration (Ptiblico, 4.2.1991); the "right contact" is established in many different ways, for example: from gifts and parties to
access to foreign enterprise food and hi-fl shops, paid holidays abroad for top officials or their families, access to scholarships for graduate
studies of top officials and graduate studies of their relatives, 'pocket money' for business missions abroad, including the payment of
expenditure such as call girls and boys, and, lastly, employment, for top officials or their relatives, at the foreign partner subsidiary or even
abroad (a technique also used by WB). From my experience I noticed that firms which do not involve themselves in these kind of activities
had little possibilities of getting a project approved, whatever the conditions and costs and even the opinions of members of government on
the issue; unlawful "right contact" is established through the payment of commissions to civil servants who gil the allocation of a
government contract to a given firm or who supply information allowing a given firm to be successful in tenders or simple cotrpetition; it is
from former "right contacts" in the public achnthistratMn that some foreign firms got access to privatisation of PEs. The "tight contact"
strategies also extends to prospective rulers; for example, a Portuguese health firm (Clipovoa) which entered into an agreement with
UNITA to practice lower prices for the members of that party, was in the late 80s negotiating health contracts (studies, construdion and
management of hospitals) with ex-Portuguese colonies (Espresso, 26.1.1991).
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integration of the country in the world economy, implemented through capital penetration
and 'recovery' by former metropolitan capital was the outcome.159
International economic relations per se contributed to the failure of the central
command economy because, firstly, the state was not capable of achieving an effective
control of the country's resources due to the country's underdevelopment. Secondly,
attempts to change the patterns of these relations, through economic policy and related
legislation, were usually only partially implemented. Lastly, the sets of contracts entered
into by Angolan firms in international relations led to a progressive fragmentation of the
state property rights, on which lay the foundations of the central command economy, since
part of decision-making powers arising from property rights were in fact transferred to
foreign partners under different forms of contracting.
159 . 'Capital recovery' is evident in the return of abandoned firms to previous owners (see seciion 8.1).
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PART III
EPILOGUE
It is necessary to make a second revolution.
Agosthdio Neto, 1979
This is the time to abandon silence, fear, shyness and have courage to face the great battles which are
forthcoming.
Rut Ramos, 1990
CHAPTER 8
THE REFORMS
The socialist project was replaced with economic and political reforms. From 1985,
economic reforms were adopted and their goals changed substantially up to the 90s. Political
reforms were partially induced from abroad, especially by the peace negotiations initiated in the
beginning of the 1990 and the linkage of peace to extensive political reforms. The economic crisis,
the centralization of decision-making reached by the end of the 80s, growing discontent and the
consequent loss of the social base and legitimacy of MPLA, created the conditions for change.
8.1. The economic reform
Deteriorating war conditions, increase in debt, starvation and generalised shortages,
protest from managers and the struggle of the informal economy against the exercise of economic
power by in some cases distant state bureaucracies, undermined the legitimacy of those claiming
the socialist option while making evident the failure of attempted strategies of development.
The awareness of many non-orthodox socialists of the need to change the overall
framework for the organisation of the economy and restructure the public sector, was countered
by agrarians and orthodox socialists occupying posts mainly in functionalist organs and party
structures. This conflict, which was apparently situated at the economic level and concerned
essentially state and party bureaucracies, coincided with the emergence of two other different
forces: the reformist take-over of top level decision-making, and the entry of PRA to the IMF/WB
network.
1. Rol. no 20 89 (PC). ratified adhesion to IMF, WB, IDA, IFC (International Financial Corporation) and MICA (Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agreement); Resol. no 2/87 (PC), ratified adhesion to Lome III.
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8.1.1. The 1985 economic reform
The economic reform was formally approved by MPLA in the 1985 Congress but in fact
the first steps had begun in 1982, as a result of the worsening of the economy in that year due to
the South African invasion and the fall in the prices of oil. It began with the 'plan of emergency'
where for the first time it was openly declared that the state should concentrate in key areas of the
economy and should resort to private enterprise in the other areas (Mario Nelson, 1991: 45). 2 It
was a response to the failures of the central command economy and aimed its restructuring "to
liberate the productive forces" constrained by the statist system implemented in the 70-80s.3
Maintaining socialist goals, the reform intended essentially the restructuring of the mode of
organisation of the system and not a change in the foundations of the system.
Indeed the main goals of the reform were to: i. improve the working of mercantile-
monetary relations as a regulator of the economy (and a source of information), which meant, as
referred to above, the progressive integration of the informal economy, ii. move from super-soft
budget constraints to soft-constraints, while reducing state deficits and the printing of money, iii.
enable the state to get rid of undertakings with low degree of socialisation by transferring them to
other economic agents, including associations, co-operatives and 'collectives of workers', iv.
respond to demands of PEs for changes of their relationship with the state, that is, satisfy claims
for increased autonomy, v. decentralise and debureaucratise decision-making in the planning
system, including by the adoption of pluriannual plans, the coordination of the different plans
(National Plan, Budget, Foreign Exchange Plan, etc.) and changes in the role of functional and
branch ministries.4
2.The economic reform was called SEF (financial cleansing) and was approved by Resol. on the Economic and Social Development of PRA on the
Period 1986-1990, MPLA II Congress, December 1985.
3.As one of its ideologists put it.
4.On the goals of the reform in the period 1986-90, see, e.g., PR to the SEF Seminar, August 1987, on the Resol. of the 2nd Congress. See Chapter 4.
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Soon, the economic reform appeared as a new magic formula with which to substitute
'scientific socialism 15 and like the latter was appropriated for alternative use by competing political
groups representing conflicting interests, including those of capital generated in the informal
economy as well as foreign interests.
As the reform began to be implemented only three years after its adoption, its outcomes
were affected by the world restructuring under the rule of financial institutions. There is little
information on the linkage between concrete economic policy measures and the intervention of
IMF/WB since the government, ironically, decided to assume as its the most unpopular measures
and thus the classic IMF package appeared as achievements of the economic reform. According
to available information, by 1990 the package included: i. the restructuring of the state-controlled
banking sector "with a view to privatisation", ii. the devaluation of national currency, to the level
of black market rates, iii. restrictions on public expenditure with, for example, the dismissal of
about one quarter of waged/salaried labour, iv. liberalisation of prices for many fanning
commodities, v. 400% increases in state supplied fuels, housing rents and electricity in the first
stage of the adjustment, and vi. privatisation of small businesses.6
In exchange for the implementation of this 'reform', PRA got: i. international expertise for
the draft of economic policy,7
 and, ii. its debt of about USD 6 bn, mainly to Western creditors,
reschedulled by the Paris Club, which gave PRA a six-year reprieve on repayments. IMF
membership gave PRA a share quota in the Fund of USD 180 Mn, as a base for future borrowing.
However, this 'unequal exchange' between the country's strategies of development, whatever they
would be, and IMF financial support did not mean substantial funding, as IMF funding only met a
small proportion of balance of payments needs.8
5.For example, comments on the new statute of the public manager (JA, 25.1.1989).
6.South. June 1990, 83. The increase on prices was a proposal of UN agencies (ibid.). See subsection 8.1.6.
7.IMF, WB and UNDP experts were involved in the studies ofthe restructuring (South, ibid.). See section 7.3. (role of consultancies).
8.South, ibid. See subsection 8.1.6.
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The trends of the reforms from the 90s express the alliance of reformists with international
bureaucracies, grounded in identity of approaches to economic strategies, and related policy
measures, as well as their identification as members of bureaucratic organisations. Nevertheless,
the economic reform had different goals and did not emerge from pressure, or know-how, of
international institutions. It was initiated by functionalist organs from the early 80s in an
environment of conflict. International powers became more and more demanding as the economic
crisis worsened and the negotiations for the peace settlements advanced. In 1991, the formal
framework of the economic reform apparently did not mean a change in the form of the system
but a change in the system itself
8.1.2. Privatisatisons, entrepreneurs & the consolidation of national capital
Notwithstanding the socialist option and nationalisations, private enterprise survived.
Indeed, CL art. 10 guaranteed the freedom of private property and economic initiative,
approached from the stand-point of the economic function of means of p.todudlotO ithoii
developing the constitutional norm provided for different regimes of private owners according to
branches and to the association, or otherwise, to PEs. It is not by chance that the tougher regime
for private firms appeared in trade. Indeed, this was one of the areas where competition between
settlers and Angolans lasted for centuries, with the progressive marginalisation of African traders
from the market. It was also in trade that the public sector was defeated by Angolans as private
undertakings achieved the control of the market for consumer goods. The picture in, say, natural
resources was different: the attempts of the state to control the activity were undermined by the
possession of technical knowledge and information on the working of the world markets, as well
as dominant positions in these markets, by necessary foreign partners with whom Angolan
entrepreneurs could not compete.°
9. See subsection 3.1.4. and Coelho, 1985: 12.
1 °. See sections 1.1., 5.2. and 7.2.
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A. The private sector and the legal framework for privatisation
Economic legislation of the late 70s imposed a set of restrictions on the powers of private
owners: i. the restrictions on private ownership centred on the state reserved ownership and/or
activity, ii. the nationalisation and intervention in management regimes, iii. the eventual integration
of private firms in planning, iv. workers control in private and mixed firms established by GLL,
and, v. the application of the common regimes of licensing, credit, prices and payments through
the banks.11
The norms providing for absolute or control reserved areas essentially targeted foreign
firms. At the time the reserved areas legislation was enacted, Angolans were not in a position,
given the characteristics of Portuguese colonialism, to own firms, except for small-sized
undertakings in farming, ranching, trade and, quite rarely, in the manufacturing industry and
services. Nevertheless, Angolans, whose expectations for independence meant getting rid of
competing and expropriating settlers, as the occupation of abandoned assets in trade and farming
demonstrates, aspired to private entrepreneurship. Other aspirants to private ownership, of the
entrepreneurial type, were the 'old Creole' families ruined by colonialism. 12 However, surrounded
by left-wingers in the 70s and later by the strata which appropriated the post-colonial state,
Angolan private entrepreneurs were restricted to a grey zone between the state sector and the
foreign enclave. During the 70s and 80s, working essentially in the informal economy, these
entrepreneurs, especially the middlemen who got the bulk of profits, were capable of achieving a
reasonable accumulation, facilitated by the 'compulsory savings' caused by shortages which
prevented them of engaging in luxury consumption. After establishing links with the state/party
bureaucracies and, in some cases, with foreign firms, and creating networks of smuggled goods,
such as the Kinshasa/Brussels network (Birmingham, 1988: 5-6), entrepreneurs channelled
11.See Chapters 4 and 7 and section 3.4.4. For the scarce data on private enterprise, see subsection 2.2.2. and 8.1.2.; also Bhagavan, 1980; in 1985
the private sector counted for 29% of gross value of output and mixed firms 15% (Hodges, 1987: 33).
12.See sections 2.3. and 5.2.
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demands through the kin/tribe mechanisms to the party and the state. 13 The reflection of the
informal economy at the political level (informal as well) was thus one of the factors which led to
a new approach to the role of private firms. Furthermore, IMF and other international institutions
pressure for privatisation, and the linkage of aid to the promotion of small businesses, reinforced
the demands of private actors.
The Law on Economic Activities (LEA) responded to demands in three main directions: i.
transfer of PEs under the 'redimensioning' scheme, ii. repeal of reserved areas, and, iii. a clear
definition of guarantees for all types of economic agents. 14
The most significant changes in reserved areas are in natural resources and banking.
Education, health care, culture and art, sanitation and drainage, social welfare and sports were
considered "activities connected to the public administration" and not covered by LEA. 15 State
reserved areas of activity included central banking, the military industry, distribution of water and
electricity for "public consumption", basic drainage, media, telecommunications and post-office,
some kinds of transports, and ports and airports. They almost coincided with activities banned to
foreign investors, with no significant differences of status between them and domestic private
actors. 16
In natural resources there was an important change, since any economic agent got access
to them through concessions and other regimes not implying the formal transfer of ownership.17
Another significant difference in the reserved areas regime is that while under previous legislation
13.See sections 3.5. and 8.2.
14.Law no 10'88, here referred to as LEA; for the purposes of the law enterprises are PEs and mixed firms, co-operatives, private firms ruled by the
Commercial Code (partnerships and companies, LEA, arts 4/1 and 4/2), 'family undertakings' (arts 4/1 and 9) and self-employed citizens (arts 4/1 and
10).
15.LEA art. 1/3; however, this does not mean that these activities are reserved to the state and from 1991 private education coexisted with the public
me (see section 5.4.).
16.LEA arts 171 and Law no 13/88, art 4; the basic differences refer to education and health, banned to foreign investors. See subsection 8.1.3.
17.LEA, art 18. Although the 1978 oil law was in force up to the end of 1993, on mining Law no 1/92, waived all the barriers, except the
concessions regime, to access to mineral resources and does no make a distinction between domestic and foreign investors; but the ownership of the
minerals remains vested in the state until they are extracted,
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they had to be waived by formal law, LEA allocated the CM powers to waive reserved areas
either related to "public administration connected activities" or to strictly economic activities,
except for the military industry and the central bank functions.18
In 1988 economic agents attained a standard of rights higher than individual citizens, and
this ultimately reflected an underlying philosophy of 'corporatism' and their higher bargaining
power as contrasted with non-associated individuals. These rights were formulated as general
incentives to performance and compliance to law while regulations up to 1990 only provided for
other incentives for buyers or franchisees of privatised undertakings, concessionaires of land and
foreign investors. LEA also provided for duties of economic agents, especially to submit to the
licensing legislation.19
LEA institutionalised privatisation under the broad formula of 'redimensioning'. 2° The
shortage of managerial skills, often stated without taking into account the problems the managers
of PEs had to face, worked as a rationale for the policies later implemented. It is not by chance
that 'redimensioning' appears in LEA in the section on private enterprise: in fact redimensioning
appears more as the sale of PEs to private, national and foreign, enterprises, and in some cases as
their transfer with no payment, than their restructuring according to the different possibilities
opened by the 1989 legislation.
The 'redimensioning of the state entrepreneurial sector" covered all PEs, state
shareholdings in mixed firms and companies subject to state intervention. 21 Concerning PEs,
18.Art 16 for activities referred to at an. 1/3, and 17/2 for the reserves under art 17/1.
19.LEA, arts 2, 12, 13, 15 (on the "right of free association"), 3 and 19, respectively.
20.Preamble Dec. no 32/89; redimensioning is: i. "the process of achieving the adequacy of the state entreprerieurial sector to the strategic goals of
development and its effective capacity of management" (art. 1/a), ii. 'The reorganisation of PEs to guarantee their efficiency and profitability" (art.
l/b), iii. "measures aiming to guarantee the use of all productive capacities within the policy of alliances, in order to improve the living standards of
the population" (att. 1/c), iv. the solution of situations of state intervaition under Dec. no 128/75 (rut. 1/d). Also, LEA, art. 23/1, in the section on
private enterprise.
21.Cit. dec., art. 3; including PEs which, dealing with international relations, had internally adopted the form of companies (totally-owned by the
state), in a rebellion against the restrictive framework of LPE/77 (see section 4.2. and subsection 8.1.4.); on intervened companies, see section 4.1. and
on mixed firms,
	 Chapter 7.
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decision-makers22
 had powers either to maintain the PE in the public sector or to opt for the
following alternatives: i. restructuring according to LPE/88, 23 transformation into a totally owned
state company, ruled thus by company law, or mergers and/or divisions into PEs, ii. concession of
exploitation, under lease or not, to "national or foreign, mixed, co-operative, associated or private
entities", 24
 iii. extinction and liquidation and total or partial sale of PEs assets to national or
foreign entities, and/or, iv. dissolution and liquidation of the PE and total or partial incorporation
of its assets as capital in one or more new enterprises where national private or foreign capital
participated. 25
 Decision-makers could maintain, increase, reduce or sell financial participations of
the state or PEs in mixed firrns. 26
 Companies under state intervention would be nationalised,
declared bankrupt or delivered back to former owners, and in the latter case the state would cover
all or part of their debts "to ensure its economic-financial feasibility".27
Further regulations established that some small-sized PEs should be immediately
privatised. 28
 Collective forms such as co-operatives and associations had preferential rights in
acquisition. 29
 The state paid the debts of privatised firms, while the decree provided for incentives
to buyers such as credit facilities, tax and custom duties exemptions, guarantees of state 'non-
intervention' in their activities, and "fair treatment of their legitimate interests". 30 The decree also
22. i. The CM or the organ to which it delegates powers, for strict° sensu PEs (cit. dec., art. 13/1/a); ii. the ministries of Justice, Finance and branch for
gate financial participations in mixed firms (ibid., art 13/1/b), and, iii. the provincial commissioners for small undatakings (ibid., aft 13/1/c); GARE
(see subsection 8.1.5.) intervened in the decision-making process giving advice (ibid., art 13/2); from decisions related to redimensioning there was a
right to appeal to the CM (cit.dec., art 15/1).
23.Dec. no 3Z 89., art 5/a; Law no 11/88, here referred to as LPE/88, ruled the new regime of PEs (see section 8.1.4).
24.Citdec., arts 5/b, art 5/d and 5/6, respectively. 1Pace is approached as a rent contract with reserve of purchase.
25.Cit.dec., arts 5/e and 5/& respectively.
26.Cit.dec., art. 6; on financial participations, see, e.g., subsection 7.1.
27.Cit.dec., arts 7/1 and 7/2.
28.Cit.dec., art. 16 and Dec. no 34/89, arts 1 and 2 (on the privatisation of small-sized PEs).
29.Dec. no 34/89, art. 4/2.
30.Ck.dec., arts 2'2, 13, 14/6 and 14/a, respectively.
311
Reforms
regulated proceedings: tenders, analysis of proposals by a joint commission of the branch and
Finance provincial boards and decision by the provincial commissioner.31
B. Implementation of privatisation
There is only sparse information, and a very short period of time, to assess the
privatisation process in Angola. From 1990 the patterns of privatisation changed far beyond the
original goals of redimensioning. Former intentions to transfer PEs to collective forms did not
seem make the agenda. Indeed, the process started with the satisfaction of demands of national
capital: land and trade. By the end of 1988 the economic reform Secretariat was producing
documents on new legislation for land ownership and "principles by which the unwieldy state
sector is to be dismantled". 32 Also, there were decisions on the privatisation of all retail trade in
Luanda and all but one wholesale PEs. 33 The measures aimed at cutting theft on state trade
"which accounts for the loss of 40% of all imported goods",34 figures showing the corruption of
the state trade apparatuses and the links, or better the roots, of the informal economy.
The legislation on privatisation emphasizes that applicants should have the "necessary
economic, financial and technical capacity" .35 However, as apparently no credit facilities are
available to 'economically weak' groups, such as collectives of workers and emergent co-
operatives, the entities with 'financial capacity' were PEs, foreign enterprises and the traders of the
informal economy or individuals with links to the financial institutions and related access to credit.
Also, the state did not prioritize the transfer of these undertakings to their own workers, to
31.Cit.' dec., arts 7, 8 and 9.
32.AED, 16.9.1988. See subsection 6.1.2. (land ownership) and subsection 8.2.2. (NCL norm on land). Still, apart from the norms of the 1992 CL on
land, no law was published until the end of 1993.
33.State retail shops should be transferred to: i. public entities or enterprises, ii. co-operatives, and iii. private individuals or firms, whether national or
foreign (Exec.Dec. no 24/89, Internal Trade, 'Regulations on the Transfer of State Commercial Establishments to Other Economic Agents', art. 6/1.
Nationals had preference rights (citexec.dec., art 6/2), after open or restricted tenders but 'Those ... who intend to acquire the property or lease of the
commercial undertakings ... shall demonstrate the necessary economic, financial and tedmical capacity to the fulfilment of the obligations they will
assume." (citexec.dec., arts 8 and 9). See also subsection 6.1.2., on the preference rights of co-operatives.
Minister for Internal Trade (AED, 16.9.1988); see also sections 5.2. and 5.3.
35
. See note 33. Also, art. 5/3 of Law no 1/92, whidi established the requirement that prospective concessionaires of mineral resources should have
"financial and technical capacity".
34.
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marketing, consumers and producers co-operatives, associations of workers or peasants or even
villages or neighbourhoods. As the process of statisation of trade networks, and the undermining
of the importance of the consumer co-operatives, led to strong connections between the trade
bureaucracies and the private sector, including traders of the 'parallel market', both groups were
ready to associate, becoming partners in entrepreneurial ventures. 36
 Conflict on privatisation as
reflected in the official journal shows the tip of the iceberg: in 1989, the Ministry of Trade
cancelled leases of hotels to (not identified) entities because no tender had been made. 37 Further
legislation established strict regulation of tenders.38
Privatisation of small businesses in trade was followed by: i. sale of transports, 39 fishing
equipment and factories of fish meal, 4° withdrawal of PEs from the marks franchise business, 4 ' iii.
sale or free delivery of farms or plantations to settlers who came back to the covntly 2272,der the
restructuring or to TNC5. 42 By 1990, the process of privatisation became more intensive. Five
36.As an example on private enterprises associates within the state apparatuses, in 1983 the minister of Internal Trade enacted a regulation ordering
private franchisees of hotels and restaurants, a measure initiated by Exec.Dec. no 42/81 (Internal Trade) to pay royalties (Exec.Dec. no 8/83, Internal
Trade, art. 1) since they had been exploring the (public) establishments for two years 'free of diarge'. See also sections 5.2. and 5.3.
37.M.o. no 42 89 (Trade).
38. Joint Exec.Dee. no 15/91, regulates open tenders and priorities in privatizations and Joint Exec.Dec. no 16/91, regulates open tenders and
negotiations.
39.Dec. no 10 89. liberalised the transport of passengers and load (art 1) and allowed the grant of concessions of the service of public transport to
licensed private firms (arts 3 and 10). Dec. no 30/89 liberalised coastal maritime transport (to national firms, art. 1) and submitted the activity to
licensing (art. 1) (art. 2); Resol. no 8/89 (CDS) provided for the sale of transport means by the state (art 1/b).
4°. Resol. no 889 (CDS) provided for the sale of non-working ships to "co-operatives and joint, mixed and private enterprises" (alt. 4/b) and also the
sale of factories of fish meal (art 4/e); Dec. no 58/89, regulated the sale of fishing ships, owned by PEs and considered obsolete (art. 1), after
authorisation by the branch minister (art 3), and provided for their sale to private firm (art 4/2).
41.Formerly under (false) control of 'mail-box' foreign trade PEs; Resol. no 10/89 (CDS). approved the "New System of Technical Assistance and
Policy for National Franchisee", of (foreign) marks. Franchisees should rule their activities by principles, e.g.: i. linkage of sale to post-sale assistance,
ii. promotion of competition, iii. barriers to the entry of new marks without the guarantee of technical assistance and related financial resources, iv.
intenration in the system (of a franchisee) of all firms with tradition in the activity, including small and medium sized workshops and promotion of
creation of co-operatives, v. training of personnel at all levels, vi. guarantee of efficient management of stocks and improvement of quality of services
(art. 1/b); the 'national franchisee' coordinated a national network of subordinate firms through technical assistance to the mark, joint planning.
auditing, supervision and coordination of trading activities (alt 1/c); the national franchisee were wider the control of related branch ministry (art
1/g). The regulations provided for a list of authorised marks promoting thus an oligopoly market for equipment under the rationale of achieving some
state control.
42.See subsection 6.1.2.
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sectors were defined as a priority for privatisation: i. "all foreign trade",43 ii. breweries, iii. wood
industries, iv. textiles, and v. hotels. Later other activities were added: construction materials,"
part of transports, mechanical metalwork industry, bakeries, the coffee industry, the food-
processing industry, wood-working, soap and cleansing products and rubber processing and
tyres.45
In 1989 the relative weight of different forms of ownership in the formal economy as a
result of privatisation was:
TABLE 1
Enterprises by activity and ownership (1989)
State Mixed Private OtherM Total
Industry 199 11 323 28 561
Construction 47 4 44 - 144
Agric cattle 144 n.d n.d. 144
Transport 41 1 218 260
Trade n.d. 1 617 8 731
Other 9 2 11
Not defined 29 56 85
Total 544 17 1260 36 1857
Source: G.ARE (Redirnensioning Cabinet), Survey to Entrepreneurship in Angola (quoted in Faria, CS, 25.5.1992). (1) Intervened, Co-operative
Nevertheless, as argued later, although only 544 of total enterprises surveyed were PEs,
they had 80% of total number of employees, 75% of volume of business and 78% of gross value
added, which meant that PEs dominated the economy in terms of employment, market share and
volume of goods and services produced. In 1989 the Government Action Programme changed the
views on privatisation, deciding to focus on measures aiming to make PEs fully profitable so they
would progressively repay their huge debts to the banks.46
43.Under the economic reform the controversial monopoly of foreign trade (see subsection 4.2.2) was defined as "all the operations need an ex ante
govenunent authorisation and all flows (in and out) of commodities are subject to registration, analysis and evaluation in order to confirm if the value
of exchanged commodities corresponds to hard currency paid or receive (PR to the special session of the CM to analyse the Programme of Economic
Recovery, in JA, 19.2.1989). This definition coincides with the regime of licensing of activity and operations in force during late colonialism (see
subsection 1.1.3).
44.See subsection 7.1.1.
45.AED. 21.5.1990 and Marches Tropicaux, 20.4.1990.
46.J. Faria, CS, 25.5.1992, on "invented managers".
314
Reforms
But in the 90s the picture and actual goals of privatisation became clearer. The
government's declared intentions to sell firms to foreign investors and proceedings adopted
favoured the sale to these entities. 47 Potential buyers, backed by IMF and other international
institutions, continued to argue for the devaluation of kwanza as a "condition for the success of
the privatisation programme"," since PEs became cheaper impacting the 'debt equity swap'
scheme proposed by some creditors.
In 1991 a new privatisation package furthered the process of transfer of PEs to former
owners and foreign and national capital. According to available sources, privatisation would be
very fast,49 small PEs would be transferred, by open or limited tenders, to national capital and
large firms (including some de facto monopolies and firms resulting from the 70s horizontal and
vertical integration) to foreign investors. 50 Simultaneously, intervened companies would be
returned, by direct negotiation, to the owners who had abandoned them in 1974-75. In fact by
early 1991 about 100 intervened firms were returned to Portuguese former owners. 51 Again, the
argument used was the lack of managerial skills while the intention to reconstruct the colonial
economy was unveiled:
"The results (of state entrepreneurial activities) were discouraging because the
state had no capacity of management to occupy such a larger entrepreneurial area.
... We are now launching the converse (to the 70s nationalisations) movement."52
47.E.g.. declarations of the minister of Trade and Industry quoted in AED, 21.5.1990. Resol no 6/89 (CM), defined that foreim investment should be
channelled to: "promotion of exports and substitution and reduction of imports especially": i. farming/ranching production and food industry,
mining. iii. fisheries and related industries, iv. light industry, especially the production of mass consumption goods for support to agriculture, v.
industry of materials for construction aiming the construction of houses of social type for the improvement of the population living conditions" (alt 1);
and "especially (these foreign investments) pennitting the recovery of infrastructures and equipment already existing" (art. 2).
48.AED, 21.5.1990.
49.And thus 'we cannot be very ambitious or accurate" (Minister of Finance, A. Jaime, interview to Expresso, 15.6.1991).
50.List of PEs to privatise in 1991 in inrindry, transport, agriculture, fisheries, coffee and construction, as published in Expresso, 15.6.1991. See
subsection 4.2.2. (monopolies).
51.Mincster•	of Finance to Palle°, 12.4.1991. See section 4.1.
52.Minister of Finance, to Paha), 12.4.1991.
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The overall picture concerning entrepreneurship and firms in 1991 was: i. some hundred
thousand small precapitalist farming producers committed to self-subsistence; ii. some ten
thousand individual traders, many without a permanent shop, iii. less than two thousand
entrepreneurs of the formal private sector (some of them foreign) concentrated in trade,
farming/cattle ranching and transports ( the traditional activities of the Angolan bourgeoisie and
agrarian petty-bourgeoisie ruined by colonialism), "with low skills and little management
experience", and, iv. some hundreds of PEs, "many led by people without the appropriate skills
and with the vices acquired during the years of administrative management of the economy, with
no worries of profitability." (Mario Nelson, 1991: 46-7). But encouraged by the 90s
developments, national capital became more demanding, 53 while international aid was channelled
to private undertakings. 54 Also, the state undertook the responsibility to promote the integration
of national and foreign capital using the privatisation programme.55
By 1991 there was as well a certain disenchantment with the overall implementation of
policies and the behaviour of entrepreneurs and public institutions involved in privatisations. An
assessment of the implementation of the economic policy in the late 1980s stated
The little progress made in some areas, especially on the financial and prices
systems and the labour and foreign exchange policies, has as consequences that
being an entrepreneur is still an adventure, given the multiple barriers which is
necessary to overcome daily to maintain the firms operating, even at low levels of
productivity, smashed by the weight of burdensome regulations and an all powerful
bureaucracy which feels with impunity due to the lack of a judiciary machinery
which guarantees the rights of economic agents. The economic distortions at the
level of prices and foreign currencies ... also caused the emergence of many
speculators, a group of entrepreneurs who does not dignify the class and whose
activities damage the whole society. These entrepreneurs have already learned to
53.In a seminar with the PR held in 1990, national capital argued: i. "we shall not fear that Angolan entrepreneurs become ridi since this wealth will
never leave the country unlawfully and will always represent an important segment of the ootmtry's wealth" (a statement countered by news on the
transfer abroad of even aid, Moita, PUblico, 28.6.1991); ii. complete liberalisation of prices (decided in 1991), iii. legislation on ownership and the
promotion of leasing, iv. foreign exchange facilities, including as to international funding and credit lines, to compete with foreign enterprise, v.
deregulation, and, vi. changes in banking (Expresso, 24.11.1990).
54.E.g., South, June, 1990, 87.
55. IIOur tragedy is to have no national entrepreneurial class, we have not a great internal saving and the state is in a situation on which it cannot
auppott financially the emergence of this entrepreneurial class. But we intend to solve the problem in the following way: the so-called small firms will
in principle be reserved to national entreprenews but concealing large firms we are aware that we have neither internal financial capacity nor technical
capacity and know-how. So we are trying to attract foreign investment and, simultaneously, to associate it to national investment, and through this
symbiosis try to give birth to and to consolidate the national business." (Minister of Finance, quoted Expresso, 15.6.1991).
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live in the frontiers of legality and are only capable of developing activities where
they have a fast profit. Moreover, this group of entrepreneurs has today
complicities at the level of the structures of the (state) bureaucracy, a reason which
makes it a promoter of corruption, a phenomenon which may tend to spread and
involve many other entrepreneurs if in the short run measures to suppress the
powers which the bureaucracy holds are not adopted and if there is not an
understanding that these powers go far beyond the regulatory powers the
bureaucracy should have in a market economy. (Mirio Nelson, 1991: 44-6)
8.1.3. The changes in foreign investment legislation
Privatisation and the revocation of state reserved areas of activity and ownership created
opportunities for foreign investment and a more intensive integration in the world economy.
Legislation reflected these changes in LFI188. 56 The law maintained the previous reserved areas
but waived the reserve on insurance and the scope of the reserve on banking restrained to "the
functions of central bank". However new reserved areas were added: ports and airvorts
administration and long distance transport by sea and air. This definition almost coincided with the
absolute reserved areas at LEA. Conversely to LFI/79, where the reserved areas could only be
changed by formal law, LFI188 allocated powers to the CM to authorize foreign investment in
"areas subsidiary or complementary" to these of the reserved areas.57
The role of PEs in the process also changed and they were no more privileged partners of
foreign investors, although allowed to associate in joint ventures. LFI/88 defined mixed
enterprises 58 and compelled in principle for a financial participation of the local PE of at least
51%. The law also waived previous norms on compulsory capital apportations of the Angolan
party in mixed enterprises, which attempted to save hard currency and facilitate capital raising by
the PE. 59 Local private firms are free to associate with foreign partners and the latter are able to
56.Law no 13/88, Law on Foreign Investment, here referred to as LF1188.
57.LF188, arts 4/1 and 4/2, respectively; LEA, art. 17. See subsection 4.1.2 and section 7.1.
58.LFL 88, arts 2 1 d, 7/a, 8/2, 8 4 and 8/3. See sections 7.1. and 7.2.
59.LFL 88. art. 9'2: but "die CM may fix national participation at a lower percentage". See section 7.1.
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invest with no need to associate to a national partner. Also, the form contractual joint ventures
was open to any kind of enterprises and no more restricted to PEs.6°
The law included a new form, the "joint enterprise", a company associating a "non-public"
firm to a foreign investor, with no compulsory ceiling for the financial participation of the national
firm, and relying in contractual regulation "according to the title of authorization". 61 The previous
requirements on technological capacities and export or import-substitution impact for foreign
investment by the creation of a 'private enterprise' were waived. 62 Tinancial applications',
including provisions of capital and commodities "aiming to generate revenues by loans, hiring or
sale and not for direct use" were also considered foreign investment.63
Rights of foreign investors under LFI179 were maintained, except for long-term
contracting, with a broader scope and some qualifications. 64 Although foreign investors became
subject to the common fiscal regime, discretionary incentives, such as tax and customs duties
reductions or exemptions, persisted. LFI188 also provided that investors who reinvest exportable
profits in the country, "develop significant actions of a social character ... for training and
utilisation of national workers and cadres" might be granted "other benefits, incentives or
privileges" •65
60.LF1 88, att. 2 1 f. See section 7.1.
61.Arts 2/1 e, 7/b and 10/3; the authorization of the CM included "the conditions and modes of investment" (art. 28/1/a).
62.LFI188, arts. 7/d and 12/1. See section 7.1.
63.LFI 88, arts 7/e and 13.
64. i. The "rights arising from ownership" (LFI/88, art 14/2) which include ii. the export of nd profits, aft er authorization by the Ministry of Finance
within a 60 days term (art 14/2/a, similar to LH179, art. 12/c, and Exec. Dec. 30/89 [Finance], art 3), iii right to "fair compensation" for
nationalisation, but without the previous requirements of LFI/79 (LFI/88, art. 14/2'c), iv. reexport of invested capital, after authorisation by the
Ministry of Finance (LF1188, art 14/2/b), v. return of investment paid in products, after authorisation, and on the terms of agreements (LF1188, art
14/4); payments are evaluated "in the conditions of the international market", and, vi. access to internal and external loans (LFI/88, arts 143 and 17).
See section 7.1.
65.LH, 88, arts 20/1, 15/1 and 16, respectively, exemptions or reductions are granted by the minister of Finance case by case and he/she may grant
"generic exemptions by regions, sectors of activity or products" (art, 15/2).
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After a provision compelling investors, foreign and/or national, to take the risks of their
activities, and eventually to provide guarantees, 66
 duties related financial accountability were
narrowed but norms on reserve funds were maintained and the obligation to insure workers
added. 67 LFI/88 kept obligations of information but waived norms on the control of enterprises by
planning. 68
 The law established that foreign investors should employ Angolan labour and resort to
foreign personnel was conditioned. 69 LFI188 provided for the "necessary training and social
conditions amounting to these of foreign workers" for Angolan labour and, innovating, the
"progressive filling of managerial, technical and administrative posts by Angolan labour", but did
not refer to equal pay. Also, the compulsory allocation of profits to the social fund was waived,
affecting negatively workers access to social benefits from the firm." Violation of the law or
contractual obligations might mean the loss of tax or other incentives, while in LFI/79 the CM
could revoke the authorization for the investment.71
LFI/88 maintained a priori controls, but established the criteria to assess investment
proposals: i. increase and diversification of exports, ii. import-substitution, iii. production of raw-
materials for industry or "goods or services necessary to the national economy", iv. use of local
goods and services, v. "induced benefits", "foreign exchange balance" and location of
investment. 72 The law also eased the bureaucracy of the process, a demand of foreign investors.
66.Cit. law. arts 19,27 1 and 272.
67.Cit.' law, arts 18/i (similar to LF1179, art 18/d), 18/h, 18/a and 18/1.
68. To submit to audits (inspections) from the Ministry of Finance (art. 39) and "die control of Angolan authorities ... supply all the demanded
informations (art. 18 a, in fine); foreign investors also must "put at the disposal of the company or association the technology needed to the fidfilment
of its object" (art. 18/c), supply statistical information (art 18/g); to get the approval of investment projects foreign firms must supply the information
demanded for at arts 23 and 25/2 (on the investment proposal). See sectica 7.1.
69.Forel. gn personnel should be "skilled in qualifications not existirig in the country (and) according to legislation in force" (LFI188, arts 33, Angolan
personnel and 34/1, foreign personnel). See Chapter 4, Table 2, and sections 7.1. and 7.2.
70.LFI 88, arts 33 and 34 1. See sections 7.1. and 7.2., 5.2. and subsection 3.4.4.
71.LF188, arts 40 and 41. See section 7.1.
72.LFI 88, art. 24.
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The power to authorise the investment was vested in the CM, 73 but the Cabinet of Foreign
Investment (CFI), integrated in the Ministry of Planning, controlled the whole process. CFI had
powers to propose the rejection of investment proposals which, if ratified by the Minister of
Planning, would not go to the CM for analysis. 74 This power gave CFI a high degree of discretion
on the whole foreign investment process, which rose substantial conflict with the investors,
national or foreign, and the branch ministries. The Ministry of Finance had supervisory powers75
and the central bank assessed a priori the whole financial package of the investment, especially its
impact in the balance of payments. The terms for decision-making on foreign investment were
shortened, but not respected.76
The new legislation lifted barriers to foreign investment and meant smatter transaction
costs (e.g., the costs of negotiating with different bureaucracies and these related to risks linked
to dispersed decision-making in a framework of a priori controls). It also widened the range of
local partners available allowing foreign investors an eventual larger room for manoeuvre,
including in the 'social engineering' of a local non-state comprador bourgeoisie.
Portuguese firms and national capital appear as main beneficiaries of late 80s legislation.
The former had the (persistent) problems of shortage of sufficient capital facilitated by the
privatisation schemes with transfer of industries to former owners. 77 Also, their past function of
middlemen between northern capital and Angola led to related investment in Portugal. 78 This
function would also allow Portugal to face the creation of the single market, where it has
73.LFI/88, art. 28 1, the CM approves investments and must decide on: i. conditions and forms of investment (al. a), ii. date of beginning of execution
(al. b), and, iii. duration of investment (al. c). See section 7.1.
74.LFI/88, arts 26 a and 26/b.
75.Art 17 maintained the a priori control powers of the Ministry of Finance and BNA bank concerning resort to external loans. See section 7.3.
76.LFI 88, arts 25/1 and 29; 135 days were saved probably by the reduction of two intervening entities. Still, in June 1991 only 10 projects were
approved (Patio:), 20.6.1991).
77.See also PUblico, 24.4.1991, on demands of nationalised banks. See chapters 1 and 7.
78. E.g,: i. Asea Brown Boveri (PUblico, 22.3.1991), ii. Alcatel (Sibado, 8.10.1988), iii. Israel (Expresso, 11.5.1991); and generally, Belgian
chairperson of International Confederation of Commerce declared that Portuguese tradings were a bridge for the marketing of European products in
the ex-colonies (0 Anna, 17.2.1989).
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difficulties to compete, while preparing the restructuring of its industry with the sale of obsolete
equipment to the neocolonies and the profits from trading ventures in Africa. 79 From the 90s the
demands of Portuguese capital increased proportionally to successes in the restoration of colonial
links and the developments of the peace process: from 'debt equity swap' at very low exchange
rates80
 to guarantees from the government of imports of all kinds of raw materials formerly denied
to PEs.81
Another development in the area of international relations was the progressive
involvement of South Africa. From the late 80s, and notwithstanding the fact that apartheid
changes did not mean majority rule, Angola established trade relations with RSA, 82 furthered by
penetration of RSA capital through the privatisation scheme and indirect participations of firms
operating in Angola. 83 Finally, credit lines to finance imports were negotiaked 1.99V14 'The.
strengthened economic relations between Angola and RSA raise the problem of the impact of the
79 . Portuguese firms come to Angola: either to "sell a little of everything" and/or equipment, or to work in construction and "some really want to
invest", also 'There are many opportunities to explore especially on industrial equipment obsolete in Portugal but not in Africa and which may be used
(there) in good conditions" (official source, quoted in Pilblico, 24.7.1991). An important role in the design and implementation of these relations was,
it seems, played by the Portuguese state group IPE, adviser of functional bureaucracies on the restructuring and simultaneously involved in a set of
joint ventures with Angolan and foreign firms operating in the country (e.g, Loy, quoted at JA, 12.3.1988 and PUblico, 19.4.1991).
8°. When demanding the debt equity swap for Angola and Mozambique debts to Portugal, Portuguese entrepreneurs wanted to follow 'secondary
market rates: between 6 to 10 cents per one USD for the Mozambique debt and 40 cents per one USD for the Angolan debt; the Portuguese state
would sell its credits to risk capital companies which would proceed to debt equity swap in the ex-colonies; the debtor ocamtries could participate in
risk capital joint-ventures (PUblico, 15.5.1991).
81.Pu' blico, 24.1.1991.
82.Goncalves, PUblico, 6.7.1991, who refers to sales of oil and to South Africans already implementing projects in Huambo in mid-I 991 (PUblico,
25.5.1991); the reinforcement of ties with RSA capital and related settlers sectors is reflected also in the return to the Angola of settlers who migrated
to RSA in 1975 in support to apartheid, some to produce mass consumption goods for the 'region' (Zambia, Zaire and Namibia) with advantages such
as "a discourse merging the economies of Southern Africa" (Ptiblico, 24.7.1991). Links with the Anglo-American group in the marketing and
exploration of diamonds were restored. De Beers (and CSO) came bath to Angola (see subsection 7.2.2., note 104) having entered into an agreement
with &Klima, for an immediate investment of USD 125 Mn for exploitation and exploration of kimberlites; CSO would market 100% of the Cuango
river production at a quota of USD 300 Mn/year, the contract allocating exploration risks to De Beers and a joint-venture with Endiama would be set
up if kimberlites were found. De Beers would also build a centre for the selection of diamonds in Luanda under a leasing contract_ it seems that CSO
was trying to get the monopoly of purchase of future mines in the medium run (Evresso, 27.4.1991 and PUblico, 22.11.1990).
83.For example, the Angolan monopolist of tyres, a strategic industry even for the army, was bought by a Portuguese group linked to South African
interests (Amorim group, Expresso, 18.2.1989, on the Angolan subsidiary, and 23.3.1991, on RSA subsidiary). Also, adviser of the Ministry of
Planning for the restructuring Portuguese state holding IPE associated in the 90s to Anglo-American in a joint-venture (Pablico, 11.3.1991).
84.Expresso, 27.4.1991. and Pablico. 6.7.1991.
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restructuring in Southern Africa and the roles allocated to South-African capital and to the
Frontline states in the region.85
It is, however, hazardous to conclude that the changes in the legal regime of foreign
investment led to substantial increase on direct investment. Available information points to an
increase on the sale of services and goods and signals an attitude of expectation of foreign
investors concerning the sale of PEs, the development of the political process and the involvement
of financial institutions in a structural adjustment programme. 86 Conversely, in 1990 Angola had
for the first time in its history "foreign negative investment", with an outflow of capital greater
than the inflow, due to the fact that the amortization of foreign investment in this year was
superior to the gross formation of capital with resort to foreign investment (Mario Nelson, 1991:
56). From the domestic standpoint, the changes of legislation led to the creation of strong ties
between local capital (state and private) and foreign partners, notwithstanding the fact that many
joint projects set up after the peace agreements did not last with the flight of foreign capital as the
post-elections war worsened. War partially stopped a process which was developing and on which
economists had warned: "a comprador capitalism, that is, a (national) entrepreneurial class living
in the orbit of foreign firms" (Mario Nelson, 1991: 52), including by fronting for foreign firms in
their relations with the public administration, in a phenomenon which mirrors the Nigerian
indigenization policies and its actual implementation (e.g., Biersteker, 1987).
8.1.4. PEs demands for autonomy and the 1988 law
As the years passed, managers, already unable to make decisions on a wide range of
subjects, saw the enterprises become paralysed due to problems of bureaucratic decision-making
on the supply of inputs to PEs, which became more acute as the balance of payments conditions
85. If De Klerk declarations are taken seriously, an economic community with Frontline states as peripheries could be in the agenda: message to
Savimbi for the 1991 UNITA Congress raised the idea of an economic community in Southern Africa (Pirblico, 2.3.1991).
86.For example, a Portuguese investor argued: "The basic issue in Angola is growth, a problem linked to the solution of the political situation and the
establishment of a de facto peace.... As the development of the economy means the participation of entrepreneurs, it is neesary that the government
creates conditions at the political and economic level to attract investmait ... Economic stability (in Angola) only will be obtained through agreements
of structural adjustment with IMF and WB ... (but these agreements) are not sufficient for the promotion of growth, and thus the government has to
create conditions for the take-off of the financial sector, mainly with the creation of banks and insurance companies." (0 Jornal, 24.5.1991).
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worsened in the 80s. 87 When contrasting the legal framework of PEs with that of mixed ventures,
dependence, for example concerning access to the supply of inputs the country does not produce
or the marketing of production in world markets, pointed to a direction, a trend, towards the
association of PEs to foreign firms to overcome the transaction costs arising from the planning
system and to minimize shortages (Coelho, 1984). Sonangol is an example of this kind of
association and the image of success of a PE in Angola. Interpretations of the reasons of this
success were diversified, but a manager of an industrial PE summarized the bulk of the problem:
"if we had access to the resources allocated to Sonangol, we would be very good as well",
something which is not just the problem of Angolan PEs, but that of Third World societies and
the poor in general.
The high degree of paternalism of the system implemented in Angola conditioned the
behaviour of PEs managers and led to their demands of autonomy. How to get access to
resources, especially, inputs in a situation of widespread shortages, indebtedness and bureaucratic
authoritarianism," led to belief in two solutions: i. changes in the institutional framework which
had made PEs just production units of competing managing ministries, and/or, ii. the association
to foreign firms which, having a higher bargaining power towards some state bureaucracies and
financed by parent states or institutions, could provide the solution for many problems of inputs
supply.
Both solutions were actually followed. Concerning changes in the institutional framework,
and besides the general common regime instituted by LEA, the 1988 legislation especially
LPE/88: i. internalised part of functional and branch controls while providing for a more extended
external autonomy of PEs, ii. allocated PEs some degree of contractual freedom, including
powers to expand and/or reorganise in groups, a substantial change, while LEA provided for
87.See Chapter 4, espec. Table 2 and also 5.2.
88.The instructions system caused a 'military' mentality to develop: simultaneously "the most important virtue of a subordinate is obedience ... (and)
the two kinds of attitudes are 'compatible within ones personality: he will command 'downwards and obey 'upwards"'; this "process starts earlier with
selection" (Kornai, op.cit., 74).
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more diversified forms of PEs, 89 iii. reinforced workers participation in top decision-making while
providing for their participation in profits, 90 iv. apparently rationalised the planning system
reducing the number of indicators and institutionalising a shift from hierarchy to the use of
economic leverages,91 v. decentralised some areas of decision-making in local government, by
allocating to the provincial commissioners previous powers of the branch ministry over medium
and small-sized PEs, and, vi. responded to managers demands on their status regulating the
profession of 'public manager'.92
LPE/88 covered totally-owned PEs while LEA provided for the organisation of PEs under
the form of companies, the so-called 'hidden public sector'. LEA adopted a more substantial
concept of PE by considering mixed firms as forms of 'state entrepreneurial activity', either by
association to 'national capital' or to foreign investors. LEA seemed to point the restructuring of
the public sector towards an Italian model, by establishing that PEs could "create enterprises,
under the forms provided for in commercial law",93 but legislation to implement this approach was
not published until the end of the period studied. Also, 1989 legislation on the restructuring
89.LPE 88, art. 12; association of enterprises had limits arising from the founders powers, planning and also from the need to resort to Budget and
banks funding, and so to the application of related control mechanisms.
90.LPE 88, art. 24, on allocation of profits: i. 1st priority of net profits: reserves, investment fund and social fund, ii. 2nd priority: delivery to the state
as owner, and distribution among workers as participation in profits; the minister of Finance decided on the allocation of profits to the 2nd priority (art.
243), after proposal by the board of directors; Dec. no 45/89 (see note 99) had a different approach for the PEs of large dimension; indeed profits were
allocated to: i. payment of taxes (regulated by Dec. no 5/89, compelling PEs to pay taxes according to the common regime, art 1), ii. reserve fund of at
least 10%, iii. investment fund, iv. social fund, v. "distribution of individual incentives to workers, including members of management boards, as
participation in profits p to ... a % fixed according to future regulations", and, vi delivery of profits to the state "as owner of the enterprise" (cit. dec.,
art. 34).
	 See Chapter 4, Table 2.
91. Law no 12/88, here referred to as PL/88 established indicative planning and defined the National Plan, as "a set of enactments and directives
orienting the action of the government in the implementation of the economic and social policy and objectives established for a given period." (art.
3/1). The Plan should contain: i. the main goals and proportions of economic and social development, U. the economic policy and means to implement
it, iii. measures of correction of regional imbalances, iv. measures aiming the training of workers, and, v. "the main socio-economic targets" (art 4/1);
'instruments of economic regulation' they are listed as: i. norms for prices and wages fixing ii the structure and level of taxation, ui. the policy of
incentives, iv. the interest rates and the credit policy, iv. the exchange rates and the foreign exchange policy, vi. the policy of formation of financial
funds, the aiteria of amortization of fixed actives (art 4/5). The periods of planning were divided into pluriannual (2 to 5 years), annual and long-nm
programmes for specific sectors or branches (e.g., non-renewable sources of energy), (arts. 6-8). The Ministry of Planning had the power to establish
indicators (art 11/2/c), espec. related to investment, which might also need the approval of Ministry and even the CM (art. 23/2). The firms annual
plan did not need the approval by Ministry of Planning an improvement (art 24). Non state enterprises were not under obligations of planning unless
they were in a "dominant position in a branch, sector or region" (art 20/2/a) and/or involved in investment "mobilising significant resources and whose
implementation has significant social and economic impact" (art 20/2/b). See Chapter 4, Table 2.
92.Dec. no 16'89, approving the Statute of the Public Manager, SPM.
93.LEA, arts 20/b, 20 c and 20/2, respectively.
324
Reforms
allocated the CM powers to create this form of PEs. 94 The form adopted for parastatals had
significant consequences: for example, workers participation in the board of directors or in profits
does not apply to companies.
Concerning parastatals to which by LPE/88 applies, the area of the founders powers does
not differ substantially from LPE/77, although the language changed. 95 The set of norms on
founders powers conflicted with the rules on "free association", which allocated PEs powers to
"associate by its initiative, to other entities", including to form and/or integrate groups. 96 LPE/88
included an obligation of the state to produce legislation on 'groupings', while establishing that
PEs in future 'groups' kept their corporate personality and might or not be subject to the
"economic or financial coordination and direction of one of the group's enterprises, according to
the type of association." 97 An innovation is the set of norms aiming to prevent previous patterns
of behaviour, such as hasty creation of PEs with no conditions (for example, the guarantee of
supply of raw-materials), or their late entry to projects involving them."
Internalisation of functional and branch controls included a priori and a posteriori controls.
LPE/88 established, for PEs of large dimension, a new organ, the board of directors, 99 composed
representatives of ministries of the branch and Finance, the PE and workers. 100 Medium and
94.See subsection 8.1.2.
95.PEs were created by the CM, but it might delegate this power for medium and small-sized new PEs. The initiative to propose the creation of a new
PE was widened to members of the CM and provincial conunissioners (art. 33). The approval of articles of association remained essentially the same
(35 3 and 35 2). Founders also kept the power to decide on dissolution and liquidation, mergers and divisions (arts 67/1, 67/3, 68 3 and 69/4). See
subsection 4.2.2. (LPE/77).
96.LPE '88, art. 12. By 1989 some PEs were already using these powers (e.g., JA, 7.4.1988).
97.LPE/88, art 38/1 and 38/2. The law does refer 'groups' and 'groupings' as interchangeable.
98.Cit. law, acts 39 and 40.
99. LPE'88, art. 43/ 1/a. The board of directors approved plans, budgets and investments, ratified prices or submitted proposals to competent
authorities, approved the internal regulations of the PE and supervised its activities, appointed the deputy directors and proposed the appointment or
dismissal of the general director (arts 44,46 and 48/2). The organisation of PEs of large dimension is ruled by 'standard articles of incorporation',
approved by Dec. no 45/89.
190. The board of directors may have 3 or 5 members (art. 45). The five members board has: i. a chairman appointed by the CM or the branch
minister, ii. a member appointed by the brands minister if the chaimum has beat appointed by the CM, iii. a member appointed by the minister of
Finance, iv. a member "elected by workers ... according to criteria which will be defined", and, v. the general director, appointed by the branch minister
under proposal of the board (LPE/88, arts 45/2,45/3 and 4811).
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small-sized PEs basically kept the organisation established in LPE/77, 101 except for a new organ,
the audits counci1. 102 The latter internalised a posteriori control as a compulsory organ for all
types of PEs. 103 The members of audits councils had duties of information to the ministers of
Finance or branch, on "anomalies or deviations in the enterprise's activity". 104
The internalisation of a priori and a posteriori controls under LPE/88 eased the
relationship between PEs and state bureaucracies, now members of the PE. Still, the powers of
the branch ministry under LPE/88 may counter this trend. 105
 But the ironic feature of the new
regime of PEs is that as PEs got a more flexible organisation and relations with state
bureaucracies the majority of them were privatised, with the 1988 legislation applying only to a
restricted range of surviving parastata1s. Also, many former managers of PEs who had been
arguing for autonomy left the public sector to set up their own firms and benefit, in some cases,
from privatisations. 106 Still, while large PEs (Sonangol Endiama, former BPA, a state merchant
bank) engaged themselves in diversification, the creation of groups, including joint subsidiaries
with foreign firms, the past dependence of PEs in state bureaucracies remained due to the
coincidence of two types of factors: the endurance of (now informal) interference from the branch
ministries in the management of PEs and the maintenance of a set of regulations calling for a
priori controls. The latter, which have particular emphasis in the areas of foreign exchange and
113I . LPE 88, art. 43/2, while art. 43/3 stated that medium-sized PEs might have "all or some of the organs referred to at number 1" (these of large
pEs). The PEs executive organs are: i. a director appointed by the branch minister or the provincial commissioner (arts 47/2/a and 48/3), ii. deputy
directors (appointed by the branch minister or the provincial commissioner, under proposal of the director, arts 47/2/b and 48/4), iii. the council of
direction (art 52), and, iv. the audits council.
102.Composed of representatives of the ministries of the branch and Finance appointed by the ministers (LPE/88, arts 54/1/a and 54/1/b).
103.Cit. law, art_ 43/1/d (large PEs) and art. 4312/c (medium and small-sized PEs). The audits council supervised "the compliance to the norms ruling
the activity", controlled accounting aiteria used in the PE, advised on the annual report and accounts, and, when asked, on other matters (arts 53 a,
53 c, 53b and 53 d, respectively).
104.Art 56.
105.Summarising, the brand' ministry (or the provincial commissariat in decentralised PEs): i. defined the policies of development of the branch, ii.
regulated the exercise of the activity of the branch, iii. approved the plurimmual plans and budgets, iv. analysed performance and approved accounts
and reports, v. appointed directors, and, vi. demanded information (LPE/88, art 30/1); the ministries of the branch and Finance supervised 'The
implementation of the Plan directives and the policies for the branch" (art 29/3), although the PE "is not subject to and in hierarchical subordination to
the government organs which exercise these (control) powers" (art 29/4). The CM might also intervene in some case by approving the PE pluriannual
plans, budgets and investment programmes (art. 30/2).
106.It was argued, and probably right, that the potential successful entrepreneurs in the new economy could primarily be the cadres of PEs and
entrepreneurs of the formal private sector - no one else seems to be prepared to manage firms and projects (Mario Nelson, 1991: 53).
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imports licensing, linked to the economic policy pursued and dealt with below persisted as a web
of authorizations which did not favour competitiveness of PEs. Moreover, the behaviour of
bureaucracies with powers to grant authorizations was reproduced downwards in the relations of
PEs with their subsidiaries approached frequently more as divisions of the parent PE than as
autonomous companies with legal personality.
81.5. The restructuring and new roles for state bureaucracies
The restructuring led state bureaucracies to specialise in new functions, related to
licensing, privatisation, channelling state resources to competing beneficiaries, awarding state
contracts and dealing with international relations.
In the legislation of the late 80s, competition among bureaucracies, problems arising from
difficulties of information flows and related coordinated decision-making, were solved by
concentration of powers in one of the functional bureaucracies and partial loss of branch's
powers. 107
 The trend of the late 80s was also a change in the roles of functional bureaucracies
which did not mean a loss of powers. The branches restructuring and loss of powers made them
more modest, and during the early 90s they turned to participation in the sale of the state and to
international economic relations. 108 Simultaneously, as the scope of licensing widened to cover
areas not previously regulated, the state bureaucracies got new a priori control powers, being able
to control the shaping of the branches structure by using their licensing powers.
The latter are especially important in the areas of imports (ministry of Trade) and foreign
exchange (central bank), which from colonialism have been under licensing. The maintenance of
licensing in these two areas from the mid-60s illustrates that a given degree of regulation is
107.Al a given stage the main winner was the Ministry of Planning, which got the bulk of the powers. It dealt with privatisation through the
Redimensioning Cabind (GARE) (Dec. no 36/89, art 1), which, together with the ministries of the branch and Finance, and hi some cases provincial
organs, prepared and/or made the decisions on the future of PFs (Dec. no 32/89, arts 9/b, 11/2, 12/1, 11/2, 12/1, 12/2 and 16/2). Later the Ministry of
Finance demanded the control of GARE and there were proposals to merge the ministries of Finance and Planning to prevent their competition
(minister of Finance, quoted in Expresso, 15.6.1991). The Ministry of Planning also got powers in intonational relations: i. the control and
management of ACP/EEC projects (PR Dec. no 29/86, art 4), as well as WB programmes, and, ii. the Cabinet of Foreign Investment (CFI).
108.As the organic Law of ministries show, concerning their statutory functions. See section 4.2.
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necessary in an underdeveloped country which cannot afford complete liberalization of its imports
and expenditures of hard currency. But at the same time, demonstrates that the characteristics of
the whole legal system (including its enforcement apparatuses) and of the bureaucracies which
deal with the application of the regulations also matter. Thus, as part of former civil servants left
the public administration to run their own businesses or moved into companies, the state
bureaucracies became, as prices soared and living conditions worsened, one of the most corrupt
segments of the Angolan society, in a process of Zairification which is being reinforced.109
Another phenomenon related to the state bureaucracies in the late 80s-early 90s is the
progressive integration of officials from different international organizations within the state.
Consultants from, say the IMF or WB, set up their offices within the public administration, and
play an important role on the drafting of policies or even in demands for &ants in existkkg
policies and legislation and in the effectiveness of the conditionality of aid or access to
international lending.
The present developments in Angolan economic policies, and underlying strategies of
development, show the hazards of the extension of the world dominant mode of production to the
peripheries. Firstly, the emergence of a national skilled bourgeoisie capable of performing the
functions it performs in the centre, took centuries of apprenticeship and political struggles under
successive restructurings of the concerned societies. To achieve the current integration of Angola
in the world system, there being no national capacity, the resort had to be made to foreign firms
and states. In this social context, state bureaucracies are a necessary link for the mediation of
processes between the different levels (of articulation) of the system: nobody can by-pass them
(neither governments, nor foreign interests, nor even the emergent national bourgeoisie which up
to now has been a client of the state), except if the strategies of development were substantially
different. After expanding under statist socialism, they are to keep the bulk of their functions
109 . See. e.g. Askin and Collins, 1993, on 'cleptocracy' in Zaire. In the 90s, a relative freedom of press led to many comments on 'nepotism' and
bribery within the date
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under dependent capitalism, whatever the governments (and the political system) in the next
decades.
8.1.6. Other aspects of the restructuring
Successive restructuring programmes - SEF, Government Action Programme, Programme
of Economic Recovery and the Programme of Economic Stabilization - did not attain their goals,
notwithstanding the deep changes in economic policy, which meant even a change in the system.
The main factor of the failures of development projects and restructuring programmes from
independence - of 'socialist' and 'capitalist' tones - remains war, shortly stopped during the 18
months which preceded elections. But all the programmes adopted were not implemented for
reasons which go beyond the war factor. Firstly underdevelopment and secondly the political
reasons described in this work and which persisted. Briefly, after the change in the original
economic reform, there was no longer a strategy of development, or better, policies turned into
structural problems. Economic policy became a list of policy measures aiming in the short/medium
run at responding to the competing demands of national interest groups, international
organizations, foreign investors, etc.
The measures of austerity, demanded by international organizations, creditors and foreign
investors, reinforced in late 1990 with the change of currency and the creation of the ill-fated 'new
kwanza,' 110 which followed Brazilian patterns and caused serious problems to the working
class. 111
 The exchange was followed by a rise in some taxes and prices, 112 and a 100%
110. The change of currency meant the retention by the state of 95% of money in circulation: i. in cash the date retained 95% transfonned into state
bends, and the holder could keep 5%, it. in current deposit accounts, 7/8ths were transformed into term accounts for 180 days, renewable, and 18th
was kept in the current account (Pali, 24.9.1990); the outcomes were: "by the end it did not solve anything. There was an immediate decrease in
prices but shortly later, when the payment of wages/salaries was reestablished, everything came back to the former situation, since the shortage of
essential goods remained" (Goncalves, Ptiblico, 24.7.1991).
I ll. As an MP has put it during the discussion of the Government Prograimne, "in other peoples this (austerity package) would cause revolts" (quoted
pUblico, 24.9.1990).
112 .
 pUblico, 24.9.1990, on the Government Action Programme.
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devaluation of kwanza, which did not please foreign investors and IMF. 1 13 The devaluation
caused an immediate increase in prices, precisely the contrary of the government goals.114
The problems the population had to face with the restructuring were already serious
before the monetarist measures. Indeed, from 1988 the state did not fund wages in many
enterprises and employees went unpaid for 12 to 16 months. The problem of belated payments of
wages originated in cuts in public expenditure under the IMF-oriented policies. 115 Sackings are
not transparent but they generated a high rate of unemployment, with related problems of poverty
and criminality: in 1993, only 40% of the workers in the formal economy in 1990 had a job.116
Workers resorted to strikes as soon as they became tolerated. 117 Also, shortages in the supply of
inputs for PEs continued, 118 eventually to ruin PEs and legitimate their privatisation. 119 The
austerity measures motivated UNTA protest to the PR against the
"slow and distorted way how the theoretical lines of SEF were implemented by the
state apparatuses" causing "a significant imbalance in the relation between
production, wages and prices, worsening the workers living standards" and
"belated wages payments, arbitrary, indiscriminate and massive sackings,
mismanagement of enterprises and bias and nepotism favouring small
businesses.H120
113.Mlle°, 24.9.1990; Expresso, 23.3.1991 and minister of Finance to 0 Jomal, 12.4.1991. According to an Angolan economist, "the expenditure
of the state is conditioned by the demands of IMF and WB and those of the potential investors, who consider the 100% devaluation of lcwanza as a
minor measure" (quoted in ibid.); for a Portuguese manager, "investment only will be worthwhile when the Icwanza devalues 500%" (quoted in ibid.).
114. "To reduce the purchasing power (of the population, already very low, not in need of monetarist measures to put it at a level lower than it is;
instead, it needs measures to increase it) in order to prioritize investment, to brake inflation and reduce the money in circulation in order to establish a
balance between the variance of the monetary mass and the variance of the nominal internal product." (Expresso, 23.3.1991).
115.Espresso, 15.6.1990, quoting JA.
116. Declarations of the minister of Employment to RNA, 4.12.1993.
117.Expresso, 29.9.1990 and Ditirio de Noticias, 17.1.1991. See also section 8.2.
118, In 1990 many industrial firms had to stop due the small amounts of USD for imports; from 1985 industry got every year the same amount of
foreign exchange (USD 187 notwithstanding increases in prices in international markets, and in 1990 it was reduced to USD 67 Mn; shortages
were reinforced by hick of electricity and water due to UNTTA sabotages (minister of Trade and Industry, Expresso, 16.6. /990). See subsection
4.3.1.
119. For example, in Celulose do Alto Catumbela, workers were not paid for about 2 years and the factory was almost paralysed; the government
opened and international tender for funding (Expresso, 16.6.1990) while Portuguese group Antonin was interested in 'recovering the paper industry
at Alto Catumbela (Expresso, 18.2.1989).
120•
 Expresso, 15.6.1990, quoting JA.
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Still, the shift from a socialist to a capitalist oriented strategy, and the suffering of
Angolans under austerity measures, did not conquer the goodwill of financial institutions for
access to international finding. Creditors pressed for the adoption of a structural adjustment
programme with the government negotiating with IMF a transitional adjustment prograrnme.121
Nunes described the state of the Angolan economy in 1990 which he divided in the
'enclave economy' (the oil and diamonds sectors) and the 'other economy'. Table 2 shows the
relative weight of both sectors in the GDP and the distortions due to underdevelopment. It shows
as well that while the foreign enclave, especially the oil industry almost doubled its part of GDP,
the other economy, notwithstanding successive reform measures towards an increased role of the
market moved backwards for about 20% in the volume of wealth generated. As a result, there
was a dramatic increase in the imports of consumption goods, which, allied to increases in imports
of transports, reflected in a decrease of imports of capital goods and intermediate materials
"indispensable to the recovery of production". The balance of payments constantly deteriorated,
by the weight of imports of services, while the balance of trade had superavits. Also, the capital
inflow, as stated above, decreased and the balance of payments deficits were faced with resort to
medium and long term loans. The picture worsened with the high Budget deficits (loans to the
public sector were about 90% of total loans), where expenditure with defence was more than 50%
the total public expenditure (Nunes, 1991: 18-19).
TABLE 2
Evolution of GDP by % of the 2 economies
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Enclave econ.
Other economy
42.8
57.2
48.8
51.2
56.2
43.8
62.0
36.0
62.7
37.3
Source: Ministry of Planning, quoted at Nunes, 1991:18.
121. minister of Finance. Expresso, 15.6.1991.
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By 1992, after the privatisation of many PEs, liberalization of prices, the successive
devaluations of NICz, attempts to Iremonetarize' wages, and the introduction of foreign exchange
over-rates: i. the budget deficit persisted (at about 18-19% of GDP), ii. the deficit of the balance
of payments also persisted (although the balance of trade continued with superavits) and the
country was having problems in debt servicing, iii. the 'official' inflation rate reached 175.72% in
Luanda in 1991,122 iv. there were 200,000 former members of the army demobilized with no
prospects of employment, receiving a temporary allowance from the state, 123 and, v. the informal
economy continued to prosper and resisted to integrate in the formal economy. Public expenditure
was drastically reduced and about 70,000 civil servants sacked, but the economy had no capacity
to absorb the new unemployment. 124 Still, there were no improvements in the supply of consumer
goods and prices soared. The magic fonnuta of the IMF package, after four years of
implementation, did not work. So did not the whole legislative package of the economic reform
which, although establishing a reallocation of property rights, did not mean significant growth and
improvement of living standards.
8.2. The political reforms
Discontent generated by the economic crisis and the low level of democracy, the very
dynamics of the economic reform and international pressure led to political reforms which
culminated with the 1992 new constitutional law (NCL). Although from 1990 MPLA had began
slight changes in the system, the present political system in the country arouse basically from the
pressure of international financial institutions for 'good governance' and the initiatives of UN and
the states (USA, Russia and Portugal, the so-called troika) involved in the peace negotiations.
122.The 'official rate of inflation was 1,840% in 1993 and estimates for 1994 predict a 260% rate (Financial Times, 9.3.1994).
123.comercio Extern°, 21(6), 1992, 18 ff.
124.Expresso, 1.6.1991; cuts in military expenditure in 1991 were about 50% (minister of Finance to 0 kmal, 12.4.1991).
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Indeed, the changes, except for the case of the autonomous protest in the mid-70s
repressed and almost destroyed since then, were neither the result of structured responses of
Angolan social groups to the single-party rule,125 nor the outcomes of strictly national economic
and social changes which made this new political order necessary. Firstly, the struggle which
opposed MPLA and UNITA after independence was not, contrary to reciprocal claims, a struggle
for democracy, albeit partially for different models of organising society, but essentially a struggle
for independence, that is, a 'late' and veiled colonial war opposing the first and the second
peripheries, the latter working in practice as a proxy of the 'new' colonial power, neighbour RSA
occupying Namibia. Secondly, the needs of social groups which emerged from the informal
economy and the foreign enclave to break the barriers imposed by the instituted planning system
and bureaucratic dominance did not appear as claims for democracy but as struggles against part
of state bureaucracies, since these groups can (and it seems need to) expand in an authoritarian
capitalist-oriented regime. 126 Moreover, due to insufficient accumulation, these groups will need
to control the state allocative apparatuses until they are capable of autonomous expansion.
These factors condition the outcomes of the 90s political reforms. Indeed, while law
advanced a given framework, as it was a constant in the post-colonial society, the way to the
building of a democratic society in Angola had just began, as the post-elections war demonstrates.
The 90s changes reflect the lifting of barriers to improvements in democracy but cannot be taken
as 'democracy'. Indeed, "the sum of two contempts for democracy does not exactly make a
democracy.
125.See, e.g., section 3.4.
126.See, e.g., Frank, 1991; 28-9.
127.J. Pinto de Andrade. president of ACA, PAblico, 1.6-1991.
11127
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8.2.1. Anticipating political change
From 1990 MPLA anticipated the demands of foreign powers and jeopardised UNITA
intentions for a 'two-single party' system, probably a single party if it won the elections, through a
progressive liberalisation. 12 8
The new period of civil liberties initiated in 1990, when the tight control of the population
began to relax in early 1990 through non-responsiveness of the state to urban initiatives such as
ACA. The formal change arose from CC Plenaries during 1990. In June it approved the multiparty
system and the separation of the state from the party. 129 In November, MPLA adopted
'democratic socialism' and a "mixed economy", renounced to 'Marxism-Leninism' and changed
from a workers party to a "masses party". 1 3 0
The changes were furthered in the 1990 III Congress, which ratified: i. 'democratic
socialism' as the strategic objective of MPLA, ii. the creation of a multiparty system in order "to
set up a democratic state, with rule of law, justice and social progress", and iii. economic and
social development "based on methods combining planning with the utilisation of mechanisms
stimulating and regulating the market". The Congress also approved changes in the constitution
and the need to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on
Human and Peoples Rights.131
128. According to Portuguese sources involved in the peace negotiations, the Angolan govemrnent "anticipated and initiated the reforms process
LN1TA was arguing for. If they (UNITA) radicalise their positions (eventually in a joint manoeuvre with Pretoria) they will finish surrounded"
(Expresso, 10.11.1990); UNITA claimed for Inpartidarism . as a result of the evolution of a government of national unity with NIPLA, and later,
presented itself as claiming for multipartidarism (Pnblico, 7.2.1991). See section 6.3.
129.Expresso, 7.7.1990.
130 , press conference quoted in Pnblico. 17.11.1990.
131 . General Resolution of the III Congress (quoted in Palucema, Expresso, 22.12.1990); on the new programme see also Dos Santos quoted in
Ptiblico, 5.12.1990). The II Extraordinary Congress in April 1991 reinforced these choices in the new MPLA Programme (quoted in Kibbe:),
28.4.1991); the Congress also decided: i. to continue to enlarge the social base of the party, ii. to open the CC to "new democratic sensitivities"
enlarging the spectrum of political participation in the top organs of the party" (Resol. approving the new programme and statutes, quoted in Pnblico,
25.4.1991 and 28.4.1991); in this Congress some former FNLA leaders entered directly to the CC (with no dismission by the MPLA bases).
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The peace agreements
The 'pacification' of peripheries initiated in Angola in 1988 with the New York
Agreement, 132 followed by the ill-fated 1989 Gbadolite Agreement, and culminated in 1991 with
the Washington' 33 and Bicesse Agreements between MPLA and UNITA. 134
 Through the
mediation of the UN, USA, USSR and the former colonial power, Angolans got the much needed
peace and a new constitution.
The new constitutional order resulting from the agreements authorised political parties
outside the 1975 'official movements' fi-amework, 135 'free and fair elections', respect for human
rights and international supervision of the creation of a new army merging former FAPLA and the
UNITA army, FALA. A special organ, composed by representatives of the UN, the troika and
MPLA and UNITA to supervise the political and military implementation of the agreements was
set up.136
132.Signed in 1988 on the implementation of Resol. no 435/78 (UN, Security Council), on the independence of Namibia and progressive withdrawal
of Cuban troops from Angola; under a previous agreement (Geneva), RSA troops had to withdraw from Angola up to 1 September- 1988. On the
Angolan agreements, see, e.g., Minter, 1991.
133.The Washinaon Agreement, signed in January 1991, established: i. "the right of UNITA to promote and participate freely in political activities,
according to the revised constitution and the laws relevant to the creation of a multiparty democracy ... (while) the parties will choose the period within
whim free and fair elections" (for the new government) will take place. The date of elections should be established by "consultation to all the political
forces in Angola" and "supervised by international observers who will remain in Angola until they certify that the election was free and fair and that
the results have been officially proclaimed", ii. the government would discuss with all political forces the changes to the constitution and work with all
parties to draft the laws ruling the electoral process, iii the cease-fire agreement would compel the parties no longer receive lethal materials. USA,
USSR and all the other countries would support the application of the cease-fire and abstain themselves to supply lethal materials to any Angolan
parties (the so-called 'option triple-zero), iv. the Angolan parties were responsible for the g)obal political control of the cease-fire proms ... and the
international group will be responsible for the supervision of the cease-fire, v. the process of creation of the national army would initiate with the cease-
fire and be over at the date of elections; the neutrality of the army would be guaranteed by the Angolan parties (quoted in Pnblico, 3.5.1991).
134, The Bicesse Peace Accord (May 1991) ratified the Washington Agreanent, and approved the "Fundamental Principles for the Setting up of Peace
in Angola", where, among others: i. UNITA recognised the Angolan President and government until the general elections (no 1), ii. "free and fair
elections" would take place within the terms fixed by the two parties at the cease-fire signing and the precise date would be established by consultation
with all political forces in Angola (no 4), iii. both parties compromised to respect "human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to free
association" (no 5), (quoted in Pi/Woo, 2.5.1991). In the Cease-fire Accord signed at Estoril, LTNTTA and the Angolan government agreed, among
others: i. to "cease all hostile propaganda between the government and UNTTA, at the national and international levels" (no 1/5), ii. to "cease the
unjustified restrictions or blockades to the free movement of persons and goods" (no 11/6), iii. the creation of a supervisory body composed by
representatives of the Angolan government, UNITA, (members) Portugal, USSR, USA and UN (observers), (no 111/1), (quoted in ibid.).
135.On the AA 'three single party scheme', see section 2.2.
136.CCPM (the political commission), dealing with the supervision of the global implementation of the agreements, and the and CMVF (the military
commission), dealing with the disarmament of the armies and violations of the cease-fire.
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8.2.2. The constitutional reforms
The political reforms were institutionalised by the 1991 constitutional revision, followed
by a legislative package negotiated by the different political parties constituted in the meanwhile,
and the 1992 revision. 137 The name of the country changed to Republic of Angola which was
defined as
"a democratic rule of law system having as foundations the national unity, the
dignity of the human person, the pluralism of expression and political organisation
and the respect and guarantee of the fundamental rights and freedoms of man,
either as individual or as member of organised social groups."138
The NCL: i. maintained the principle of popular sovereignty but now exercised through
either "universal periodic voting to choose representatives, referendum and other democratic form
of participation of citizens •.." , 139 ii. established the principle of election of the members of
"representative organs" (the parliament and the PR), 14° iii. waived the rules on the single party
system and introduced multipartidarism, with art. 4 ruling the role of political parties and
principles for their organisation and working.141
137.Given the substantial changes in CL from 1991, the constitution (1992 version) is referred to as NCL (New Constitutional Law). Laws no 15/91
(cm the Political Parties). 5 92 (Elections Law), 16/91 (on the Freedom of Meeting and Demonstration), 22/91 (Press Law), 6/92 (on International
Observers), 792 (on the Media Council), 892 (on the Rights of Media Use by Political Parties and the Right to Reply) e 9/92 (Radio Broadcasting
Law) were included in the legislative package. On the former version ofthe CL, see subsection 3.1.4., 3.4.2. and section 3.5.
138.NCL, art. 2. See subsection 3.1.4.
139.NCL, art 3. See subsection 3.1.4.
140, NCL, art. 54/a. The parliament (National Assembly, NCL, arts 78-104, espec. 78 and 79) is directly elected for a 4 years mandate. It is
composed by 223 MPs, 130 elected for a national constituency, 5 for each province and 3 for the Angolan communities abroad (NCL, art 79 and
Elections Law, arts 161 ff.). The PR (NCL, arts 56-74, espec. 57/1) is elected for a 5 years mandate, in a system of two tiers if no candidate obtains
more than 50% of votes in the first election (NCL,, art. 57, Elections Law, arts 144 ff., espec. 147,156-60).
141 .
 The creation and functioning of parties must respect the following principles: a) national character and scope; b) free creation; c) public pursuit of
mds; d) freedom of membership and single membership; e) exclusive use of peaceful means to pursue its ends and prohibition of the creation or
utilisation of military, paramilitary or militarised organisation; I) democratic organisation and functioning g) prohibition to obtain money value or
economic contributions from foreign govermnents and foreigt governmental institutions and organisations, as well as (prohibition) of subordination to
Mean.". NCL art. 4 was developed by Law no 15/91, arts 1, 2 and 4-10. Law no 15/91 forbids: i. local and regional parties, ii. these promoting
'tribalism, racism, regionalism and other forms of discrimination of citizens and influence of national unity and territorial integrity", iii. as parties
"aiming, through unconstitutional means, to jeopardise the democratic and multiparty regime", iv. using, or intending to use, violence to achieve their
ends, "especially armed struggle as a mean to conquer power, military or paramilitary training of citizens and possession of deposits of weapons inside
and outside the national territory", v. have "parallel underground structures", vi. use military, paramilitary and militarised organisations, and vii.
subordinate to the "supervision of foreign goverrunents, entities or parties". (art 5/2). The creation of political parties does not need an authorisation
but they have to register at the Supreme Court which verifies the fulfilment of the legal requisites for their constitution (arts 4 and 6), which include a
minimum of 3,000 signatures (art 14/1, distributed by provinces). On the parties whidi run for the 1992 elections, see Appendix to this chapter.
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The 1992 NCL enlarged the bill of rights, by clearly granting freedom of expression,
meeting, demonstration,142 association and "all other forms of expression", freedom of press,
excluding any political, ideological or artistic censorship,143 freedom of professional organisation
and creation of unions, right to strike and prohibition of lock-out. In economic and social rights,
NCL maintained the right to work, while changing the principle of distribution to the "right to a
fair pay" and incorporating into the constitution workers social rights granted at GLL. Also, it
established the "freedom of choice and exercise of profession".
rights related to industrial democracy, which were provided for at GLL and had a material
constitution status. Concerning other economic and social rights, such as to education, culture
and health, they were maintained and NCL waived the former state reserves. New rights included
in the 1992 NCL version is the right to a healthy and non-polluted environment and the freedom
of movement.145
Given the (negative) experience acquired in the working of the judiciary, especially in the
criminal area, NCL regulated related rights and guarantees in a more detailed way: i. maintained
the principles of legality of crimes and punishment, as well as non-retroactivity of criminal law,
incorporated into the constitution the presumption of innocence, iii. provided for the legality of
terms for lawful custody, iv. introduced habeas corpus, and v. established the right to legal aid.146
142.NCL. art. 32 1. Law no 16/91 regulated the freedom of meeting and demonstration, which are not subject to authorisation (sit 3), but must be
communicated to the govemor or commissioner of the area (rut 6), who may forbid the meeting or demonstration on grounds of the timing, security of
the place (art. 7).
143.NCL, arts 32/1 and 35. Law no 22/91 (media law) established: i. press is not subject to any authorisation (art. 4/1), ii. "no citizen may be
damaged in his/her private, social life or employment on grounds of his/her legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression through media"
(art. 42), iii. limits to freedom of press may only be established by "general and military law" on grounds of "defence of national sovereignty and
independence., territorial integrity ... national unity, public order, and public health and morality" (art 5), iv. media professionals have the right of
access to information, except state and military secrets, or related to suits in justice secrecy, also secret by force of law and affecting citizens privacy
(art 6/1-2). v. professionals are not compelled to reveal sources of information and their "silence cannot be punished with any direct or indirect
sanction" (art 64), vi. any physical and legal person is entitled to the right to reply in the concerned media (att. 34/1), vi. mass media cannot be under
direct or indirect monopolies or oligopolies (art. 7) and control by foreign capital (arts 12/1 and 12/5). Radio and TV broadcasts are an exclusive of
the st.ate (arts 24/1 and 30), but the state may license private radio broadcasting stations (alt. 24/2).
144.NCI., arts 33-4 and 46, respectively. See section 5.1.
145 , NCL, arts 49, 24 and 25, respectively.
146. NCL, arts 23 (prohibition of torture and cruel and degradating treatment) and 36-42. Art. 52 establishes the conditions for the suspension of
rots and guarantees and limits for the declaration of itst de siege or emergency.
194 Still, the NCL did not grant the
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The general guarantee of the obligation of the state to "create the political, economic and
cultural conditions necessary to the effective exercise of their rights and performance of their
duties by citizens", was complemented with the guarantee of citizens direct access to courts in
case of "all actions which offend their rights established at this Constitutional Law". 14 7
The economic constitution changed significantly as NCL received the general background
of the economic reform as approached in its 90s version. The former dominance of socialist
ownership and the instrumentality of private and foreign ownership and enterprise were
waived. 1 4 8 The norms on the statute of means of production grant all forms of ownership
("public, private, mixed, co-operative and family") a status of equality and established a guarantee
to foreign investment and ownership.' 49 Art. 12, after establishing the boundaries of the public
domain, contains a norm on the ownership of land:
"Land constitutes state property at origin, may be transferred to single and
collective persons, aiming its rational and integral exploration ... The state respects
and protects the ownership of persons, physical and legal, and the ownership and
possession of land by peasants, notwithstanding the possibility of expropriation on
grounds of public interest."
Art. 11 refers the definition of state reserved activities to formal law, while compelling the
state to "guarantee the efficiency and profitability" of public property. The state is also under the
obligation to stimulate private, mixed co-operative and family economic activities.150
The principle of planning was substituted by a norm allowing state intervention in the
economy:
147,
 NCL, arts 50 and 43, respectively.
148.Nationalisations and confiscations were considered "valid and irreversible" (NCL, art. 13). See sedion 4.1.
149.NCL, arts 10 and 11/4. See subsection 3.1.4. and 8.1.3.
150.NCL, art. 111, 11/2 and 111, respectively.
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"The state regulates the development of the national economy aiming to guarantee
the balanced and harmonious growth of all sectors and regions of the country, the
rational and efficient use of all national productive capacities and resources, and
the improvement of the welfare and quality of life of citizens."151
The constitutional norm on taxation establishes the principle of legality, now a tighter
regime for the foreign investment scheme since the constitution provides that legality of taxation
included the tax, taxable income, tax rates and benefits, as well as guarantees of tax-payers.152
The organisation of the state also changed, with the creation of an advisory body to the
PR, the Council of the Republic, where representatives of state organs, political parties and
independent personalities chosen by the PR sit. CDS was extinguished and the post of PM
recreated. 153
 Concerning local government it is the big loser of the negotiations of the 1992 NCL,
since while establishing 'decentralization and deconcentration', the constitution abolished all
previous forms of assemblies and their executives. The provincial commissioners became the
governors and are appointed by the PR.154
8.2.3. The 90s civil liberties and the civil society
During the 1980s and early 90s, there was in Angola a significant migration to towns,
reinforced by war and which led to which is called 'de-urbanization': the inflow of peasants was
such that towns lost many of their urban characteristics. 155 The urban population was 37.0% of
total population in 1990, as contrasted with 13.9% in 1970 and 6.0% in 1950 (Amado, Cruz and
Hakkert, 1992: 28). Thus towns have a significant impact not only in originating the new
movements and ideas, but in voting terms. On the other hand, the capital had about two million
151, NCL, art. 9. See subsection 3.1.4.
152,NCL, ad. 14. See sections 7.1. and 7.2.
153 . NCL, arts 75-77 and 109, respectively. See subsection 3.5.
154•
 NCL, arts 145-48. Local government elective regime was postponed in the 1992 version for further legislation (arts 146/2, 147/2) and the
provincial, county and neighbourhood/village popular assemblies and 'executives' abolished since NCL does not refer to them. See subsection 3.4.2.
and section 3.5.
155 . See Amado, Cruz and Hakkert, 1992, who describe the desperate living conditions of the slums population, espec. in Luanda, the cultural
heterogeneity of the town, and the changes the massive inflow of rural migrants cause (42-7).
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inhabitants in 1992, majority of them born outside the town, coming from all the regions of the
country and "represent a synthesis" but is not socially or politically homogeneous. 156 The towns in
coastal zones (except Luanda) had also a significant increase of population with the inflow of war
refugees. 157 Another area of concentration of population, the central Highlands (about 30% total
population) was the zone where the impact of war was more felt, which led Ovimbundu economy
to almost complete destruction and peasants to starvation, conditioning their attitudes towards the
political process. This picture gave to the movements and events in towns an impact in national
politics wider than in the past.
The political liberalisation led urban residents to diversified initiatives, creating
associations whose pattern differentiated from the 80s associations. The most important was ACA
which came, in a certain way, retrace the tradition of extinguished Liga and Anangola, 158 acting as
a forum for the production of political ideas and civic projects. Borrowing in the former
discussions on independence of associations, ACA maintained distanced from political parties but
contributed, as did the republican clubs in the 19th century as well as Liga and Anangola in the
20th, to the emergence of new political parties.159
During the period up to the beginning of the post-elections war, many associations and
NG0s, national, regional and local, were created in urban areas. Still, their initiatives and impact
in politics do not seem significant, given the trend to 'partycracy' revealed from the elections and
the re-emergence of war which led to widespread sectarianism and showed the weakness of the
156.
 Doncalves, Palle°, 23.5.1991.
157.The Lobito/Benguela/Baia Fasts axis had about 800,000 inhabitants, as contrasted with about 100,000 in 1970 and small towns such as Sumbe
(centre) and Soyo (north) had about 100,000 inhabitants each, as contrasted with about 10,000 inhabitants eadi in 1970 (Goncalves, loc.cit.).
158. Associacao Civica de Angola (ACA) created in 1990 (Paha°, 7.4.1991); defined as "a civic association with a political angle" (J. Pinto de
Andrade, Piiblico, 1.6.1991). ACA was dynamised by former Revolts Activa and OCA members, existed informally and was authorised by the
government only one year after its creation since the minister of Justice had denied the authorisation, on grounds that it was against the interests of the
Angolan state (Ptiblico, 12.10.1990); the association appealed to the PR and was recognised in February 1991 (PUblico, 15.2.1991), notwithstanding
strong harassment of its members, including threats and dismissals &no jobs (Expresso, 9.6.1990). Nevertheless, many MPLA members supported
the approval of ACA (e.g., Lope do Nascimento, quoted in Expresso, 2.2.1991) and it seems that the measures against ACA members "caused
amazement in many sectors of the Luanda society, including the intermediate levels of MPLA" (Expresso, 9.6.1990). See subsections 2.1.2. and
3.4.5.
159.E.g.,
 FpD, see Appendix. On associations and political parties, see subsections 2.1.2, 2.1.3. and 3.4.5.
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civil society in the new political system. For example, environmentalist groups have difficulties to
be socially accepted160 and have their claims heard by political parties.
Law no 14/91 regulated NCL, art 32, on freedom of association. For the first time in the
Angolan history the creation of associations is free. Membership of associations is free as well,
and nobody may be compelled to become or to stay a member of an association.161
Concerning industrial democracy and the workers movement, LPE/88 maintained the
framework of LPE/77 for medium sized PEs, and provided for workers participation in the new
board of directors of large PEs. The representative of workers in this board was elected.
However, as the law was not regulated these norms were non-operational unless there is resort to
the GLL rule on the workers assemblies. Nevertheless the board was a progress as far as LPE/77
is concerned, although it does not attain the level of industrial democracy provided for by Law no
3/76. Participation of workers in profits, although within the restrictions of its central allocation
and the lack of criteria on the distribution of profits among workers, was also a progress since it
created incentives for performance, besides its eventual distributional impact.162
But changes at PEs mean very little in the context privatisation, austerity measures, cuts in
welfare expenditure, including by preventing access to education, non-payment of wages and
unemployment. This situation led to UNTA protest referred to above and its parting from the
state and the single party. Indeed, in the 90s UNTA changed its positions on partidarisation of
unions and claimed for their independence from political parties and churches. 163
 With
liberalisation workers demands became transparent: payment of belated wages, increases in
160. see,
 e.g., Rui Duarte Carvalho, Pdblico, 1.5.1991.
161. Law no 14/91, art. 7. Are excluded from the regime of associations: unions, co-operatives, religious organisations, sports clubs and political
parties (art. 6); associations aiming to promote hate, violence or the overthrow ofthe Republican institutions, and with ends contrary to independence,
national unity, territorial integrity and NCL are forbidden (art 11); to guarantee the monopoly of politics by political parties, art. 8/2 forbids
associations with political ends to: i. participate in the activity of state organs, ii. contribute to the exercise of citizens political rights, iii. influence the
national policy at the parliament or government, iv. contribute to the defmition of the national policy "especially by participating in elections or by
other democratic means".
162, LPE/88, arts 62, 63, 51 and 52. See subsections 3.2.2., 3.4.4. and 8.1.4.
163 . TSF (Lisbon) broadcast, 25.10.1990. See subsections 8.1.6. and 3.4.4.
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wages, and improved working and living conditions. 1 64 A special case was the doctors movement
of protest, fighting for better working conditions and proper state assistance to the NHS, a
protest some MPLA sections tried to bar. 165
 As the government did not attend workers demands,
a wave of strikes followed, even before the approval of the strikes law, apparently a new
autonomous movement, independent of political forces.166
The 'social agitation' finally led the state to revise the economic policy fixed at the Plan
aiming a softer application of the austerity programme. No measures were taken against
strikers167 and a strikes law was adopted in the 1991 package. Only strikes with "economic,
social and professional goals related to the workers employment situation" are allowed and strikes
with other motives or with occupation of work places are unlawfu1.168
As in 1975, the outcomes of the workers movement in towns would be impacted by the
war, which led workers demands to silence, with few exceptions of strikes. The same happened
with demonstrations and other kinds of protest.
8.2.4. The elections and the post elections crisis
Among the most important political changes arising from the reforms are the creation of
many political parties, which run to the 1992 elections, and the first information in the country's
history on the political preferences of Angolans which results from elections.
•nnn••••
164.J. Goncalves, PUblico, 3.7.1991.
165.pithlico. 19.4.1991; it seems that the minister of Health, whose dismissal was demanded by the movement, even threatened doctors.
166.See, e.g., Goncalves, PUblico, 3.7.1991 and 24.7.1991, on strikes at oil joint ventures; there were also strikes at EDEL, ENCAL, Joint Soviet-
Angolan Expedition (fisheries) and the Capanda project (Piblico, 21.6.1991); of journalists of the broadcasts in national languages and sound
operators at the national broadcast station (PUblico, 12.6.1991) and teachers.
167.PUblico, 2.5.1991, Goncalves, Priblico, 24.7.1991 and Patio°, 19.4.1991, respectively.
168. Law no 23/91, arts 3 and 7/a; promotion of unlawful strikes is punished with imprisonment and adhesion to these strikes with disciplinary
liability (arts 27/1 and 27/2). The right to strike is not granted to the military, police, prosecutors, members of sovereignty organs (PR, PA,
government and courts), workers in prisons and military establishments and firemen. Some categories of workers have to ensure minimal services (arts
6,8 1, 20 1, 8 4 and 20,3, respectively). As in the 1975 legislation, the strike suspends the employment contract and strikers are not entitled to wages.
Employers cannot sack or transfer strikers or strikes delegates for a given period, except in case of disciplinary liability (art_ 21).
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The September 1992 elections have been the first with universal, direct and secret ballot in
the country. They aimed the election of the PR and the parliament fulfilling a goal (and
compromise) established at the Peace Agreements and NCL. 16 9 During the peace negotiations the
representatives of the government as the other involved parties discussed the timing of the
elections and the whole peace process, including the disarmament of the armies. The government
considered it was necessary a transitional period of three years to extend the public administration
to all the national territory, to create the national army and the extinction of both FAPLA and
FALA, as essential conditions to the universality, openness and democracy of the elections.17°
Also, there was a need to prepare the state apparatuses and the very people for a method of
selection of rulers which was different from their past experiences. UNITA argued that elections
should take place within a shorter lag of time because it was convinced of its victory and wanted
to seize power as soon as possible. From the negotiations a transitional period of eighteen months
was agreed and implemented.171
It was difficult to implement the new electoral system in such a short period due to the
shortage of resources demanded by the process, the serious economic crisis the country was going
through, and the fact that UNITA did not disarm and its forces occupied counties and villages
intimidating the people and preventing the action of the public administration. 172 While keeping a
supervisory and peace-keeping force (UNAVEM), the UN did not allocate Angola the resources
it granted to the Narnibian elections and thus the Angolan state bore the majority of costs and
responsibilities. 173 The latter created a special board, the National Electoral Council (NEC), with
169.See section 8.2.1.
170. The Elections Law provides that the elections will take place "in the space of the territory under effective jurisdiction of the public
administration" (ant 9).
171.The "timing (of the peace process in Angola) is being finished by the Portugal, USA and USSR representatives" (Pilblico, 5.3.1991, quoting
Voice of America). See also Minter, 1991: 142.
172.These problems were denounced by govemman representatives at the Joint Military Commission of Supervision (CMVF), but were approached
with a certain degree of cynicism by different parties involved (from the troika to UNAVEM) and some of their officials even made comments on the
issue as 'path accidents'.
173 , The UN collaborated with technical assistance, including training of personnel, and supervised the whole process, supplying international
observers and materials.
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related provincial councils, composed by representatives of political parties and the public
administration.174
The polls registration was a success, if we consider the extension of the territory, the
difficulties of communications and the shortage of resources. In some zones such as Jamba,
UNITA prevented the extension of the public administration and the working of the multi-party
system. 175
 However, in a country with a very young population (about 44.5% are less than 15
years old) 4,828,468 voters among about 10 Mn total population registered, which meant a
significant interest in the participation in elections.176
174.Elections Law, arts 12 ff., espec. art. 14 (headed by a judge of the Supreme Court). The NEC was supported by a public agency, the Direction for
Elections, headed by a member of the FNLA Politbureau, which promoted the voters registration, the implementation of elections and the counting of
votes.
175.The conditions for an effective registration of voters were the extension of the public administration, whidi implied the appointment of a public
authority to the site and the implementation of the structures of local government, free movement of persons and goods and the full exercise of
activities of the different political parties. Still, two months after the opening of the voters registration there were zones occupied by UNITA after the
cease-fire, under control by the latter, which had expelled and aggressed, in some cases, local authorities The UN and international observers paid
little attention to the situation, calling the zones under control by UNITA 'zones of difficult access (in the words of an Angolan 'zones of access made
Onambwe, JA, 12.8.1992). RSA sent 'brigades' to help with the registration of voters under UNITA rule, but some of these places in Moxico
and Kuando-Kubango were later not included in the registration, a decision ratified by the UN and CCPM. An example of the registration problems is
Kuando-Kubango. a zone not attractive for migrants which still had more voters than the estimate population for 1991, while in Cabinda the number
of voters registered was only 5 0/0 of total population and in Uige, 30% (see next note).
176.The Table shows the population estimated in 1991 and the data from the 1992 voters registration. In 1991 the Angolan population was divided in
48.8°o men and 51.2% women.
POPULATION AND REGISTERED VOTERS
Province Population (000) Voters
Cabinda 163 16,079
Zaire 192 80,166
Huge 837 318,131
Lunda Norte 292 141,545
Lunda Sul 155 87,451
Bengo 166 91,921
Kwanza Norte 378 137,962
Nlalanje 892 327,337
Luanda 1,629 854,981
Kwanza Sul 651 369,150
Moxico 316 137,798
Benguela 644 567,825
Huambo 1,524 467,811
Bin 1,125 354,537
Namibe 115 84,918
Huila 869 509,167
Kuando-Kubango 130 133,161
Cunene 232 145.528
Total 10,310 4,828,468
Sources: i. data population 1991 - INE, Angola - Perfil Estatistico Econernico e Social (1988-1991), estimates based on 1985 Census; ii. data of the
elections registration: CNE, Apuramento Defmitivo (JA, 17.10.1992).
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Seventeen parties and a coalition run for the parliamentary elections. 177 Their programmes
are little differentiated, demonstrating, given their diverse and even opposed goals and practice,
the degree of rhetoric characterizing the multi-party system in the country. 178 Still, the campaign
was also marked by: the delays in the disarmament of UNITA and the creation of the new national
army as well as occupation of villages and counties by UNITA, with intimidation of campaigners,
including the murder of FDA members. The former army was quickly extinguished in the eve of
the elections and a Chief-Staff composed by equal members of UNITA and the government was
appointed, while Savimbi and the government accepted to respect the results of the elections.179
The elections outcomes
The results of the elections confirmed the bipolarisation predicted and feared by many.
They also established PRS, an almost unknown party, as the third political force and confirmed
the suspicions on FNLA decay among the Kikongo. The emergent parties, except PRS, showed a
very fragile social base, notwithstanding their declarations before the elections and were criticised
for prioritizing top politics, their eagerness to enter into The corridors of power' and their
contempt for popular organisation.
177.During the campaign all parties had equal access to the state TV and radio stations. UNTTA used as well its private radio station, Vorgan, where
it refused access to other parties.
178. See Appendix to this chapter.
179.JA, 28.9.92.
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TABLE 3
Total parties votes for parliament and number of MPs
Patty Total votes % Total MPs
1. MPLA 2,124,126 53.74 129
2. UNITA 1,347,636 34.10 70
3. PRS 89,875 2.27 6
4. FNLA 94,742 2.40 5
S. PLD 94,269 2.39 3
6. PRD 35,293 0.89 1
7. AD 34,166 0.86 1
8. PSD 33,088 0.84 1
9. PAJOCA 13,924 0.35 1
10. FDA 12,038 0.30 1
11. PDP/ANA 10,608 0.27 1
12. PNDA 10,281 0.26 1
13. CNDA 10,237 0.26 0
14. PSDA 10,217 0.26 0
15. PAI 9,007 0.23 0
16. PDL 8,025 0.20 0
17. PDA 8,014 0.20 0
18. PRA 6,719 0.17 o
Source: CNE, Apuramento Defmitivo.
Table 4 shows the four parties which got the higher number of votes by province. They
demonstrate that while ethnic voting may have influenced a substantial number of voters in many
rural areas (and to reach this kind of conclusions one has to accept the doubtful assumption that
there is some connotation of political parties with ethnic groups), MPLA and UNITA appear as
parties with a national base. Furthermore, in the northern provinces where MPLA won, Kikongo
voted massively in parties non-Kikongo connected. The same happened with the Southern
peoples (e.g., Herero, Cuanyama and Ganguela). But, conversely, in the Mbundu and Ovimbundu
provinces there were significant victories of parties with a social base linked, at least in
propaganda, with their respective ethnic groups. Still, in the Ovimbundu region the province of
Benguela, notwithstanding the occupation of some counties by UNITA, shows already some non-
ethnic voting. Luanda, as a multi-ethnic town of about 2 Mn inhabitants at the time, the significant
victory of MPLA is due more to the suspicions of urban population on UNITA intimidations,
aggressive discourse and obscurantism, than to ethnic choices.
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TABLE 4
Four parties more voted for the parliament by province
Province First Second Third Fourth
Cabinda MLA 7,448 UNITA 1,544 FNLA 209 FDA 66
Zaire MPLA 20,240 FNLA 20,053 UNITA 16,353 PAJOCA 1,579
Uige MPLA 136,167 UNITA 79,277 FNLA 5,114 PLD 8,645
Luanda . NIPLA 531,294 UNITA 140,959 FNLA 30,883 POP 6,351
Bengo MPLA 54,586 UNITA 13,747 FNLA 5,114 PLO 895
Kwanza-N. NIPLA 102,213 UNITA 6,658 FNLA 2,929 AD 1,568
Kwanza-S. MPLA 220,086 UNITA 61,099 PLD 5,130 PRS 4,127
Malange MPLA 185,935 UNITA 26,201 PLO 5,130 PRS 4,127
Lunda N. NIPLA 77,694 PRS 18,673 UNITA 8,844 FNLA 2,274
Benguela UNITA 260,655 MPLA 181,730 PLO 15,869 PBS 5,433
Huambo UNITA 289,283 MPLA 61,146 PLO 20,722 PSD 8,064
Bid UNITA 204,930 MPLA 36,598 PLO 12,790 PSD 3,052
Lunda Sul MPLA 37,309 PBS 22,811 UNITA 2,681 Al) 1,163
Moxico MPLA 66,344 UNITA 27,290 PRS 6,264 PLD 3,264
K.-Kubango UNITA 87,808 MPLA 26,693 PLO 2,616 PRS 1,214
Namibe MPLA 42,458 UNITA 15,374 PLO 1,314 AD 812
Huila MPLA 245,952 UNITA 100,219 PLO 8,987 PRS 5,437
Cunene MPLA 90,233 UNITA 4,714 AD 1,540 PRS 1,473
Source: CNE, Apuramento Definitivo 1992.
The candidates for the presidential elections were Dos Santos and Savimbi, an
independent (Chipenda), nine other candidates for parties and one for a coalition. Dos Santos had
in the first tier 49.57% votes while Savimbi had 40.07%. The other candidates had no significant
number of votes and the third was H. Roberto with 2.11% corresponding to the FNLA 2.40% in
the parliamentary elections.
The post-elections crisis
When the media began to publish their own accounts of the elections results, the new
democratic system had to face serious strains. As they indicated MPLA as the winner, UNITA
claimed the results were MPLA manoeuvering leo and prevented the publication of the results
blackmailing with resort to war. The publication was suspended and there was a period of silence
and uncertainty. After an increase in terrorist and military activities by UNITA, and much
180. savun
. bi quoted at Vorgan (Terra Angolana, 6.10.1992). UNITA e Savimbi would win in 12 of the country's 18 provinces and alleged frauds
were being set up (UNITA newspaper, Terra Angolana, 6.10.1992),
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international intervention, the results of the elections were finally published. Since the government
and NEC did not accept the blackmail of war threats, UNITA was forced to show its real views
on representative democracy: it did not accept its defeat, demanded the revocation of the
elections and new elections four months later. Notwithstanding the fact that the UN recognised
the elections as 'free and fair' and considered that eventual irregularities did not substantially affect
the results of the scrutiny, 181
 UNITA persisted in war and blackmail, occupying counties, towns
and villages, entire provinces, from where it expelled and murdered the government
representatives, while committing other political assassinations.182
Thus the so-called UNITA democrats showed that they were only interested in
representative democracy as a mean to seize power. Indeed, after the euphoria of elections
UNITA showed what the majority of Angolans already knew but international powers denied:
instead of being a champion of democracy fighting for human rights, etc., it revealed itself a
fascist military organization. 183 For its fascist activities UNITA has a powerful secret police,
Brinde (trained and, it seems, supported by the RSA police and army), which apparently controls
the terrorist wing of the organisation which performs operations such as bombing in civilian
targets, political murder, smearing of opponents and spying. The extension of Brinde moles within
the public administration and political parties is not known, but the lists of people to murder found
out in UNITA offices after its defeat in the 2nd Battle of Luanda suggest a high number of spies
in enterprises and neighbourhoods, who, among other activities, listed people with some
connection with MPLA, FAPLA, etc., for later repression.
The problem of the national army had also a great impact in the post-elections
developments. As stated above, the Peace Agreements established the creation of a non-party
181.Referring to the Elections Law, art. 197.
182.Such as the case of the Huambo academics and other people linked to the journal Jango. By 1994 the list of political assassinations in the zones
under the control of UNITA, from civil servants to judges and journalists, is endless.
183 , Vv'hich had been predicted but not taken into accourit by international powers. E.g., on UNITA Pinto de Andrade argued in 1990: "It will not be
easy for an essentially military organisation to abandon methods characterised by violence and destruction, to renounce to the path of 'dictates' to
impose consensus and turn to the long road of confront of solutions, (and) civic and brotherly relations' . (quoted in Evresso, 22.12.1990).
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linked army. FAPLA were effectively dismantled, with the massive demobilization of their
military. The later should be integrated in training and social reintegration programmes, supported
by international assistance, but mostly were in fact thrown into unemployment, in many cases with
a shocking indifference for the many years they spent fighting for the country's survival. From the
Peace Agreements some left back to their villages as the army no longer supplied water and food
to some military camps. Concerning FAPLA's weaponry, and in the past it had been considered
one of the best equipped armies in Africa, a part became useless due to shortage of spares caused
by the prohibition of sales of armament to the Angolan state and UNITA. Other part of FAPLA's
equipment was, it seems, rejected by advisers in charge of assisting the creation of the new joint
national army (British, Portuguese and French).184
UNITA maintained its more significant operational groups in 'camps', integrated in the
new army individuals who were mostly political cadres keeping in a reserve outside the national
army a part of its important military cadres, hid a significant part of the weaponry supplied by the
USA and RSA and even during the transitional period (to elections) occupied counties it never
succeeded in conquering during its war against the post-colonial state.
Thus the new national army (FAA) was trapped into a situation of almost complete
shortage of military means to face the war moved by UNITA after its defeat in the elections.
More suspicious former FAPLA soldiers and officers took home various weaponry. If they had
not behaved as such the wave of death and destruction caused by the UNITA military victories
until it controlled about 80% of the national territory would be greater. In fact, in a first stage of
the post-elections war UNITA was only faced by the National Police in towns and the people in
towns and the countryside. Indeed, popular resistance against UNITA prepotence and the
passivity of the government was similar to the 1975 self-defence schemes.
184. who. it seems, took the opportunity to 'advice the purchase of weapons from their countries, transforming the creation of the new army and the
'assistance' in a profitable sale of weaponry. FAPLA assets, from airplanes to heavy trucks, were as well sold at 'symbolic' prices to civilians and
military of high posts.
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During one year UNITA destroyed more - human lives, infrastructures, plants, schools,
hospitals, etc. - than during the 15 previous years of post-colonial war. This devastation was made
possible by lack of control by the institutions in charge of the monitoring of the disarmament of
FAPLA and FALA and in supporting the creation of the new national army.
Also, notwithstanding all the information on UNITA militarism and fascism acquired along
the years, especially after the declarations of its dissidents from the 80s, 188 after a period of
suspicion a substantial part of the Angolan right, 186 including sections of the MPLA, accepted
UNITA as a reliable partner for a democratic system, an attitude of 'collective amnesia'. Its former
history of ethnic fascism was forgotten, either by international powers or the domestic right,
given its relevant role on which they believed to be the 'struggle against communism'. Thus even
before UNITA demanded a share of posts in government as if it had won the elections, lobbies
were active in pressing for the appointment of UNITA leaders in a future MPLA government.
As for the expectations of the people, the majority of Angolans believed in the 'new
collective dream' of representative democracy and peace, and in the possibility of integration of
UNITA within he Angolan society in a peaceful process. Thus, the people voted massively (the
rate of abstention was 8.65% in the parliamentary and 8.85 in the president elections), 187
 hoping
to finally be able to leave in peace. It proved once again a failure of hope.
The disintegration of the country
When Angolans voted massively for peace and ratified the choice for a multiparty
democracy, not even the more pessimists expected the country to dive into such a tremendous
catastrophe. After the elections, Angola suffered the worst economic and military crisis of its
history and the hardships the population endured cannot be compared with the sacrifices it had to
185.See section 6.3.
186.See. e.g.. at the Appendix the parties which supported Savimbi for president. Also, when UNITA contested the elections on grounds of alleged
frauds, it was supported by FNLA and Roberto, PDA and A Nem, AD and S. Cacete and Chipenda.
187.JA, 17.10.1992.
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bear either during the war for independence or the South African invasions. The post-elections
crisis also caused the economic and political institutions arising from the reforms fall apart in a
process of disintegration of the country.
Concerning the economy more than one decade of the post-colonial war led to
overwhelming constraints to development projects dealt with in this work. Peace also meant for
Angolans prospects of increased living standards and the restructuring of the economy leading
eventually to a more developed society. In fact, during the 90s peace period, there was a revival
of the economy, with an increase in investment and farming, as the communications by road
between the different regions of the country were restored. Although prices had soared and there
were serious problems of unemployment, there was some optimism concerning the future. But
with the new war, development and better living standards are postponed, becoming increasingly
unpredictable. Many years of shortages and hard work will be necessary to reconstruct what
UNITA destroyed in about one year of war. Inflation reached socially and economically alarming
levels..- 88
 Wages deteriorated in an accelerated way and no wages adjustments could reach the
inflation rate. The hard currency resources to finance imports became progressively more scarce
while the needs of imports increased to re-equip the army at the same time as the national
production of all kinds of consumer goods was completely paralyzed. The scarce goods available
were, given the impossibility of free movements of goods and persons, transported by airplane to
the hinterland zones controlled by the government. In some cases, for example the towns of
Menongue and Kuito besieged by UNITA, this was not possible and thousands died in the
fighting and by starvation. But even in the zones where food was distributed the scheme of air
transport made the goods prohibitively expensive and an increasing number of poor had no access
to them. Death by starvation began to occur in towns such as Luanda where although there was
famine, death by starvation was negligible.
188 . See note 122.
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The restructuring of the economy led to the abandonment of the previous rationing
schemes of prices subsidised by the state and related apparatuses. Thus, the means to face the
post-elections shortage of food are smaller than in the past and the poor have no access to the
very few essential goods formerly distributed under the rationing scheme. This is just an example
of the problems the government had to face. Due to pressure from international institutions it has
had to implement a programme of economic liberalization while simultaneously engulfed in a
devastating war. But even the so-called free market economies when in a situation of war were
forced to adopt measures of strong state intervention in the economy, including rationing of
consumer goods.
Direct foreign investment, which outside the extractive industry was just beginning in the
90s, had a serious setback, with investors either giving up investments already approved by the
government and initiated or avoiding to transfer to the country the capital they had agreed to
under contracts, some of them for the creation of joint ventures.
As the right of the Angolan people to development is destroyed and the economic and
social rights of citizens reached their lowest level of effectiveness, the prospects for a wider
exercise of other rights in a context of war are not bright. In the areas under the control of
UNITA the citizenry live under a regime of the most odious military dictatorship. Concerning the
degree of democracy in the zones under the control of government, there was the postponement
of many projects of increased democratization of society, given the dominance of the interests of
defence in facing war, that is, the need of survival which means that often democracy and the
respect for human rights became a second priority. Also, war provides an excuse for all kinds of
authoritarian ideas, to exercise autocracy and to forget the constitutional programme and bill of
rights (already of problematic effectiveness in an underdeveloped country), at the least for a part
of the population.
The post elections crisis, beyond the flagrant violation of agreements and compromises
entered into, also showed the fragility of rule of law established at NCL, art. 2. The NCL norms
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on rule of law were negotiated, as the whole constitution, by political parties, including UNITA.
Furthermore, many parties included rule of law as a goal to attain in their programmes. 1B9 But the
crimes against persons, property and the state committed by UNITA members remained
unpunished up to 1994, while international powers involved in the solution of the Angolan
conflict do not seem aware of the impact of this impunity in the whole legal system implemented
from the late 80s. Indeed, there is a systematic violation of all the legislation in force in the
country - from the constitutional norms and legislation on the political process (whose application
would mean that UNITA would become unlawful as a political party and its present leaders could
never candidate again to an elected mandate)' 90 to the criminal law (UNITA murderers
supposedly will not go under trial), to even legislation on compensation for damages. 191 The
inertia of the state, itself blocked by the troika and UN attempts at reconciliation with UNITA, the
de facto existence of double standards concerning the application of law (of which UNITA
members appear to be exempted) with the tacit approval by the international powers involved, led
to a climate where law lost its legitimacy and any attempt at respect and application of law appear
as awkward activities of lawyers generating serious problems of intimidation to judges, lawyers
and even the police.192
8.5. Conclusion
From the official take-off of the economic reform, a process rapidly ensued which diverted
the restructuring of the economy from the direction decided by the II MPLA Congress. The
process appears as the consolidation of the integration of the country in the world system, and has
similarities with the 60s restructuring of the relative position of Angola in this system. The
189.See Appendix.
190.See note 141.
191.An exception to this state of 'legal apathy is the complaint to the police, in order to sue in criminal courts later, on the murder of a member of
UNITA at Jambs, by his family.
192 , An example is the case of Prof. Medina, deputy chairperson of the Supreme Court, who was smeared in the press as an 'advocate of the interests
of settlers' because she sued, in a private law case, an MPLA MP who, as a member of the government, had allegedly allocated her house to his wife.
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patterns of this position result from: i. the country's underdevelopment which was shadowed
under the impact of the independence victories and the early 70s boom, ii. the strategies of
national reconstruction aiming to "attain the 1973 levels of production" (which meant the
reconstruction of the late colonial economy), 193
 iii. administrative planning (from the stand-point
of social groups it generated and/or enabled to grow, as well as the authoritarian practices it
reproduced), and, iv. external aggressions making it impossible any alternative path.
The needs of legitimation made the US administration, RSA and proxy UNITA to mask
the late colonial war as a struggle for democracy. This factor, added to the needs to lift the state
barriers which the expansion of capitalist relations demanded, had as a result that the change in
the form of the economic system, brought together higher standards of rights and liberties.
But the overall economic result of the different and ultimately non co-ordinate
international interventions in Angola is wild capitalism, widespread corruption and shameless
amassing of wealth together with the stringent poverty of the majority of the people. Ironically,
the efforts to improve the degree of democratisation of the Angolan society whose pace and
framework arose from the international agreements, had as a consequence the complete denial of
minimal democratic rights for the large number of Angolan citizens living under UNITA's
dominance and a jeopardy of the rights and freedoms of citizens in the zones under the
government control. It may be said that the continued interventions in Angola put a brake on
internal developments, as reflected in the different reforms, and eventually led to setting back the
steps already made by the Angolan society towards improved democracy. Indeed, the devastating
post-elections war and the efforts of international powers to force the government to share power
with UNITA mean more serious risks to sustainable development and democracy than the status
quo which preceded the political reforms.
193 ,
 Eg... Bhagavan, 1980 and PR to the SEF Seminar, August, 1987.
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The reforms period highlight continuities of the Angolan history - from war to reformism,
from achievements when authoritarianism is diluted to the continued rebellions of the second
peripheries against the mediatory role of the first periphery in shaping the relationships with the
global system. Still, the lifting of barriers in many areas of individuals self-development and
organisation means that repressed strengths of society may develop, countering the negative
impact of unrestricted expansion of the obscurantism, violence, indigenous wild capitalism and
lump en bourgeoisie.
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APPENDIX
Political parties which run for the 1992 elections
1.PRD (Partido Renovador Democratico), founded in 1990 by ex-Nitists; prowarnme: democratic and republican state with rule of law and respect
for human rights; dominance of a market economy, foreign investment and private initiative in a mixed economy of an welfare gate, with neither
central command economy nor 'wild capitalism'; integrated development approached in its different economic, social, cultural, environmental and
political dimensions; PR candidate, Luis dos Passos, a former FAPLA officer who participated in the 1977 attempted coup.
2. PAJOCA (Partido da Alianea da Juventude, Operarios e Camponeses de Angola), founded in 1991 by MPLA dissidents; programme: mixed
economy, welfare gate, with special emphasis in education and health; state monopoly of foreign trade; privatization of banks and leases of land to
foreigners; supported Dos Santos as PR candidate.
3. PAI (Partido Angolan° Independente), founded em 1983 in Lisbon; programme: market economy and welfare state, with emphasis in a national
health service, 9 years compulsory schooling, ban of children's work, access to employment and return to the country of cadres living abroad;
decentralised local government and elected members for all post in the public administration; supported Dos Santos asPR candidate.
4. PDLA (Partido Democratic° Liberal de Angola); programme: no data; PR candidate, Honorato Nlando.
5. PSDA (Partido Social Democratic° de Angola), founded in 1990 by migrants returned from Zaire; programme: no data; PR candidate,
Kilandamoko, former civil servant in the Zairian administration, who gave up to support Savimbi.
6. FNLA. programme: separation of powers and political and administrative decentralization; welfare gate, with emphasis in education and health;
market economy based in private initiative with democratic planning and egalitarian distribution of wealth . PR candidate., Holden Roberto.
7.PDP-ANA (Partido Democratic° para o Progresso da Alianca Nacional Angolans), founded in 1991, composed mainly by Kikongo;  programme:
respect for human rights and the environment; welfare state with emphasis in education; modernization of agriculture with the support of UN agencies;
eation of an African common market and south-south co-operation. PR candidate Mfulumpinga Victor, member of the FNLA Polithureau in the
70s, who gave up to support Savimbi.
8.PRA (Partido Refonnador Angolano), founded in 1992; pro gramme: no data; PR candidate Rui Pereira, former exile in Portugal.
9. CNDA (Convenes° Nacional Democratica de Angola), founded in 1991 by MPLA dissidents; programme: 'free' market economy with economic
democracy, anti-trust laws, consumer protection, reduction of social and regional inequalities, full employment, priority to national capital and
incentives to foreign investment; total or partial privatisation of PE,s but state monopoly in mining, energy, transport and insurance, collectivization of
agriculture oriented to the satisfaction of people's needs and balanced development of all the regions of the country, PR candidate, Pinto Joao, former
head of MPLA department for the media, who gave up to support Savimbi.
10.PNDA (Partido Nacional Democratic° de Angola); pro gramme: no data.
11. PDA (Partido Democratic° de Angola), founded in 1991 by MPLA dissidents; programme: democratic and rule of law gate, with separation of
powers; market economy with some elements of welfare gate;PR candidate Prof. Alberto Neto.
12. FDA (Forum Democratic° Angolano), founded in 1990 in Canada by UNITA dissidents; proizramme: rule of law with respect for human rights
and fiuniamental freedoms; market economy with some elements of welfare state; supported Dos Santos asPR candidate.
13.AD-Collgacio (Aliano Democratica - Coligaeão), founded in 1992, composed by FpD (Frente para a Democracia, founded in 1991 by former
OCA members, with a social-democrat programme), UDA (Unificaeäo Democritica Angolana), PDPA (Patti& Democratic° Pacifico de Angola),
PNEA (Partido Nacional Ecologiga de Angola) e MDIA-PCN (Movimento de Defesa dos Interesses dos Angolanos - Partido do Conscitncia
Nacional). all small parties and some of them with a social base essentially in the far north of the country; AD assumed itself as the third road', an
alternative to MPLA and UNITA, as "an equilibrium force capable of surprising the large parties"; programme: not available, PR candidate, Simi°
Cacete.
14. MPLA; elections programme: rule of law, democratic multiparty system, with respect for human rights and freedoms; reform of the public
administration, with decentralization and deconcentration in local govermnent elected organs, debureaucratization of gate apparatuses and
improvements of services supplied to the people, reform of the judiciary, aiming the access to justice, the independence of courts and the effective
performance of their functions of guarantee of citizens rights; improvement of economic, civil and criminal legislation to adequate it to the democratic
and rule of law state; prevention of crime through social and civic education programmes with the participation of the civil society; in economic policy:
to promote employment, develop education and health and recover infrastructures; to create incentives to the national production by the decrease and
substitution of imports and promotion of exports; to protect the national industry, espec. the food, light, construction materials and building industries;
to control inflation and fix an exchange rate where internal prices reflect external prices, liberalization of agriculture prices, updating of the minimal
wage and defence of the incomes of the lowest income groups through agreements bemoan the gate, eroployers and workers; reduction of public
evenditure and increase in non-oil tax revenues, reduction of balance of payments imbalances; support to the creation and development of national
entrepreneurs as "a fundamental class for the economic recovery of the country and the consolidation of the new internal economic order", support to
the informal economy in order to create a "climate favourable to investment", use of monetary policies as economic stabilizers (limits to loans, interest
rates and compulsory reserves), while facilitating loans to agriculture cattle-ranching fisheries and housing keep the loans to the privatization's
developing the privatisation programme and prioritising Angolans in the purchase of PEs and state assets, reserving a quota for workers; to adopt
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incentive to private enterprise and foreign investment, promoting the association of national and foreign capital; agrarian policy: to promote food self-
sufficiency and the supply of inputs to industry, to improve living conditions in the countryside to brake rural migration to towns, to defend the
maintenance of land occupied by peasants and guarantee the access of dernobilised soldiers, refugees, and disabled people, as well as war orphans and
widows; to create incentives for the recovery of coffee plantations by Angolans and expatriates; oil and mining policy: to create reserves while
simultaneously increasing the production  for evort; PR candidate: Dos Santos.
15.PRS (Partido de Renovacdo Social), with a social base mainly Lunda; programme: no data.
16. UNITA; elections programme: laic state, protecting freedom of religion, human rights and equality of opportunities; 'Afiicanization' and
'Angolanisation' with education of the youth in the struggle against all vices contrary to the African culture and training in the West of all youngsters
who studied in "communist countries"; reform of public administration with better services supply, the sacking of civil servants and the maintenance of
those allying technical competence with "political consciousness"; government of "national unity" with other parties; solution of the problem of the
autonomy of Cabinda, in a way different from that of the MPLA (but does not say how); disband of the 'emergency police' and refusal of a scenario
similar to 1975 "when the rejection of the dernocratic game by MPLA, colluded with the Soviet-Cuban expansionist ambitions dived the unprotected
people in the catastrophe of 16 years of war"; economic policy: market economy, support to the creation of an Angolan entrepreneurial class and
guarantees to foreign investment; relations with all countries except Cuba;PR candidate: Savimbi.
17.PSI) (Partici° Social Democrata), founded in 1988; programme: separation of powers, respect for human rights and protection of Angolan cultural
values; market economy with state intervention to fight unemployment and oligarchies, defending the less protected strata; cooperativization of
agriculture, protection of fisheries and abolition of the state monopoly of foreign trade, PR candidate: disqualified by the Supreme Court due to former
conviction for rape and later substituted by Bengui
18.PLO (Partido Liberal Democratico), founded in Lisbon 1983 by exiles; programme: democratic rule of law state with respect for fundamental
freedoms; market economy with full employment, struggle against illiteracy and poverty, protection of children, single mothers, widows, orphans and
war disabled; PR candidate: Attalla Pereira, exiled in Portugal from 1975 to 1992, the first woman to run for president in Africa.
Sources: Centro de Imprensa Anibal de Melo, Angola: Partidos Politicos, Luanda, 1992; IVTLA, Manifesto Eleitoral, Luanda, 1992; Correio da
Semana (CS), 15.9.1992 (UNITA elections programme) e JA, 23.8.1992 (AD-Coligaglio).
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
This work investigated three main general problems. Firstly, what are the elements in the
continuities in Angolan history which are barriers to the projects of rupture implemented by the
post-colonial state. Secondly, what were the origins and functions of the socialist project adopted
after independence. Lastly, what problems of functionality and effectiveness did the post-colonial
economic law face.
1. Rupture: the socialist project and the central command economy
Chapters 2 and 3 described the genesis of the political elements of the socialist-oriented
project of rupture adopted by the post-colonial state. It was emphasised that in economic terms
the project resulted from peculiar conditions of the attainment of independence by Angola (the
massive abandonment of means of production by owners) and from the fact that the expectations
of the population centred on demands of and for the state.
While imperial aggressions made it extremely difficult, even impossible, to implement the
declared project of autonomous socialist development, they were not the only factor. Indeed, the
abandonment of the project resulted from many internal factors, including the internal dynamics of
MPLA itself reflecting an acute conflict between the different social forces who had carried out
the struggle for independence. The failure is also an outcome of the system institutionalised after
independence. Firstly because its intended (and 'half implemented') 'statist socialism' conflicted
with the relative position of the country in the world system as a supplier of non-manufactured
commodities where the main exported product, oil, is produced by TNCs, and a buyer of
manufactured commodities and even non-manufactured goods, with an obsolete industry
importing from the West not only equipment and technology but even intermediate and raw-
materials. Secondly, because 'statist socialism' generated or reinforced social groups, for example
the majority of state bureaucracies, who are against socialism, understood as a more egalitarian
society with improved democracy, equal opportunities, a progressively fairer distribution of
wealth and the strategic goal of enabling people to run their own lives and to participate in the
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exercise of any kind of power. Finally because the authoritarianism underlying statist socialism
alienated from the very process of development the social groups without whom no country may
attempt to break the vicious circle of underdevelopment.
From the analysis of the implementation of the centralised economy in Angola, we may
conclude that the inadequacy of Angola's central command system to the country's social and
economic realities reinforced the 'magic' character of already magic relationships.' This meant that
instead of the modernity, improved rationality and industrial democracy which the planning
system aimed to achieve, uncertainty and alternative use in fact led to the shaping of new social
groups holding economic power and achieving the most private interests. Dependency within the
global framework of international economic relations, also led to failures of the statisation of
means of production and thus of attempts to control the commanding heights of the economy
through nationalisation and planning. Indeed, the impact of the sets of contracts entered into by
Angolan firms on state property rights led to a progressive fragmentation of these rights into
powers which were increasingly transferred to foreign partners, not withstanding (the contrary
aims of) the legal framework. The state's response to this failure of its attempts of effective
control was progressive centralisation of decision-making as its powers as owner escaped.
The distributive goals of the system (especially through planning of fixed wages and
prices) failed, as state provision could not meet, due to reasons dealt with in the course of this
work, demand for the most essential goods and services. The responses of the population to this
failure had important social consequences. Firstly, the emergence and stratification of a (national)
trading strata holding economic power, partially grounded in its connections with the state and
nationalised enterprises. This group successfully appropriated part of the oil surplus (through the
mechanism of appropriation of products and services of PEs sold at fixed prices or plainly
embezzled, and financed by the NB revenues), extorted the surpluses of peasants (with no access
to some kinds of goods and no possibility to market their products), and also the incomes of the
remaining waged/salaried labour. Thus, except for top officials and foreign enterprise, the other
1 . See Introduction, section D.
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social groups became progressively integrated within the informal economy in a position of
subordination to the emergent lumpen bourgeoisie' of trading capital.
Increased poverty, failure of promises, and also the attempts of transformation of
economic and social relations, led not only to conflict within peasant societies but to tensions
between the first and second peripheries, reflected by the adhesion of peasants to movements
waging wars and/or leading protest against the first periphery. Violence has been a constant in
peasants struggles against the state, encouraged by foreign support to the parties involved. The
wars which opposed the first and the second peripheries generated reformism of the colonial and
the post-colonial states. In this interaction between the first and second peripheries the socio-
political group of agrarians, given their connections with traditional power structures, always
played a mediatory role in the outcomes of the conflict. Due to this, they have been the social
group whose demands the state tried to satisfy during the reformist phase, at the same time as the
demands of the real centre, for example land for plantation agribusinesses were, except for the
short statist period, also satisfied. Reformism meant, nevertheless, reallocations of land at the
expense of poor peasants (who were expropriated of their lands) and the disruption of peasant
societies leading to the creation of a reserve of labour. The main emphasis of reformism has been
to reshape exchange relations, either to give incentive to farmers/herders or to lower prices of
fanning products in the exports economy and for consumers of the first periphery. The alliance of
the state with the farmer/trader strata impacts the political process since this group, although used
to populism, does not carry democratic conceptions and practices.
As happened in the strictly political area, the economy of the 80s saw the dominance of
agrarians associated to state bureaucracies, while the state constituted the necessary passage for
any social group aiming to move to upwards positions. In this passage, the socialist option was
particularly functional, since its hierarchical organisation, concentration of resources and access to
funding created the possibilities for access to resources with no need for substantial accumulation
or significant transaction costs. 2 Attempts of planning bureaucracies to apply instruments
2
. Except for the costs of illegality, which usually did not reach the largest traders, that is, these with the 'right connections'.
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borrowed from central command economies simply did not work as the informal economy
progressively invaded all the spheres related to the supply to consumers and as the goods and
services supplied by the state proportionally decreased, under the impact of austerity measures
and widespread theft. The central command economy died a natural death when the balance of
power between the two apparently competing sectors decidedly fell to the side of the informal
economy, a part of which was enabled to reshape its relationship with the state in a less direct
way, through the purchase of privatised state undertakings and reliance on state provisions for
access to soft loans, import quotas and inputs.
The reform adopted in 1985 proposed to liberate the productive forces. Indeed, it lifted
the restrictions to the expansion of national and foreign capital. Still, the privatisation
implemented in the late 80s reflected more a change in the form of the relations between
economic agents and the state than significant changes in the content of these relations. Indeed,
the dominance of the informal economy and the widespread presence of private firms within PEs
(under TACs and/or the international joint-ventures) demonstrate the privatised character of
relationships which covertly operated under the central command institutional framework.
Thus the formal economic system as established by economic law (maxime the economic
constitution and legislation concretising it) given its high degree of negative real efficacy, did not
appear at the level of law of the actual economic system in the 80s. Progressively, law lost its
connection to reality, a non-correspondence which was reinforced by the expansion of the
informal economy (including the working of the foreign enclave) together with informal
allocations of power and the spreading of informal law (for example, party decisions enforced by
the control of repressive apparatuses). The actual economic system when the (political and
economic) structural adjustment demanded the (formal) repeal of the socialist option was neither
socialist nor in transition to socialism. It was in fact a form of dependent state monopoly
capitalism coexisting with small mercantile and subsistence production. So the reforms and the
IMF package in fact implemented a change in the form of the actual system, while at the level of
law apparently this was a change in the system.
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The initial reform tried to save the socialist option by adapting the legal model to the
reality, rationalising the working of a potentially socialist system. The convergence of reformist
ideology, demands from the agrarian/trader strata and international agency destroyed this
possibility and promoted, at the legal level, the conditions for the reinforcement of the capitalist
(and dependent) character of the system: it was thus a change in the form. Nevertheless, this
change in the form impacts the relative boundaries between economic sectors and the retreat of
the state may mean patterns of integration in the world economy preventing any hope for
autonomous developments, or even for development itself.
2. The post-colonial state
The functions of the state3 of the first periphery as a mediator, on one hand both of the
relations between the first periphery and the centre as well as the second peripheries, and on the
other hand between the centre and the second peripheries caused: i. permanent interventionism, ii.
policy failures, iii. organisational failures pairing with enlargement of apparatuses, and iv. violent
responses from all the parties involved. These have been constants of both the colonial and the
post-colonial states.
The complexity of the linkages within the global system, and the supplementary role of the
state of the first periphery would make it difficult for any state to manage these linkages. But its
difficulties are reinforced by the centre imposing institutions, policies and organisational solutions
which do not fuse with the needs of social control of the first periphery and the second
peripheries, as well as with the management of tensions within the spaces which constitute its area
of action. That is, transplants of models, motivated not only by supraordinating needs of the
centre but also by attempts to save in transaction costs within the global system meant a
permanent inadequacy of the inputs and outputs of the state of the first periphery. 4
 The
organisational inadequacy is reflected in the size of its apparatuses, their incapability to perform
3. Approached as a set of relations and a process of articulation.
4. On inputs and outputs of developed states, see Therborn, 1980; the costs of ruling the system (here transaction costs) are minimized by the centre
when imposing uniform solutions (e.g. the IMF package) to standardize the system; the peripheries bear part of these costs; for example, costs of
communication with the peripheries having to adapt themselves to the centre means (including discourses), costs of ineffectiveness of standardised
solutions, etc.
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their functions and their changing character. 5 A concrete example is Angola: i. a transplanted
model of central command economy aiming to face the hollow of the massive flight of settlers (a
linkage with the centre), ii. the internalisation at the level of state apparatuses of the middlemen of
the second peripheries (agrarians) to manage the relations with these peripheries, iii. the two first
factors generated tensions within the state apparatuses reinforcing the state inability to perform its
different functions, especially those related to administration of resources, iv. additional
disjunctures arose from the impact of these factors in the linkages with the centre (the area of
international economic relations), leading to progressive loss of control of these linkages (for
example, the fragmentation of property rights arising from contractual regulation, etc.).
The weaknesses of the post-colonial state also derived from the fact that in the Angolan
process it controlled sources of accumulation and surpluses and was thus a necessary step of non-
owners to control and divert resources and become owners. The clientelism of indigenous groups
on the state (and) party in power, including the informal economy, transformed the state
apparatuses into a terrain of direct social struggles over resources 6 while simultaneously this state
was attempting to implement a project of rupture which meant its direct struggle with the centre.
The state was acting in different levels of the linkages of the global system: i. with the centre
(boycotts), destruction, ii. with neighbouring first peripheries (wars), and iii. with fractions of the
domestic second peripheries (UNITA war and destruction). That is, the post-colonial state had to
manage the linkages allocated to it, to face the tensions within the first and second peripheries
(struggles for access to resources) and face as well the tensions created by the centre to ensure
the stabilisation of the regional and global systems.
To perform these overwhelming tasks the post-colonial state has no funds, cadres and
information available at the centre. Resort to the centre to supply these resources means
reinforcement of inadequacy and disjunctures. For example, in the relationships with the second
peripheries which keep imbalanced degrees of development the post-colonial state has to cope
5.That is, the changing attitudes of UDCs bureaucracies towards the different components of the global system is partially motivated by their failures
to cope with their own organisational problems.
6.That is not politically mediated by political parties, organs such as parliament and the govenunent, etc.
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simultaneously with their fragmentation (small units), the fact that they do not need and are not
interested in much state interference (as Hyden points out) 7 and the demands of the centre of
subordination of peasants to create additional surpluses and increase available goods.
The accumulation of failures by the post-colonial state leads to legitimacy crisis of ruling
groups (and hence the 'political instability). But an additional outcome is the loss of self-
confidence and also 'external' and internal 'reliability' of the first periphery either to promote and
manage change or to perform its functions within the global system. This legitimates the transfer
of decision-making to apparatuses of the centre specialised in the subordination of the first
periphery (e.g., the INIFIWB network), with progressive centralisation within the global system.
The overall conclusions on the project of change from above of the post-colonial state are:
i. given its functions within the global system, the post-colonial state will always be caught
between contradictory functions, "contending formations" and inadequacies, ii. the assumption of
models and even referential frameworks from the centre, necessary in the relations with the
centre, will reinforce the tensions the post-colonial state has to face and also dysfunctionalities
and negative functions, and are a trap pushing towards increased subordinated roles of the first
peripheries and centralisation within the global system, iii. attempts of radical change either
related to the locations within the system and/or to a reshaping of relationships within the space of
the first and second peripheries contrary to the centre's interests, that is 'non conforming
behaviour', are punished by resort to direct coercion (war, civil or regional), iv. the outcomes of
the latter are always ruinous for UDCs (economically, by the impact in the project of change and
by the reinforcement of the centre's authority).
Thus the project of autonomous change, which is autonomous within pre-established
boundaries, has to move into at least two assumed contradictory directions: i. managing the
relations with the centre and demanded by the centre, ii. centering in the logic, and strengths, and
7
. On the autonomy of peasants fomiations, their resistance to loss of their economic indepaidence and dianges in their environrnent, as well as these
societies as a 'contending mode of production', see Hyden, 1987.
364
Conclusion
actual relationships, internal to the peripheries. This calls for different organisational forms,
technologies of transformation and also different apparatuses of the state.
3. The efficacy of law
This work aimed to inquire into the functions performed by economic law in the post-
colonial period in Angola. An ambitious project of social change was supposed to be implemented
by the promotional state which relied on legal regulation of the nationalised sector to achieve the
control of economic and social processes leading to socialist development. The assessment of the
real efficacy of Angolan economic law, especially the set of norms implementing the central
command economy raises a number of issues which are discussed below.
Social feedback and negative efficacy
It seems clear that the post-colonial economic law resulted from the incorporation into law
of the demands of the 1974-75 social movements which reinforced the 'socialise component of the
ruling party generated in the independence war and related experiences in liberated zones. In
addition, the mode of articulation of the formal relationships within the socialist model followed
narrowly the outcomes of the political process and related progressive defeat and marginalisation
of the popular components: as grassroots forms of organisation and participation were
progressively repressed or emptied of content, centralised and individual decision-making
substituted for the collective and decentralised schemes adopted in the early years of
independence. This meant in fact that real efficacy became progressively more problematic until a
point was reached where dysfunctions transformed into negative functions (that is, for example,
the planning system itself generated and reproduced the forces against the socialist option).
The negative functions of economic law related prima facie to the social feedback to
legal regimes. As the socialist goals of more egalitarian distribution, coupled with the centralised
goals of achieving this distribution through the state, barred the expectations and the satisfaction
of needs of social groups such as the trader/agrarian strata, these groups successfully appropriated
the promotional state and were able to control processes of reproduction in the sense more
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adequate to their interests than the socialist option. In a central command economy, the control of
the state is crucial to the control of resource allocation and flows. Playing with the failures of the
providential state to satisfy demands and locating themselves at the level of bureaucracies and the
informal economy, the agrarian/trader strata made an alternative use of administrative planning
and negatively conditioned the performance of the law's allocative function and the direct
allocations made through the instructions mechanism. Also, emphasising state's omissions, the
agrarian trade/strata enabled some social groups to satisfy their needs in the consumer
goods/services area at the expense of others, to which a specific role was allocated by law within
the socialist option. This is the case, for example, of the cooperatives v. small farmers
competition.
The social feedback from other social groups acting outside the state was also important.
The working class guise underlying the socialist option, either through declared goals, working
class elites participation in decision-making or even the very control of management at
enterprises, acted as a negative limit for the control of the state, and its outcomes, by the
agrarian/trader strata. This negative limit, from a given point of expansion of the informal
economy, became a barrier to the development of this social group, and to the transformation of
its most advanced components from small mercantile production into capitalist production. When
this point was reached, the agrarian/trader strata moved from alternative use to demanding
reforms which coincided in may points with the goals of the structural adjustment demanded by
the centre.
The intentions of law-makers, widely propagated under the legitimation functions of
economic law reinforced by the need to satisfy demands as revealed by the different components
of the MPLA coalition, created expectations which actually could not be met. The social feedback
to deception from the poorest segments of society also contributed to the negative functions of
Jaw: these social groups self-organised to survive and integrated themselves into the informal
economy, feeding the process of accumulation reproduced there.
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Interrelations within the legal order and negative functions
The changes in existing (at independence) social relations demanded by the socialist model
had, from the stand-point of the legal system, an error in premises. Social change induced by the
promotional state demands a careful balance between repression and encouragement, between
commands de fare' and commands de non fare, and between the related positive and negative
sanctions. Moreover, the transformation of social relations by law is the area precisely calling for
an emphasis in enabling and encouraging commands guaranteed by positive sanctions (Bobbio,
1977). When we look to the areas of the Angolan legal system dealing with social change, the
emphasis goes to commands of non fare and negative sanctions. Furthermore, as the economic
situation deteriorated, conflict soared, and MPLA lost part of its social base, the repressive
character of the legal order increased, commands of non fare spread and even informal negative
sanctions were applied. This reflected: i. the defensive character of apparently offensive processes,
eventually offensive in a given initial stage and defensive from a given point of external aggression
and internal constraints, ii. the impact of the Portuguese legal system which, under different
background and circumstances, was not capable of achieving its promotional functions and relied
on repressive commands and negative sanctions to condition the behaviour of Angolans, while
reserving the positive sanctions to settlers and foreign capital, iii. the agrarian approaches to the
relationship between rulers and ruled, and, iv. the transplant of legal solutions arising from
experiences of statist socialism. So, in the promotional Angolan legal system, aiming to regulate
processes of change and development, the structure of norms was in contradiction with the
functions: instead of encouraging initiative and desired behaviour, the mobilisation of resources
was discouraged, instead of making performance easy it made it difficult and even impossible.
This contradiction within the legal system and within a given branch of law had an impact on the
degree of efficacy. Contrasting different legal regimes, the emphasis in negative or positive
sanctions is also important to the attainment of efficacy concerning the definition of the different
recipients of legal commands as privileged, or as favoured under positive discrimination. For
8 . Commands of fare demand an action, refer to doing something. They have a special importance in economic law, relating. e.g., to obligations to
draft plans and produce reports, take measures to implement projects and programmes, to invest in selected areas, etc. See, e.g. Bobbio, 1977, and
Criannini, 1977.
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example, the commands offare to Angolan PEs, managers and workers were mainly guaranteed
by negative sanctions, not to speak on the informal scape-goating schemes. The commands of
fare to foreign firms were guaranteed by positive sanctions, for example different incentives.
Faced with the same or similar command, foreign firms would be in a better position (encouraged)
to performance which would bring about rewards than PEs to whom performance, whatever its
costs would not bring any positive consequence.
The socialist option implied also empowering privileged economic agents to perform their
social tasks. When we look at the different legal regimes for economic agents, it is evident that
law did not allocate them powers to regulate freely micro relations through all kinds of
agreements, to which they actually were more able to enter since this regulation related to their
more direct interests and acting in the 'field', they possessed better information on the issues at
stake. Instead, legislation on administrative planning withdrew powers from PEs to regulate
relations involving them while, simultaneously, allocating these powers to, in some cases, distant
bureaucracies which, given information constraints, were not capable of regulating those relations
in a more adequate way. Conversely, once again, in foreign enterprise legislation a strong
emphasis was put in contractual regulation which meant the allocation of powers to involved
parties to choose the solutions more adequate to their interests. These differential regimes, which
added to the non-regulated informal economy, led to a lower status of PEs and to dysfunctions of
legislation regulating the boundaries and related balance of power of the different economic
sectors, reflected in the progressive expansion of international contracting, even when local
resources were available.
As referred to above, PEs and co-operatives were privileged economic agents under the
socialist option. When their legal regimes are contrasted with those of private and foreign firms,
the immense hierarchy established by the system of administrative planning, of which PEs were at
the bottom, has significant consequences for the real efficacy of constitutional directives: i. their
transactions, given the complicated authorisations regime, became too costly, especially in the
area of purchase of inputs, ii. their sales became non-rewarding, since they had the burden to
apply the fixed prices legislation which they could not discuss, iii. in competition with the
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private/foreign sectors, and supposed to become the dominant sector in the economy, they were
instead barred access to decision-making and contractual regulation, which meant shortage of all
kinds of inputs, including relevant information for managerial and technical decision-making. This
implied that the privileged sectors could not satisfy needs, while their competitors have been
capable of performing their social functions. As a consequence the boundaries between the
economic sectors in fact changed but with the progressive retreat of PEs and co-operatives from
the market and the related expansion of the other sectors.
One of the areas where this expansion was significant was the association of PEs to
foreign firms to ensure the supply of inputs. Foreign firms made an alternative use of the planned
system, by using the shortages economy and lower bargaining power of PEs towards state
bureaucracies and foreign partners as a mean of selling goods and services and choose the
contractual forms (governance structure for relations) more adequate to the host country
conditions. Thus, formerly deregulated TACs were the form usually adopted, except in the area of
natural resources and related activities where joint-ventures linked to foreign investment provided
for long-term contracting, aiming at the maintenance of related activities, necessary to the regular
supply of raw materials to industries of developed countries or NICs, to save in the transaction
costs of negotiating contracts under the complicated system of authorisations, and to bargain,
grounded on superiority of resources, financial and information, the more adequate contractual
relationships. These differential regimes impacted thus the efficacy of the promotional norms as
they led to the reinforcement of dependence instead of the progressive development of the
country.
Also, as stated above, these developments had as a consequence the progressive
fragmentation of property rights of the state in its entrepreneurial ventures, which mainly resulted
from two factors. Firstly, its progressive loss of control over the input (the essential international)
side of the activities of Angolan firms, given the increasing dependence of Angolan firms on the
supply of all kinds of imported goods and services. Secondly, the simultaneous loss of control
over the output (internationalised or otherwise) side since if the external marketing was not
properly supervised in exports, in firms selling to the internal market the production was deviated
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from the plan allocation by smuggling to the informal economy. In fact, PEs and mixed enterprises
had a more or less intensive degree of privatisation arising from the contractual arrangements
reached in response to the problems of financing and supply of material or non-material inputs
within a given legal framework. The contractual arrangements resulted not only from all the
factors preventing effective control in an UDC9 but also from the legal framework which
conditioned the institutional arrangements adopted by the involved parties, including PEs, and the
working of these arrangements (such as in the case of the 'technical assistance' contracts). Law
was thus influenced in its content either by the feedback of contractual design impacting new legal
solutions (e.g., the Capanda regime) or in its efficacy, as contracts provided for an institutional
frame regulating significant relations and establishing borders to property rights (of the state, say
in natural resources).
The conclusions arising from the impact of international relations in economic legislation
regarding supposed internal relations are: i. there are no strict boundaries, in dependent countries
at least, between the national and the international economies which means that the regulation of
strictly domestic relations will be impacted by the mode of organisation of relations at a world
level, ii. consequently, the design of institutional alternatives needs a scope larger than the narrow
allocations of economic power which take into consideration only the interests of national groups
or national linkages, iii. the integration of an UDC in the world economy continues under
changing forms and according to the strategies of the centre, whatever the attempts of domestic
governments to put a brake on it, iv. thus the problem is how each country integrates in the world
economy, in what conditions and at what costs, and not whether or not it will integrate in a more
or less remote future, v. still, strategies of development, including adaptative institutional design,
may contribute to improve the conditions on which this integration is processed and to increase
the bargaining power of involved domestic economic agents.1°
9. See. e.g., Asante and Stockmayer, 1982, referring to minerals contracts.
10. see, e.g., Ghai and Choong on management contracts by the UDCs PEs (1988: 22-3).
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In the interrelations within the legal order, the standards of rights enjoyed by citizens and
firms also impacted on the real efficacy of the economic law promotional norms. An evident area
is the production of information and knowledge, from which both were estranged given the
related legal regimes. This meant that the production by the country of an essential input for all
productive processes was prevented and meant the allocation of scarce foreign exchange
resources for purchase abroad, reinforcing shortages and dependence. Also, at the institutional
level, this had as a consequence the progressive expansion of all kinds of foreign consultancies
aiming at social engineering which, among other aspects, contributed to achieve non-national
goals of 'standardisation' of societies aiming at savings in costs of information and negotiation for
the centre's capital penetration in UDCs, together with high social and information costs to the
host country.
When we look at the real efficacy of the post-colonial economic law as widely negative, it
does not mean that law did not perform alternative functions of a positive nature to the objectives
of some social groups. Indeed, as referred to above, some groups (e.g., agrarians and reformists)
saw their historic expectations satisfied under administrative planning and the socialist option.
Law and change
From what has been said above, we may conclude that the promotion of change through
legal solutions regulating relations in a given prospective direction faces a set of limits. Firstly,
those which arise from the class structure of society. Colonialism, and the counter ideologies it
produced, veiled this class structure as the overwhelming majority of Angolans appeared at
independence as non-owners of means of production. However, some of them owned knowledge
(a productive force) which enabled them to control political and military apparatuses, pre-state
structures and some had also free access to land, within the boundaries of traditional territories.
The owners of these resources had interests which can be found in their past and in the historical
processes which led to their non-ownership. The control of the state, and through it, the control
of natural resources and nationalised firms, was a necessary path to enable access to means of
production. This access meant the attainment of (past) goals which were conditioned by
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education/experience acquired ideology (that is, the system of ideas-social representations and
attitudes and behaviours), where non-ownership meant radicalism in relation to means (the armed
struggle, the socialist option) but not in contents (democratisation of society). When in power, a
substantial part of non-owners had as a reference their former social class (e.g., landowners) and
not their actual social class (e.g., Leninist party bureaucrats). This 'disjuncture' led to the fact that
the very law makers were against the laws they enacted, and through a system of successive links
penetrated into the civil society by informal modes of coordination which contributed to the
failure of the adopted model of change.
Secondly, the relative position of the country in the world system and the attitudes of the
world elites towards the peripheries attempts of change. The wars waged against PRA are an
evident example that it is possible to play on poverty and dependence to condition the direction of
change in a given peripheral country by reducing the people of a potentially rich country to
starvation. In the Angolan case, the possibilities of manipulation by foreign powers were
reinforced by the physical proximity of RSA sub-imperialism. In addition, the centralised and
authoritarian model of socialism adopted, wasted the full use of the country's resources, especially
the knowledge and energy of its men and women. Also, the centralised model was not adequate to
the country's class structure, dimension, societal diversity and possibility to cope with hierarchical
and centralised management and processes from above.
Thirdly, the relationship between the allocation of resources by law, which includes the
definition of preferential sectors, and the application of law, from the holder of the resource to the
beneficiary, is a path which implies in economic law different mediations by various bureaucracies,
depending on the way the relationships between different social groups are shaped. The
importance of kin loyalties, for example, in the behaviour of state bureaucracies when applying
law and/or executing directives, plays a significant role in the effectiveness and thus in efficacy.
Lastly, the internal relationships of the legal system condition the effectiveness of law
across branches, including its negative functions.
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4. Overall conclusion: the world system, continuity and rupture
The development of the Angolan society, and the different projects it produced, has been
conditioned, in a more or less direct mode, by factors related to international restructurings and
new functions within the system. The international changes forced Angolan societies to go
through successive restructurings. Examples are the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade
(restructuring), changes in markets for export commodities (e.g., rubber trade, restructuring
international markets forcing restructuring of peripheries), lower prices of export commodities
(e.g., coffee and oil, leading to slight changes in the instituted system), wars and financing of
wars, change of system (independence) and new international division of labour and regional
roles. The impact of developments in the world system led to economic crisis which had constant
patterns: revolts of the second peripheries (linked or otherwise to the first periphery), wars, slight
changes in the system but always in conjunction with external variables which create the
conditions for failure in the next stage. Wars, usually a response of the second periphery to the
economic crisis and forced restructuring, promoted and manipulated by the international powers
in the post-colonial period, caused statisation, increased role of state bureaucracies and military
apparatuses, combined with allocation of resources to defence and simultaneous maintenance of
extortion of surplus under unequal exchange.
As a conclusion we may say that the formation of present Angolan social groups (as
broadly defined and roughly described in this work) proceeded under the determination of the
development and changes of the global system, but with a relative autonomy conditioned by the
specificities of components (e.g., Portuguese colonial power), related specific modes of
articulation (e.g., systematic resort to direct coercion in the impossibility to ensure social control
by other forms) and as well by the specific responses given by Angolan formations along their
history to the problems they had to face as a result of their insertion in the global system. The
relative autonomy of peripheries means a feedback action which conditions the developments at
the centre, especially the modes of articulation within the hierarchy of the global system. Also, as
the peripheries defend a way of life conflicting with centre's interests (especially the second
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peripheries and excluding comprador and co-opted social strata), the relative autonomy of the
formations in the bottom of the global system creates a space for 'people' to be (or to become) a
source of dysfunctionalities (in the working of the system) and tensions pressing towards change
either in relative locations in the hierarchy or in the modes of articulation. The outcomes of the
process will depend on the internal struggles and dynamics within the peripheries and 'mediators'
in the different linkages (e.g., bureaucracies) will play a significant role in these outcomes.
The changing forms of the process of integration in the global system, leads to connected
transformations in the roles of the state, converting it to a mediator of the shaping of the
relationships demanded by the centre's expansion. In the course of this work there was an attempt
to demonstrate that these processes meant a reshaping of social relationships in the concerned
societies with an increasingly more complex hierarchy (more linkages and more mediations). The
more complex hierarchy meant the progressive estrangement of the initial basic components of
colonised societies (the independent kingdoms subjects of the first contacts) from the centre to the
bottom of a system (the present subsistence economy). In Angola the tensions generated within
the system and in the processes were resolved after violent responses of the bottom to changes in
its location within the system and roles in the processes.
One of the roles of the first periphery is to manage and face the tensions with and the
responses from the bottom of the system. Given the characteristics of Portuguese colonialism, the
state (of the first periphery) always had to assume an active role in this management, and hence
the constant of interventionism." Also, as the society of the first periphery is not homogeneous
and has the peripheral quality, the very first periphery identified and associated with the second
peripheries in responses and struggles. This created fractures within the first periphery and
seriously damaged the performance of its functions of stabilisation within the global system. When
the confrontation between the first and second peripheries reached a given degree, reinforced by
the overlapping of alliances between components of both levels, endangering the balance of power
within the system, the colonial state of the first periphery resorted to the centre to act directly as a
1 1 . In this sense but in other approach, Saul; 1987: 241.
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stabiliser of the tensions in the bottom of the system, for example by capital inflow and supply of
weaponry. The direct intervention of the centre always meant, at the economic level, a
restructuring of the peripheries, a reformism which, still, reached essentially the very first
periphery.
Independence and the MPLA socialist project meant the withdrawal from its location
within the system of both the first and the tributary second peripheries, with whom this first
periphery also tried a re-articulation of relations, and attempts to create spaces (alternatives)
within the system. 12 Given the specific location of this first periphery and its proximity and
linkages with the centre (e.g., as supplier of strategic mineral resources), added to the dangers of
spreading of tensions along the region and thus to the reinforcement of tensions within the global
system, the centre intervened directly (e.g., mercenaries and supply of weapons to conflicting and
manageable second peripheries) or indirectly, using RSA to act as a substitute of the former
colonial state in its role of stabiliser of the tensions. That is, within the system, the rebellion of the
first periphery is more dangerous to the system as a whole than that of second peripheries, due to:
i. the role of the first peripheries in managing the tensions and controlling multiple second
peripheries, and, ii. the proximity (given its mediatory role) of the first periphery to the centre.
The entry of a regional first periphery as a substitute for the former colonial power had,
nevertheless, a destabilising impact not only within the Angolan components of the system but on
the regional components (e.g., Namibia, and the very RSA). However, it had a global stabilising
impact, after a restructuring which would correct the (new) tensions generated by the involvement
of two regional first peripheries in an armed conflict where second peripheries re-aligned in a
transborder association with related first peripheries.
But the late colonial war meant also the reinforcement of fractures between the first and
second Angolan peripheries which led the post-colonial state to a progressive retraction towards
its pre-defined location within the hierarchy of the global system. The direct intervention of the
12 . The 'location' and 'spaces' struggles refer to the distribution and redistribution of surpluses within the world system, appropriated by the centre
(Wallerstein, e.g., 1991: 18-19) and to attempts of peripheries to guarantee their own expansion within the system, braked by the centre's hegemony
(some NICs, for example, try create spaces for their own evansion in the world system, generating and/or reinforcing tensions within the system).
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centre in the process (actually due to dangers in the regional balance of power the late colonial
war and realignment of peripheries caused) meant the restructuring of involved first peripheries,
meaning reformism and capital inflow, pairing with the reintegration of the second peripheries in
their previous location. In the Angolan case, direct intervention in the 90s not only used financial
institutions and economic machinery, but also resorted to direct engineering of political
institutions (such as a part of the 1990s reforms), which aimed, among other things, to impose
representatives of sections of the second periphery (UNITA) to share power in the first periphery.
These developments, signal attempts of the centre to delegitimate the state of the first periphery,"
especially nationalist governments, 14 and simultaneously to build links with the second peripheries
by imposing their self-appointed representatives in central government.
The process of change in peripheral societies, either promoted by the state or by
indigenous social groups, moves thus along global as well as domestic boundaries which may be
called objective limits. The presence of global objective limits challenges the conceptions of
change, which usually take into account only the internal boundaries of a given class structured
national society. The global objective limits have a double-edged impact in change: they are
barriers to the development of autonomous change but simultaneously their very existence acts as
a propelling force to change (e.g., poverty as a structural element and conjunctural factors such as
the fall of coffee and cotton prices in 1960 reinforced the discontent which led to the 1961
rebellions).
Putting it differently, underdeveloped countries, given their dependent economic structure,
have very little room for manoeuvre to make their own strategic choices. The country's capacity
to respond effectively to imperialist dicta lies in its people but also in the hegemonic political
forces at a given moment, which do not last forever. When the process of radical social change is
undertaken by liberation movements which have been fighting for political independence, the
achievement of programmes of radical change becomes more problematic since these movements
13. As argued by Beckman, 1991: 2, 9-11.
14. On the approaches to nationalist governments of the Third World in the new international order, see, e.g., Chomsky, 1991.
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carry within themselves part of the indigenous social forces favourable of neocolonial solutions. It
seems that we may say now that, with extremely high social costs in the process of learning,
African peoples are entering into a clearer and more defined phase of political development where
international intervention and post-colonial rhetoric is no more an alibi for authoritarian and
neocolonial rule by the country's traditional elites who had led the struggle for independence. This
is, nevertheless, an outcome of independence itself.
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